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ABSTRACT 
 
ACCOUNTNG FOR ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN FINANCING 
MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY 
USING DATA FROM THE CAPE WINELANDS DISTRICT 
MUNICIPALITY 
  
M. J. Josie (Student Number 2658061) 
PhD thesis, School of Government, University of the Western Cape. 
 
In this thesis I argue that by taking account of economic disparities and 
backlogs in intergovernmental infrastructure grants to municipalities in 
South Africa, government will effectively meet its constitutional obligation 
to equitably allocate infrastructure grants to local government according to 
the principles of parity, proportionality and priority (Young, 1994). 
Municipalities will thus be able to provide basic services to households in 
keeping with the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa (1996). 
Adapting the Petchey et al (2004) provincial capital expenditure grant 
model to the provision of municipal services using secondary data and 
information from local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District, I 
evaluate whether government’s existing municipal grants are allocated 
equitably and, whether they account for disparities that differentiate 
municipalities from each other.  
 
The findings from my analysis show that the current approach to financing 
municipal infrastructure does not sufficiently account for disparities and 
thus, undermines the requirement for equitability, adequacy and efficiency 
of intergovernmental allocations. Consequently, the right of citizens to basic 
municipal services is compromised and the macroeconomic structure is 
weakened. Furthermore the institutional arrangements for local government 
autonomy is undermined because municipalities cannot ensure stability, 
predictability, flexibility and economic efficiency of infrastructure budgets.  
 
As municipalities receive part of their finance from national government 
through infrastructure grants, I used data from five local municipalities to 
examine the extent to which there is equitability and efficiency in the way 
this finance is allocated. To this end I constructed and applied a composite 
disparity index for each municipality to my adapted municipal infrastructure 
grant model to analyze and observe the impact of economic disparities in 
grant allocations. The findings show that a grant model that accounts for 
economic disparities satisfies the constitutional, economic and institutional 
considerations that should inform municipal grant allocation decisions. I 
conclude the thesis by highlighting the limitations and possibilities of using 
a municipal infrastructure grant model that accounts for economic 
disparities and, I propose some recommendations for applying such a model 
in South Africa.  
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… in South Africa there is such an ill distribution of  wealth that any form of 
political freedom which does not touch on the proper distribution of wealth will 
be meaningless. … So for meaningful change to appear there needs to be an 
attempt at reorganizing the whole economic pattern and economic policies … 
Steve Biko, 1977  
 
… as long as poverty, injustice and gross inequality persist in our world, none of 
us can truly rest. Nelson Mandela, (2005 speech, Make Poverty History) 
 
Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit 
of the law…Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislation and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination may be taken. The Bill of Rights, (Constitution of South 
Africa, 1996, Section 9 clauses 1 and 2  
 
An Act of Parliament must provide for the equitable division of revenue raised 
nationally among the national, provincial and local spheres of government…and 
any other allocations to provinces, local government or municipalities from the 
national government’s share of that revenue, and any conditions on which those 
allocations may be made. The Act… must take into account: the need to ensure 
that the provinces and municipalities are able to provide basic services and 
perform the functions allocated to them; the fiscal capacity and efficiency of the 
provinces and municipalities; developmental and other needs of provinces, local 
government and municipalities; economic disparities among and within the 
provinces; … the desirability of stable and predictable allocations of revenue 
shares; and the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies or other 
temporary needs, and other factors based on similar objective criteria. The 
Constitution of South Africa, [Section 214 (1) and (2)]. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction1 
The purpose of the research for this thesis was to study the implications of taking 
account of socio-economic capital cost disparities and historical capital backlogs 
in infrastructure grant transfers to municipalities with communities historically 
disadvantaged by apartheid2 in South Africa.  
The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution (Chapter 2, 1996) prescribes 
that the state must provide certain socio-economic rights to all citizens. The 
provision of certain of these rights falls within the ambit of municipal 
responsibility for sanitation and water. Among others these rights include an 
environment that is not harmful to health and wellbeing; access to adequate 
housing and basic shelter, access to health care services and, sufficient food. The 
Constitution also enjoins government at the national, provincial and municipal 
spheres to take reasonable legislative and other measures within available 
resources to achieve the progressive realization of these rights.  
The Constitution, in Chapter 13, prescribes a set of guidelines for reasonable 
legislative and other measures to be taken within available financial resources. 
The principles for legislative and other measures are based on important clauses in 
the Preamble and Founding Provisions of the Constitution.  
The Preamble principles (The Constitution, 1996: 1) for deciding on legislative 
and other measures for determining available resources include the recognition of 
“the injustices of the past”; healing “the divisions of the past and establish(ing) a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
                                                
1  All definitions and explanations of terms are presented in footnotes. Quotations in this thesis are in italics 
with quotation marks when part of the text and, larger quotations are indented in italics without quotation 
marks.  
2 Apartheid was the official state policy in pre - 1994 South Africa and was characterized by the systematic 
political, economic, social and judicial oppression and discrimination of the black (African, Coloured and 
Indian) majority by a government representing a white minority. It has its genesis in the history of European 
colonialism and the subsequent discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa. (See Lundhal and Ndlela, 
1980, Marks and Rathbone, 1982; Crankshaw, 1997, Terreblanche, 2002, Feinstein, 2005, Seeking and 
Natrass 2006) 
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rights”; and, improving “the quality of life of all citizens and free(ing) the 
potential of each person”.  
The Founding Provisions (Ibid: 3) suggest that legislative and other measures for 
determining available resources should include such values as “Human dignity, 
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms” 
and, equal entitlement to “the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship”. The 
notion of equal entitlement is further bolstered in the Bill of Rights (Ibid: 7) 
where equality is meant to include “the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms” and, where the state is required to “promote the achievement of 
equality” through “legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination” of past 
apartheid policies.       
According to Chapter 13 (Ibid: 124-125) all three spheres of government are 
expected to finance the progressive realization of basic services from available 
financial resources generated by own tax revenues and, equitable shares of 
nationally collected revenue transferred to provinces and municipalities by 
National Government through the legislative instruments of the national budget 
(Annual Division of Revenue Act) and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 
(1996). Chapter 13 also stipulates that before the division of revenue bill is 
enacted it must take account of a list of public finance considerations [Ibid, 
Section 214 (2) a-j: 125]. These considerations underpin the priorities, limits and 
constraints for government policy in implementing the principles and values 
written into the Preamble, the Founding Provisions and the Bill of Rights.  
It is clear from the foregoing that all three spheres of government are therefore 
confronted with the constitutional mandate of prioritizing the progressive 
realization of basic services in the face of prescribed limits and, constraints on 
available resources. With limited available own resources poorer municipalities 
with disadvantaged communities are faced with the enormous problem of 
providing the necessary infrastructure to access basic public services. This is 
particularly so if these municipalities are characterized by a range of  
 
 
 
 
  3 
socio-economic disparities and inequalities inherited from the past. Given this 
problem the study for my thesis asked: 
How can municipal infrastructure grants take account of historical backlogs 
and disparities that differentiate municipalities from each other?  
To address this question and, following from my preliminary analysis of the 
current situation in which municipalities find themselves, I proposed two 
arguments that guided my empirical research. In the first argument I suggested 
that structure of the existing conditional infrastructure grant formulae does not 
take account of regional capital cost disparities that differentiate municipalities 
from each other in the provision of basic services. This omission compromises the 
right of citizens to basic services as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Furthermore 
the omission compromises the principle of the equitability and efficiency of 
allocations within and between municipalities as required in Section 214(1) (a) to 
(c) and Section 214(2) (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of the Constitution. My second 
argument suggested that national government’s existing project approach to 
financing municipal infrastructure based on the unit costs of inputs is flawed. This 
flawed approach compromises the intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) 
principle of municipal autonomy and, the requirement for stability, predictability 
and flexibility of municipal budgets required by section 214 (2) (i) and (j) of the 
Constitution. 
My arguments raise two secondary questions about the structure of the existing 
conditional grant scheme for allocating nationally collected revenues to local 
municipalities.  The first sub-question is what are the likely impacts on grant 
shares of including cost disparities in an intergovernmental infrastructure grant 
scheme intended to equitably allocate funding to municipalities?  Secondly, can 
equitability, stability, predictability and flexibility of municipal budgets be 
enhanced by the inclusion of cost disparities and economic efficiency 
considerations in a municipal infrastructure grant scheme.  
Given the main question and two sub-questions the ultimate aim of the research 
was to explore and test the possibility of taking account of capital cost disparities 
in an intergovernmental infrastructure grant model for equitably allocating finance 
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to municipalities within the constraints of a limited available pool of funds. To 
achieve this aim I set myself three objectives that also defined my approach to the 
study.  
The first objective of the study was to analytically review the way in which 
municipal infrastructure grants are currently allocated to local municipalities for 
redressing socio-economic disparities, infrastructure backlogs and inequalities in 
historically disadvantaged communities in South Africa. The second objective 
was to examine and evaluate the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) 
Provincial Capital Expenditure Grant Scheme (Petchey et al, 2004) for allocating 
targeted municipal infrastructure grants and to assess whether this approach may 
be appropriate for addressing disparities and inequalities within and between 
municipalities in South Africa. The third objective was to assess the trade-off 
between economic efficiency considerations and the equitability of allocations 
that take account of capital cost disparities within and between municipalities in 
achieving their targets with specific reference to the requirements listed in clauses 
(e), (f) and (g) in Section 214(2) of the Constitution. 
The questions and objectives that informed the study for this thesis presupposed 
an analytical understanding of the political economy structure in which 
infrastructure grants are determined and allocated to municipalities in South 
Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations context. In this sense 
intergovernmental fiscal relations decisions that affect municipalities are 
determined by both macroeconomic and microeconomic structural constraints. 
This is particularly so with respect to the roles, decision-making behaviour and 
linkages of economic agents and institutions within municipal boundaries with 
large communities which have been disadvantaged by apartheid. My approach can 
be defined as structural because it seeks to model the way policy-makers should 
behave and impact upon intergovernmental fiscal relations and institutions in 
allocating infrastructure grants to municipalities. The theoretical and conceptual 
basis of the structural approach is discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2 
of this thesis.  
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The relevance of a structural premise for the thesis is that infrastructure 
investment decisions of local municipalities are influenced by state intervention 
and institutional arrangements in the allocation of resources, income distribution 
and class relationships among households, investment decisions by firms, the 
technology costs of producing a service and, the macroeconomic impacts of debt, 
interest rates, prices and inflation and, foreign trade. In turn the microeconomic 
nature of infrastructure investment decisions by municipalities will have 
significant macroeconomic impacts for employment, income distribution, demand 
for goods and services and, domestic saving and investment opportunities.  
As local municipalities in South Africa receive much of their infrastructure 
investment finance from national government it is important to interrogate the 
extent to which there is equitability and efficiency in the way this finance is 
allocated. Municipalities are faced with varying degrees of historical 
disadvantage, socio-economic inequalities and geo-spatial disparities. They also 
have to deal with past and present institutional arrangements and transaction 
costs, and macroeconomic constraints that impede their ability to finance their 
infrastructure investments. 
Through the process of interviewing government officials and analyzing official 
data from the five local municipalities in the Western Cape Winelands District, 
my study for the thesis evaluated the approaches that maybe adopted for the 
equitable and efficient allocation of existing municipal infrastructure grants such 
that they take into account the cost of structural socio-economic disparities that 
differentiate local municipalities from each other. Appraising the equitable 
sharing models proposed by Petchey, MacDonald, Josie and Nthite (2004), Josie, 
MacDonald and Petchey (2008); Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, Mabugu, Kallis 
(2007) the thesis evaluates the FFC provincial capital grant scheme model 
(Petchey et al, 2004) for application to municipalities with economic disparities 
that differentiate them from each other.  
All three objectives of the thesis will be achieved by using infrastructure data and 
other information from the Cape Winelands District local municipalities to 
examine whether National Government’s municipal infrastructure grants are 
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equitably allocated. Thus, the study examines the notion of equitability in South 
Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations system against government’s 
constitutional obligations to provide certain basic municipal services to all 
citizens (Bill of Rights, Chapter 2 of the Constitution). This obligation falls within 
the notion of socio-economic rights (Liebenberg, 2010; Stytler, N. and De Visser, 
J., 2007; Metha, L., 2005).  
Context And Background  
Over the past five years South African local municipalities have been plagued by 
many protests and demonstrations against local authorities. Municipal IQ, an 
organization that monitors developments at local government level, tracked 
reports of these protests and the findings have been published extensively in the 
South African media. The Business Day newspaper (22 July 2009) reported from 
a Municipal IQ statement that:  
…halfway through the year, 13% of the major service delivery protests 
recorded since 2004 took place last year (2008). It suggests that should the 
trend continue, the number of protests this year (2009) will exceed those of 
2007 and last year and come close to the 2005 peak when 35 protests were 
recorded countrywide.  
The Business Day report indicated that according to Municipal IQ protests related 
to poor public service delivery increased in 2009 with 24 major protests organized 
compared to 27 in the whole of 2008. Allan and Heese of Municipal IQ (Internet 
briefing paper, www.municipaliq.co.za, accessed 17. 11. 2009) on reporting data 
from Municipal IQ’s Hotspots Monitor confirmed that there have been more 
major protests in 2009 (up to October) than any previous period since protests 
started in 2004.  
On the 18 November 2009 The Voice of the Cape (www.vocfm.co.za 18 
November 2009) radio station broadcast a statement from the Municipal IQ Hot 
Spot Monitor reporting that by the end of August 2009 83 major protests were 
recorded. This accounts for 44% of major protests recorded between 2004 and the 
end of October 2009. 
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An executive summary of research undertaken by the South African Parliament 
Research Unit and published on the Internet by the Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group (www.pmg.org.za/node/18556, August 2009) reported that between 
January and June 2009 a total of 26 protests were recorded. This was one less than 
in 2008. The Municipal IQ statement and the South African Parliamentary 
Research Unit (August, 2009) attribute the protests to the inadequate provision of 
social infrastructure such as housing, water and sanitation; the concomitant lack 
of delivery of public services and, corruption amongst public officials and 
politicians.  
In their analysis however, Alan and Heese (2009), also add that:   
…a sense of relative deprivation, and inequality within an urban context, is 
key to understanding why protests take place. People will wait for service 
delivery, but not if it seems that everyone else in their municipality is getting 
services before them. Add to this the marginalization and exclusion felt by 
communities in informal settlements and the general desperation for services 
in these areas, and top it all up with a lack of information from the 
municipality.  
The authors conclude that contrary to popular arguments that protests are an 
indication of municipal government failures statistical analyses suggest a 
significant link between the service delivery protests and high levels of migration 
and informal settlement patterns in relatively successful and productive 
municipalities.  Recently, the authors suggest, some of these protests have turned 
destructive and are mixed with dangerous overtones of xenophobic and tribal 
violence against political and economic migrants and refugees from other poorer 
provinces and African countries. The new entrants set up in existing informal 
settlements swelling the ranks of these communities and adding further to the 
demand pressure for municipal services. 
The Western Cape Province has not escaped such protests. Over the past five 
years the Western Cape Province has witnessed service delivery protests in 
townships and informal settlements (Khayalitsha, Langa, Phillippi and Delft) 
around the Cape Town metropolitan area and in De Doorns and Stellenbosch 
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areas of the Cape Winelands District and, in Piketberg, in the adjacent Berg River 
Municipality. In 2005, The Cape Argus newspaper (7 July 2005), reported violent 
service delivery protests in the De Doorns area of the Cape Winelands District. 
From the 17 to 18 November 2009 protests again erupted in De Doorn. The 
November 2009 protests in De Doorn were openly xenophobic with local 
residents from informal settlements nearby attacking foreign seasonal labourers 
being hired by the local farmers. According to news reports on the News24 
Internet news service (www.news24.com accessed on 17 and 18 November 2009) 
these protests are regular events at harvest time.  
The Cape Winelands District is semi-rural and essentially based on the wine and 
agricultural industries. Historically the wine estates depended on slave labour. 
With the advent of democracy and the introduction of labour regulations in the 
agricultural sector in South Africa there have been massive evictions of farm 
labour from the estates (see my summary in the Appendix of interviews 
conducted in the Cape Winelands District). The consequence of these evictions 
has seen an increase in informal settlements and higher unemployment around 
towns and relatively more affluent centers thus creating added pressure on 
municipalities to provide accommodation and services. (See Western Cape Anti-
Eviction Campaign website www.anti-eveiction.org.za). 
Targeting disparities in municipalities through intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers 
In the context of growing inequality in South Africa the service delivery protests 
are not surprising. The relationship between inequalities in regional patterns of 
disparity and deprivation and intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) will be 
discussed further in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis. The next few 
paragraphs briefly puts into perspective the impact of inequality trends in South 
Africa.   
After Gauteng the Western Cape province reveals the second highest level of 
inequality (Development Indicators Report, 2009) among provinces in South 
Africa. Amongst the many factors underlying the causes, constraints and 
challenges of service delivery protests are the past and present structures and 
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institutions that determine the political economies of inequality and poverty in 
municipalities. To address some of these constraints and challenges government 
needs to assess and restructure the intergovernmental fiscal relations arrangements 
that govern the financial transfers and grant schemes that finance municipal 
infrastructure and service delivery. Such an assessment must take cognizance of 
the relationship between increasing trends in inequality and growing protests in 
the country. 
 n a long list of fourteen constraints and challenges that hamper service delivery 
presented in the executive summary of the Parliamentary Research Unit Report 
(2009), the first five have direct and indirect implications for intergovernmental 
infrastructure finance allocations. These implications are discussed briefly below.  
Firstly, the Report suggests that lack of capacity in engineering and project 
management skills has impacted negatively on the implementation and 
management ability of municipalities to provide adequate access to clean water 
and sanitation services to disadvantaged communities. As a consequence, the 
Report suggests that urgent projects necessary to address inequality and poverty 
are left incomplete with funds unspent because many municipalities are unable to 
manage their projects. However, it has been argued by municipal officials (see 
Summary of Interviews, Appendix) that projects are left incomplete and funds 
unspent also because municipalities are unable to plan and budget with certainty 
and predictability. Addressing this challenge is one of the aims of my thesis.  
While metropolitan and larger municipalities are able to finance such capacity 
needs from their own revenue sources, many smaller local municipalities, in 
which a large proportion of poor people reside, depend almost entirely on 
discretionary local government equitable shares and conditional infrastructure 
grant transfers from the national government share. The local government 
equitable share is meant to finance municipal operational and maintenance costs. 
On the other hand the conditional grants for municipal infrastructure, housing and 
roads are specifically meant for building these physical and social infrastructure 
needs. 
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The way in which the conditional grants are determined, allocated, disbursed, 
implemented and monitored is a cause of much consternation and anxiety 
amongst municipal officials given the lack of technical capacity in disadvantaged 
municipalities. The relevant municipal, provincial and national government 
officials who were interviewed for my study expressed this consternation and 
anxiety very emphatically (See interview questionnaire and summary in the 
Appendix). The concerns of the officials relate to the fact there is no equitable, 
stable and predictable allocation mechanism in place for conditional infrastructure 
grants.  
Equitability, stability and predictability are key requirements of Section 214(2) (i) 
and (g) of the Constitution. The grants are currently allocated as per project 
application and have very serious consequences if municipalities without the 
requisite technical skills capacity cannot access and/or manage the 
implementation of projects. The situation is further exacerbated by the 
uncoordinated way in which grants are allocated and disbursed for the same 
integrated development plan (IDP) project. For example, a municipality with an 
IDP programme that requires project funds for housing, roads, water and 
sanitation has to submit different project proposals to the different government 
departments.  Each department has a different set of conditions; time delays and, 
takes account of different considerations with respect to implementation and 
performance criteria. Clearly this does not make for equitability, stability, 
predictability and certainty in allocations. Aggravating this problem further is that 
consequent delays compromise the planned time lines for the delivery of services 
and are likely to precipitate angry responses from disadvantaged communities.  
The second challenge in the Parliamentary Report (2009) suggests that 
widespread and growing unemployment and poverty levels are increasing the 
dependency of households on municipalities to provide free basic services thus 
fuelling frustrations in disadvantaged communities. The Allan and Heese 
Municipal IQ paper (2009) cited earlier adds that the influx of political and 
economic refugees from other African countries into informal settlements and 
townships only serves to inflame such frustrations as both groups compete for 
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scarce jobs and, municipal services under pressure from high demand, lack of 
capacity, uncoordinated and, inadequately and inappropriately funded budgets. 
This frustration was dramatically illustrated in the second week of November 
2009 when the media reported one such violent protest against so-called foreign 
farm workers in the De Doorn area of the Cape Winelands district of the Western 
Cape.  
The Parliamentary Report (2009) goes on to list the third, fourth and fifth levels of 
constraints and challenges faced by provincial and local government as follows: 
the negative impact of the economic recession on the cost of services for 
disadvantaged communities already reeling under the weight of poverty and 
deprivation; the under-spending by municipalities due to poor project planning, 
poor management and/or lack of capacity; outstanding debt payments for services 
from residents, businesses and government departments. All three of these 
challenges place constraints on the determination of infrastructure grants and the 
way in which they are allocated. The inability of municipalities to accurately plan 
and spend their budgets was subsequently confirmed in the official government 
report on the State of Local Government in South Africa published in November 
2009 (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, COGTA). This Report is 
reviewed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
Considering the background presented in the foregoing discussion this thesis 
questions whether the current approach to financing municipal infrastructure is 
appropriate. It also questions whether it may be necessary for an alternative 
approach to be adopted. Such an alternative approach should take account of 
disparities and efficiencies in ensuring equitable and adequate shares of all 
allocations and, support stability, certainty and predictability in planning and 
budgeting. Such an approach should also make it relatively easier for 
municipalities to plan, coordinate, manage and deliver infrastructure dependent 
public services. 
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The Challenge of Economic Disparity and Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations  
Municipalities, legally responsible for local service delivery and development, are 
faced with many challenges, not the least of which is the poverty and deprivation 
consequent on structural inequalities inherited from the apartheid past. To this 
challenge one can add the legal obligation for municipalities to progressively 
realize the rights of all citizens to basic services enshrined in the Bill of Rights in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights affirms the rights of basic public 
services for all South Africans and proposes that it may be provided within reason 
and progressively over time, taking into account the availability of financial 
resources.  
Over the recent past, in their attempts to claim such rights, citizens have 
individually and collectively sought redress in the South African judicial system. 
The Grootboom Constitutional Court case ruling in September 2000 (See 
Southern African Legal Information Institute, 2000, www.saflii.org.za/za/cases) is 
typical of such court cases and the litigious environment in which all spheres of 
government have to function.  
Mrs. Grootboom and other applicants who lived in an informal slum settlement of 
Wallacedene near Cape Town brought such a case to the Constitutional Court. 
The applicants argued that in terms of Section 28 (1) (c) of the Bill of Rights their 
children had a right to “basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
social services” (The Constitution, 1996) and therefore government had a 
responsibility to provide them and the community with decent shelter and related 
water and sanitation services. The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Mrs. 
Grootboom and other applicants. The Constitutional Court ruling has 
subsequently been used as a precedent in other claims of this nature. The socio-
economic mandates in the Bill of Rights and their various interpretations will be 
discussed in greater detail in the literature review (Chapter 2) of this thesis.    
Given the current local government context of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
discussed above it is no wonder that Government in South Africa is presented 
with a basic public finance dilemma: how to balance the mandates in the Bill of 
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Rights and equitably finance the provision of municipal infrastructure services 
while simultaneously ensuring economic equity and efficiency. National, 
provincial and local government spheres are each constitutionally entitled to an 
equitable share of nationally raised revenues for the provision of services to 
communities (See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (SA), 1996, 
Chapters 2 and 13). The dilemma resides in how this revenue should be equitably 
shared such that each sphere of government may fulfill its constitutional 
obligations. 
The South African Constitution (1996) is very explicit in its prescription that not 
only must nationally collected revenue be allocated equitably to all spheres of 
government but it must also take into account disparities and other considerations 
that distinguish communities from each other [See Chapter 13 Section 214(2) (d), 
(e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j)]. This constitutional injunction implies that municipal 
infrastructure grants should also be allocated equitably and take account of certain 
considerations such as: (d) the need to ensure that provinces and municipalities 
are able to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to them; (e) 
the fiscal capacity and efficiency of the provinces and municipalities; (f) the 
development and other needs of provinces, local government and municipalities; 
(g) the economic disparities within and among the provinces; (h) the obligations 
of the provinces and municipalities in terms of national legislation; (i) the need for 
desirability of stable and predictable allocations of revenue shares; (j) the need for 
flexibility in responding to emergencies or other temporary needs, and other 
factors based on similar objective criteria.  
Such an allocative responsibility requires taking into account the legacy of 
inequality and disparity of the apartheid past and the immediate socio-economic 
needs of the present. The Bill of Rights provides the constitutional foundation for 
this responsibility. In this respect financing municipal infrastructure presents a 
very specific dilemma.  
The spatial and demographic configuration of the current municipal boundary 
dispensation bears the legacy of apartheid policy. To protect the privileges and 
interests of the white minority population apartheid policy institutionalized (under 
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the Group Areas Act of 1955)3 the targeted location of the African, Coloured and 
Indian (Hereafter referred to as Black) population groups in designated areas with 
limited social and physical infrastructure and considerable distance from centers 
of employment (See Lundhal and Ndlela, 1980; Marks and Rathbone, 1982; 
Crankshaw, 1997; Terreblanche, 2002; Feinstein, 2005; Seeking and Natrass 
2006). The net result was that communities found themselves in conditions of 
unemployment, extreme poverty and deprivation.  
The Group Areas Act left a devastating legacy of institutionalized inequality and 
discrimination in land distribution; discriminatory employment, labour and wage 
remuneration policies; unequal education and health facilities and, restrictions on 
social mobility and access to services for black people (The Urban Foundation 
Group Areas Policy Document, 1990). Many municipalities in South Africa still 
carry the responsibility of providing social and physical infrastructure and basic 
services to disadvantaged black communities. Most of these communities were 
victims of institutionalized inequality and are still burdened by exponentially 
growing infrastructure backlogs and, suffer the consequences of the negative 
impact of backlogs on the delivery of basic services. 
The 2009 Development Indicators Report published by the Presidency, 
Government of South Africa (25 September 2009), confirms that despite fifteen 
years of post-apartheid democracy persistent income inequality remains the single 
most important challenge facing all levels of government.  
Income inequality in South Africa was not reduced even during the years of 
economic growth: while income of all sectors has improved, that of the 
richer segment of the society seems to have improved at a faster rate. 
(Development Indicators Report, 2009: Executive Summary). 
                                                
3 The Group Areas Act was written into law by the white minority National Party Government in 1950 soon 
after coming to power in 1948 and stated that South Africans must live in separate residential areas 
designated for the use of different race groups in terms of the Population Registration Act of 1950. These two 
Acts constituted the formal legal foundation on which apartheid was built.  
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The report shows that the Gini coefficient4 based on data from the national 
Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) has not improved significantly and, was in 
fact 0.640 for 1995; 0.680 for 2000; 0.690 for 2005 and, 0.679 for 2008. 
(Development Indicator Report, 2009: 25).  One reason for the persistence of such 
inequality may be the structural disjuncture between the intended constitutionally 
based policy objectives of the post-apartheid state and the continued existence of 
socio-economic, political and institutional arrangements that have their roots in 
the political economy of colonialism and apartheid. Recent literature from the 
New Institutional Economics school of thought argues strongly for taking into 
account institutional arrangements and configurations in economic development 
policy. (Platteau, 1994 and 2000; Young, 1994 and 1998). The relevance of the 
New Institutional Economics approach for the thesis will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter (Chapter Two: Literature Review).  
In addition to taking account of disparities and inequalities between and within 
communities the Constitution also requires that government consider the fiscal 
capacity and efficiency of provinces and municipalities in their endeavor to 
provide services (See Constitution, 1996, Section 214 (2) d, e, and g). The study 
for the thesis analyzed how government may balance the requirement to 
simultaneously take account of disparities and economic efficiency so that 
municipalities may reduce infrastructure backlogs and effectively provide basic 
services. The next section of this introduction discusses some of the pertinent 
conceptual foundations and principles that underpin the notions of inequality and 
efficiency and, the ways in which it impacts on individuals and communities. In 
this thesis disparity is used as a synonym for inequality.  
The Cost of Disparity in the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
Dilemma 
There is broad agreement amongst economists of differing persuasions that socio-
economic disparities and inequalities impact on the material, physical and 
psychological quality of life and capabilities of individuals and the communities 
                                                
4  The Gini Coefficient is an index that measures the level of inequality in society between 0 for no inequality, 
and 1 for complete inequality. 
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in which they live. The literature on these issues by Alfred Marshall and Amartya 
Sen is reviewed in Chapter 2. 
The importance of the principles and considerations raised by Marshall, Sen and 
others were important in defining the fundamental objective of the thesis as it 
applies to municipalities in South Africa in general and the five local 
municipalities in the Cape Winelands District of the Western Cape Province in 
particular.   
In South Africa the legacy of the structural inequalities inherited from the 
apartheid past inhibits the ability of local governments to deliver the concomitant 
services as mandated by the Bill of Rights. Among the key challenges facing local 
governments are disparities in the quality, availability and adequacy of public 
infrastructure across local municipalities. Associated with this challenge is the 
requirement for government to allocate adequate and equitable levels of capital 
grants to local governments to eradicate capital backlogs and to eliminate the 
socio-economic disparities that limit their infrastructural capacity to promote 
growth and development in the quest to eradicate inequality and poverty. 
Following from this argument the thesis examines the relationship between 
economic disparity, infrastructure and capital stock in achieving equitability and 
economic efficiency. 
Economic disparity, infrastructure and capital Stock 
In macroeconomic analyses and, in the context of national accounts, public 
infrastructure is aggregated and classified together with privately provided 
infrastructure as the capital stock of a nation or sub-region. The level of public 
infrastructure investment in the overall capital stock is an important variable in 
determining national and sub-regional economic growth and development. For 
instance, Bhaduri (1986) and Taylor (1991), among others, discussed the 
importance of the capital stock variable in macroeconomic theory and, Hulten 
(1990) and Diewert (2006) discussed the measurement of capital stock for 
microeconomic applications. These concepts are explored further in Chapter 2. 
Despite the many difficulties associated with the measurement of capital 
discussed in the literature, from the accounting perspective of fixed assets and 
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land, capital stock estimates are an important indicator for measuring wealth and 
analyzing the role of capital stock in production of goods and services. It is in the 
context of the production of public services by municipalities that capital stock 
estimates will be used in this thesis to gauge the required level of public 
infrastructure investment necessary to meet the demand of communities 
disadvantaged by past disadvantages and current socio-economic disparities. 
The Problem: Balancing the Costs of Economic Disparity and 
Efficiency  
In the light of the preceding discussion and given the fundamental questions and 
sub-questions the problem posed by the thesis can be expressed as finding an 
effective way of balancing the costs of addressing economic disparity while also 
addressing the costs of economic efficiency in equitably allocating infrastructure 
grants to local municipalities.  
In 2005 I was part of a Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)5 research team 
that presented a report (FFC, 2005) recommending to National Government a 
capital grant model for allocating infrastructure grants to provinces. The report 
was based on a paper (Petchey et al, 2004) prepared for the 2004 Tenth 
Anniversary Conference of the FFC.  The model incorporated the principle of 
taking account of disparities (called disabilities in the Report) in developing a 
capital grant scheme formula. A generic version of the model was later published 
in the Journal of Development Studies (Josie et al, 2008). In 2007 I led an FFC 
research team that developed a macro-model extending the principles of the 
provincial capital grant model to include all equitable share allocations to 
national, provincial and local governments (See Petchey et al, 2007). The latter 
was an attempt to show how it could be possible to progressively provide basic 
services taking into account disparities and the availability of financial resources 
in balancing the cost of disparity with the constitutional requirement for economic 
efficiency.  
                                                
5 The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) is an institution set up in terms of the Chapter 13, Section 220, 
of the Constitution (1996) to make intergovernmental fiscal relations recommendations to government. It 
reports to Parliament.  
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In arguing for an alternative approach to equitably sharing national revenue the 
Petchey et al (2007) report suggested that the current formulaic approach does not 
adequately cater for three policy issues. Firstly, it does not consider the need to 
balance the provision of constitutionally mandated basic services within 
macroeconomic constraints that limit available resources. Secondly, it is unable to 
objectively determine the equitable revenue shares for the three spheres of 
government. Thirdly, the current formulaic approach is unable to allocate 
infrastructure and capital grant funds in a way that is consistent with responses to 
the first two policy issues. These issues reflect the same challenges faced by 
policy makers in applying the existing formula for allocating infrastructure grants 
to municipalities. The empirical case study for this thesis was an attempt to 
examine the challenges with a view to providing an alternative model for 
allocating infrastructure grants to municipalities. In other words the study focused 
on the most appropriate policy instrument for equitably and efficiently balancing 
the allocation of government’s municipal infrastructure grants such that they meet 
all the requirements of the Constitution. 
Thus, to answer the questions identified earlier in this chapter I undertook the case 
study using secondary data on socio-economic disparity indicators from five local 
municipalities falling within the jurisdiction of the Cape Winelands District 
Municipality of the Western Cape Province. The five local municipalities studied 
were Breede River, Breede Valley, Drakenstein, Stellenbosch and Witzenberg. To 
complement the use of secondary data I also conducted a series of semi-structured 
interviews with officials from the District and local municipalities and, with 
officials from related provincial and national government departments. The aim of 
these interviews was to understand the extent to which including disparities in the 
grant model would imply a change in the intergovernmental institutional 
arrangements that governed infrastructure grant transfers to municipalities. The 
results of the interviews were supplemented by analyses and reviews of official 
government and private sector reports on the issue of municipal finance, 
governance and the delivery of infrastructure-based public services. The interview 
questionnaires and a summary of the responses are presented in the Appendix to 
this thesis.  
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Equitability, in the sense used in the thesis, means the equitable allocation of 
nationally collected revenue to all spheres of government as prescribed in Section 
213 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996). While in general the equitability 
of allocations is the aim of Section 214, sub-sections (2) (a) to (j) represent the 
constraints that have to be considered when making the equitable allocations. In 
particular sub-section (e) lists the fiscal capacity and efficiency of the provinces 
and municipalities as a key constraining consideration. To the extent to which this 
constraint applies to the public finance context of the allocation and distribution 
of nationally collected taxes one can assume that efficiency here carries the same 
meaning as the notion of economic efficiency often used in the tradition of the 
neo-classical economic school of thought.   
The Penguin Dictionary of Economics (Bannock, Baxter and Davis, 1992) 
captures the essence of the neo-classical definition of efficiency as follows:  
The state of an economy within which no one can be made better off without 
someone being made worse off. For this to be the case, three types of 
efficiency must hold. The first is productive efficiency, in which the output of 
the economy is being produced at the lowest cost. The second is allocative 
efficiency, in which resources are being allocated to the production of the 
goods and services the society requires. The third is distributional 
efficiency, in which output is distributed in such a way that consumers 
would not wish, given their disposable income and market prices, to spend 
these incomes in any different way.  
Research Design and Methodology 
The research design for the study was based on the integration of five inter-related 
components of analyses each of which applied a specific empirical methodology 
to the financing of infrastructure in the local municipalities in the Cape Winelands 
District. The thesis design is illustrated in Figure 1.1 and explained in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
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Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of the thesis design and components  
IGFR Infrastructure Finance for Municipalities
In terms of Constitutal obligations &  Economic Imperatives 
Theoretical 
Infrastructure Grant 
Model
Simulation 
Model
National Revenue 
Budgeted Pool of 
Funds
Data
1) Population for SA
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3) Capital cost disparity factors
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5) Capital backlogs
Allocations to 
Municipalities
A
B
C
D
E
F
 
 
Legend: IGFR = Intergovernmental fiscal relations; LM = Local municipalities; 
SA=South Africa 
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The first component (Box A) of analysis is a critical assessment of the existing 
intergovernmental fiscal relations institutional and governance frameworks within 
which the state allocates finance for municipal infrastructure. The second 
component (Box B) requires the estimation of the pool of funds available for 
financing local municipality infrastructure needs. The third component (Box C) 
specifies the data requirements for an assessment and construction of a reasonable 
estimate of public infrastructure backlogs as a function of the desired per capita 
level of public capital stock6 and the capital cost disparities for estimating the 
composite disparity indices. 
The fourth component provides the analytical incorporation of estimates of 
infrastructure backlogs and, the disparity indices into a coherent model that will 
lend itself to providing an alternative approach to allocating infrastructure finance 
that takes into account equitability, economic disparity and economic efficiency.  
The fifth and final, component converts the theoretical model into a computer 
simulation model capable of simulating and generating alternative allocation 
scenarios that are consistent with the general equitability principles of parity, 
proportionality, and priority suggested by Young (1994: 8-9) and discussed in the 
literature review (Chapter 2) of the thesis.  
The assessment of the statutory, institutional and governance policy objectives, 
targets, instruments and budgetary arrangements for infrastructure grant 
allocations used information from official documents and interviews with officials 
from municipalities and relevant national and provincial government departments.   
Estimating the value of the actual capital stock for the particular service for a 
specified period for municipalities in the Cape Winelands District was based on 
actual public expenditure data. Estimating the value of the actual capital stock for 
the particular service for an identified municipality in the specified period used 
                                                
6 For the purpose of this study capital stock refers to the stock of all physical durable and tangible production 
factors. In the United Nations System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93) in practice this corresponds to 
fixed capital, and in business accounts, it corresponds to tangible fixed assets. 
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data derived from national and provincial estimates based on generally accepted 
accounting inventory methodologies (perpetual inventory method7).  
The required population data of the identified municipality in the specified period 
were sourced from officially published government statistics. The required 
population data forecasts of South Africa for the specified period were sourced 
from the official government statistical agency, Statistics South Africa (StatsSA).  
For determining the pool of funds available for municipal infrastructure for the 
specified period data from the National Treasury macroeconomic projections were 
used, assuming that Nationally Treasury took account of macroeconomic 
considerations listed in Section 214(2) of the Constitution. The study for the thesis 
used public infrastructure backlogs data from officially published sources.   
Aggregated or composite capital cost disparity indices were estimated to show 
how the costs of historical backlogs and other disparity factors would impact on 
municipal budgets. The relevant disparity indices and their weights in a model can 
also be identified using statistical econometric regression analysis techniques 
(Petchey et al, 2000) or it may be assumed that the factors and actual weights are 
policy choices of decision makers. The latter point is discussed in detail in the 
literature review (Chapter 2).  
I evaluated the Petchey et al (2004) model for allocating infrastructure grants to 
local municipalities using a methodology for analyzing and comparing the results 
of including and excluding cost disparities in the model. To do this I used a 
municipal specific disparity indicator derived from data from the five local 
municipalities in the Cape Winelands District. Through this process I defined a set 
of disparity indices and weights and then, assessed the effect of the disparity 
indices on municipal capital stock and population data by carrying out simulations 
of the infrastructure grant model adapted for allocating grants to municipalities. 
Using the results of model simulations that first excluded and then included 
disparities in the calculations, I compared the results with respect to: 
                                                
7 The Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) is a technique for estimating capital stocks. The technique entails 
adding gross fixed capital to an initial estimate of the capital stock and then by applying a rate of 
depreciation, calculates the net capital stock. (UN SNA93).  
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• The positive or negative effects of disparities on infrastructure backlogs; 
• The impact of disparities on the municipalities’ share of the grant pool for 
backlogs; 
• The impact of disparities on the speed with which municipal backlogs are 
reduced;  
• How disparities affect the per capita economic efficiency portion of the 
infrastructure grant; 
• How the inclusion of disparities impact on the equitability, stability, 
predictability and flexibility of municipal budgets.  
The methodology used for adapting the Petchey et al model for allocating 
infrastructure grants to local municipalities is fully developed in Chapter 4. One 
key limitation to this thesis is the unavailability of capital stock data at municipal 
level. This is exacerbated by difficulties in accessing the capital expenditure data 
requirements and the information from official sources. Expenditure data is 
essential for estimating capital stock levels using the perpetual inventory method. 
Another limitation is the assumption that official data is a true indicator of reality 
in municipalities. Despite these limitations the data was used for illustrative 
purposes and to demonstrate the feasibility of the model proposed in this thesis.  
The Context of Disparities in Municipalities in the Cape 
Winelands District 
It is argued in the literature (see Chapter 2) that socio-economic inequality and 
disparities within and between communities in South Africa have their roots in the 
history of slavery, colonialism and apartheid (Terreblanche, 2002; Lundhal, M. 
and Ndlela, D. B., 1980; Seeking and Natrass, 2005). Andries du Toit (2004) 
argues that this is particularly true of the Western Cape in general and the Cape 
Winelands District more specifically.  
Recent studies on municipal infrastructure and development in South Africa 
reveal serious shortcomings by municipalities in the delivery of social 
infrastructure services such as housing and related services. The studies in a 
collection edited by van Donk et al (2008) cover a range of local government 
issues that include the intent and impact of policy; evolving human settlements; 
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urban passenger transport; social development and the implications of HIV/AIDS; 
institutional arrangements for economic development and finance; 
intergovernmental delivery and, electricity distribution and industry reform. An 
official study commissioned by the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government [The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), 
2007] raised specific concerns about the municipal infrastructure grant system and 
the possibility of a review of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) in 
particular. 
While these studies deal with a wide range of local government issues they do not 
adequately address the systemic link between equitability, efficiency and 
economic disparities in the infrastructure grant allocation system. Of particular 
concern to policy makers is that despite increases in infrastructure finance to 
municipalities the gap between rich and poor within and between the historically 
advantaged and historically disadvantaged communities seems to be widening at 
an alarming rate and, with negative socio-economic consequences. This trend was 
reflected quite sharply in the recently published (2008) Community Household 
Survey by Statistics South Africa. Of relevance for this thesis (Western Cape 
Provincial Treasury, 2006) the Cape Winelands District local municipalities 
reveal a similar trend.  
In the Cape Winelands District the problems of historical inequalities and 
disparities within and between municipalities were starkly raised at a Cape 
Winelands District Municipality (CWDM) Poverty Conference, 27 May 2005, 
where a study entitled “Measuring the Vulnerability of the Poor” (CWDM, 
Conference Presentation, 2005) presented some key findings about local 
municipalities in the Cape Winelands District. These include in-migration into the 
district by work-seekers; expansion of informal settlements; 43.4% increase in 
numbers of people earning less than R9600 per annum between 1996 and 2001; 
the gap between rich and poor widening; three local municipalities in the district 
(Witzenberg, Drakenstein and Breede Valley) have the highest concentration of 
low income earners; unemployment being extremely severe in regional centers; 
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slow economic growth in the district and, informal settlements clustered around 
highest economic activity.  
With respect to infrastructure and access to municipal services the study showed 
that housing, water, sanitation and electricity backlogs were severe across the 
district but especially so in Witzenberg and Breede River Winelands local 
municipalities. A recent study (Burgoyne, 2007: 17-18) on the factors impacting 
on the housing delivery in the Western Cape revealed that the Cape Winelands 
District Municipality had the second highest housing backlogs estimate in the 
province for 2007/08 after the City of Cape Town. Of a total provincial housing 
backlog of 410 000 units, the Cape Town estimate was 300 100 units and the 
Cape Winelands was 38 522 units compared to 35 380 for the Eden; 15 876 for 
the West Coast; 17 427 for the Overberg and, 2 522 units for the Central Karoo 
districts respectively.  
International trends in health and social indicators are strongly correlated with 
inequality, poverty and infrastructure provision (Glyn A. and Miliband D., 1994). 
Data from the local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District (Western Cape 
Provincial Treasury, 2006) reveal increased incidence of TB in Breede River, 
Witzenberg and Stellenbosch; higher teenage pregnancy in Drakenstein; low birth 
weight figures, malnutrition and increases in cases of Feotal Alcohol Syndrome 
(FAS); increasing HIV cases, and a decreasing use of access to primary health 
care services. Trends in crime show that Drakenstein has one of the highest 
incidences of general crime and, crimes against women and children and, 
unacceptably high rates of drug and alcohol related crime compared to the 
national norm.  
The Cape Winelands District Municipality Conference presentation (2005) 
identified several emerging issues and made some important recommendations 
with respect to infrastructure provision and accessibility to public services. Of 
particular significance for financing municipal infrastructure were: the strong 
correlations between settlement type and poverty; the growing gap between rich 
and poor; the worsening depth and scope of poverty; the limited access by 
disadvantaged communities to services and assets; minimal informal sector 
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activity and, the multi-dimensional character of poverty and vulnerability. The 
most important recommendations made that are relevant for the thesis is the 
urgent need to address specific infrastructure backlogs and integrated 
interventions in certain sectors and, the need to review existing government 
instruments to assess the impact on poverty.  
In South Africa all three spheres of government are bound by constitutional 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) and legal considerations to 
try and achieve equitability without compromising efficiency in achieving 
economic growth and development. Finding the most appropriate financial 
resource allocation mechanism to fund municipal infrastructure investment will 
contribute to addressing this challenge.  
Given the above background and the three objectives of the thesis (listed on page 
4) my study was multi-dimensional in depth and scope of analysis. It assessed 
how the integration and provision of different infrastructure services impact on 
the interrelationships that cut across the political, economic, institutional, spatial 
and social groups and classes within the Cape Winelands District in the context of 
historical disparities and socio-economic inequalities.  
A multi-dimensional approach required a theoretical and analytical framework 
that is equally multi-dimensional in character. For this reason the study adopted a 
structuralist theoretical framework for the analysis of the equitability and 
efficiency of the allocations of infrastructure grants to municipalities. This 
framework and approach is discussed in greater detail in the literature review 
(Chapter 2) of the thesis.  
Summary 
In this chapter, following the University of the Western Cape (UWC) Thesis 
Guide and, Mouton (2001), I developed the idea for the thesis and provided a 
motivation as to why the study for the thesis was necessary and relevant. I 
discussed the relevance of the study and the thesis conclusions in the context of 
the unfolding problems bedeviling the delivery of basic municipal services and 
the financing of municipal infrastructure within the institutional and legal 
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parameters defined by the South African Constitution. I also demonstrated in the 
chapter how the general literature helped to refine the thesis topic and informed 
the definition and articulation of the research problem that guided the case study. 
The chapter also presented the main research question and sub-questions and 
fundamental aims and objectives of the research. The chapter provided a brief 
description of the theoretical framework for the research and the underlying 
assumptions on which the study was based. Following from the theoretical 
framework the chapter presented the research design and methodology used to 
conduct the empirical study on which the thesis conclusions and 
recommendations are based. The rest of the thesis is divided into six other 
chapters and a concluding chapter.  
 Chapter 2 reviews the literature dealing with a structural approach to analyzing 
the intergovernmental financing of municipal infrastructure. The primary aim of 
this chapter is to demarcate and evaluate the scholarship and show how the 
specific theories, concepts and approaches constitute a relevant theoretical 
framework for the development of the thesis through its different stages.  
Chapter 3 provides the background to the problem of local government 
infrastructure grant allocations in South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal 
relations (IGFR) context. This chapter critically assesses the statutory, 
institutional and governance policy objectives, targets, instruments and budgetary 
arrangements of local government infrastructure finance in South Africa’s 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system. These elements are discussed against 
the need for government to address equitability, efficiency and the socio-
economic rights framework within which the state should allocate municipal 
infrastructure grants. 
Chapter 4 discusses and documents the various research methodologies and data 
used for analysis.  
Chapter 5 presents data and statistical disparity profiles of the five local 
municipalities in the Cape Winelands District. In this context the chapter 
discusses the main characteristics of each municipality incorporating data and 
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information from secondary and primary quantitative and qualitative sources 
including interviews, surveys and published reports.  
In Chapter 6 I develop an adapted theoretical version of a disparity weighted 
municipal infrastructure grant model based on the Petchey, et al (2004)8 provincial 
capital grant model developed for the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC, 
2005). The municipal infrastructure grant model is intended for the equitable 
allocation of infrastructure grants to municipalities.  
In Chapter 7 I present the results and findings of the Excel Simulation Model 
estimations from my adapted version of a municipal infrastructure grant model. 
To produce the results and findings the simulation used official government data 
and information to construct capital cost disparity indices for the five local 
municipalities. Using the constructed capital cost disparity indices to test and 
evaluate the impacts of including capital cost disparities in the model the 
simulation produced results for the evaluation of the impacts on grant shares 
under three alternative scenarios. The chapter also presents findings on the effects 
of accounting for capital cost disparities with specific reference to the trade-off 
between equitably funding disparities in infrastructure backlogs against funding 
economic efficiency. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. The chapter summarizes and discusses the salient 
points of the main findings by drawing together the results from the preceding 
chapters. In particular the chapter discusses the results in the context of the 
literature and theories reviewed and identifies the data gaps, limitations and 
anomalies that require further investigation. Based on the results of the model 
simulations the chapter discusses the broader significance of the results and 
proposes some recommendations for applying the model for allocating municipal 
infrastructure grants. The chapter also makes recommendations for further 
research to address the limitations identified in the study.  
                                                
8 The model was first presented as a paper by Petchey, Josie, MacDonald and Nthite at the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission (FFC) Tenth Anniversary Conference in August 2004 and later, published by the FFC as 
a set of recommendations and operational manual for the South African Government and Parliament in 2005. 
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An Appendix with the questionnaires and summary of interviews follows the 
conclusion and bibliographical references. The Excel Simulation Model and an 
electronic version of the thesis on compact disc are attached to the hard copy of 
the thesis.     
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Chapter 2 
 A Structural Approach To Intergovernmental Financing 
Of Municipal Infrastructure: A Review Of The 
Literature 
The South African Constitution (1996) recognizes implicitly in its Preamble that 
the history of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa has left a legacy of 
structural inequality and poverty (Liebenberg, 2010). The legacy of this structural 
inequality and poverty is characterized by widening socio-economic disparities 
between rich and poor communities in local municipalities. The Founding 
Provisions of the Constitution (Chapter 1) affirms that South Africa is founded on 
the values of “1(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.” The Bill of Rights (Chapter 2) 
enshrines the rights of all citizens to human dignity, equality and freedom. In the 
literature Liebenberg (2005) analyzes the way human dignity may be used to 
interpret the socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights. The author argues that 
the Bill of Rights imposes obligations on the State to ensure that citizens have 
access to socio-economic goods and services. However, such second-generation 
rights are subject to resource availability and, the state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realization of each of these rights. 
In the rest of the thesis I refer to socio-economic rights as constitutionally 
mandated basic services (CMBS). The provision of many of these rights is the 
responsibility of local governments acting on behalf of the State. Furthermore, the 
delivery of, and access to these basic services require public infrastructure 
investment by local municipalities. If municipalities lack the necessary finance to 
provide public infrastructure it becomes the responsibility of national government 
to provide funds to municipalities from nationally collected revenues. In Chapter 
13 Section 214(g) the Constitution further requires that Government take 
economic disparities into account in equitably allocating funds to local 
municipalities. Given this background I adopt a structural approach for analyzing 
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and evaluating the intergovernmental financing of municipal infrastructure to 
achieve the objectives of the thesis.  
 In this chapter I will critically review the theories, concepts and methods that 
form the basis for the theoretical framework for a structural approach to assessing 
and analyzing the impact of economic disparities on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations between local municipalities and national government. A structural 
approach provides the most appropriate framework for analyzing and evaluating 
the systemic economic, social and institutional interrelationships of the 
intergovernmental financing of municipal infrastructure. In Chapter 4 I discuss in 
detail why the structural approach is appropriate for developing, analyzing and 
evaluating models for allocating infrastructure grants. In particular it provides a 
firm foundation for understanding the linkages between the microeconomic 
decisions taken at municipal level and macroeconomic decisions taken at the level 
of national government. The overall economic interrelationships and linkages are 
schematically summarized in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4. A stylized view of the 
structural approach to understanding local government’s institutional 
arrangements in South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations system is 
captured in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4. In the rest of the chapter I will 
define and review some of the key concepts of the structural approach as it was 
used in the study for this thesis.  
Structural Definitions and Concepts used in the Theoretical 
Framework     
Structuralist theories and approaches to economic analysis were largely 
influenced by the works of Michal Kalecki (See Osiatynski 1990; Taylor 1991; 
Fitzgerald and Vos 1989, and O’ Hara, 2001) and were extensively used to 
analyze the political economy problems associated with post-colonial 
reconstruction and economic growth in Latin America and in other parts of the 
developing world. 
A structuralist theory of development focuses on specific structures of a given 
political economy and has its roots in development economic theory. It places 
greater emphasis on the interactions between economic agents, socio-economic 
 
 
 
 
  32 
and political groups, classes and institutions and other economic components in 
the economy and their impact on the macroeconomic structure and its 
performance (O’Hara, 2001). It draws on stylized facts based on micro-economic 
empirical analysis of the behaviour of economic agents and social groups and 
from this builds a foundation for the construction of macroeconomic development 
models.  
Modern day applications of a structural approach to political economy analyses 
are explained in detail in the works of Lance Taylor (1991: 2-10) and E. V. K. 
Fitzgerald and Rob Vos (1989: 27-33). The use of stylized facts hinges upon a set 
of premises about the structure of the political economy of a country and 
assumptions about the behaviour of and inter-actions between all the economic 
agents and the existential context9 of their social class, production organization 
and institutional relationships.  
Taylor (1991: 10-12) argues that a key generalization about the behaviour of 
economic agents and social classes can be drawn from macro level information 
that defines and limits the boundaries within which they interact. Depending on 
how much freedom they enjoy, economic agents and social classes will make 
decisions and behave according to the limits set by macroeconomic constraints. In 
many instances (such as the prices determined by foreign trade) these limits are 
beyond the control of individual agents. Thus an economy is said to have a 
determinate structure if the interactions and inter-relationships of all economic 
agents are pre-determined by institutions, production technologies and distribution 
of incomes, resources and other factors of production. Fitzgerald and Vos, 
(1989:28) elaborate:  
The institutional framework refers above all to ownership, but also to the 
institutional form of enterprise, social group organization and state 
intervention. The concrete setting of these characteristics condition the way 
resources are allocated and markets eventually clear. Macroeconomics is 
built up from the microeconomic level by studying the precise features of the 
                                                
9  This is the boundary within which individuals exist as free agents and are responsible for their own actions 
and decisions. 
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agents and the markets in which they operate, such as oligopolistic10 firms or 
household selling labour. This then leads on to a macroeconomic structure, 
which includes government, foreign trade, and so on. Production structures 
are seen as relatively inflexible in the short run as they embody a 
determinate technology, which can only be changed over time by investment. 
Following Taylor, (1991) and, Fitzgerald and Vos (1989), stylized facts11 in 
structural economic theory, may be defined as empirical and generalized 
representations of various facts and components of an economic system used to 
model the roles, decision-making behaviour and linkages of economic agents and 
institutions within the production relationships that characterize the political 
economy of a country. The link between the micro decision-making behaviour of 
individual agents and the aggregate behaviour of whole population groups are a 
key theme in explaining the role of institutions in economic phenomena. This link 
is developed in the lectures of Bastiaensen (2007/08) and the works of Platteau 
(1994 and 2000) and Young (1994 and 1998). To explain institutional impacts on 
economic policy I retain, for the purpose of the thesis, the approach advocated by 
Young (1998: xi) that: 
Institutions emerge over time from the cumulative experience of many 
individuals. Once their interactions coalesce into a settled pattern of 
expectations and behaviours, an ‘institution’ has come into being. The 
theory makes qualitative predictions about the evolutionary paths that such 
processes tend to follow and the diversity of institutional forms that they 
produce.    
In addition to the emphasis of income distribution in determining welfare and 
demand Fitzgerald and Vos (1989: 29) propose two other areas of analysis where 
the structural approach will be important.  
                                                
10 Oligopolistic behaviour of firms is characterized by perceptions of interdependence, retaliation and, 
sometimes collusion, in decisions on pricing, investment and advertising policies especially in markets where 
there are few sellers of goods and services. 
11 Taylor (1991: 5) suggests that “ realistic macroeconomics has to be based upon  ‘stylized facts’” and 
describes these as “…empirical generalizations drawn hierarchically at the macro, sectoral, and micro 
levels, about the economy at hand; …”   
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Firstly, structural analysis will be useful in the area of governance and 
accountability in countries in transition and undergoing structural transformation. 
In this instance such an approach is required for instituting, managing and 
monitoring prescribed policies of transformation and institutional restructuring of 
arrangements and transaction costs. Secondly, with relevance for infrastructure 
investment, the structural approach focuses attention on the extent to which the 
availability of infrastructure, skilled labour, markets, resource allocation 
mechanisms, production costs and imported inputs determine whether businesses 
invest in a particular area or not. Both these emphases take on greater significance 
within the context of the constitutional requirement for equitable financial 
resource allocation mechanisms to municipalities to provide basic services to 
citizens and promote developmental and sustainable local government. Mr. Trevor 
Manuel, the former South African Minister of Finance, underscored the need for 
state intervention to be founded on equitable financial resource allocation 
mechanisms (Sunday Times, 25 May 2008):  
Ensuring that national revenue is used equitably is the most important thing 
any government can do to promote the trust, confidence and inclusion 
central to the stability required for long-term economic growth. 
 
Following the arguments of Fitzgerald and Vos (1989:28-29) what then 
constitutes a structural perspective for modeling the equitable sharing of 
infrastructure grants to South African municipalities? To answer this question I 
construct and present in Figure 4.1 and Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 (Chapter 4) 
summarized representations of the interactions between economic agents, socio-
economic and political factors, institutions and other economic components in the 
economy and their impact on the macroeconomic structure and its performance. 
The summarized representations show in stylized form the linkages and flows 
between the allocations of municipal infrastructure grants and the possible 
macroeconomic and microeconomic impacts on growth and development.  
In the rest of this chapter I sequentially and critically review what the literature 
says about the key components that constitute the structural approach represented 
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by Figure 4.1 and Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 (Chapter 4). . In particular I l review the 
literature on how economic inequality and disparity can become structurally 
entrenched because labour market relationships and behaviours between economic 
agents are defined and institutionalized by political power and control. From this 
discussion I review the literature on the nature and impact of accounting for 
structural economic disparity in intergovernmental financing of local government. 
I also review the literature on the constitutional and institutional 
intergovernmental arrangements that govern the allocations of infrastructure 
grants in South Africa, and that can be used to progressively eradicate the 
structural inequality and disparity. Finally, I will discuss the literature on 
infrastructure and capital stock in macroeconomic aggregates and, on the role and 
measurement of capital stock in infrastructure grant models that may be used to 
equitably allocate infrastructure grants to local municipalities so that they may 
address the negative social and economic effects of economic disparity.  
Perspectives on Disparities and Socio-economic Inequality  
Making the provision of certain public services a right is based on the recognition 
by the Constitution of the historical legacy of socio-economic disparity 
consequent on centuries of colonialism and apartheid oppression suffered by 
millions of South Africans (Liebenberg, 2010; Lundhal, M. and Ndlela, D. B., 
1980) from 1652 to 1994. For the purpose of the thesis economic disparity in 
South Africa is defined as an economic inequality, gap or difference in some 
economic respect. In South Africa the requirement for taking account of economic 
disparities in grant allocations is a constitutional obligation [The Constitution, 
1996, Section 214 (2) (g): 125] that must be considered amongst other 
obligations. The growing levels of household and regional economic inequality 
that characterizes disadvantaged communities in South Africa (see Chapter 5) 
places a burden on national government to take account of these inequalities in 
grant allocations.  Throughout the thesis I use the term disparity to be consistent 
with the constitutional requirement [Section 214(2) g] for government to take 
account of disparities in grant allocations. In the context of the thesis the use of 
the term disparity also means socio-economic inequality between and within 
municipalities.   
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One reason for the persistence of such inequality in South Africa is the structural 
disjuncture between the intended constitutionally based policy objectives of the 
post-apartheid state and the continued existence of socio-economic, political and 
institutional arrangements that have their roots in the political economy of 
colonialism and apartheid. Recent literature from the New Institutional 
Economics school of thought argues strongly for taking into account institutional 
arrangements and configurations in economic development policy12 (Platteau 
2000; Young, 1998; Young, 1994).  
The notion that economic inequality and disparity can become a permanent 
structure of the political economy of society is fairly well established in the 
literature and predates the 1789 French Revolution. Inequality features 
prominently in the seminal works of Jean Jacques Rousseau such as the 
Discourses on the Origins of Inequality (1755), Discourse on Political Economy 
(1758) and The Social Contract (1761). Among others these writings had a 
significant influence on the events that led up to 1789 revolution in France. (See 
Mason, 1979 for a discussion on Rousseau). It was in The Social Contract that 
Rousseau famously declared; “Man was born free; and everywhere he is in 
chains” (Mason, 1979: 154). To paraphrase Rousseau, in 1994 South Africans 
broke the shackles of colonialism and apartheid and attained freedom and yet, 
everywhere inequality still keeps the vast majority chained to relative deprivation 
and poverty.  
Inequality and disparity in society has been a concern for political economists 
going back to the writings of Adam Smith in his famous treatise entitled the 
“Wealth of Nations” published in 177613. For Adam Smith inequality and poverty 
posed a serious threat to the economy and the interests of the wealthy. He noted in 
the “Wealth of Nations” that for every rich person there were about five hundred 
                                                
12 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines institution as an “established law, custom, usage, practice, 
organization.” The term is used in this sense in the thesis.  
13 The full title of the book is An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. The 5th edition 
was published in 1904 in London and is available on line on (http//www.econlib.org/library/smithWN.html) 
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poor and that affluence for a few presupposes the poverty of the many. Such 
poverty, he implies, may provoke conflict between the rich and poor.     
A current perspective on inequality by Dugger (in O’Hara, 2001: 505-508) 
defines inequality as a social pathology characterized by limiting opportunities, 
freedom and capabilities on the consumption of food, clothing, housing standards, 
health care and education for one social group so that another social group 
benefits from the economic surplus thus generated. Dugger argues that such 
limitations can be costly as “the direct cost of maintaining structured inequality is 
usually high” because of the requirement of a multi-faceted state apparatus for 
maintaining control and hegemony (O’Hara, 2001:505).  
According to Dugger other features that characterize structured inequality include 
its circular and cumulative processes; its manifestation as gender, racial, national 
and class inequalities; its formal incorporation in the broad institutional control 
and distributive roles of the state; and its promotion of enabling myths that justify 
the maintenance and persistence of inequality in a vicious cycle of consciousness 
and practice among victims and perpetrators alike (O’Hara, 2001:  505-508). 
The circular and cumulative processes of the different manifestations of structured 
inequality is reinforced by formal institutional control of the state and through its 
promotion of a plethora of enabling myths that keep it in place. The circular and 
cumulative process generates a cycle of evolving consciousness and practice 
reflecting attitudes and roles of inferiority and superiority among victims and 
perpetrators respectively.  
On the other hand for Sen, Adam Smith’s notion of ‘necessity’ means that the 
necessities that matter in society are a bundle of capabilities that enhance the 
functioning of human beings in their quest “to generate some minimally required 
freedoms such as the ability to appear in public without shame.”  (Sen 1999: 73).  
The relationship between functionings, capability and freedom in the context of 
inequality, poverty and deprivation in South Africa has its origins in the history of 
colonialism and apartheid. It is important to recall that during the years of 
colonialism and apartheid in South Africa the “broad institutional control and 
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distributive role” (Dugger in O’Hara, 2001) of the state was geared towards 
promoting enabling myths of the inferiority, of the majority black population and 
legally, and sometimes violently, denying them the bundle of capabilities that 
would enhance their functioning as human beings in society (Sen, 1999: 73).  
To reinforce his argument that inequality follows a circular cumulative process 
Dugger proposes a corollary that suggests that in subjecting their victims to 
material and social deprivation the perpetrators of inequality make it easier to look 
down on their victims as:  
…Inferior beings, and…undermine …(their)… self-confidence and self-
worth with invidious distinctions…(and)…find it easy to take further 
advantage …without feeling guilty.” The victims often react by “accepting 
their fate and by blaming themselves for their own shortcomings. Their even 
lower condition makes it easier still for the upper classes to ignore or 
despise them. All these processes increase the cumulative relative inequality 
between classes. (in O’Hara, 200: 506).   
The cumulative process of inequality is reinforced and underpinned by enabling 
myths of the superiority of the perpetrators and the sense of inferiority of the 
victims.  
The arguments put forward by Dugger apply equally to situations of slavery, 
colonialism, racial segregation and apartheid. These propositions have been well 
documented in the anti-colonial literature (Fanon, 1961); anti-racist literature  
(Myrdal, 1944, in O’Hara, 2001: 776; Sen, 1999), and anti-apartheid literature 
(Biko, 1978).  
Fanon (1961), the French psychiatrist, in particular addressed the devastating 
long-term impact of French colonialism and inequality on the psyche of the 
colonized in Algeria. More recently economists such as Heckman and Cunha 
(2009) have presented a study investigating the impact of the economics and 
psychology of inequality and human development on capabilities. The Heckman 
and Cunha paper was first presented as the Marshall Lecture at the European 
Economics Association, 2008 to commemorate the pioneering works of the 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century economist Alfred Marshall. Marshall is 
often considered to have laid many of the foundations of modern microeconomic 
theory. What is less known is that Marshall also considered inequality and poverty 
key variables in undermining economic growth and development.  
Reflecting on Marshall’s most important work it is not difficult to find references 
to his thoughts on the impact of inequality in generating poverty, dysfunctional 
behaviour and socio-economic ills in society. In the introduction to his Principles 
of Economics first published in 1890 Marshall writes eloquently about the role 
and impact of income inequality on household poverty.   
But the conditions which surround extreme poverty, especially crowded 
places, tend to deaden the higher faculties. Those who have been called the 
Residuum of our large towns have little opportunity for friendship; they 
know nothing of the decencies and the quiet, and very little even of the unity 
of family life; and religion often fails to reach them. No doubt their physical, 
mental, and the moral ill health is partly due to other causes than poverty: 
but this is the chief cause. (Marshall, 1920, Principles of Economics, Book I)  
It is important to note that Marshall did not stop at only analyzing the economic 
impact of wealth, inequality, injustice and poverty. In Chapter V, Book IV of 
Principles of Economics he went further to consider the impact of these variables 
on the health, strength, psychology and the evolution of consciousness14 and, 
efficiency of human beings in society. 
More recently, apart from Heckman and Cunha, other economists have studied the 
nefarious and insidious psychological effects of inequality and poverty on human 
capital as it relates to economic efficiency, growth and development. See in 
particular the studies by Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2001.  
Sen (1979) discussed the relationship between human capabilities and equality 
and traces the evolution of the different concepts of equality as it applies to the 
welfare and utility disadvantage of individuals and concludes that these traditional 
concepts have serious limitations. He argues that what is missing in these 
                                                
14 Marshall’s reference (See Note 63 to Chapter V) to “nervous strength” and “vigour” may be considered 
important attributes in the evolution of human psyche and consciousness.  
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conventional economic frameworks to equality and inequality is an understanding 
and, a recognition of the urgency related to the individual’s ability to do or 
perform certain basic functions that would make him or her a fuller human being 
in society. Traditional notions of equality focus on how welfare is enhanced by 
utility or primary goods or a combination of both. However, even though these 
notions of goods and/or their utility may include income, wealth, rights, liberties, 
opportunities and the social basis of self-respect the focus is still on the 
possession of these goods and rights rather than what they do to and for human 
beings. For Sen, a person’s ability to do certain things and be truly human 
depends on whether the person possesses some basic capabilities to move about; 
to meet nutritional needs; to be clothed and sheltered; and, to have the power and 
freedom to participate fully in the social life of the community. An alternative 
approach to the conventional understanding of equality according to Sen is the 
interpretation of needs as basic capabilities. Because Sen believes that the 
understanding of needs and interests is implicit in the demand for equality he calls 
this type of equality “basic capability equality” (Sen, 1979). The application of 
the capability approach to policy to deal with disparity and disadvantage in 
various countries is captured in a collection of essays edited by Comim, Qizilbash 
and Alkire (2008). 
Sen15, in 1999, alluded to the relationship between the evolution of consciousness, 
inequality and, its consequent impact on capabilities in achieving valuable 
functionings by the disadvantaged.  
The relevance of these different types of achievements in understanding a 
person’s advantages and disadvantages is not hard to establish. It is easily 
seen that people have reason to value living healthy and comfortable lives, 
with self-respect and social participation, and other functions of this kind. 
(My emphasis) … This is not merely because of the basic heterogeneity of 
                                                
15 Sen’s argument that the development of a person’s capabilities can also be a function of economic 
disparity is explored in a collection of essays on the concepts, measures and applications of the capability 
approach edited by Comim et al (2008).   
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pleasure… but also because of the adaptation of mental attitudes to chronic 
deprivation (the persistently deprived learns to take pleasure in small 
achievements, but that does not make her deprivation disappear) (Sen, 1999: 
31). 
While Sen and many modern day economists only address the systemic 
relationship between inequality, poverty, the provision of public infrastructure and 
its impact on labour in production, Marshall was keenly aware of the role played 
by physical infrastructure and public capital stock in the creation and distribution 
of wealth. In a sense he recognized much earlier the importance of unequal access 
to public infrastructure services as a key determinant in defining capabilities in the 
creation of wealth and, how its unequal distribution and inadequacy generates 
poverty. Discussing physical public goods which are common to all members of a 
community Marshall noted in Books II and IV the right of citizens to security, 
roads, energy, water and sanitation and housing (Marshall, 1920. Principles of 
Economics, Book II). In Book IV he recognizes that poor drainage can cause 
diseases and overcrowding and, slum conditions can lead to poor health and low 
self-esteem (Book IV, Chapter V, Marshall (1920). He advocated for government 
to provide public infrastructure facilities in the interests of the greater good of 
society and to promote economic growth. 
Marshall’s view on public capital underscores the importance of physical and 
social infrastructure in the lives of people. This view also highlights the role 
played by public infrastructure as a catalyst for economic growth and 
development in the structure of the economy.  
It is through the processes highlighted in the literature discussed above that 
inequality and disparity become structurally entrenched as part of the political 
economy of a country. 
Perspectives on Economic Disparity in South Africa and the Western 
Cape Province 
In South Africa effective governance for local government is constantly presented 
with the question of how to equitably finance the provision of public services 
while ensuring economic efficiency in the pursuit of growth and development. At 
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first sight this question seems to present as the perennial dilemma faced by 
development economists in the debates on the trade-off between equity and 
economic efficiency in the quest for long-term growth (Glyn and Miliband, 1994: 
2-12; Kanbur and Lustig, 1999). For South Africa all three spheres of government 
are bound by legal considerations to try and achieve equity without compromising 
on efficient economic growth and development. The Bill of Rights (Chapter 2) of 
the South African Constitution mandates the provision of basic services by all 
three spheres. Chapter 13 (Sections 213 and 214) of the Constitution also 
stipulates that the provision of such services be financed equitably taking into 
account certain considerations such as debt, deficit, economic efficiency, fiscal 
capacity and development among others. This section of the chapter reviews the 
literature with respect to inequalities and disparities that differentiate poorer local 
municipalities from their richer counterparts in the Western Cape province of 
South Africa.  
In the literature the relationship between the provision of public infrastructure and 
the geographical location of local communities is inextricably linked with the 
history of colonialism, slavery and apartheid in the Western Cape in particular and 
South Africa in general.  
Terreblanche, (2002), provides an in-depth analysis of the transition from slavery 
and indentured labour to legal and institutional inequality in South Africa under 
apartheid. The analysis argues that because of the history of slavery and apartheid 
the different forms of inequality have become systemically entrenched and will 
not be eradicated overnight. Terreblanche (2002: 11-13) traces eight patterns of 
labour relations in the transition from slavery (since 1652) to modern forms of 
inequality in South Africa. The eight patterns include direct legally forced labour; 
indentured and bonded labour; compulsory indentured labour; forced contract 
labour; migrant labour system; protected white labour system; balkanization of 
African labour in tribal reserves; and, a reserve army of impoverished and 
unemployed African workers. According to the author (Terreblanche 2002: 13) 
the evolving patterns of unequal labour and socio-economic relations has been 
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characterized, since the 1960s, by the increasing unemployment and poverty of 
black workers in general and African workers in particular.  
Terreblanche (2002) argues that the systemic exclusion of black people from the 
mainstream of the economy combined with low levels of direct investment and 
low levels of skills have marginalized African workers in particular, and made 
them ineligible for employment in the formal sectors of the economy. Data 
presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis suggest that many of the consequences of the 
patterns of labour relations presented by Terreblanche (2002) seem to persist in 
the economic, labour, property and social relations of the political economy of the 
Western Cape to in general and the Cape Winelands District in particular.  
The history of inequality from its genesis of colonialism, slavery and apartheid 
has received attention in other recent studies. Of particular significance is the 
study by Seeking and Natrass (2005) and, with specific reference to the Cape 
Winelands District of the Western Cape, the study by Andries du Toit (2004) is 
important and is discussed in Chapter 5 to identify some of the more salient 
features of economic disparity in the Cape Wineands District Municipality. 
Seeking and Natrass (2005) seem to confirm Terreblanche’s (2002) argument that 
the structural nature of inequality distinguishes South Africa from countries such 
as Brazil and India. Unlike in the latter the unemployed and those without 
incomes in South Africa do not have access to subsistence forms of livelihood. 
Disparities in the patterns of land and asset ownership, public infrastructure and 
access to basic services, especially for the rural poor in South Africa, have not 
changed significantly. The patterns of unequal labour relationships have become 
structurally entrenched as a result of the laws that forcibly relegated African and 
Coloured workers to remote rural areas far from the cities and access to 
infrastructure and public services. A detailed discussion of these features of 
economic disparity is presented in Chapter 5. The relationship between 
disparities, capability, public infrastructure and access to services is discussed in 
the next section on this chapter.   
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Disparity, capability, public infrastructure and access to services 
Sen (1997) argues that needs of individuals and communities for the attainment of 
basic capabilities are heterogeneous and, as such, are derived from a whole range 
of utility, welfare and value opportunities offered by environmental, economic, 
private and public agencies in the form of incomes, goods and services. 
Possessing basic capabilities to function as a human being in society depends on 
whether individuals and communities have access to incomes, goods and services 
offered by the environment, the state or the private sector. For individuals the 
primary services offered by the public sector and environment provide access to 
basic capability equality through education, health, housing, roads, transport, 
energy, and water and sanitation services. Such services create opportunities for 
individual incomes and resources and the attainment of basic capabilities through 
a chain of heterogeneous links made up of personal well being, environmental 
well being, access to public goods, community relational cohesion and solidarity, 
and household level welfare.  
For communities and individuals to access the primary services offered by the 
public, private and environmental sectors there must be adequate levels of 
investment in public infrastructure. Accessibility to primary services and the 
attainment of basic capability equality is dependent on the availability of adequate 
and appropriate public infrastructure. In as much as income and resource 
relationships to heterogeneous factors enhance individual capabilities, so too does 
investment in public infrastructure enhance capabilities in communities or 
municipalities.  
For Sen (1999), individual freedom is inextricably linked to the endowment of 
abilities and capabilities necessary for every human being in the quest for true 
humanity. A model for applying Sen’s capability approach developed by Dubois 
and Rousseau  (Comim et al, 2008) demonstrates that a person’s vulnerability is 
determined by a set of capabilities. Vulnerability increases in the face of higher 
risk and decreases with enhanced capability such that: 
Vulnerability = R/C where, R = risk                             (2.1) 
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The authors imply that by combining assets and access to services individuals and 
households can protect themselves from a pattern of various social risks and 
associated shocks when capability is a function of public capital investment, 
infrastructure services and accessibility to socio-economic opportunity such that:  
C =f(pki, pis, aeo)                                                      (2.2)  
Where 
C = capability 
pki = public capital investment 
pis = public infrastructure services 
aeo = accessibility to socio-economic opportunities 
 
Following from this relationship the authors argue that: 
Since everyone in daily life faces a pattern of various risks (social and 
idiosyncratic), it is the assets owned which prevents them from falling into 
poverty. According to their capacity of combining various assets, they will 
more or less (be) protected from the consequences of any corresponding 
shocks (Dubois and Rousseau in Comim et al, 2008: 429) 
This conclusion is an important linchpin principle in the development of the idea 
for my study for the thesis. Following the model let us assume in a local 
municipality there is a person i at date t with the ability to do things to deal with 
disparity and, who has the potential to be truly human. The ability to deal with 
disparity is used in the sense of the ‘doings’ of the person and the potential to be 
truly human is used in the sense of a person having endowments to avoid 
vulnerability (Sen, 1987). In this case the ability to confront disparity and the 
potential to be truly human are two components of person i’s level of capability. 
The level of capability is, therefore, a function of these two components such that: 
Ci,t = f(Ai,t ),(Pi,t )                                       (2.3) 
Where: 
Ci,t  = level of capability 
Ai,t  =ability to deal with disparity 
Pi,t  =potential to be truly human 
 
Also relevant for my analysis is the essay in Comim et al by Unterhalter (2008) 
on the capability approach in relation to state policy on gender, HIV/Aids and 
education in South Africa. Based on empirical evidence from a study of HIV/Aids 
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intervention policies in schools in Durban, South Africa, the author found that the 
application of the capability approach requires a keen understanding and 
acknowledgement of the importance of social theories of inequality “that allow us 
to understand what happens in the socially constructed spaces, in which the 
capability approach is applied…” (Unterhalter, in Comim et al, 2008: 504-505). 
Without such an understanding the author concludes that the application of the 
approach will be limited. In the study for the thesis I attempted to discuss and 
analyze the importance of inequality and disparity in the context of the Cape 
Winelands District as the socially constructed space in which the capability 
approach may be applied in order to give meaning to policies for equitably 
financing municipal infrastructure.    
The capabilities and functionings of the people of the Cape Winelands District 
can best be understood in the context of the lifecycle effects of the colonial and 
apartheid legacy of disparity and inequality in these disadvantaged communities. 
In an attempt to give practical meaning to Sen’s notion of ‘basic capability 
equality’ Yaquib (2008, in Comim et al: 438) refers to this as understanding 
capabilities and functionings over the lifecourse of a person as opposed to an 
ahistorical understanding of a person only as an adult. According to Yaquib to 
expand peoples’ capabilities to overcome poverty, policy interventions should 
best be made at childhood, when they are more likely to succeed. By lifecourse 
Yaquib (Comim et al: 437) means the process of growing up from childhood to 
adulthood. In this sense growing up is not only the essence of human development 
it is also a function of several factors amongst which childhood poverty and 
unequal opportunities to develop in childhood are key variables. The author 
presents data evidence that tracks individuals over several decades to show the 
links between “childhood deprivation and low adult attainments in health, 
education, income and psychosocial well-being.”  Yaquib (Ibid: 439-440) makes a 
strong case for applying the lifecourse approach to understanding the evolution of 
capabilities and functionings as the ability of individuals to make choices about 
and, have command over the use of a set of commodities that enhance their 
development over a long period of time. Citing Sen (1987: 26) the author argues 
that the reason for this is because the set of choices made by an individual is 
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invariably dependent on ‘personal and social factors’ affected by time in three 
ways.  
Firstly, command over income to access commodities that enhance functionings 
evolves over time according to the age effects determined by biological and social 
factors; the shared cohort effects; the serially dependent effects such as past anti-
poverty interventions and, random events in the life of the individual. Secondly, 
the individual’s ability to effectively utilize commodities is also dependent on the 
experience an individual has gained over a period of time. Thirdly, choices that 
enhance functionings may depend on when poor individuals make decisions to 
invest in physical, human or social capital. 
Adequate and equitably targeted investment in public infrastructure across 
different regions enhances personal and environmental capabilities and also 
addresses inequalities in regional per capita incomes. It also strengthens 
community relational cohesion; affords individuals accessibility to services and, 
reduces intra-regional inequality. The role of public infrastructure in providing 
communities access to basic capabilities can only be understood in the context of 
the relationship between interpersonal inequalities and spatial inequalities and 
disparities that distinguish communities or local municipalities from each other.   
The relationship between interpersonal and spatial dimensions of inequalities has 
received attention in a United Nations University-World Institute for 
Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) study project on spatial 
inequality and development directed by Ravi Kanbur and Anthony J. Venables 
(September, 2005). The objective of the study project was to try and explain why, 
in developing and transition economies, spatial and regional disparities in 
economic activity, incomes and social indicators, are increasing.  
The key findings of the Kanbur and Venables study project address three 
fundamental issues. The first is the extent of spatial disparities and their 
consequences. The second explains the levels and trends in spatial inequality. The 
third addresses the appropriate policy responses to spatial inequality. The study 
project was undertaken across a wide range of countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern 
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Europe and Latin America. The study concludes that despite the country 
heterogeneity spatial inequality is high and increasing. In assessing the diverse 
countrywide data the authors attribute the rise in spatial disparities to two key 
determinants. Firstly, certain regions are favoured by natural resource 
endowments such as proximity to rivers, ports and borders. These factors 
obviously account for the advantages enjoyed by such regions. Areas lacking in 
such endowments are, by implication, disadvantaged. The second determinant is 
infrastructure and openness to international trade. These factors are closely linked 
to benefits that may be derived from urban and industrial agglomeration and 
interactions that generate sustainable development and growth cycles. The authors 
assert that most of the empirical studies in the project show that public 
infrastructure is a key explanatory factor in rising spatial inequality in developing 
countries.  
The UNU-WIDER study project (Kanbur and Venables, 2005) highlights two 
reasons why policy makers should be concerned about rising spatial inequality.  
Firstly, inter-regional inequality within a country is but a spatial manifestation of 
overall national inequality across individuals. Policy makers should be concerned 
because when spatial inequality rises, national inequality also rises. Secondly, in 
situations where regional socio-economic disparities coincide with political, 
ethnic, language or religious divisions resulting from historical and institutional 
roots then spatial inequality should be of concern to policy makers governed by 
considerations of inter-regional equity enshrined in their constitutions. The latter 
consideration is of particular relevance for South Africa and, given the history of 
Western Cape, of sub-regions within the Western Cape Province. The study 
project argued for targeted spatially equitable public infrastructure and public 
service allocations to address inequalities between and within regions.  
In South Africa Havemann and Kearney (2006) analyze the relationship of spatial 
inequality to labour market outcomes. The paper reports the results of an 
empirical study that uses econometric regression analyses to show that, given the 
apartheid political legacy of irrational spatial planning, location is a key 
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determinant for labour market outcomes. The authors introduce a new 
urbanization index as an input into their econometric analysis. 
The study found that there was a positive relationship between the probability of 
being employed and the degree of urbanization. While this is true for most local 
municipalities in South Africa there are exceptions to the rule for six smaller 
municipalities. In these municipalities it was found that factors such as location 
near to a national highway or rail linkage to a metropolitan area, or a relatively 
well educated or highly skilled workforce played an important role in making 
these municipalities more successful despite their location. It is interesting to note 
that four of the six municipalities studied are located in the Western Cape 
Province and one of the four, namely Stellenbosch, falls within the Cape 
Winelands District, the focus area of the research for my thesis.  From the results 
of their study the authors argue that while urbanization offers investment 
opportunities that may determine labour market outcomes, policy makers should 
not ignore or underestimate the investment potential of smaller municipalities to 
influence labour market outcomes. Drawing on the recommendations of the UNU-
WIDER study project the authors strongly advocate higher levels of public 
investment in public transport infrastructure for railways and roads to reduce the 
structural spatial inequalities that separate the rural poor from the urban rich. The 
study argues that such investment will create opportunities for more positive 
labour market outcomes and an improvement in household incomes.  
Another international study on child labour and access to basic services 
(Guarcello, Lyon and Rosati, 2004) comes very close to showing a possible causal 
link between infrastructure provision and basic capabilities.16 The study sets out to 
show how the availability of certain basic services can affect the value of 
children’s time and, consequently, household decisions on how this time may be 
allocated between school and work. If education is a key input into developing 
basic capabilities then household decisions on allocations of time between school 
                                                
16 The International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF and World Bank initiated the study jointly in 2000 
under a programme called Understanding Children’s Work (UCW). 
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and work is bound to influence the capability outcomes of households and the 
levels of basic capability inequality between households.  
The Guarcello et al study investigates the availability and access of infrastructure 
services such as water and electricity as a determining factor in household 
decisions about children’s time spent between work and school. The study also 
applies an econometric methodology to data from five developing countries to 
investigate the impact that the access to water and electricity has on children’s 
activities. Using several advanced econometric techniques and sensitivity analyses 
the authors are able to make conclusions about the causal relationship between 
water and electricity access and children’s activities. The study concludes that 
households with access to water and electricity are more likely to send their 
children to school and less likely to send them to work or keep them at home. The 
study also shows that the availability of water and electricity encourages early 
school enrolment and reduces dropout rates at later ages. For policy makers the 
findings of the study mean that the provision of access to infrastructure based 
services such as water and electricity is crucial for areas where school attendance 
is low and child labour is high.  
All three studies reviewed above demonstrate that the inadequate provision of 
basic services and the lack of physical access to these services seriously handicap 
disadvantaged communities in the attainment of basic capability equality. Given 
the evidence from the literature discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter 
it is clear that the national government has a responsibility and obligation to 
ensure that local municipalities provide the necessary public infrastructure for 
their citizens in general and, more specifically, for those communities that still 
suffer the consequences of an apartheid legacy of structural economic disparity. 
National government fulfils this obligation through the allocation of 
intergovernmental infrastructure grant transfers to local municipalities. In the 
following sections of this chapter I review some literature on how government can 
effectively use a municipal infrastructure grant model to equitably and efficiently 
allocate such grants so that disadvantaged communities may benefit from such 
transfers.  
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Resource Allocation, Institutions and Social Justice 
The grant model developed in this thesis is a tool for resolving the allocation 
problem that arises when the State is confronted with having to serve the interests 
of justice at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic level with respect to the 
provision of basic public infrastructure. Generically, the allocation problem, 
Young (1994: 6) notes, is about how institutions distribute “specific benefits and 
burdens” within the framework of the principles of social justice and the 
legitimacy of different forms of government. However, he notes further that 
theories of social justice are not specifically concerned with distributive problems 
at the microeconomic level. Young (1994: 7) argues strongly that as gross 
disparities and inequities are the result of the cumulative effects of local decisions, 
they should be rectified through redistributive policies at the societal or national 
level and “not by trying to coordinate the decisions of local allocative 
institutions”. This condition is in South Africa satisfied because national 
government has a constitutional obligation to strengthen the legitimacy of sub-
national forms of governments to achieve social justice by equitably distributing 
nationally collected revenue to provinces and municipalities. 
In South Africa, addressing gross disparities and inequities of the apartheid past 
and achieving social justice through redistributive policies at the level of local 
government is prescribed in the Constitution and legislation. In this regard 
Liebenberg (2010) affirms: 
The Constitution seeks to create an enabling legal framework for redressing 
the injustices of the past and creating a transformed society ‘based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’. A 
fundamental feature of this Constitution is a holistic Bill of Rights, which 
integrates civil and political rights with socio-economic and cultural rights. 
All of these rights are enforceable by the courts, which have a broad 
discretion to grant just and equitable remedies. (Preface: xxi).  
However, in terms of local government responsibility Steytler and De Visser 
(2007: 7-9), argue that the socio-economic rights in the Constitution only translate 
into a requirement for local municipalities to provide services to all individuals 
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where these rights intersect with the functional responsibilities of local 
governments to provide basic municipal services. Amongst the rights that may be 
associated with the provision of municipal services the authors include access to 
housing, health care services, sufficient food and water, social security and social 
assistance. While these rights fall within the ambit of municipal competence there 
are other rights such as the access to sufficient water and housing that are the 
concurrent functional responsibility of all three spheres of government. In the 
former the obligation is on the municipality and in the latter the municipality 
plays a crucial complementary and supplementary role.  
The institutional dilemma and difficulty for local municipalities is how to achieve 
redistributive justice through the allocation of scarce own resources. Thus, with 
respect to redistributive justice the cumulative effect of local municipal decisions 
about the allocation problem of scarce own resources may be rectified through 
redistributive policies at the national level. Through this process the municipal 
allocation problem becomes an issue of how the institution of national 
government distributes “specific benefits and burdens” Young (1994: 6) within 
the framework of the principles of social justice and gives credence to the 
legitimacy of local government. It is for this reason that the thesis proposes a 
municipal infrastructure grant model for national government to fulfill its 
responsibility for the equitable sharing of municipal infrastructure grants.   
For the construction of the municipal infrastructure grant model in this thesis I 
retain Young’s specific principles and definition of the allocation problem. 
(Young, 1994: 7-8). Young defines the allocation problem as follows: 
An allocation problem arises whenever a bundle of resources, rights, 
burdens, or costs is temporarily held in common by a group of individuals 
and must be allotted to them individually. An allocation or distribution is an 
assignment of the objects to specific individuals…An allocation is a decision 
about who gets a good or who bears a burden, and is usually decided by a 
group or by an institution acting on behalf of the group” 
From Young’s definition of the allocation problem, and his subsequent discussion 
I retain several foundational principles for the construction of the infrastructure 
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grant model. Young discusses eight factors give rise to allocation decisions. 
Allocation decisions are taken when a set of resources, rights, burdens or costs are 
temporarily and collectively controlled by a group of individuals who also have 
individual entitlements to the resources, rights, burdens or costs. Secondly, an 
allocation means an assignment to specific individuals by a group or institution 
acting on behalf of the group about who gets the good or who bears the burden. 
This principle is captured in the tables presented in Chapter 4 in the sense that the 
tables identify the government institutions as the groups, acting on behalf of the 
nation as a whole, that determine who gets the goods and services and who bears 
the tax burden.  
Thirdly, a decision may be about allocating a good, a service or a burden. 
Fourthly, a good, service or burden may be homogeneous and divisible such as 
money or water. Fifthly, a good or service may be inhomogeneous and divisible 
like land. Sixthly, a good or service may be homogeneous and indivisible like 
seats in parliament or exemptions from obligations. Seventhly, they may be 
heterogeneous and indivisible such as in allocating kidneys for transplant or 
places in universities or jobs for designated groups. Eighth, the goods may be 
fixed (by law) or variable in the sense that the required resources may not be 
readily available at a given time.  
According to Young (1994: 8) the allocation is effective if it results from three 
different types and levels of institutional decisions. These types are the supply 
decision about the quantity of goods or services to be distributed; the distributive 
decision about the formula, principle or instrument according to which goods or 
services are allocated to beneficiaries; and, a reactive decision made by 
individuals in response to the institutional choices made. Young’s study focuses 
specifically on the rules of distribution applicable to distributive decision-making 
and the principles on which these rules are founded. Young (1994: 8) defines the 
allocation rule as follows: 
In general an allocation rule is a method, process, or formula that allocates 
any given supply of goods among any potential group of claimants 
according to the salient characteristics of those claimants.  
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The equity principles of Parity, Proportionality, and Priority describe the general 
structure of an allocation rule and are the foundations of theories of distributive 
justice discussed by Sen (1997) and Young (1994). Parity means that all 
claimants should be treated equally; Proportionality recognizes that goods and 
services must be divided according to the established differences amongst 
claimants; and, Priority affirms that the person with the greatest need is entitled to 
a first claim on the goods or services. The content of an allocation rule, however, 
is more complicated in practice and, according to Young (1994: 9), requires 
normative principles that emerge from empirical rules-based institutional choices, 
judgments and compromises between competing principles. In the thesis I attempt 
to incorporate the equity principles of parity, proportionality and priority by 
using a composite disparity index in a formula that allocates the supply of 
infrastructure funds for the benefit of disadvantaged communities living in local 
municipalities.  
Constructing a composite disparity index is a complex proposition and is beset 
with many difficulties. In the following section I review some of the literature on 
constructing composites indices and the difficulties associated with such attempts. 
The literature is reviewed in the context of approaches to grant allocations based 
on the equity principles of parity, proportionality and priority. 
Approaches to Grant Allocations Accounting for Capital Cost 
Disparities  
Following from the equity principles discussed by Young (1994) an important 
component in the design of grant systems is accounting for cost differences in the 
resources required to achieve comparable service levels.  These differences arise 
due to variations in demography, geography and socio-economic disparities 
among sub-regions. However, determining normative principles of parity, 
proportionality and priority to account for cost disparities in grant formulae from 
institutional choices remains the biggest challenge.  As discussed in the literature 
structural inequality in levels of development, including critical capital backlogs 
is a major determinant of regional disparities. Even though a country’s 
constitutional and legislative framework may provide a firm foundation for 
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making rules based institutional choices regional disparities are difficult to 
prioritize and measure and very few countries attempt to do so in a detailed way. 
Reschovsky (2007) makes the point that estimating the differences in sub-regional 
input costs that should be incorporated in a grant model can be controversial and 
highly political because parochial considerations play a crucial role in determining 
what sub-regional features, characteristics and indicators are prioritized and taken 
into account. In the absence of clear normative principles based on institutional 
choices any judgments and compromises between competing principles will be 
perceived as less than objective. Explanations as to how the parameters in grant 
allocations were estimated would most likely raise suspicions that the weights 
were chosen on the basis of political and/or parochial considerations.  
Despite the challenges and difficulties of doing so there is general agreement 
amongst public finance practitioners that, in principle, differences in fiscal 
requirements ought to be included in equalization grants targeting disadvantaged 
communities. This is especially true in systems where sub-regions have little 
revenue-raising capacity of their own. Any attempts to incorporate disparity cost 
indicators in grant formulae would contribute to the economic stability, fiscal 
equity and efficiency of the intergovernmental system. More particularly taking 
account of disparity cost indicators would ensure compliance with the equity rules 
of parity, proportionality and priority in allocation formulae. Some perspectives 
on the inclusion of disparity cost indicators for ensuring parity, proportionality 
and priority in grant allocations are reviewed in the following section. Particular 
attention is focused on how disparity indicators can be used for prioritizing the 
person with the greatest need being entitled to a first claim on the goods or 
services provided by the state because such claimants have been the victims of 
established structural inequalities. 
Perspectives on constructing disparity cost indicators for grant allocations 
To more effectively take account of municipal disparities in a capital grant model 
several composite cost disparity indices for disadvantage and socio-economic 
inequality may be constructed from sets of sub-indicators. International best 
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practice shows how other countries have captured the disparity costs in formulae 
for delivering services to regions with varying degrees of disparities.  
In Switzerland and Japan for example (Petchey et al, 2004; Reschovsky, 2007), 
residential location in remote and inaccessible geographical areas is used as a 
factor to calculate grant subsidies to these sub-regions. The first such sub-
indicator may be population dispersion. Consider, for example, a geographically 
large municipality with a dispersed population.  The cost of providing a school or 
hospital in the remote regions of such a municipality is higher than the cost of 
providing the same school or hospital in an urban metropolitan municipality with 
a predominately city-based population.  This is so because, to provide a school or 
hospital in a remote location, it is also necessary to incur the cost of providing 
access roads, extending electricity and water systems and other infrastructure.  As 
a result of such ‘population dispersion disparity’ the per capita unit cost of the 
flow of capital services in such a municipality may be relatively high. However, 
Reschovsky (2007) argues that that the key problem in estimating the costs of 
such inputs in the provision of public services is “identifying which factors are 
likely to play a role in influencing the costs of services and then determining the 
quantitative importance of those factors.” (Reschovsky, 2007: 404). (Italics)  
A second example of a composite capital cost disparity measure that may be 
relevant in South Africa relates to debilitating diseases. If a municipality has a 
relatively high incidence of debilitating diseases such as HIV/Aids or TB in its 
population, then the cost of each unit of health service may be high compared to a 
municipality with a relatively lower incidence of such diseases.  This is because 
HIV/Aids and TB require more social infrastructure resources to manage services.  
Although there is no conclusive evidence (Lienhardt, 2001) to suggest a causal 
link between debilitating diseases such as TB and HIV/AIDS and environmental 
or socio-economic conditions some studies (David et al, 2007) suggest that socio-
economic and environmental conditions such as overcrowding and informal slum 
settlements are closely associated with a higher incidence of TB and HIV/AIDS. 
From this observation one can assume that the cost of providing a given unit of 
public service output may be higher in municipalities with structural 
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disadvantages resulting from the injustices of policies of the apartheid past. For 
example, the cost of achieving given educational and health outcomes for people 
from poor families may be higher than the cost of achieving the same educational 
or health outcomes for people from richer backgrounds. Municipalities with more 
poor people (unemployed, lower incomes) and victims of past socio-economic 
discrimination might, therefore, be expected to incur higher costs in achieving 
given health and educational outcomes. Thus, some aggregated measure of socio-
economic inequality and debilitating disease sub-indicators may be included in a 
composite capital cost disparity index.  
As it is cumbersome to use a broad array of capital cost disparity indicators in a 
model for infrastructure grants to municipalities, one way of incorporating several 
sub-indicators into a model is to aggregate all the sub-indicators into a single 
composite capital cost disparity indicator. One such approach was used to 
construct the Financial and Fiscal Commission’s (FFC) Capital Grant Scheme 
Model with Provincial Disabilities (Petchey et al 2004). In the FFC model the 
incorporation of multiple disparity indicators (called disabilities) began with the 
identification of a capital cost disparity indicator and the definition of its capital 
cost disparity function. Following this procedure used for provinces a capital cost 
disparity for a given municipality can be defined in order to arrive at a capital cost 
disparity function. In Chapter 4 of the thesis I present a method adapted from the 
Petchey et al paper (2004) for constructing disparity indices for the five Cape 
Winelands District local municipalities. The actual values for the disparity indices 
are calculated in the simulation model and presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
Australia is an example where the equalization grants formula attempts to 
incorporate needs and disparity factors (called disabilities) in a sophisticated way 
to determine the horizontal allocation of grants among states. Petchey, Shapiro, 
MacDonald and Koshy (2000) developed a model demonstrating how to capture 
differences within fiscal equalization formulae in capital costs across Australian 
states. However, in a later study completed for the Australian Commonwealth 
Grants Commission, Chan, MacDonald and Petchey (2007) made an important 
finding that highlighted the difficulty with incorporating disparity costs in grant 
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formulae. The authors found that while they were able to identify and estimate the 
statistical significance of the main indicators that influence the cost of providing 
services they were unable to produce econometric results because of data 
limitations related to sample size and imprecise demand and supply definitions of 
disparity related proxies. The authors concluded that unless reliable data became 
available the study offered the best alternative for identifying disparity indicators 
in Australia. 
In South Africa, in addition to the models developed by Petchey et al (2004) and 
Josie, MacDonald and Petchey (2008), another attempt was made to construct a 
grant model that incorporates disparities. In October 2007 Petchey et al 
constructed, for the FFC, a model that attempts to capture inequality and poverty 
disparities within provinces and municipalities in South Africa. In all the FFC 
allocation models composite capital cost disparity indicators were constructed and 
incorporated into the model.  
Identifying proxies for disparity indicators in South Africa is not new and has in 
fact been the subject of other studies with particular focus on constructing health 
and deprivation indices. Of significance are two studies on regional trends of 
deprivation and health disparities for informing public funding allocation 
strategies in South Africa by Di McIntyre et al (2000) and, Di McIntyre and 
Okore Okorafor (2003).  
The first study by McIntyre et al (2000) constructed four specific alternative 
deprivation indices to achieve vertical equity goals in the allocation of limited 
government resources. The aim of the study was to evaluate the significance of 
small spatial units in developing deprivation indices for prioritizing need in the 
allocation of state financial resources. To ensure that disparities for deprivation 
are not assumed to be of equal importance the variables were given differential 
weightings. The deprivation index developed in this study represents a state of 
social and material disadvantage experienced by an individual, household, group 
or community relative to the general norm in society as a whole. In this sense 
McIntyre et al (2000) assert that deprivation is closely related to Sen’s human 
capabilities in that deprivation may be seen as the inability to achieve an adequate 
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level of basic capability relative to the societal norm. The second study by 
McIntyre and Okore (2003) was an attempt to construct multiple deprivation 
indices from the 2001 South African census data at the level of the local 
municipality. From this study I incorporate the deprivation indices developed for 
the five Cape Winelands District Municipalities as sub-indicators for constructing 
a capital cost disparity indicator for the municipal infrastructure grant model 
proposed in this thesis.  
Several difficulties are associated with attaching differential weightings to 
disparities. In some instances this is related to the paucity of data and information 
in transitional economies like South Africa. In the weighting schemes adopted in 
the studies by Petchey et al (2004) and McIntyre et al (2000) the approaches do 
not offer the possibility of reasonable bounds within which the weights may be 
specified. Nevertheless, the usefulness of such indicative tools in 
intergovernmental systems is that, compared to arbitrary decisions based on 
prevailing political interests, they provide a more objective mechanism for 
equitably allocating a limited pool of available funds. Given these shortcomings it 
is prudent to explore other weighting schemes that may go towards resolving 
some of these difficulties.  
In the literature on disparity indices reviewed thus far the issue of attributing 
differential weights to disparity indicators to distinguish their varying degrees of 
importance in the scale of priorities is perceived as a fundamental challenge in 
grant allocation models (Chan et al, 2007).  Without clearly identifying and 
defining the most important variables for disparity measuring the parity, 
proportionality and priority normative indicators will be very difficult. As is the 
case with the McIntyre et al (2000) study this difficulty can be overcome through 
an arbitrary normative policy decision by attributing differential weightings to 
avoid the assumption that disparities are equally important. This is not an ideal 
alternative although I adopt this principle in developing composite disparity 
indices for this thesis. Chan et al (2007) argue that econometrically defining and 
estimating proxy disparity weights can be achieved if reliable sample size data is 
available and, if demand and supply disparity related proxies are more precisely 
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defined. However, in the literature on constructing composite indicators there are 
alternative methods for constructing and identifying weights that can determine 
the varying degrees of importance of a variable in a model. In the next few 
paragraphs I will explore one such alternative proposed by Cherchye et al (2006). 
The composite indicator (CI) in Cherchye et al (2006) is presented as a weighted 
average of individual sub-indicators and defined as:     
 
          
CIc = wc,i .yc,in
i=1
m
!
                                                                       (2.4) 
Where: 
Ic :  composite index for country j,
yc,in : the (possibly normalized) value for country j  for sub-indicator i (i=1,...m),  
wi : the weight  assigned to indicator i.  
Weights are bounded such that 0 ! wc,i !1 and wc,i
i=1
m
" = 1
 
In the paper composite indicators are used to summarize a set of diverse sub-
indicators for the purpose of comparing countries with each other or, to assess 
their evolution over time. In general the ultimate goal of a composite indicator is 
to compare an entity relative to other entities in the set as a function of some 
benchmark policy objective determined from within the set of entities.   
In proposing an alternative approach to constructing composite indicators the 
authors argue that the standard approach has two important shortcomings that 
have raised criticism against the use of composite indicators. Firstly, the standard 
approach is overly dependent on preliminary normalization aggregation 
techniques for ranking countries. The main purpose of normalization aggregation 
techniques is to ensure that sub-indicator data sets are comparable and use 
measurements that are consistent across the sub-sets of data to be aggregated and 
weighted. However, in the process normalization aggregation techniques 
transform original data and this may result in changes in the ranking of the 
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variable. Such changes resulting from normalization techniques make the 
composite indicator meaningless and raise disputes and disagreements amongst 
stakeholders with respect to the credibility of the selected composite indicator. 
The authors suggest that a method that does not require normalization would 
eliminate this dependency and the basis of the criticism. 
The second shortcoming and source of criticism against the use of composite 
indicators is associated with the weighting scheme for aggregating sub-indicators. 
Very often there are stakeholder disagreements about the selection process and 
choice of sub-indicators to be aggregated into a composite indicator. To resolve 
such disagreements some experts propose the equal weighting of all sub-
indicators as a compromise (See McIntyre et al, 2000 and Petchey et al, 2004). 
However, equal weighting will be misleading because it does not reveal any 
specific knowledge about the importance of true weights in the scale of priorities. 
Equal weighting will be meaningless and a useless exercise as the initial purpose 
of the weighting procedure is to reveal the relative significance of the sub-
indicators being aggregated. This poses the same problem encountered with 
normalization techniques where ranking scores depend on the weighting scheme. 
Fixed or equal weighting schemes will invariably be an advantage for some 
countries while being a disadvantage for others. Inherently such a scheme is 
insensitive to the regional specificities of each country or region being compared. 
Consequently, it defeats the purpose of taking into account the country specific 
differences for which a model may have been initially constructed as was the case 
with the FFC provincial capital expenditure model. To overcome the 
shortcomings above Cherchye et al (2006) propose the use of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (See Cooper et al, 2000) and the Benefit of the Doubt method for 
constructing composite indicators (see also the OECD Handbook on Constructing 
Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide, 2008). 
DEA is a linear programming tool17 and has been extensively used to construct 
composite indicators for policy performance assessment  (Chercheye et al, 2006). 
                                                
17 Linear Programming is a mathematical method for finding the maximum or minimum of a function under a 
set of given constraints. It is often used to determine the optimal allocation of scarce resources by selecting 
and applying appropriate weights to a set of observations. 
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In the European Union it is used to address the need for a weighting system that 
includes country specific sensitivity and flexibility in allocating resources in the 
context of tensions between the centre and states. Chercheye et al (2006:4) argue 
that the DEA technique may also be used for constructing composite indicators 
where quantitative sub-indicators are available but exact information of weights is 
unavailable. Melyn and Moesen first applied the technique in 1991 to evaluate 
macroeconomic performance (As cited in Cherecheye et al, 2006: 4) and called it 
the ‘Benefit of the Doubt’ method. 
The ‘Benefit of the Doubt’ method is based on a key principle of the DEA 
technique, namely that information on an appropriate weighting scheme may be 
sourced from official data available in a country. In evaluating performance, for 
example, one can assume that the required available sub-indicator data set will 
reflect the relative significance or importance of that particular sub-indicator in 
the policy decisions of the country. In other words the problem of lack of 
knowledge of a country’s ‘true’ policy weights can be resolved by assuming that 
these can be inferred from analyzing the relative significance or importance that a 
country attaches to a particular sub-indicator. The country is given the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’ on the basis of the relative importance or, significance it attaches to a 
particular set of sub-indicators. Weights in this sense are estimated separately for 
each region and, region specific weights accorded to each sub-indicator are 
endogenously determined. Thus the problem of having to apply equal weights to 
all sub-indicators is averted and flexibility is introduced into the weighting 
scheme albeit within given parametric constraints. 
Given the shortcomings associated with estimating weights discussed earlier it 
will be extremely difficult for policy makers to determine which of the many sub-
indicators to prioritize when taking into account several dimensions in a model. 
Government policy statements about priorities themselves do not represent a 
quantitative weight that can be attached to each dimension to facilitate 
prioritization (Moesen and Chercheye, 1998: 14-15). Furthermore there is the 
possibility that governments may change priorities over time (Moesen and 
Chercheye, 1998: 15): 
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There remains…the more fundamental question of weather the publicly 
announced objectives coincide with the true goals of policy makers. In other 
words: the stated preferences may deviate from the actual preferences.”  
In the presence of this limited quantitative information, Moesen and Chercheye, 
(1998: 15) provide a rationale for applying the DEA and relative ‘Benefit of 
Doubt’ weights to construct a composite indicator to measure macroeconomic 
performance in the context of the European Union. 
For all these problems we will…develop a mathematical technique which 
allows allocating relative weights when only relative information is 
available. The technique that will be used is based on DEA. This technique 
weights the components of the synthetic (read composite) performance 
indicator in such a way that each country gets the benefit of the doubt. The 
latter implies that the highest weights are attached to those indicators for 
which the country performs relatively better. In other words, a particular 
dimension is deemed to be important for a country if the country performs 
well in that dimension when compared to other countries. 
In addition to its ability to estimate unequal weights in the presence of limited 
information it is also important to note two other properties of the DEA-‘Benefit 
of Doubt’ method. Firstly, in constructing a composite indicator, it allows for the 
estimation of weights associated with each sub-indicator to be bounded between 
values of 0 and 1. Secondly, both the weights and the benchmark (called the 
efficiency frontier) are endogenous to the model and estimated empirically from 
the data set used by the model. Although this method is not adopted for this thesis 
it provides a useful indication of the possibility that is available for prioritizing 
weights for disparity indicators. The literature reviewed in this section provides 
sufficient evidence to suggest that it is possible to use disparity indices such that 
they ensure parity, proportionality and priority in the equitable allocation of 
limited government infrastructure grants.  
Taking account of economic disparities in infrastructure grant allocations as 
proposed in this thesis will have wider economic impacts than just addressing and 
mitigating the immediate effects of deprivation. It is implied in the literature (see 
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Taylor, 1991 and, Fitzgerald and Vos, 1989) reviewed in this chapter that in 
addition to addressing economic disparity, taking account of capital cost 
disparities will also have positive economic benefits for local communities and 
the national economy as whole. From the macroeconomic dimension, adequate 
and uniform access to services in general and public infrastructure services in 
particular are important for maximizing the gains from trade and promoting the 
efficiency of intra-regional common factor markets for goods and services. (See 
Petchey et al, 2007). It is for this reason that a municipal infrastructure grant 
model also has to take account of fiscal capacity and economic efficiency when 
equitably allocating grants. This principle is explicitly recognized in Section 
214(2) (e) of the South African Constitution.  
To achieve maximum economic benefits the level of and, the changes in, the 
norms and standards of infrastructure provision have to be maintained at a 
constant and consistent rate to ensure sustainable economic growth. This is 
particularly important where the cost of socio–economic inequalities and 
disparities grow proportionately and differentiate communities across sub-regions. 
These cost disparities and inequalities are reflected in indicators of high 
unemployment, low fiscal capacity, economic inefficiency, poverty and 
deprivation.  In the absence of uniform minimum norms and standards these 
disparities are further exacerbated and lead to unequal net fiscal benefit across 
regional boundaries (Boadway, 2004). Very often this translates into the rapid 
mobility and migration of labour, skills, goods, capital, services and other 
production factors across regional boundaries. The in-migration and over-
crowding in towns and cities mentioned in the introduction to this thesis is one of 
the main consequences of this rapid mobility of factors. It is also clear from the 
literature on structural macroeconomic theory that allocating grants to address 
capital backlogs and provide basic infrastructure services will have significant 
impacts on the macroeconomic aggregates of any economy because of the 
positive impacts on capital stock aggregates. In the next part of the this chapter I 
review the literature with regard to understanding the relationships between 
infrastructure grants, investment in public capital stock and the impact of these 
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variables on the macroeconomic structure of the economy (see Figure 4.1 in 
Chapter 4).    
Infrastructure and Capital Stock in Macroeconomic Aggregates   
Municipal service infrastructure constitutes a small but important component of 
the national aggregate fixed public sector capital stock. In turn the aggregated 
fixed public sector capital stock is a factor in determining the composition of the 
fixed investment variable in achieving macroeconomic policy objectives. In 
explaining the role of fixed public sector capital stock in South Africa’s aggregate 
fixed investment Natrass (2000: 9) argues that: 
The private sector accounts for the most significant fraction of total 
investment (currently more than 70%) in South Africa…the share of the 
government sector (the public authorities and the public corporations) has 
been declining steadily since the early 1980s. While this potentially frees up 
resources for the private sector, it can be harmful to growth in instances 
where public investment is a necessary condition for private investment (e.g. 
economic infrastructure).  
This argument neatly sums up why public investment especially at the local level 
is a necessary condition for promoting private investment and, consequently, 
economic growth and development.  
A country’s macroeconomic aggregate indicators for economic growth are 
captured annually in the National Accounts. Natrass (2000: 7-11) presents a 
succinct explanation of the role of capital stock in South Africa’s National 
Accounts. I summarize the key points below.  
Gross capital formation (GCF) consists of investment spending on fixed capital; 
that is, gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) plus changes in 
inventories of capital stocks such that: 
GCF = GDFCF + changes in inventories.                                           (2.5) 
Investment is the sum of all spending on capital goods by both the private and 
public sector for a given period before taking into account the rate of depreciation. 
 
 
 
 
  66 
Capital investment includes fixed investment in machinery, plant and related 
equipment, construction and building and changes in the inventories on existing 
capital stock due to additions to the physical stock of capital. Inventories refer to 
unsold stocks. In South Africa’s the national accounts, gross domestic product 
(GDP), the key indicator for economic growth, is calculated from the sum of all 
expenditures, factor incomes or outputs.  
Based on total expenditures GDP can be written as: 
GDP = C + GCF + G + X – Z          (2.6) 
Where: 
C = consumption 
G = government spending 
GCF = Gross capital formation 
X = exports 
Z = imports 
Based on total factor incomes GDP can be written as: 
GDP = C + GDS + T                       (2.7) 
Where: 
GDS = Gross domestic savings 
T = Taxation (all taxes) 
Generally accepted national accounting principles posit that total expenditures 
should equal total factor incomes such that: 
GDP = C + GCF + G + X – Z = C + GDS + T          (2.8) 
Transposing and substituting GCF for GDCF 
GDP = (G – T) + (X – Z) = GDS – GDCF                (2.9) 
In national accounting terms  
(G – T)  is the government budget deficit or surplus 
(X – Z)  is the balance of payments current account surplus or deficit 
GDS – GDCF is the net capital inflow from abroad and change in gold and other 
foreign reserves.  
Generally accepted national accounting principles also posit that  
GDS = GCF and is an ex post  (i.e. after the fact) national accounting identity. 
Therefore  
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GDS – GCF = 0 by definition.  
From equation (2.8) it is clear that increased government spending (G) and 
increases in gross capital formation (GCF) will have a significant impact on 
economic growth. 
Vane & Thompson, (1989: 23-24) explain the key determinants of fixed 
investment (i.e. gross capital formation) and the role this variable plays in the 
changes to the GDP. The authors explain that there are two important 
determinants of gross capital formation (GFC). One is the cost of borrowing funds 
to finance investment expenditure, i.e. the rate of interest. The other is a change in 
national income (or equivalent output) determined by investment spending in 
fixed capital stock. If the desired capital stock (K*) is some function of output (Y) 
then: 
Kt* = vYt                                                             (2.10) 
If this relationship is lagged by one period we have 
Kt=1* = vYt!1                                                         (2.11) 
Subtracting (2.11) from (2.10)   
Kt* ! Kt!1* = vYt ! vYt!1 = v("Yt )                        (2.12) 
Where  
!   symbolizes change in a variable. 
Assuming that actual levels of capital stock equals desired level of capital stock 
then  
Kt* ! Kt!1*                             
is the actual change in the capital stock or investment spending on fixed capital 
and 
It = v(!Yt )                         (2.13) 
where !t represents investment spending at time t.  
The authors argue that besides fixed capital investment there are other 
determinants of general investment. These determinants include variations in 
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business confidence (for example, renewed optimism will lead to increases in 
investment), and government taxation policies leading to changes in the 
profitability of investment. (Vane & Thompson, 1989: 24). Provide full reference 
By the same token my argument is that any increase in allocations of government 
spending on municipal infrastructure will have a significant impact on the levels 
of capital stock in general and local economic development in particular. 
However, to determine the desired level of capital stock needed to achieve 
economic objectives a reasonable estimate of existing capital stock has to be 
calculated. The difference between the desired level and existing level of capital 
stock is the level of capital backlog that has to be eradicated. The cost of 
eradicating capital backlogs while taking account of capital cost disparities 
determines the level of fixed investment that will be required to achieve 
macroeconomic policy objectives.  
Perspectives on infrastructure investment and economic growth and 
development 
Literature on public infrastructure investment shows that there is a link between 
public capital investment, capital formation, increasing human resource potential 
and economic development and growth. The rapid growth and development in the 
economies of India, Malaysia, Singapore and South East Asia in general 
demonstrates the importance of public capital formation in economic growth 
strategies in these countries. In these economies capital formation and 
productivity growth is closely linked. Timmer and van Ark (2002) demonstrate 
this relationship in constructing fixed non-residential capital stocks for South 
Korea and Taiwan.  
While the literature shows that most Asian economies saw an increase in capital 
stock infrastructure investment in the 1980s and 1990s, Ndulu et al (2005) and 
Ndulu (2006) notes that in sub-Saharan Africa inadequate public infrastructure is 
the greatest obstacle to faster economic growth. In this regard Sub-Saharan 
African economies were characterized by low capital accumulation, high prices of 
investment goods, low productivity of investment and a higher level of 
geographical disadvantages that compromised growth and regional integration.       
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 Naqvi, (2003) in a macroeconomic study comparing the productivity of public 
capital against private capital in Pakistan from 1965 to 2000 examined the role of 
public infrastructure finance in economic development and growth as modeled by 
Aschauer, 1989. Using econometric co-integration techniques the study 
demonstrates that the externalities generated by public capital accumulation is 
clear evidence that public capital was more productive than private capital in 
macroeconomic growth in Pakistan. Romp and de Haan (2005) extensively 
surveyed the literature on the role of infrastructure investment and capital stock in 
European countries. The authors present an overview of theoretical and empirical 
case studies on the ways in which public capital investment can impact economic 
growth and development. The article concludes that although not all empirical 
studies can show that public capital has positive impacts on economic growth 
there is currently greater unanimity that public capital investment increases 
economic growth.  
In recent years, however, the arguments and conclusions advanced by Aschauer 
and others have been challenged in the literature. Aschauer’s seminal 1989 
econometric study presented estimates that purported to show dramatic returns to 
public capital investment in the USA. Aschauer’s argument, based on the premise 
that decreases in productivity and economic growth in the USA was a function of 
a decrease in public sector investment, was aimed at promoting further public 
infrastructure investment to enhance economic performance. Hulten and Schwab 
(1993) subsequently questioned Aschauer’s argument both methodologically and 
conceptually. The authors argue that the US data may indicate a correlation 
between infrastructure and output growth, but this association cannot be 
interpreted to mean that lower infrastructure was the cause of slower growth. 
They suggest that any one of several other variables such as low productivity and 
higher costs may have had just as significant an impact on slowing growth for the 
period of Aschauer’s study.  
The Hulten and Schwab (1993) paper does not question the need for public 
infrastructure investment it merely challenges the presumed causality between 
public infrastructure investment and economic growth as advocated by Aschauer 
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and his supporters. Hulten and Schwab propose that rather than arguing for more 
public infrastructure investment greater emphasis should be placed on developing 
and devising more effective ways of allocating and spending existing levels of 
public capital expenditure. Notwithstanding the debates and problems raised in 
the literature in the next section I review the concepts and definitions that will 
underpin the role of capital stock in a municipal infrastructure grant model.              
Capital stock in an Infrastructure Grant Model: Concepts and definitions  
Following from the above discussion of the literature the argument for an 
infrastructure grant model for equitable allocations to municipalities with capital 
cost disparities should also be about addressing the negative impacts of 
infrastructure backlogs on public capital stock accumulation. Financial resource 
allocation mechanisms to address infrastructure investment needs require a 
reasonable estimate of infrastructure backlogs.  
In the literature (Levtchenkova and Petchey, 2000) to be discussed later in this 
chapter capital stock data is a critical input for measuring and forecasting 
infrastructure investment and, for estimating infrastructure deficiencies or 
backlogs as a function of a desired level of capital stock necessary for economic 
growth. The difference between the estimated level of capital stock and desired 
level of capital stock gives an indication of the level of capital backlog in the 
economy. For public sector infrastructure spending general capital stock estimates 
provide an important indicator for determining the amount of financing required 
thus enhancing government’s contribution to the desired level of capital stock in 
the economy. Generally accepted international or nationally determined best 
practice estimates can be used as the standard benchmark for the desired level of 
capital stock.     
In some developing and developed countries initial capital stock estimates by 
service can be obtained from local government financial records. These estimates 
are collected and recorded according to the 1993 United Nation’s System of 
National Accounts called SNA93 (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, Statistical Division, 2003). The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
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and Development (OECD, 2001) has also published handbooks and manuals 
providing supplementary information on the SNA93.  
Many different meanings have been applied to the term capital. The generally 
accepted SNA93 meaning of capital is that it is an input in the production process 
and consists of machinery; transport vehicles, buildings and any other tangible 
fixed assets purchased through investments  that have value and that depreciate 
beyond the current year.  
Capital stock and infrastructure investment - A review of the conceptual 
issues 
For the purpose of this thesis capital refers to all durable and tangible production 
factors. In the system of national accounts this often corresponds to fixed capital, 
and in the business accounts, it corresponds to tangible fixed assets. Rakneurd et 
al (2003: 2-3) elaborate further: 
In this sense, capital is an input in the production process, which generates 
operating profits. 
According to accounting standards, tangible fixed assets are assets that have 
value beyond the current year. It consists of machines, transport vehicles, 
buildings, etc. Tangible assets are acquired through investments, which are 
capitalized and depreciated over the expected lifetime of the asset.)  
The SNA93 defines fixed assets as produced assets that are used repeatedly, or 
continuously in the production process for more than one year. Produced assets 
are further distinguished from non-produced assets. The former are all non-
financial assets produced as outputs in the production process as defined by the 
SNA93. The latter are assets required as inputs in the production process but have 
not them selves been produced. These include natural resources such as land, 
forests and mineral deposits. 
Produced fixed assets are further sub-divided into tangible and intangible fixed 
assets. Tangible fixed assets consist of dwellings, other buildings and structures 
and machinery and equipment. In addition cultivated assets such as trees or 
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animals repeatedly or continuously used for producing goods and services are also 
defined as tangible fixed assets.  
Intangible fixed assets include mineral exploration, computer software, 
entertainment, literary or artistic originals and other intangibles fixed assets 
intended to be used for more than one accounting year. 
 Despite the usefulness for recording transactions, Diewert and Lawrence (2000) 
raise several other concerns about the SNA93 for measuring capital. Chief among 
the concerns is the inability of the SNA93 to take account of the recently 
developed theories of capital measurement for production function18 and 
productivity estimation of services generated by a particular type of capital stock. 
The latter point is important as the productivity of public sector capital stock is a 
good measure of the efficient and aggregate service flow generated by a particular 
type of capital stock. In a more recent paper Diewert (2005:9) explains why 
accounting for the contribution of capital to production is more difficult than 
accounting for other factors of production.  
The main problem is that when a reproducible capital input is purchased for use 
by a production unit at the beginning of an accounting period, we cannot simply 
charge the entire purchase cost to the period of purchase. Since the benefits of 
using the capital asset extend over more than one period, the initial purchase cost 
must be distributed somehow over the useful life of the asset. This is the 
fundamental problem of accounting.) 
Diewert (2005: 10) further argues that this durable quality of capital inputs leads 
to more measurement problems that do not apply to goods and services used for 
production within a single accounting period. Notwithstanding these problems the 
author concludes that conventionally, the value of a capital asset “at the beginning 
of an accounting period is equal to the discounted stream of future rental 
                                                
18 A production function is a compact mathematical expression used to analyze the physical relationship that 
shows how factor inputs are transformed into outputs of goods and services using a specific production 
technology. (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995).     
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payments that the asset is expected to yield. Thus the stock value of the asset is 
set equal to the discounted future service flows that the asset is expected to yield 
in future periods.” 
These concerns about the SNA93 were already raised in the OECD Manual 
(2001) for measuring capital stock. In the chapter on the basic definitions and uses 
of capital stocks and flows the Manual notes that the SNA93 does not take 
account of the gross fixed capital stock value [OECD, 2001 SNA 93: para. 4.11] 
although this capital stock value is a starting point for calculating consumption of 
fixed capital and net capital stock. The Manual defines gross fixed capital stock 
as, “…the value, at a point in time, of assets held by producers with each asset 
valued at ‘as new’ prices - i.e. at the prices for new assets of the same type - 
regardless of the age and actual condition of the assets. (Ibid: para. 4.9). 
According to the OECD Manual gross capital stock has at least four analytical 
uses. Firstly, it is widely used as a broad indicator of the productive capacity of a 
country. Secondly, it is often compared with value added to calculate capital-
output ratios for an economic sector or the country as a whole. Thirdly, the gross 
operating surplus is usually divided by the gross capital stock to calculate the 
profitability of a sector or the economy as a whole. Finally, it is sometimes used 
as a measure of capital input in studies of multifactor productivity.  
Following from the above discussion one can argue that gross capital stock 
estimates are a key indicator in economic analyses. Based on the discussion one 
can also argue that capital stock estimates may also be applied to sub-regions 
within a country. The level and condition of gross capital stocks in a particular 
country also provide an indication of the flows of infrastructure investment for 
public capital to an area and the flows of services that the particular public capital 
stock may generate in that area. By implication public capital stock data estimates 
could be used by National, Provincial and Local Government departments for 
general financial planning and forecasting public sector capital expenditures to 
finance public infrastructure investments (Levtchenkova and Petchey, 2000). In 
this regard public capital stock data could provide government agencies with 
reasonable estimates of the value of their infrastructure in order to calculate the 
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opportunity costs19 of capital. Such costs could then inform decisions on charges 
for the use of public infrastructure.  
As will be demonstrated in this thesis the database of capital stock estimates is 
also a key input in time series and cross-sectional studies of the role of public 
finance in public sector infrastructure investment. Levtchenkova and Petchey 
(2000: 196) illustrate this point as follows: 
… one could use the data in a cost function model to estimate the extent to 
which capital costs vary across States because of economies of scale, 
population dispersion, age distribution of the population and income status, 
and the extent to which they differ because of inefficiencies and different 
State policies. This information would in turn be extremely useful…in 
measuring regional differences in the costs of providing services…    
According to the authors such capital stock data sets provide useful economic 
performance benchmarks (Bogetic and Ferdeke, 2006) for intergovernmental 
fiscal relations and for researchers working with Government countrywide 
economic models required to compute production functions. In a discussion paper 
examining a specific method for improved capital measurement Raknerud et al. 
(2003:3) underscore the importance of measures of capital stock in economic 
research.    
Most studies of production, including some very important topics like 
measurement of productivity, returns to investments, and economic 
depreciation, rely on measures of capital stocks and services.   
Measuring capital stock 
A key assumption for using public capital stock data estimates in a capital grant 
model is that the provision of good service outcomes and outputs required for the 
successful elimination of inequality and poverty is a function of adequate funding 
for the progressive eradication of infrastructure backlogs and on-going 
infrastructure needs (Levtchenkova and Petchey 2000:196).  Thus not only must 
                                                
19 “The value of that which must be given up to acquire or achieve something”. The Penguin Dictionary of 
Economics, 1992  
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existing capital stock be considered, but also capital deficits or backlogs and the 
rate at which the stock of capital depreciates must be taken into account. In 
addition the impact of the cost of inherited capital backlogs on the level of actual 
capital stock, on-going capital requirements and new capital investment must be 
estimated. In the public sector infrastructure backlogs tend to grow at a faster rate 
because of inadequate funding for maintaining and recapitalizing public and 
private capital stock. In a working paper on the estimating the restoration and 
modernization costs of infrastructure facilities in the USA, Lufkin et al (2005) 
argue that part of the problem for under spending may be attributed to a poor 
understanding of the level of funding required because budget estimates are based 
on ad hoc approximations or historical trends rather than all capital cost factors. 
Further, the authors argue that capital stock estimates cannot ignore restoration 
and modernization funding requirements. However, including restoration and 
modernization into the mix adds a further level of complexity as issues of 
obsolescence, changing uses and extraordinary damage to infrastructure, 
determine these issues.  
Maintaining and recapitalizing facilities require substantial expenditures by 
virtually all public and private organizations. In the U.S. these expenditures 
amounted to $192 billion in 1992, or roughly 40% of total construction-
related activity. While considerable, these expenditures are widely regarded 
as insufficient to maintain the productive capacity of the nation’s facilities 
and infrastructure. Part of the problem is political: maintenance activities 
rarely have the same cache as ribbon-cutting celebrations for new 
construction. But  some part of under funding must be attributed to the 
limited estimation tools available to policy planners. Without credible 
empirical support it is difficult to  make a case for the required funds.) 
(Lufkin et al, 2005: 3) 
Conceptually the measurement of capital in general, and public capital more 
specifically, has always been considered controversial in the economic literature. 
In a frequently referenced article Hulten (1990) attributes this to the special role 
played by capital both as an input and also because of its durable characteristics. 
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Apart from the lack of appropriate estimation tools another area of concern 
addressed in the literature for measuring capital and allocating infrastructure 
finance is the difficulty of distinguishing between public capital stock and private 
capital stock.  This problem is exacerbated by the difficulty in distinguishing 
between infrastructures for different services as the one facility in a sub-region 
may serve several service sectors simultaneously.   
The capital grant model developed by Josie, MacDonald and Petchey (2008), is 
capable of allocating capital expenditures for economic infrastructure (e.g. road, 
rail, transport, communications, energy or water provision) and social 
infrastructure (e.g. health, education, welfare or housing facilities and services). 
The determinant factor distinguishing allocations for economic infrastructure and 
social infrastructure (education, health, recreational facilities, etc.) is the method 
used for measuring the required value of capital stock necessary for providing a 
service or promoting economic development.  
Capital stock for economic infrastructure is estimated using optimization 
techniques to determine efficiency gains derived from the services of given 
economic infrastructure. Social infrastructure capital stock estimates are based on 
normative considerations to achieve a per capita minimum standard in the quest 
for equity in the provision of social services. The capital grants model developed 
by Josie, MacDonald and Petchey (2008) uses such capital stock inputs to explore 
the transition path to the agreed equalization standards for both economic and 
social infrastructure. In this sense the model attempts to determine the minimum 
funding required to ensure that the transition path of the existing capital stocks 
converge to the desired levels of stocks required for the provision of the necessary 
economic and social services. By the same token the model will very quickly 
establish the capital stock implications for under-funding or allocating too few 
resources for public capital formation.  
The input costs determinants for capital stock encompass more than just public 
sector factors (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1995). As the different elements of capital 
stock cannot be added together their value is generally aggregated to produce an 
estimate at prices for a given year. Any level of new capital expenditure or net 
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investment is a proportion of the difference between the desired capital stock and 
the actual capital stock. Thus, any backlog in new or replacement investment will 
increase the gap between actual and desired capital stock to be made up in any 
one period.  
Notwithstanding the problems and difficulties associated with the methods used 
capital stock measures based on current spending trends are a good indicator of 
the efficient and actual capital stock required for capital service outputs. In other 
words they are important for determining an appropriate transition path and, for 
estimating capital need based on the difference between the actual capital stock 
and what stock is required to attain the defined transition path. 
A review of the methods used for measuring capital stock 
Empirical studies in the literature present different methods for estimating gross 
capital and net capital stocks. At least four techniques have been identified in the 
literature for estimating gross capital stocks for national accounting purposes. The 
perpetual inventory method (PIM); the survey method; the balance of fixed assets 
(BFA) technique; and the use of administrative records. Around these four 
techniques many variations and versions have been developed for estimations of 
capital stock in different sectors (private and public) of the economy.  
Net capital stocks are generally derived from gross capital stock estimates and 
company accounts use many disparate techniques for calculating these estimates 
and this makes them unusable for national accounting purposes. These techniques 
include the use of insurance company records of current property values and 
values of tangible fixed assets owned by public companies. The most 
comprehensive survey of the capital stock estimation methods listed above is 
presented in the 2001 OECD Manual for measuring capital stocks. There have 
also been several empirical applications, reviews and adaptations of the 
techniques.  
The Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) is the most popular technique for 
estimating capital stocks in developed and developing economies. The technique 
entails adding gross fixed capital formation to an initial estimate of the capital 
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stock and then deducting the value of capital assets that have reached the end of 
their service lives. The OECD, 2001, SNA93 (para. 6.189) elaborates: 
The perpetual inventory method requires an estimate to be made of the stock 
of fixed assets in existence and in the hands of producers. This is done by 
estimating how many of the fixed assets installed as a result of gross fixed 
capital formation undertaken in previous years have survived to the current 
period.   
The PIM is extensively used for estimating capital stocks. The standard procedure 
is to estimate the gross capital stock by applying a depreciation rate to calculate 
the consumption of fixed capital. Thereafter, by subtracting the accumulated 
capital consumption from gross capital stock the net capital stocks are obtained. 
An alternative procedure uses a more integrated approach that combines the 
relationship between the service output efficiency, the age and the declining price 
value of the asset. The age-efficiency profiles are estimated for each service life 
for each asset type against a discount rate in order to generate the net capital 
stock. It is assumed in this approach that the market price of the asset is 
equivalent to the rentals the asset is expected to earn under market conditions.  
The PIM estimation procedure requires several different categories of 
information. This includes a value of an initial or benchmark capital stock 
estimate; gross fixed capital formation for each year after the starting year; 
depreciation and average service life of the asset; information on how assets are 
written off; and rates of variations in the prices of assets.   
The literature presents different versions of the PIM techniques used extensively 
in measuring capital stocks in developed economies (Diewert and Lawrence, 
2000; Hulten, 1990, Rakneurd et al, 2003; Lufkin et al, 2005); in developing 
economies (Timmer and van Ark, 2002; Naqvi, 2003) and, in economies in 
transition (United Nations Commission for Europe, Statistical Division, 2002). In 
applications of the PIM several difficulties have been identified. These include 
data intensity, the numerous assumptions about fixed capital formation, and the 
consumption of fixed capital, depreciation, and the services generated by the 
asset, all of which pose practical problems for its indiscriminate application. 
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Nevertheless, despite these problems it is the preferred procedure for estimating 
capital stock. The UN Economic Commission for Europe, Statistical Division, 
2002, “Measurement of Capital stock in Transition Economies” lists a few 
concerns about some of the alternative methods. The BFA, surveys and 
administrative records methods, for example, do not take account of declining 
efficiency, obsolescence and variations in inflation when evaluating assets. In 
many developing countries and countries in transition data surveys and the 
maintenance of records are costly. The lack of technology and skills also means 
that data may be limited, deficient, fragmented, out of date and not in conformity 
with SNA93 requirements.  Further, the reporting requirement is an additional 
administrative burden on enterprises and other economic agents.   
Following from the above discussion it is clear that capital stock estimates are a 
key indicator in economic analyses. Such estimates may also be applied to sub-
regions within a country as the level and condition of capital stocks in a particular 
area also provide an indication of the flows of infrastructure investment for public 
capital to an area and, the flows of services that the particular public capital stock 
generates in the area. By implication, public capital stock data estimates could be 
used by National, Provincial and Local Government departments for general 
financial planning and for forecasting public sector capital expenditures to finance 
public infrastructure investments (Levtchenkova and Petchey, 2000).  
The key premise for using public capital stock data estimates in this thesis is that 
the provision of service outcomes and outputs required for the successful 
elimination of inequality and poverty is a function of funding for the progressive 
eradication of infrastructure backlogs and on-going infrastructure needs. The 
thesis assumes that in the public sector infrastructure backlogs tend to grow at a 
faster rate because of inadequate funding for maintaining and recapitalizing public 
capital stock.  
In developing a policy model for reducing capital backlogs in transitional 
economies and using South Africa as a case study, Petchey and Levtchenkova 
(2002) concluded that compared to an international benchmark, in South Africa, 
the overall amount of physical infrastructure available for the provision of 
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important services such as housing, education and health is insufficient. The 
results from the study show a marked variation across provinces indicating that 
infrastructure ‘backlogs’ for the provision of services create widely variable 
access to services across provinces. 
The Levtchnkova and Petchey (2000) version of the perpetual inventory method 
was initially developed for estimating capital stock data for National, State and 
Local components of the General Government in Australia for the period 1962 to 
1999 for services provided. The estimates were produced using unpublished data 
supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on annual gross fixed 
capital expenditure flows, consumption of fixed capital and aggregate capital 
stocks. The study created the possibility to estimate two hundred and thirty-eight 
different regional capital stock series over four decades. This version of the PIM 
technique begins with a given estimated capital stock at some point in time. 
Thereafter it creates subsequent stock estimates using data on capital expenditure 
and depreciation.  
For the purpose of estimating capital stock data for local municipalities in the 
Cape Winelands District of the Western Cape I use an adapted version of the 
Levtchnkova and Petchey (2000) method that assumes a constant depreciation rate 
invariant across time. The adapted version of the method was chosen because 
municipal boundaries in South Africa are about ten years old. This means that the 
data for the rate of depreciation across municipalities are probably unavailable or 
are not likely to vary across local municipalities. Therefore, in estimating capital 
stock for the Cape Winelands District Municipality my study assumes a constant 
depreciation rate invariant across time, municipality and service. The full version 
of the method is presented in Chapter 4.  
Summary 
In this chapter I critically reviewed the theories, concepts and methods that may 
inform the framework for a structural approach for the empirical case study on 
which this thesis is based. A structural approach provided the framework for 
analyzing and evaluating the systemic economic, social and institutional 
interrelationships of the intergovernmental financing of municipal infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
  81 
The definitions and concepts of the structural approach helped to show the 
linkages between the microeconomic decisions taken at municipal level and 
macroeconomic decisions taken at the level of national government. The 
application of the structural framework pointed the direction to the literature that 
highlighted processes that show how economic inequality and disparity become 
structurally entrenched as part of the political economy of a country. From this 
perspective I reviewed the literature and identified the concepts and definitions 
that can facilitate an understanding of the nature and impact of accounting for 
economic disparity in intergovernmental financing of local government. Key to an 
understanding of the nature and impact of economic disparities was a review of 
the literature on the constitutional and institutional intergovernmental 
arrangements that govern the allocations of infrastructure grants in South Africa.  
I also examined the literature to understand the role of public infrastructure in 
mitigating the effects of structural spatial inequalities and disparities among local 
municipalities in the Cape Winelands District. I explored the literature on 
methods and procedures for constructing and using a composite capital cost 
disparity index to take account of disparities in capital grant allocation models.  
In the final part of the chapter I reviewed the literature on infrastructure and 
capital stock in macroeconomic aggregates and, on the role and measurement of 
capital stock in infrastructure grant models. The literature pointed to the 
possibility that capital stock and capital backlog estimates can be used in 
conjunction capital cost disparity indicators to calculate, using a capital grant 
scheme, the level of funding required for financing public infrastructure in local 
municipalities. The literature reviewed in this chapter provides sufficient evidence 
to suggest that it is possible to use disparity indices such that they ensure parity, 
proportionality and priority in the equitable allocation of limited government 
infrastructure grants.  
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Chapter 3 
Background And Motivation For A Review Of Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant Allocations In South Africa’s 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (IGFR) System 
The introduction to this thesis briefly discussed the wave of municipal service 
delivery protests and demonstrations that swept across South Africa between 2004 
and 2009. Given this situation this chapter provides a background as to why 
Government in South Africa is presented with a basic public finance dilemma of 
how to fairly and equitably finance municipal infrastructure services while 
simultaneously ensuring economic efficiency in the quest for growth and 
development.  The chapter also provides a motivation for a restructuring of the 
institutional arrangements and formula used for the intergovernmental transfers of 
municipal infrastructure grants.  
Under South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations system (The Constitution, 
1996 and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997) national, provincial 
and local government spheres of government are entitled to an equitable share of 
nationally collected revenues for the provision of services to communities. 
However, raising adequate levels of revenues for redistributive purposes is a 
function of sustained investment, growth and development. Striking a balance 
between the need to provide constitutionally mandated basic services within 
macroeconomic constraints that limit the available resources is a fundamental 
problem that underpins South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations system. 
In Petchey et al (2007), this problem was discussed and a model to address 
equitable intergovernmental redistribution of nationally collected revenues was 
proposed as a solution to the dilemma. The model has a subcomponent that deals 
specifically with the equitable allocation of capital and infrastructure grants.  
In the aftermath of the service delivery protests in South Africa finding solutions 
to the public finance dilemma took on a greater sense of urgency. National, 
provincial and local governments viewed the protests as an indication of the high 
degree of frustration resulting from extreme poverty and inequality and, the 
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inability of the current intergovernmental systems to deliver basic services at the 
municipal level. The anxiety felt by all three spheres of government was 
expressed in a comprehensive assessment of the state of local government 
published in the fourth quarter of 2009 by the National Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). The report entitled 
“The State of Local Government in South Africa – Overview Report”  (COGTA, 
2009) presents a grim assessment of the conjunctural effect of several external and 
internal factors that militate against the efficient and effective delivery of 
municipal services. The COGTA (2009) Report underscores the problems faced 
by different categories of municipalities20 discussed in the introduction to this 
thesis. There are some points raised by the COGTA Report that are worth 
reiterating.  
The assessment (COGTA: 10-29) emphasizes the point that different categories of 
municipalities face unique conditions and challenges and therefore, one-size-fits-
all type systems and policy instruments are not likely to address the problems 
associated with service delivery. While some category B1 and B2 local 
municipalities may be stable and well resourced others face huge infrastructure 
and service backlogs due to, “the negative impacts of demographic change and 
prevailing apartheid-based socio-economic legacies” (Ibid: 22).  High levels of 
community household inequality and poverty indicators exacerbated by in-
migration pressures often characterize collective disadvantage in many 
municipalities. Category B3 and B4, essentially rural and small municipalities, are 
in economically depressed areas with low revenue generating capacity; inadequate 
institutional development and unable to attract skilled human resource capacity. 
The Report concludes from the above assessment that  
…these municipalities are seriously challenged to fulfill their obligations. 
They may be financially non-viable, articulate distress via heightened levels 
                                                
20 There are 283 municipalities in South Africa grouped into seven categories. (A) – the 6 Urban Metros with 
large populations; (B1) – 31 local municipalities with large budgets and secondary cities; (B2) – 137 local 
municipalities with a large town as the core; (B3) – 31 local municipalities with small towns, small urban 
populations but no core large town; (B4) – 32 mainly rural local municipalities with communal land tenure 
and one or two small towns; (C1) – 25 District Municipalities which are not water service authorities; (C2) – 
21 District Municipalities which are water service authorities.  
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of community protest, and be particularly vulnerable to political control and 
poor institutional management and compliance. (Ibid: 22) 
The Report assessment attributes these vulnerabilities to several external and 
internal factors. The intergovernmental fiscal relations system ranks second 
amongst the external factors. 
Table: External and Internal Factors Impacting on Poor Municipal Performance. 
External Factors Internal Factors 
National policies for local government Sound political leadership 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations system & 
design for local government transfers 
Strong organizational capacity 
The legislative and governance framework 
for local government  
Good governance practices 
Monitoring and oversight of local 
government 
Relevant policies and programmes to be 
implemented  
Capacity building policies Adequate staffing and systems 
Apartheid spatial legacies Workable plans and budgets 
(Source: Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009)   
 The COGTA assessment further argues that the unintended consequences of the 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach led to both financial and operational non-viability of 
socio-economically vulnerable municipalities. Financial and operational non-
viability was especially manifest in their inability to manage infrastructure 
development and investment policies. This point is important, as investment in the 
development of municipal infrastructure is a key component in the efficient and 
effective provision of many basic municipal services. The Report assessment 
proposes that government takes account of the vast differences between municipal 
spaces and, that a spatial differentiation approach be used to identify specific 
institutional and administrative policy instruments to target communities in 
remote areas with high backlogs, poor economic potential and high 
unemployment (Ibid: 29). The COGTA Report proposal begs the question of what 
type of approach is required to take account of factors that differentiate 
municipalities from each other. This is the fundamental question of the thesis. To 
support its proposal the Report in Chapter 3, presents an assessment of the current 
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state of local government service delivery and infrastructure provision in South 
Africa.  
In the Report service delivery and infrastructure are assessed against three 
constitutional criteria: The requirement for local government to ensure the 
provision of services in a sustainable manner; the need for local government to 
promote social and economic development, and the necessity for local 
government to promote a safe and healthy environment (Ibid: 34). While 
commending the progress made by stronger municipalities the Report highlights 
the unique and complex development problems faced by weaker and more  
vulnerable municipalities. Among others these problems include a massive 
infrastructure backlog. This backlog is the legacy from the apartheid past and will 
require “extraordinary measures to address funding and delivery capacity” (Ibid: 
34).  
The corollary to the underdeveloped infrastructure and service delivery in weaker 
and vulnerable rural municipalities is that relatively more developed 
municipalities are under pressure from increased urban growth, in-migration, 
informal settlements and population growth as poor people leave weaker 
municipalities in search of jobs and security. These pressures require new forms 
of urban spatial, infrastructure and budget planning in developed municipalities as 
they struggle to cope with the consequences of an increasing financial burden. 
This COGTA assessment serves to confirm the views expressed by the Municipal 
IQ and Parliamentary Research Unit reports discussed in the introduction to this 
thesis. The COGTA Report concludes that: 
The two main obstacles to accelerating basic services are therefore the lack 
of critical infrastructure in rural areas and the proliferation of informal 
settlements in urban areas. Both these obstacles are beyond the capabilities 
(institutional and fiscal) of powers and functions of municipalities to 
confront by themselves. (Ibid: 35) 
 
In examining the legislative and institutional policy instruments that govern the 
way service delivery and infrastructure are implemented the Report concludes that 
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a major obstacle to service delivery is the lack of effective alignment of integrated 
planning and coordination among different government departments. For example 
some provincial infrastructure and regional planning policy objectives captured in 
the Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS) are not implemented, 
and are even more difficult to monitor and sanction, because they are not 
supported by legislative and institutional policy instruments. On the other hand 
local government integrated development plans (IDP) are legally binding on 
municipalities through the Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act. In addition the haphazard manner in which the district 
facilitation role, as envisaged in the Municipal Structures Act, is implemented in 
practice aggravates the disjuncture between provincial and municipal policy 
objectives and plans (Ibid: 35). Most, if not all, disadvantaged rural local 
municipalities fall within district municipalities charged with facilitating sub-
regional development.   
With respect to integrated infrastructure development the Report (Ibid: 36-39) 
implies that in practice the absence of alignment, coordination and effective 
intergovernmental planning between national, provincial and local government 
spheres impedes the building of integrated human settlements and the provision of 
basic water, electricity and sanitation services. In urban environments increasing 
backlogs due to pressures of in-migration and homelessness exacerbates this 
situation. The COGTA Report calls for “a national, differentiated and 
coordinated planning effort…to provide a new vision for intergovernmental 
developmental planning” (Ibid: 37) to address these problems. 
The COGTA assessment (Ibid: 40-50) found that many disadvantaged 
municipalities could not meet national public service infrastructure policy 
objectives because of inadequate funding or difficulties associated with national 
transfer funding mechanisms. As a result of the past and present problems the 
Report announces the emergence of a second-generation set of coordination, 
management and financial challenges. These challenges include higher demand 
for infrastructure services as a consequence of a growing economy; the need for 
upgrading, rehabilitation and replacement of aging assets, and the re-location of 
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poverty and inequality from deprived rural areas to towns and cities.  The Report 
suggests that overall, the current levels of municipal infrastructure investment are 
inadequate to meet the demands of a growing economy and that many local 
municipalities have indicated that they are 100% dependent on national grants 
(Ibid: 59). Further, the Report implies that the nature, diversity, design and 
coordination of the grants and the way they are allocated and disbursed to 
municipalities compromise the principles of democratic accountability and 
autonomy of local government (Ibid: 60). Interviews for this thesis among 
officials in three local municipalities in the Cape Winelands and the Cape 
Winelands District Municipality itself confirm this finding (see Summary report 
of interviews in the Appendix). 
There are several points of concern raised by the COGTA Report (Ibid: 60) that 
have specific relevance for the questions around which the thesis is developed. 
For example the weak coordination in implementation of programmes between 
different departments is a source of delays in the delivery of services.  The 
proliferation of grant transfers from different departments, for the same 
programme, adds another dimension of complication. In the introduction to this 
thesis both these points were presented as a rationale for a new approach for 
equitably allocating infrastructure grants.  
Other points of concern raised by the COGTA Report include the weakening of 
democratic municipal accountability and oversight because of municipal 
dependence on infrastructure grant transfers. This argument was also made in the 
thesis rationale for a new approach to financing municipal infrastructure. The final 
point of concern in the COGTA Report that supports the thesis justification for a 
new approach to allocating infrastructure grants “is the weak programme design, 
implementation and evaluation procedures (that) limit the impact of grants on the 
development outcomes sought by government…” (Ibid: 60). In fact, addressing the 
limitations of “weak design” such that grant formulae take account of 
development outcomes, constitutional imperatives and differentiating disparity 
factors among municipalities is the main aim of this thesis.  
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Intergovernmental Principles for Financing Municipal 
Infrastructure Needs  
The key financial policy objectives for sustainable local government in South 
Africa are derived from constitutional and other legal obligations. These 
obligations require municipal organization, planning and budgeting systems to 
equitably target the provision of basic services and socio-economic development 
for all citizens. Municipal budgets and municipal infrastructure grants are the 
main policy instruments that direct the expenditure stance of municipalities in 
achieving the infrastructure service delivery targets. Inadequate municipal 
infrastructure has negative consequences for the delivery of services and 
economic growth and development.  
Despite much of the finance for municipal infrastructure being provided by 
national government through the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG), recent 
trends discussed in the COGTA assessment indicate that municipalities have not 
shown any marked progress in construction, maintenance and repairs of basic 
infrastructure. Unless these issues are addressed the achievement of sustainable 
local government as envisaged in the Constitution will be delayed and the 
inequalities that characterize South African society will be aggravated and 
exacerbated. It is suggested in the reports reviewed in the introduction and in this 
chapter that the service delivery protests discussed are a direct consequence of the 
inability of municipalities to deliver infrastructure services such that inequalities 
are progressively eliminated. To provide a background to the problem of 
intergovernmental financing of municipal infrastructure this chapter reflects on 
recent assessments and the effectiveness of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
(MIG) in particular. The MIG is one among many infrastructure grants from 
national government to local municipalities. The table below showing MIG 
allocations as a percentage of all infrastructures transfers to local government also 
lists the other grants. 
A central priority of national government in South Africa is to progressively 
provide basic services to all South Africans within the constraint of available 
resources.  This objective is set out in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights (The 
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Constitution, 1996) and is a fundamental responsibility of government.  Rights to 
which all citizens are entitled are in areas such as freedom of movement; a 
protected environment that is not harmful to health and well-being; housing; 
health care; food; water and sanitation; social security, and education.  
Responsibilities in respect of realizing these rights are shared amongst national, 
provincial and local governments, with each sphere of government charged with 
fulfilling its assigned functions.   
Under the Constitution, national government also has over-riding responsibility 
for the management of the country’s affairs and shares responsibility with the 
provinces and local governments for the provision of basic social services. 
National government may mandate appropriate essential or minimum levels and 
standards of services.  Provinces are responsible for delivering most of the range 
of social services, which fall in the areas of education, welfare, and health.  Local 
governments carry responsibility for provision or local infrastructure and basic 
services such as sanitation and water reticulation. 
The objective of South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal arrangements is to 
ensure that these inter-governmental responsibilities are carried out in the spirit of 
co-operation (Chapter 3 of the Constitution) and, take account of equity and 
efficiency.  Ultimately, it is the well being of all citizens, wherever they reside, 
that should be the main goal guiding intergovernmental decisions around fiscal 
arrangements amongst the three spheres of government. This principle of the 
interrelationship between fiscal responsibility and meeting the constitutional 
requirements for the provision of basic services is illustrated in the diagrammes 
and tables in Chapter 4.  
An important determinant in ensuring the well being of all citizens is the 
provision of adequate public infrastructure for communities, households and 
individuals to access publicly provided services. The main aim of this chapter is 
to present some perspectives on recent assessments of the current inter-
governmental funding arrangements for the provision and maintenance of 
municipal infrastructure. In particular the chapter will examine the effectiveness 
of the conditional Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) as a funding instrument 
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targeting Government’s fundamental policy objective to address inequalities and 
poverty that perpetuate the legacies of apartheid in communities. The COGTA 
assessment underscores the growing public perception (see the discussion in the 
Chapter 1) that increasing inequalities and the disadvantages of poorer 
communities are a consequence of historical infrastructural backlogs.  As noted in 
the COGTA assessment the situation is made more difficult by an undifferentiated 
approach to costing the provision of infrastructure. Such an approach results in an 
inequitable allocation of grants, thus delaying access to services for the most 
vulnerable communities.   
A review of the structure of the MIG formula and its application in allocating 
infrastructure grants presents an ideal focus for achieving the aims of the thesis. 
This chapter considers two questions that point to a level of dissonance in the way 
the MIG is implemented and monitored. Firstly, the chapter focuses on whether 
the current demand driven approach determined by municipal infrastructure 
project applications for MIG funds is consistent with all constitutional mandates? 
The second focus is whether the current MIG allocation formula adequately takes 
account of all disparity and inequality cost factors that differentiate municipalities 
from each other. Following this assessment the thesis presents in chapters 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 an alternative approach for the allocation of municipal infrastructure grants.  
This chapter presents a brief assessment of the MIG and the difficulties associated 
with its implementation. The assessment draws on reviews undertaken by the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) and a study commissioned by the 
national Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG). Following this 
assessment the chapter considers the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) in the 
context of South Africa’s constitutional and intergovernmental fiscal relations 
system. Finally the chapter examines the adequacy of the MIG arrangements to 
take account of the disparity and inequality cost factors that differentiate 
municipalities from each other.  
Perspectives on the MIG and its Implementation 
In June 2006 the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 
published a document describing the municipal infrastructure grant (MIG) and the 
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management process and procedures for its use among municipalities (DPLG, 
2006).  
According to the DPLG document the key principles on which the MIG is 
founded are the following: financing infrastructure for the provision of basic 
services; targeting the poor in recipient municipalities; using the grant in such a 
way that it also maximizes economic benefits that include job creation and the 
development of enterprises; allocating the grant equitably and ensuring that it’s 
outcomes are accessible by the poor; ensuring that spending decisions for the 
grant are best undertaken at municipal level in accordance with national norms, 
standards and conditions; using the funds efficiently such that optimal 
improvement in access to services are provided at the lowest possible cost; and, 
ensuring that the use of the grant reinforces local, provincial and national 
development objectives. In addition to the principles listed in the DPLG Report 
the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, mandates government to provide some of 
these infrastructures supported services as socio-economic rights in themselves. 
Following from these principles the DPLG document lists four main policy 
objectives for the MIG programme. These objectives underpin national 
government’s obligation to fund infrastructure subsidies that ensure all 
households have access to a basic level of infrastructure services.  
Firstly, the MIG programme is to fully subsidize the capital costs of providing 
basic services to disadvantaged and poor households. Secondly the MIG is to 
allocate funds equitably, transparently and efficiently in support of socio-
economic development. Thirdly, the MIG is expected to strengthen municipal 
development capacity through encouraging multi-year planning and budgeting 
systems. Fourthly, the grant is expected to act as a catalyst for municipalities to 
synchronize local objectives with national priorities. 
The MIG is a conditional grant from National Government’s equitable share of 
total nationally collected revenue and is allocated to local government through the 
National Budget. Table (3.1) calculated from the 2008 Budget Review (National 
Treasury, 2008) shows the importance of MIG funds to local Government 
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between 2003/04 and 2007/08. It is clear from this table that the MIG grants 
constituted the largest proportion of National Government transfers for financing 
municipal infrastructure over the period.  
Table 3.1: Infrastructure transfers to local governments, 2003/04 – 2009/10 
(MIG as a % of all infrastructure allocations to municipalities) 
Outcome Revised estimates Medium-term estimates 
R million 2003/04 2003/04 2003/04 2003/04 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2007/08 
Direct transfers 
for: 71.78 71.78 71.78 71.78 86.63 87.57 83.77 86.63 
Municipal 
infrastructure grant 
(MIG) 42.73 42.73 42.73 42.73 52.78 41.19 49.98 52.78 
National 
Electrification 
Programme 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29 3.27 3.05 4.91 3.27 
Implementation 
water service 
projects 17.88 17.88 17.88 17.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Disaster relief 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Poverty relief funds 6.88 6.88 6.88 6.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Publc transport 
infrastructure & 
systems grant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.21 16.21 12.73 8.21 
Neighbourhood 
development 
partnership grant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.50 7.67 9.03 3.50 
2010 FIFA World 
Cup stadiums grant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.88 19.44 7.12 18.88 
Indirect transfers 
for: 28.22 28.22 28.22 28.22 13.37 12.43 16.23 13.37 
Water & sanitation 
operating subsidy 14.30 14.30 14.30 14.30 3.43 2.72 2.15 3.43 
National 
Electrification 
Programme  13.93 13.93 13.93 13.93 6.80 5.89 7.78 6.80 
Bulk infrastructure  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.10 2.30 3.56 2.10 
Backlogs water  
sanitation clinics & 
schools 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 1.07 1.92 0.73 
Backlogs  
electrification 
clinics & schools 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.46 0.82 0.31 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from National Treasury; Budget Review 2008 
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The following two tables provide an indication of the importance of the MIG 
funds in the Cape Winelands District local municipalities. The second table shows 
that, if the Cape Town Metropolitan area is excluded, the Cape Winelands district 
at 16.20% has the second highest level of projected sanitation backlogs in the 
Western Cape Province.   
Table 3.2: Cape Winelands District: Sanitation Backlogs Estimates for 2007 
Local 
Authority 
Number 
informal 
houses no 
access to 
basic 
sanitation 
Number 
informal 
houses with 
access to 
shared 
services 
Number 
backyard 
dwellers 
with access 
to shared 
services 
Total 
existing 
backlog 
Estimated 
future 
backlog due 
to growth 
Growth as 
a % of 
existing 
backlog 
Breede 
River 
Winelands 
0 628 4635 5263 4510 3.1 
Breede 
Valley 
470 2041 5180 7691 6320 3.0 
Drakenstein 1189 2112 10200 13501 7845 2.3 
Stellenbosch 10 300  7560 7870 7781 3.5 
Witzenberg 0 2227 1600 3827 2280 2.4 
Farmland 370 0 0 370 0 0 
Total  2039 7308 29175 38522 28673 2.8 
(Source: January 2007, Department of Local Government and Housing, Western Cape Province 
& National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry) 
Table 3.3: Cape Winelands District: Sanitation Backlogs Estimates as a Percentage 
(%) of All Western Cape Province Municipal Authority Sanitation BacklogsD1 
Western Cape 
Local 
Authorities 
Informal 
houses no 
access to 
basic 
sanitation 
Informal 
houses with 
access to 
shared 
services 
Backyard 
dwellers with 
access to 
shared services 
Total of 
existing 
backlog 
Estimated 
future 
backlog 
due to 
growth 
Growth 
as % of 
existing 
backlog 
Cape 
Winelands 
District 13.96 05.00 11.50 09.30 16.20 02.80 
Central Karoo 
District 03.08 00.05 00.79 00.61 00.68 02.00 
Eden District 57.34 05.29 07.70 08.70 16.58 03.10 
Overberg 
District 18.14 03.07 04.11 04.25 08.94 03.30 
West Coast 
District 00.68 01.70 04.94 03.87 06.72 02.80 
Cape Town 00.68 84.76 70.96 73.20 50.85 01.80 
(Source: January 2007, Department of Local Government and Housing, Western Cape Province 
& National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry) 
                                                
D1 Totals may not add up to 100 % because of rounding to the nearest whole number.  
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Rationale for Reviewing the Current Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant Scheme  
In many instances the inadequacies in municipalities identified in the COGTA 
assessment are reflected in poor revenue projections and poor collection and 
credit control systems. The unavailability of reliable financial data and unreliable 
socio-economic statistics led to inaccurate financial and service delivery 
information. This consequently resulted in municipalities being unable to 
undertake effective expenditure planning, budgeting and financial management. 
As noted in the COGTA assessment this trend has been most starkly demonstrated 
in the area of municipal infrastructure planning and delivery. Since 1998 poor 
planning and budgeting information meant the inequitable allocation and 
distribution of revenue for the provision of basic services and development in 
disadvantaged local communities.  
By 2006 the annual Local Government Review by National Treasury (National 
Treasury, October 2006) identified key areas that require refinement and reform in 
the existing local government system for allocating infrastructure grants. The 
areas of concern identified in the Review are almost identical to the findings of 
the COGTA evaluation. Amongst others the Review included the misalignment 
between the different powers and functions of the category B local municipalities 
and the category C district municipalities as being typical of the dysfunctional 
arrangement of powers and functions between these institutions.  
Another area of concern identified by the National Treasury Review was finding 
an alternative source of own revenue for municipalities to replace the abolished 
regional service council (RSC) levies. For many poorer municipalities the RSC 
levies were the main source of revenues. In the absence of this own source 
revenue and with no sustainable tax bases disadvantaged municipalities became 
totally dependent on MIG grants for infrastructure development. However, the 
Review of Transfers in the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Systems in South 
Africa by the FFC (Josie, Khumalo and Ajam, 2006) suggests that the conditions 
attached to the MIG limit the flexibility that local governments need to attain their 
objectives.  
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Given the high levels of service delivery and infrastructure backlogs and the 
consequent inequalities between and among municipalities the National Treasury 
Review implied that a re-evaluation of the local government equitable share 
formula and the municipal infrastructure grant (MIG) mechanisms may be 
necessary. The COGTA assessment provides substantive evidence to support this 
assertion by the National Treasury Review. Clearly the growing infrastructure 
backlogs and associated service delivery problems are an indication that the 
current mechanisms are inadequate or inappropriate and compromise local 
government’s ability to deliver on their constitutional mandates and development 
imperatives. 
The National Treasury Review also identified the lack of planning and 
coordination between municipalities and provinces where these two government 
spheres have concurrent funding responsibilities for the delivery of housing, 
health and public transport services. 
The 2006 Review reflected government intentions to set specific policy targets to 
eradicate remaining backlogs in sanitation, water electricity and other service 
delivery backlogs between 2008 and 2013. Notwithstanding the enormity of this 
task municipalities are still expected to maintain appropriate current levels of 
service delivery in communities. In addition local governments are required to 
create conditions for economic growth. To support these policy objectives the 
Review reported that local government’s share of nationally raised revenue has 
risen to 7% between the 2006/07 and 2008/09 medium term plan and it is 
expected that local governments should fund the bulk of their services from own 
revenues.  
While National Treasury reported that over 90 per cent of local government 
revenue is generated from own revenue sources (Budget Review, 2006), this 
statistic is misleading for three reasons.  First, over one-half of local government 
revenue is received in the form of user fees, paid by citizens for electricity, water, 
sanitation and other services.  The services that do not yield income may be more 
dependent on transfer revenue for renewal and maintenance. 
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Secondly, as municipalities increasingly fulfill responsibilities to all South 
Africans, the situation of under-funding from own-source revenue and the reliance 
on the equitable share of national revenue and conditional grants may increase 
because of population growth from in-migration from rural areas. Thirdly, as 
noted above, there are considerable differences among municipalities. While some 
have an adequate tax base, there are many others that have insufficient tax bases 
to yield required revenues.  New policy objectives set by government are expected 
to increase the need for more funds for financing public infrastructure.  
The envisaged policy objectives for the 2006/07 medium term period were free 
basic services for households that cannot afford such services; a proper waste 
management system; eradication of the bucket sanitation system; housing and 
built environment with the necessary infrastructure for sustainable communities; 
enhancing financial management and the capacity of municipalities to deliver 
quality services and, ensuring that the delivery of municipal infrastructure 
contributes to job creation (Budget Review, 2006). 
The provision of free basic services however, depends on adequate and well-
maintained and operated municipal infrastructure. The development and 
construction of infrastructure is funded largely through the conditional municipal 
infrastructure grant (MIG) dedicated for spending on basic public infrastructure in 
previously disadvantaged communities.  
The MIG is the largest infrastructure allocation and had increased by R21.5 
billion for the 2006/07-2008/09 period (see Table 3.1 above). In addition to the 
MIG municipalities received R4.4 billion as part of the electrification programme 
for connections to poor households. Including the delivery of free basic services 
in the package to be provided by municipalities raises the question as to how the 
cost of such provision will be incorporated in the MIG formula.  
In the 2006 Budget Review government committed to ensure the provision of free 
basic services to poor households. Included in this list of services were water, 
sanitation, electricity and waste management. In addition government committed 
to the eradication of the bucket system and the development of the built 
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environment with the concomitant infrastructure for communities. These 
commitments were to be underpinned by increasing support for financial 
management and the capacity of municipalities to deliver services. Over the 
2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09 budget cycles government added R8.3 billion, 
R10.5 billion and R13.9 billion respectively to the local government budget 
framework. Over the three-year cycle the equitable share baselines were revised 
upwards by R1.6 billion to support the rollout of free basic services.  
It is clear from the reasons provided in the 2009 COGTA assessment that the 
ambitious objectives set for the municipal infrastructure grant (MIG) in the 2006 
National Treasury Budget Review were not entirely achieved. One of the reasons 
advanced by the COGTA report is that infrastructure funding mechanisms do not 
adequately take account of all the cost factors that differentiate municipalities 
from each other. This is particularly true of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
(MIG) formula.     
Perspectives on the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) formula 
Recent studies indicate that while there has been a certain degree of over-spending 
and under-spending of infrastructure budgets until the appearance of the COGTA 
assessment (2009) there was no way to show how this may be associated with the 
attainment of planned output targets for the delivery of basic services. The 
COGTA Report (Ibid: 41) in particular avers that the spending of the MIG grants 
is uneven amongst local governments because of the varied ability and capacity of 
many municipalities. 
Initially, municipalities were able to spend most of their infrastructure budget 
allocations. By 2006 both the National Treasury and the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission (FFC) observed a marked under spending on the MIG allocations. In 
its Review the FFC (Josie, et al, 2006) attributed this under expenditure to several 
reasons. The reasons included the fact that municipalities continued spending 
MIG funds rolled over from previous years; the lack of proper project planning; 
ineffective project management; the lack of capacity for managing MIG funds 
and, the late approval of projects and budgets by council officials.  
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The COGTA assessment supports the findings of National Treasury and the FFC 
and, adds a few other problems associated with the misuse of MIG funds. These 
problems include the use of MIG funds for municipal operational costs; 
municipalities retaining investment amounts in the face of huge service backlogs 
and, the negative impact of the rural nature and vastness of some regions on the 
ability of municipalities to provide basic services. The COGTA Report (Ibid: 41) 
advances three “challenging elements in the current MIG approach”.  
Firstly, the annual MIG allocations to smaller municipalities are often inadequate 
to be used for financing larger bulk infrastructure projects. Secondly, and with 
specific significance for the main question of this thesis, the formula driven 
allocation amounts to municipalities are inappropriately determined resulting in 
“the poor selection of projects and ultimately poor outcomes.” (Ibid: 41). Thirdly, 
the COGTA assessment suggests that the preceding two “challenging elements” 
in the MIG approach introduces a “lumpiness” of capital investment. Implicit in 
this suggestion is the assumption that “lumpiness of capital investment” 
compromises the principle of stability, predictability, certainty and flexibility 
required for planning, budgeting and implementing infrastructure programmes 
over a medium to long-term cycle [see The Constitution, Section 214 (2) (i) and 
(j)]. Thus the COGTA assessment proposes that municipalities be allowed to 
pledge MIG funding up to 2018 in order to acquire loan finance.    
While many problems and challenges associated with the MIG may be attributed 
to the lack of capacity and capabilities of some municipalities other problems and 
challenges such as the inadequacy of MIG funds; the inappropriate determination 
of the MIG allocation and, the “lumpiness of capital investment” derived from the 
MIG, are inherent in the design of the equitable sharing mechanisms of the 
transfer system in general and the MIG grant in particular.  
As will be noted below the structure of the MIG does not include a 
comprehensive list of the differentiating cost factors in the input variables that 
make up the formula. A grant allocation based on a formula that does not take 
account of all input cost factors is likely to place increased budgetary pressures on 
municipalities. One of the biggest challenges for the costing of input factors is the 
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lack of reliable financial data and information from municipalities. The 2006 
Budget Review suggests that the major constraint in attaining policy targets is the 
lack of reliable data and information about the actual costs of input factors. This 
makes comparisons across local governments very difficult.  
A review of the MIG must address some of the design issues. In particular 
national government needs to consider whether conditional grants such as the 
MIG should also be allocated equitably a discretionary transfer as infrastructure 
grants are also drawn from nationally collected revenue.   
The MIG Formula  
As the MIG allocations to municipalities are formula driven it will be important to 
understand the nature and structure of the formula. At least two major reviews of 
the MIG programme were undertaken in the recent past. One was done by the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) in 2006  (Josie, et al, 2006: 18-21). The 
other, by the Department of Provincial and Local Government in 2007.  Both 
these reviews discuss the MIG formula. The formula consists of percentage 
allocations for five different components representing different municipal 
infrastructure needs.  
From the DPLG review the formula can be summarized as follows: 
MIG = B + P + E + N + M  
Where: 
• B represents the allocation for basic residential infrastructure such as 
water, sanitation, roads, electricity, street lighting and solid waste removal.   
• P denotes funds for new and rehabilitated municipal service infrastructure.  
• E is the allocation for the construction of social service institutions and 
micro-enterprises.  
• N is the allocation for nodal development and renewal programmes in 
targeted urban and rural municipalities and;  
• M is a performance related adjustment to the total MIG allocation for a 
municipality.   
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In addition, each component is weighted by an identified socio-demographic 
disparity parameter that reflects differences among metropolitan and local 
municipalities.  The disparity parameters for each of the five components are 
represented respectively by 
!, ", #, $  and µ   
 
such that each parameter is a weighted adjustment for the corresponding service 
allocation component. The adjustments are supposed to take account of the costs 
of socio-demographic disparities that distinguish the metropolitan municipalities 
(Category A) from the local municipalities (Category B). The parameter values 
were estimated from the 2001 Census data (StatSA, 2001). The five components 
represent the generic costs of the broad categories of infrastructural services. The 
socio-demographic disparity parameters are adjustment weights associated with 
sub components of these broad categories. The socio-demographic disparities 
represented by the parameters may be designated as follows: 
!1 = weight  for inadequate household water and sanitation
!2 = weight  for household in informal settlements with no access roads
!3 = weight  for inadaquate household refuse and waste removal
"    = weight  for public facilities for households earning less than R1100 pm
#    = weight  for small business areas with households earning less than R1100 pm
$    = weight  for nodal development areas with households earning less than R1100 pm
µ    = weight  for performance related adjustment  
 
Thus the full MIG formula will be: 
MIG = !iB + "P + #E + $N + µM
!i=1
3
%
 
where
i= is an index for disparities  
 
The weightings for residential infrastructure in the MIG formula purport to take 
account of disparities in the provision of water, sanitation, roads and waste 
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removal for households. According to the DPLG manual the disparity weights are 
there to distinguish the metropolitan municipalities from the local municipalities. 
There are several problems with the way the formula is constructed.  
There is no clear description as to how and why certain disparity weights were 
selected and others not. In essence there are only two disparity indicators. The 
first three are indicators for inadequate provision. The second three are poverty 
weights for areas with households earning less than R1100 per month. There is no 
explanation as to why R1100 pm was selected as the poverty measure. The choice 
of the policies raises two fundamental questions.  Firstly, how are the 
inadequacies in service provision estimated?  Secondly, can the choice of a 
household poverty line truly represent disparities between metropolitan and rural 
local municipalities given that there are large pockets of informal settlements and 
unemployment within the boundaries of metropolitan areas?   
The second problem is associated with setting minimum norms and standards for 
basic services. The DPLG manual (DPLG Manual: 7) defines the norm for a basic 
water supply facility as the infrastructure necessary to supply 25 litres of potable 
water per person per day supplied within 200 meters of a household and with a 
minimum flow of 10 litres per minute for communal water points. Formal house 
or yards with connections are entitled to a supply of 6000 litres of potable water 
per month. None of the other basic service norms and standards are clearly 
defined.  
Thirdly, the formula does not have disparity components to show how local 
municipalities should be distinguished from each other. This lacunae means that 
horizontal grants, between and among local municipalities, will be inequitably 
allocated.  
Finally, including a performance related weight in the formula seems to imply that 
local municipalities without the capacity to provide adequate services will be 
penalized. Yet the capacity to deliver services in disadvantaged local 
municipalities is a function of the legacy of past apartheid policies, the lack of 
technical skills and inadequate funds from own revenues and transfers from 
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national government.  The COGTA assessment recommends that government 
should review this formula. 
Review of the MIG 
In 2003 the FFC prepared an evaluation note of the draft policy framework 
document for the MIG. (Fast, 2003) In this evaluation several important points 
were raised that are as relevant now as they were in 2003.  
The evaluation pointed to a fundamental contradiction in the requirement for 
infrastructure funds to be spent according to municipal Integrated Development 
Plans (IDP) and, according to the proportions attributed to the socio-demographic 
indicator weights in the formula. The evaluation made the point that:  
IDPs reflect local priorities, which may vary across time and geography. 
For example, a municipality at risk for a cholera outbreak may choose to 
spend most infrastructure funding on water and sanitation infrastructure 
during the first years of the MIG programme. (Fast, 2003)  
This contradiction compromises the need for flexibility in allocating grants. 
Another aspect of the MIG allocations that was raised as a potential problem by 
the evaluation, and that continues to present difficulties in the implementation of 
infrastructure projects, is the complexity of the intergovernmental arrangements 
between district and local municipalities. This point was underscored by the 
COGTA (2009) assessment.  
In its basic form all the current MIG formula achieves is an incremental slicing of 
a given politically determined pool of funds from National Government’s 
equitable share? The rationale for the formula does not give any indication as to 
how the pool of funds for the grant was determined.  There is also no indication as 
to whether the cost factors determining infrastructure needs were taken into 
account in estimating the pool of funds or at least, taken into account in the 
determination of each municipality’s MIG allocation? The onus is on 
municipalities to access these funds by submitting project proposals and plans to 
national government.    
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This formula approach to allocations seems to operate under the assumption that, 
as the conditional grants are drawn from national government’s equitable share, 
they are exempt form the constitutional requirement for all collected revenues to 
be equitably shared. In other words they may be allocated at the discretion of 
national government. Such an assumption may be based on a restricted 
interpretation of Section 214(1) of the Constitution. Conditionality of a grant does 
not necessarily imply that it cannot be allocated equitably. Neither does it mean 
that the grant can be allocated without taking into account all the considerations 
listed under Section 214(2) of the Constitution.  
South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations system is founded on the 
principle of equal treatment of all spheres of government (The Constitution, 1996 
and the IGFR Act, 1997). This implies that the structure of an intergovernmental 
allocation formula in South Africa has to include mechanisms that are firmly 
based on principles of both Section 214(1) and (2) of the Constitution.  In 
subsequent chapters this thesis will present an alternative approach to allocating 
capital grants to municipalities that takes cognizance of both Sections 214(1) and 
(2) of the Constitution.  
In addition to the formula driven allocations the MIG pool of funds also consists 
of an allocation that is non-formula driven called a Special Municipal 
Infrastructure Fund (SMIF) targeting project based applications by municipalities 
that meet a set of pre-determined criteria. 
Perspective on the project based approach to allocating MIG grants 
In its 2006 review of the MIG the Financial and Fiscal Commission (Nthite et al, 
in Josie et al, 2006) argued that under-spending by disadvantaged municipalities 
maybe due to the stringent conditions attached to the MIG allocations. Another 
reason for under-spending may be the requirement that all municipalities provide 
adequate project management irrespective of their financial and human resource 
capacity. The FFC review suggested that all these problems seem to be associated 
with the fact that the structure, conditions and procedures of MIG were carried 
over from its predecessor, the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme 
(CMIP). The latter was a project proposal application approach similar to those 
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used by development banks. These approaches are invariably underscored by the 
extensive use of cost benefit21 and cost effectiveness methods. In general, 
municipalities in South Africa have little or no in-house capacity to plan and 
prepare proposals and manage major infrastructure projects. This is particularly 
true of the poorer local municipalities.  
The MIG was instituted for the provision of basic infrastructure to municipalities 
with infrastructure backlogs and high levels of poverty and economic disparities. 
It is the largest single national transfer to municipalities. Despite the laudable 
objectives of the MIG National government’s own assessments indicate that the 
allocations have been under-spent or only effectively spent by larger richer 
municipalities. Larger and richer municipalities have a relative comparative 
advantage in resource capacity, planning and preparing sophisticated 
infrastructure project proposals over their smaller and poorer counterparts. 
Whether these project proposals are underpinned by a cost benefit analysis (CBA) 
or cost effectiveness methodology is not immediately evident from the literature. 
However, it may be assumed that for decision-makers to make an informed choice 
from amongst several competing demands for infrastructure projects the proposals 
should be supported by cost benefit or cost effectiveness analyses and an 
understanding of the types of funding available.  
In itself there is nothing wrong with municipalities accessing the pool of 
infrastructure funds through a process of submitting infrastructure project 
applications to national government. However, if the grant pool is politically 
predetermined without objectively taking into account all constitutional, economic 
and redistributive considerations then municipalities may argue that the 
determination of the pool of funds is a arbitrary process lacking transparency and 
not in keeping with the principles of co-operative governance in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution. In this regard the fact the MIG is allocated according to a formula is 
a moot point, as it does not show how the pool of funds was determined and how 
it takes account of constitutional, economic and redistributive considerations.  
                                                
21 A conceptual method used in the public sector for evaluating financial inputs and outputs of investment 
projects and, that takes into account future gains (benefits) and losses (costs) to investors and beneficiaries 
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Allocations of finance based on applications from recipients are widely used to 
disburse grants, loans or donor funds to municipalities for development projects. 
However, as Harvey (1983), points out, this is an extremely hazardous task for 
any level of government in developing countries. With very little in-house 
capacity most local municipalities would opt for other forms of finance for 
infrastructure projects. Sometimes the wrong choice may add to the risk of project 
failure. To expect local municipalities to submit project applications in keeping 
with the MIG preconditions is unrealistic in South Africa. Harvey (1983:3) 
underscores some of the prerequisites for planning, preparing and implementing 
projects.  
…those actually involved in preparing and implementing projects, as well as 
those who make decisions on the choice and financing of projects, need to 
have some knowledge of the costs and benefits of the more commonly 
available types of finance, ways of analyzing those costs and benefits, and 
some of the risks involved. In theory it would no doubt be better for 
government planners to separate project selection from the question of 
finance, rather than to react to proposals for projects with finance already 
integrated into the proposals. In practice, the planning process is normally a 
continuous mixture of both, and indeed individual projects sometimes come 
for consideration at several different stages. It is certainly better to match up 
a project to the most suitable type of finance at an early stage, rather than to 
make changes when a great deal of planning and negotiation has already 
taken place. At either stage, those involved should have background 
knowledge of costs and benefits referred to, and the suitability of different 
types of finance to different types of project.  
On its own a project based allocation arrangement does not provide the 
transparency and budget predictability so important for planning and required 
under Section 214 (2) of the Constitution and other legislation. Of course a 
project-based approach is appropriate for accessing private sector funding for 
deficit financing purposes where need is driven by competing municipal 
microeconomic demands. In such cases local governments have to fulfill a set of 
stringent conditions in order to access loans to finance municipal budget deficits. 
These conditions may include cost benefit analysis research; submission of 
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business plans and, feasibility studies. A project-based approach is also 
appropriate for helping municipal decision-makers choose to fund certain projects 
amongst a range of alternative project options. Deficit financing of municipal 
infrastructure budgets is an important instrument in funding infrastructure plans 
and programmes. In the literature Venkatachalan (2005), the OECD (2005) and du 
Mhango (in Khosa, 2000) propose several innovative approaches that 
municipalities may use to access loans to complement and supplement municipal 
infrastructure budgets.    
In South Africa, although a project-based approach may be used to inform 
municipal infrastructure budgets, it is proving to be a blunt instrument for 
informing National Government’s determination of the pool of funds that may be 
available for MIG grants through the intergovernmental fiscal relations system. 
This is particularly true for municipalities without adequate sources of own 
revenues from taxes and user-fees. Different considerations listed under Section 
(2) 214 a-j of the Constitution have to be taken into account when allocating 
nationally collected revenues.  
Under the current dispensation the microeconomic demands of municipalities are 
bound to come into conflict with the macroeconomic constraints determining the 
available MIG pool of funds from the nationally collected tax revenue and other 
sources. In the existing arrangement, to access the MIG funds, municipalities are 
expected to submit plans and project proposals based on actual costs. However, 
such an arrangement poses a fundamental contradiction. If each municipality had 
to take account of its real costs (including backlogs, inequality and other disparity 
factors) for building and maintaining infrastructure for the provision of basic 
services and economic development and, these amounts are aggregated across all 
municipalities, then the total sum may be greater than the national capital 
expenditure budget pool available for equitable allocation to municipalities. Thus, 
in public finance parlance, if this hard budget constraint limits the actual amount 
of MIG funds available why should municipalities submit plans and project 
proposals that national government departments may reject in any case?  
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As suggested above a project-based approach to funding is more appropriate to 
making loans from development banks than for equitably allocating government 
infrastructure grant transfers in a developing economy. The former runs a 
financial market for development funds and expects some form of return on its 
investment. Municipalities in such an environment are expected to operate 
according to competitive market rules and make choices about the suitability of 
the finance available. The hard-budget constraint may be one of the theoretical 
reasons why Harvey (1983: 3) suggests that, “it would no doubt be better for 
government to separate project selection from the question of finance, rather than 
to react to proposals for projects with finance already integrated into the 
proposals.” The current project approach for the intergovernmental allocating and 
disbursing of MIG funds may be one of the reasons for problems in 
intergovernmental planning and coordination and, inordinate bureaucratic delays 
in project implementation, compromising the attainment of the MIG objectives to 
deliver basic municipal services. An independent baseline study (Palmer 
Development Group, 2009) for the evaluation of government’s Support 
Programme for Accelerated Infrastructure Development (SPAID) provided 
evidence to suggest that bureaucratic delays in project implementation undermine 
the MIG objectives. 
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Table 3.2: Delays in MIG project implementation by average number of days, 
August 2008 
Project 
Category 
 
Electricity 
Municipal 
public 
services 
Roads Sanitation 
Solid 
Waste 
Removal 
Water 
Consultant 
appointment: 
      
-No. of projects 138 156 533 272 24 451 
-Days from 
registration 
114 86 101 106 134 113 
-Days Overdue 15 37 62 27 79 51 
Tender Advert       
-No. of projects   30 82 333 116 13 340 
-Days from 
registration 
172 131 157 151 312 156 
-Days Overdue 77 109 121 78 172 91 
Contractor 
appointment 
      
-No. of projects 73 116 484 236 30 604 
-Days from 
registration 
206 185 203 294 551 259 
-Days overdue 117 130 119 158 212 140 
Project 
completion 
      
-No. of projects 44 48 203 97 11 341 
-Days from 
registration 
320 374 403 607 856 541 
-Days Overdue 78 117 129 73 63 137 
(Source: Adapted from SPAID 2008 Baseline Study Estimation) 
 
Surely, given the legacy of apartheid inequality, the infrastructure development 
imperatives of local government cannot be founded on a municipality’s 
competitive edge in producing infrastructure plans, project proposals and project 
monitoring capacity. Would it not be better if national government allocated the 
macro-economically determined pool of funds available for infrastructure through 
a capital expenditure grant scheme model that includes estimates of backlogs, 
capital stocks and the aggregated inequality and disparity factor costs of providing 
services to municipalities? Furthermore, if the MIG principle that all 
infrastructure funding for a municipal function be directed to or be under the 
jurisdiction of the relevant service authority it would not be necessary to have so 
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many complex intermediate allocation and implementation mechanisms that tend 
to undermine this same principle.  
Municipalities are better placed to handle allocations because they also have the 
added advantage of raising own tax revenues and borrowing to supplement 
shortfalls in capital expenditures. Thus, under such an arrangement, the MIG 
grants will amount to a revenue equalization transfer that offers poorer 
municipalities a lifeline to plan the gradual build-up of their tax base as 
infrastructure provision stimulates local economic growth and development. This 
is a significant incentive for using the MIG as part of a matching grant 
programme. More important such a capital expenditure grant model will provide 
national government with an effective policy instrument to work within the 
constitutional requirement to ensure the provision of basic services taking into 
account reasonable measures, progressive realization and available resources.               
Conditions, intergovernmental coordination and institutional 
arrangements 
The conditions attached to the MIG are intended to ensure that municipalities 
meet national priorities, norms and standards. In this regard the MIG is allocated 
to assist the poor to access infrastructure to improve their economic opportunities. 
Thus municipalities are required to prioritize public residential bulk infrastructure 
for the delivery of water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal, street lights, roads 
and solid waste removal. In terms of MIG principles implementation plans must 
be aligned with the relevant government department’s sector policy objectives set 
before the municipal financial year. (Nthite et al, in Josie et al, 2006). 
 
Other conditions of a governance and institutional nature include compliance with 
proper planning and accountability guidelines set by different national 
departments responsible and accountable for integrating the construction of the 
elements that comprise residential bulk infrastructure services. Politically 
informed conditions include adherence to specific labour intensive methods and 
policies of transformation in the awarding of contracts. Monitoring the quality of 
infrastructure provided is an integral part of the conditional framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
  110 
The institutional policy instruments and arrangements for the implementation of 
the MIG programme reside with both the local and provincial government 
spheres. The MIG manual (DPLG, 2007) affirms the primary role of 
municipalities in the planning, budgeting, financial management and operational 
arrangements for the grant. The municipal manager is responsible for the effective 
management of the programme.  
 
At the provincial level relevant departments are expected to integrate their 
sectoral (e.g. water, roads and housing) plans with the MIG programme and 
provide planning support to municipalities. The manual provides a detailed 
responsibility matrix defining the roles and responsibilities of all spheres of 
government in the delivery of such services funded by the MIG grant. The key 
challenge in this regard is effective coordination as some of the functions have to 
be provided concurrently by the provinces and municipalities.  While 
municipalities may have the capacity to raise own revenues for funding high 
infrastructure costs provinces do not have a corresponding revenue raising 
capacity. The ensuing tensions from such discrepancies have been the basis of 
growing current problems between national, provincial and local governments in 
South Africa.  
 
An additional consideration arises specifically in the local government context, 
and that concerns the relationship of local governments to national and provincial 
governments.  In most countries, the relationship among governments is strictly 
hierarchical.  National governments deal with the provinces, while provinces 
alone deal with their municipalities.  The situation in South Africa is more 
complex, where there are three spheres of government required under the 
Constitution to govern co-operatively.  Despite this principle in practice, the local 
government sphere operates within the policy and funding parameters set 
primarily by national government. 
 
Grants should be designed to ensure local government autonomy and achieve 
fiscal equity among municipalities, and should be transparent, stable and 
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predictable. The question here is does national government have sole discretion 
over how the MIG is allocated and disbursed because it is a conditional grant 
drawn from the national equitable share? A related question is whether such 
allocations and disbursements should comply with the requirements listed in 
Section 214(2) of the Constitution? In other words should conditional grants 
drawn from the national equitable share be also subjected to the principle of 
equitable vertical and horizontal sharing amongst the three spheres of 
government?       
 
The objective of South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal arrangements is to 
ensure that these inter-governmental responsibilities are carried out in the spirit of 
co-operation, fairness, and efficiency.  In the end, it is the welfare of individual 
citizens, wherever they reside, that should be the ultimate objective guiding the 
decisions around fiscal arrangements. A national government transfer using a 
municipal infrastructure grant scheme will provide municipalities with autonomy, 
stability and predictability in exercising some flexibility in prioritizing, planning 
and choosing amongst infrastructure projects.  
 
Given the current hybrid approach to allocating the MIG it is no wonder that 
municipalities find it difficult to access the funds. It is possible that as a result of 
this and the problems mentioned above a large part of the MIG pool of funds 
varies between being over-spent, unallocated, under-spent or misspent on 
unplanned infrastructure projects.  
 
The preceding discussion presented some perspectives on the MIG and examined 
some of the structural difficulties associated with the formula and its 
implementation. Before considering an alternative approach to allocating 
infrastructure grants in the next section this chapter will assess the extent to which 
the current approach is consistent with all constitutional and legal mandates.   
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The Constitutional and Intergovernmental Context of the MIG  
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution prescribes that certain public services be 
provided to all citizens as part of their economic rights.  Depending on their 
service delivery responsibility spheres of government may be held accountable for 
ensuring that these rights are fulfilled. The provision of many of these services 
fall within the roles and functions of municipalities.   
 
The Constitution does not speak directly to the issue of vertical and horizontal 
equity amongst and between sub-national governments, though it implies equal 
rights and obligations for individuals to basic services listed in Schedules 4B and 
5B of the Constitution, (see Stytler and De Visser, 2007). For the respective 
spheres of government to provide basic services, the Constitution makes provision 
for the allocation of equal shares from the nationally collected revenues (See 
diagramme in Chapter 4). This is prescribed in Section 227 (1) and (2) of the 
Constitution (The Constitution, 1996): 
(1) Local government and each province –  
(a) is entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally to enable 
it to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to it; and 
(b) may receive other allocations from national government revenue, 
either conditionally or unconditionally.  
(2) Additional revenue raised by provinces or municipalities may not be 
deducted from their share of revenue raised nationally, or from other 
allocations made to them out of national government revenue. 
 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Constitution approaches the 
requirement for equity in a particular manner and requires the mechanism of 
“equitable allocations” to play a particularly important role in financing the equity 
that is to be achieved through provincial and municipal programmes.  
 
The municipal infrastructure grant allocations fall within the long-term vision of 
the inter-governmental system in South Africa. Municipal infrastructure grants are 
the catalyst for the building of public infrastructure necessary for local 
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governments to provide key public services to which communities, households 
and individuals are entitled. 
 
The long-term vision of the inter-governmental system is one where national 
government, in consultation and co-operation with sub-national spheres, sets 
standards for basic public services. Ideally, these standards should be transparent 
and should be provided for in national legislation.  Sub-national spheres such as 
local municipalities, utilizing the resources available to them, have the 
responsibility to design and deliver programmes within their jurisdictions that 
satisfy these national standards. 
 
At least two basic conclusions may be drawn from an examination of the 
constitutional provisions for equity in equitable allocations of infrastructure 
grants. Access to basic services is a fundamental right to which everyone is 
entitled.  Basic services include access to adequate housing and health care 
services; sufficient food and water; social security and basic and further 
education, as elaborated in the Bill of rights (Chapter 2) of the Constitution. 
Secondly, certain rights may be provided within reason and must be subject to 
progressive realization, as governments must operate within available resources.   
 
Equitable allocations, at a minimum, include an entitlement to enable the 
provision of basic services by provinces and local governments. Equitable 
allocations are provided out of national revenue. This suggests that equitable 
allocations must be adequate and distributed appropriately so as to ensure that all 
citizens have access to those basic services for which provinces and municipalities 
are responsible, subject to the constraint of available resources.  
 
Although the equitable division of national revenue among the three spheres of 
government lies at the heart of intergovernmental fiscal elations in South Africa 
and is mandated in Section 214 (1) of the Constitution, this mandate is 
circumscribed by certain requirements. In Section 214 (2), clauses a) to j) the 
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Constitution requires that several considerations need to be taken into account 
before the equitable division can take place.   
 
Many of these considerations are of relevance for intergovernmental relationships 
and the roles and responsibilities of municipalities in the delivery of services 
within their jurisdictions.  Municipalities may, for instance, be required to 
participate in the attainment of policy objectives that serve the national interest 
(clause a). A typical example, that is also relevant for financing public 
infrastructure, is South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Clause b 
(provisions for servicing the national debt and other national obligations) and c 
(needs and interests of national government determined by objective criteria) are 
of particular interest to all municipalities that may require national government’s 
support for debt financing of infrastructure projects through borrowing in the 
domestic and international financial markets. National government may have to 
weigh such support against its room for balancing its various commitments and 
obligations with the macroeconomic constraints under which it has to manage 
public finances and the economy in general. [See diagramme and flowchart in 
Chapter 4]. 
 
The clauses that impact directly on financial and budgetary issues are d), e), f), g), 
h) and i). Respectively, they are specifically pertinent for a municipality’s ability 
to provide services and perform its functions; develop its fiscal capacity and be 
economically efficient; be developmental in its policy objectives; take account of 
disparities within its jurisdictions; recognize its obligations in terms of national 
legislation; and, receive stable and predictable allocations of revenue shares.  
 
The list spans a wide spectrum of national requirements that range from the 
macroeconomic to the microeconomic. All the requirements listed above are very 
important considerations for national government in determining the equitable 
division of national revenue allocations through a formula driven process. Apart 
from being beyond the scope of local government’s competency, the balance 
between macroeconomic and microeconomic policies is extremely onerous for 
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municipalities to consider when preparing applications for infrastructure project 
finance. Municipalities are better placed to focus on infrastructure project 
priorities and plans informed by the needs of their communities. On the other 
hand, national government for example, may use fiscal capacity and economic 
efficiency assessments as key indicators for compensating municipalities for any 
shortfalls in infrastructure project finance.  
 
A formula based on a model for the equitable sharing of the MIG pool of funds 
has a better chance of equalization to compensate for a municipality’s inadequate 
fiscal capacity and, to sanction in the case of economic inefficiency. Local 
government is not in a position to incorporate market price distortions and equity 
considerations into infrastructure project plans and budgets. Market price 
distortions may negatively impact on the pool of funds that may be available for 
infrastructure funding. A nationally managed model for the equitable sharing of 
the MIG pool of funds is more suited to take account of market price distortions 
when compensating for inadequate fiscal capacity, economic efficiency and the 
social benefits and costs of projects. Such an approach will have the added 
advantage of introducing a relative degree of objectivity and transparency to the 
allocation process and provide a sound economic argument for the progressive 
and reasonable provision of basic services within available resources. Hansen, 
(1978: 1) underscores this point. 
 Often market price distortions cannot be removed through basic economic 
policy changes because of powerful political forces with vested interest in 
the status quo. Under such circumstance, one way of improving economic 
efficiency and social equity is to make investment decisions on the basis of 
shadow prices that reflect the true value to the country of its resources. 
These shadow prices may be ‘national parameters’ (e.g. the shadow price 
for foreign exchange) or they may be specific to a given sector, region 
and/or project (e.g. the shadow wage rate for labour).22 
 
                                                
22 A shadow price is the imputed value of a good or service in the absence of a market price. The shadow 
price represents the opportunity cost or real sacrifice to an economy of producing goods or services where 
charges or prices do not reflect the real value of the goods and services produced.    
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A nationally managed model for the equitable sharing of the MIG is also better 
equipped to take account of the “developmental and other needs of…local 
government and municipalities” [Constitution, 1996, Section 214 (2) (f)] within 
the context of national development objectives. In the current approach project 
evaluation and monitoring of the MIG is solely concerned with the efficiency of 
the use of resources and the hard budget constraint than with disparities and the 
gross inequalities of income distribution that prevail within and between 
municipalities.  
 
An alternative nationally managed equitable sharing model for allocating MIG 
should have the capacity for taking account of “economic disparities within and 
among” the municipalities [Constitution, 1996, Section 214 (2) (g)]. Expecting 
each municipality to be concerned with balancing between maximizing equity and 
efficiency in the local government sphere in general is unrealistic. Municipalities 
are generally concerned with microeconomic impacts of public infrastructure and, 
maximizing equity and efficiency within their own jurisdictions rather than about 
national macroeconomic growth and development strategies. In fact so-called 
applying efficient strategies alone can have negative consequences if not balanced 
with equity. 
…‘efficient’ development strategies often leave the present inequities of 
income distribution unchanged, and may even make them worse. Efficiency 
and equity usually cannot be maximized simultaneously. There is a trade-off 
between them, and deciding where the balance lies is perhaps one of the 
hardest tasks facing development planners. (Hansen, 1978: 1-2) 
It would be much better for municipal decision makers to focus on choosing 
among infrastructure projects in keeping with their microeconomic plans and 
priorities and for national government to focus on making allocation decisions 
according to national macroeconomic growth, development and redistributive 
considerations listed in Section 214 (2) of the Constitution.   
 
In its attempt to find the right balance between equity and efficiency the current 
MIG approach seeks to influence and manage infrastructure project investment 
 
 
 
 
  117 
decision-making at both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. This is a 
difficult objective for national government to achieve. Hansen, (1978: 1-2) argues 
that  
…decision makers ‘at the top’ generally find it difficult to offer any firm and 
quantitative rules about the relative importance of these two conflicting 
criteria (i.e. equity and efficiency) to guide project analysts in their choice 
among alternative projects and project designs…  
However, given that municipalities in South Africa have legal mandates 
(Constitution, Section 214 (2) h) project analysts and decision makers at the local 
government level may, as Hansen (1978) suggests, prepare alternative projects 
varying in the degree to which they maximize either efficiency or equity.  
Then, by observing which projects are chosen by decision makers at the top 
the analysts can determine the implicit weights that are placed on these 
alternative objectives. This approach is of course, not limited solely to 
efficiency versus equity, but may also be used to determine the weights 
decision makers place on other non-efficiency goals such as meeting ‘basic 
needs’ of the poor… (Ibid: 1-2).  
If national government allocates MIG funds among municipalities on the basis of 
an equitable sharing model that is based on medium to long term policy objectives 
and targets and, incorporates weights for equity and efficiency together with 
weights for sub-regional economic disparity, decision making at the local 
government level will be enhanced. The approach will also achieve two other 
purposes. Firstly it will ensure stability and predictability in the allocations of 
revenue shares for infrastructure provision as per the requirement in Clause (i) in 
Section 214 (2) of the Constitution (1996) and secondly, it will explain the 
reasons for the determination of the MIG pool of funds.  
Perspectives on Capital Cost Disparity Factors in a MIG-Type Formula 
The current methodology for MIG (as presented in the DPLG 2007 Report on the 
Revision of the MIG Allocation Formula) was supposed to have introduced a 
formula based approach as opposed to the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure 
Programme (CMIP) practice of allocations for approved infrastructure project 
applications. Although this is a significant change there is no explanation as to 
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how and why the socio-demographic indicators used in the formula were chosen. 
The indicators seem to represent backlogs in water, sanitation and housing and a 
poverty line of households below a certain level of income (See formula 
explanation above). Each indicator is weighted with a percentage of the total MIG 
fund that is used to adjust a specific infrastructure service component allocation. 
The indicators are based on the 2001 Census (DPLG 2007). The indicator weights 
are introduced to show that the formula takes account of socio-demographic 
disparities within municipalities. However, they do not show how they are 
estimated and how they take account of the cost implications of backlogs and 
economic disparity factors that differentiate municipalities from each other.  
An Alternative Approach to Allocating Municipal Infrastructure Grants 
It is clear from the preceding discussion in this chapter that intergovernmental 
transfer systems are faced with the dilemma of having to balance the need for 
economic equity and stability with efficiency and predictability in the equitable 
provision of public services. In South Africa’s case this is a constitutional 
obligation to be attained progressively and within reasonable fiscal constraints. 
Public finance literature and experiences of international practice indicate that 
resolving this problem is fraught with many challenges and difficulties. 
Notwithstanding these challenges there is agreement in the literature (see 
Boadway and Shah, 2007) that estimating the costs of providing public services 
within grant formulae is important in balancing the competing objectives of 
economic stability, equity and efficiency. 
Grant systems whose amounts are determined by a well-specified formula have a 
number of advantages over those that are determined on a year-by-year 
discretionary basis. Formula-driven grants are more transparent, reliable and 
predictable, and are less subject to short-term fiscal constraints and day-to-day 
political considerations. Formula driven grants can be designed to be in place for 
intervals of several years.  They can also be designed so that risks of unexpected 
changes in revenue are borne by national government, which may be especially 
important where municipal governments have little revenue-raising ability, and 
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where they cannot use debt as a method of insuring themselves against revenue 
fluctuations. 
The process by which grant formulae and amounts are determined should be 
transparent and undertaken from a longer-term perspective. Nevertheless, 
isolating national transfers from the budget process entirely is not feasible since 
money must be appropriated by the national legislature.  Some countries, such as 
Australia, India and South Africa have established independent fiscal 
commissions for ensuring that longer-run considerations are taken into account in 
designing grants.   
Political accountability is important for ensuring that public services are delivered 
in efficient ways and that they meet the needs of citizens.  Therefore, explicit and 
unambiguous delineation of accountability relationships between the different 
spheres of government is critical. In the case of the MIG the delineation of 
accountability relationships between national government and local government 
must be explicit and clear. Nurturing responsible and autonomous decision-
making at the municipal government level with respect to balancing equity and 
efficiency may involve some transition, but it will pay dividends in the long run. 
The Josie, MacDonald and Petchey (2008) model and the Petchey et al (2004) 
provincial capital grant model introduce the notion of costs associated with capital 
stock, capital backlogs and socio-demographic and economic disparities that 
characterize inequalities between and within sub-regions such as municipalities. 
In South Africa the Constitution (1996) requires that these factors be taken into 
account in attempting to equitably allocate capital grants for public infrastructure.  
The notion of cost disparity factors in a MIG-type capital grant model is an 
innovation that may be used to highlight the varying degrees of poverty and 
inequality across municipalities. The current MIG formula allocates funds across 
regions and sub-regions according to census population numbers and a politically 
determined indicator for poverty. No account is taken of aggregated socio-
economic inequality and geo-physical disparities that may impact on the cost of 
delivery of services. Furthermore, no account is taken of the impact of the 
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growing cost of inherited capital backlogs on the level of actual capital stock, on-
going capital requirements and new capital investment.  
Summary 
In this chapter a rationale was presented for using a capital grant model for 
horizontally allocating MIG funds among municipalities. The chapter has shown 
that it is possible for a national government to use a capital expenditure grant 
model that takes account of all constitutional requirements; macroeconomic 
considerations and, also takes account of the real cost of financing infrastructure 
projects.  
An appropriately designated local government authority is better placed to 
disburse the grant between competing demands for infrastructure project finance. 
It is more difficult for national government to manage a financing method that 
tries to achieve both macroeconomic and microeconomic objectives. This 
separation of roles will allow national government the possibility of a more 
objective oversight with respect to monitoring municipal compliance with 
constitutional requirements and other legal policy instruments. It will also create 
space to oversee the attainment of fundamental national policy objectives and 
targets. Separation of roles will also allow for local government autonomy in the 
monitoring and micro-management of municipal infrastructure development plans 
and objectives.    
For national government, using such a capital grant model at the macro level, 
makes for an easy assessment of whether constitutionally mandated basic 
infrastructure services have been reasonably, progressively and affordably 
provided. From an economic perspective it makes for effective estimation of the 
marginal product of capital at the municipal level. These estimates may be useful 
cross-checks to verify the results from the application of cost benefit analysis 
methods at municipal level.  
In summary, there is substantial scope for the current municipal infrastructure 
grant funding arrangements to use a formula that includes: allocations of national 
revenue to meet basic services; a provision for funding infrastructure backlogs 
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key to economic growth and development; and, elements in a grant scheme that 
take account of the historical and spatial disparities that determine costs of 
providing services in areas that have been the victims of past apartheid 
discriminatory policies. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Design, Methodology Data  
And Information 
 
The research design employed in the study for the thesis was an eclectic mix of 
different methodologies and approaches each corresponding to the five key 
components of the thesis (see Figure 1.1. in Chapter 1). The thesis is empirical in 
the sense that it is a case study using hybrid textual and numeric data sets from 
five local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District Municipality. The 
research employs both qualitative and quantitative statistical techniques to provide 
an analysis of the five municipalities. Secondary data from official sources were 
used for statistical analyses. Much of the qualitative information was sourced 
from official reports and interviews with government officials. The sample of five 
municipalities from the Cape Winelands District was chosen because the 
municipalities constitute a homogenous group of local governments that can be 
compared with each other within the framework of a larger district municipality 
(The Cape Winelands District). The local municipalities studied were Breede 
River, Breede Valley, Drakenstein, Stellenbosch and Witzenberg. Both deductive 
and inductive approaches are used to adapt the Petchey et al (2004) provincial 
capital grant model for allocating grants to municipalities and, evaluate its 
analytical effectiveness for allocating municipal infrastructure grant shares.  
 
The chapter restates the fundamental question to be addressed by the study for the 
thesis and restates the propositions of the thesis as hypotheses. The chapter next 
explains the different methodologies adopted for adapting the Petchey et al (2004) 
provincial capital grant model for application in municipal infrastructure grant 
allocations. Through this process the key approach, concepts, variables and 
definitions will be presented and discussed. Secondly, the chapter explains the 
eclectic set of methods used for estimating the variables in the model. Thirdly, the 
chapter explains how the information was collected from the five municipalities in 
the Cape Winelands District and other government sources. Fourthly, a 
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description and explanation of the data and their sources are provided. Fifthly, the 
limitations, shortcomings and sources of error of the data are discussed. 
 
Recall from the Chapter 1 that the study for the thesis asked a fundamental 
question: How can municipal infrastructure grants take account of historical 
backlogs and disparities that differentiate municipalities from each other? To 
answer this question the study focused on two specific propositions that challenge 
the way the current municipal infrastructure grant allocations are made and, may 
be expressed in terms of two fundamental hypotheses as follows: 
• The structure of existing infrastructure grant formulae does not 
adequately take account of all historical capital cost disparity factors that 
differentiate municipalities from each other in the provision of services. 
This inadequacy compromises the right of citizens to basic services as 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights and, also compromises the principle of the 
equitability and economic efficiency of allocations within and between 
municipalities as required in Section 214(1) (a) to (c) and Section 214(2) 
(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of the Constitution. 
• National government’s existing project approach to financing municipal 
infrastructure based on the unit costs of inputs is flawed. This flawed 
approach compromises the intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) 
principle of municipal autonomy and, the requirement for stability, 
predictability and flexibility of municipal budgets required by section 214 
(2) (i) and (j) of the Constitution. 
 
My hypotheses raised two secondary questions about the structure of the existing 
way infrastructure grants from nationally collected revenues are allocated to local 
municipalities. The first question asked, what are the likely impacts on grant 
shares of including capital cost disparities in an intergovernmental infrastructure 
grant scheme intended to equitably allocate funding to municipalities?  The 
second question asked, can equitability, stability, predictability and flexibility of 
municipal budgets be enhanced by the inclusion of capital cost disparities and 
economic efficiency considerations in a municipal infrastructure grant scheme? 
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Although the current Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) and other municipal 
infrastructure allocation instruments purport to take account of poverty in the 
formulae, the inclusion of this weight alone does not adequately take account of 
the key constitutional requirements identified in the hypotheses.  In particular, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the poverty variable in the MIG formula is a weak global 
indicator for capturing diverse disparity and inequality indicators representing 
regional differences in capital cost factors, socio-economic inequalities, the 
apartheid institutional legacy of historical disadvantage and, capital backlogs that 
impact on municipal economic efficiency and developmental needs. Furthermore, 
the current project based approach to funding municipal infrastructure through the 
MIG and other grants compromises stable, predictable and flexible municipal 
planning and budgeting processes to provide constitutionally mandated basic 
services and attain regional economic and developmental objectives. It is my 
contention that structural approaches to developing a municipal infrastructure 
grant model would be a more nuanced way to meet all the constitutional 
requirements identified in the hypotheses.  
 
Using the principles of the structural approach discussed in Chapter 2 I 
contextualize the methodology for adapting the Petchey et al (2004) model within 
a structural framework. Fitzgerald et al presents Taylor’s definition of structural 
analysis as follows: 
…an economy has structure if its institutions and the behaviour of its 
members make some patterns of resource allocation and evolution 
substantially more likely than others. Economic analysis is structural when 
it takes these as the foundation stones for its theories” (Fitzgerald et al, 
1989: 31) 
 
According to Taylor (1991: 5-6) analytical modeling needs to consider the 
macroeconomic impacts of decisions taken by economic agents and their 
institutions. These impacts emanate from the decisions of public and private 
sector economic agents and institutions that influence prices and demand and 
supply in markets. Secondly, modeling needs to consider how private and public 
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sector microeconomic decisions, investment policy, fiscal demand, savings and 
income and wealth distribution influence macroeconomic stability. Other factors 
that impact on macroeconomic stability include monetary policy, inflation, and 
forms of financial intermediation, industrial policy and private sector capital 
formation. Although it is not the aim of this thesis the impact of local government 
level microeconomic decisions influenced by infrastructure grant allocations to 
municipalities is key to understanding the evolution of their eventual impact on 
macroeconomic stability, economic growth and development. From the literature 
(Chapter 2) we know that the amount of nationally collected revenue available for 
government infrastructure grant allocations will be determined by economic 
growth and development founded on a stable macroeconomic balance.  
Taylor (1991: 6-10) presents five main principles that should govern structuralist 
analysis and modeling in developing economies. The first principle is to identify 
and specify how the relevant classes of socio-economic agents and institutions fit 
into available income and wealth distribution data by virtue of their main sources 
of income.  Secondly, price and income flow data used must be in nominal or 
money terms rather than “real” terms or “relative prices” because socio-economic 
agents negotiate on the basis of actual money defined in nominal terms. Thirdly, 
structural modeling must recognize that price fluctuations, flows of funds, foreign 
exchange flows, financial surpluses and savings and investment ratios may be 
determined and controlled by different, but powerful, private and public sector 
socio-economic agents and institutions in society. Fourthly, the analysis should 
take account of the microeconomic and macroeconomic impacts on prices of  
borrowing by economic agents and institutions. Fifthly, a structural model must 
be able to show its role in the causal linkages in the macroeconomic system. For 
example, a model for allocating infrastructure grants may be validated if it can 
empirically show that it positively contributes to the macroeconomic system as a 
whole. The current approach to allocating municipal infrastructure grants does not 
take these principles into account. The models developed in Petchey et al (2007) 
and Josie et al (2008) show how the structure of the South African economy can 
be taken into account in intergovernmental grant allocations.  Although this is not 
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the objective of the thesis Figure 4.1 schematically illustrates how this can 
happen.  
Figure 4.1: A Structural View for Modeling the Equitable Sharing of Infrastructure 
Grants to Municipalities in South Africa with high levels of Disparities  
 
 
 
 
 
ffff 
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, Mabugu, Kallis: 2007) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1 the microeconomic infrastructure investment decisions 
of local municipalities will be influenced by state intervention and institutional 
arrangements in the allocation of resources, income distribution and class 
relationships among households, investment decisions by firms, the technology 
costs of producing a service and, the macroeconomic impacts of debt, interest 
rates, prices and inflation and, foreign trade. In turn the microeconomic nature of 
infrastructure investment decisions by municipalities will have significant 
macroeconomic impacts for employment, income distribution, demand for goods 
1. Pool of Funds for 
Infrastructure 
Expenditures from 
Nationally Collected 
Revenue  
2. Infrastructure Grant 
Model taking account of 
Backlogs,  Inequalities, 
Disparities & 
Institutions 
6. Data  
Municipal 
Capital stock, 
Expenditure 
trends, Socio-
economic 
indicators 
7. Estimating 
Infrastructure 
Backlogs & 
Socio-economic 
Disparity 
Indices  
3. Simulation 
Model for 
Calculating 
Equitable Grant 
Allocations 
4. Equitable 
Grant 
Allocations to 
Municipalities 
5. Macro & 
Microeconomi
c Impacts on 
Growth & 
Development 
 
 
 
 
  127 
and services and, domestic saving and investment opportunities. In this way 
regional economic growth and development prospects are enhanced creating the 
potential for a greater revenue base from which to finance future municipal 
infrastructure investment.   
 
The use of a structural approach suggests two questions. The first question is why 
should the microeconomic infrastructure investment decisions of local 
municipalities impact on the overall macroeconomic balance and performance? 
The answer lies in the fact that investment in public infrastructure contributes to 
the aggregate capital stock of the national economy in general and the regional 
economy in particular. In Taylor (1991) the importance of the aggregate capital 
stock variable figures prominently in several macroeconomic models. While the 
MIG formula includes a factor for infrastructure backlogs it does not take account 
of the impact of a capital stock variable on the municipal economy. The second 
question is how to conceptualize the problem (identified in Chapter 3) of local 
government institutional arrangements in South Africa’s (SA) intergovernmental 
fiscal relations (IGFR) system within a structural framework? This question will be 
addressed below.  
A Stylized View of Local Government Institutional Arrangements 
in South Africa’s (SA) Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (IGFR) 
System 
Following from the research design in Figure 1.1 in Chapter1 this section presents 
a structural framework for conceptualizing local government institutional 
arrangements in South Africa’s (SA) post-apartheid intergovernmental fiscal 
relations (IGFR) system (represented in box A, Figure1.1). Chapter (3) discusses 
the framework and identifies the background to the problem of local government 
infrastructure grant allocations in South Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations 
(IGFR) System. The framework provides a stylized view of the constitutional 
obligations and institutional arrangements within which intergovernmental fiscal 
relations are mediated. In this framework the place of local government’s roles and 
responsibilities can be viewed in the broader context of the constitutional 
obligations and institutional arrangements that define and determine 
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intergovernmental fiscal relations among the national, provincial and local spheres 
of government.  
 
The questions about infrastructure grants implied in the hypotheses can best be 
understood within this structural analytical framework for two reasons. Firstly, 
such a framework for the study was useful in understanding the area of governance 
and accountability in post-apartheid South Africa in transition and, undergoing 
structural transformation (Fitzgerald and Vos (1989: 29).  In this sense the 
approach provided the basis for understanding the processes for instituting, 
managing and monitoring prescribed policies of transformation and institutional 
restructuring of arrangements and transaction costs. Secondly, a structural 
analytical framework helped to understand infrastructure investment decisions as it 
focuses attention on the extent to which the availability of infrastructure, skilled 
labour markets, resource allocation mechanisms, production costs and imported 
inputs determine whether a local economy will attract investments. Clearly, both 
these reasons take on greater significance within the context of the constitutional 
requirement for equitable grant allocation mechanisms to municipalities to provide 
basic services to citizens and promote developmental and sustainable local 
government. 
 
The key constitutional intergovernmental fiscal relations institutional arrangements 
of expenditure functions, governance responsibilities and accountability constraints 
discussed in Chapter 3 are captured in stylized form in the structural framework 
presented in the Table 4.1 below in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. The 
table presents a global stylized perspective of the interrelationships between the 
three spheres of government. However, in terms of South Africa’s 
intergovernmental fiscal relations institutional arrangements local municipalities 
receive much of their infrastructure investment finance from the national 
government’s equitable share.  
Implicit in the hypotheses and objectives of the thesis is whether there is 
equitability and allocative efficiency in the way this grant is distributed. As noted 
in the introduction municipalities are faced with varying degrees of historical 
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disadvantage, socio-economic inequalities and geo-spatial disparities. They also 
have to deal with past and present institutional arrangements and transaction costs 
and macroeconomic constraints that impede their ability to finance their 
infrastructure investments.  
 
Table (4.2) is a summary of the sources of revenues that are available for the three 
spheres of government. It is clear from this table that national government has 
responsibility for collecting the bulk of the taxes and levies that constitute the 
national revenue from which the pool of funds for infrastructure grants is 
determined. From macroeconomic and public finance theory we know that 
government’s fiscal policy stance (that is government’s position on taxes, 
expenditures, borrowing and deficit financing) is a key variable in the 
determination of economic growth and eventual size of the revenue pool. Table 
(4.3) is a summary view of how the nationally collected revenue is shared amongst 
the three spheres of government. 
 
Together the three tables above summarize in stylized form the various statutory, 
economic and institutional considerations that go towards informing government 
infrastructure investment decisions. If, as is argued in the structural tradition, 
infrastructure investment plays an important role (see the literature cited in Chapter 
2) in determining the capital stock variable in the macroeconomic balance and 
stability   and, the eventual growth of the economy, then the way municipal 
infrastructure grant allocations are made (see Box 4 in Figure 4.1 above) will be 
very important in determining macroeconomic policy objectives. In Chapter 3 the 
assessment of the statutory, institutional and governance policy objectives, targets, 
instruments and budgetary arrangements for infrastructure grant allocations used 
information from official documents and interviews with managers and financial 
officers from the local municipalities and relevant national and provincial 
government departments. 
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Table 4.1:  Stylized View of IGFR Institutional Arrangements in SA  
 
Governance & institutional responsibility of: Expenditure 
shares in terms 
of Bill of Rights 
& Section 214 (1 
& 2) of 
Constitution for: 
National 
Government 
Provincial 
Government 
Local 
Government 
Constraints in 
terms of Bill of 
Rights & Section 
214 (2) clauses (a to 
j) of Constitution 
National Interests 
(e.g. Defense & 
foreign) 
Sole No No 
National Debt Debt service & 
Deficit limits 
Limited 
borrowing 
Borrowing & 
bond issue 
Needs & interests 
of national 
government 
Public service 
personnel, capital 
& operational, 
other  
Agency role As delegated 
Education Higher, adult & 
technical; science 
& technology 
Basic & early  
childhood 
No 
Health Teaching 
hospitals & 
medical research 
Basic & 
primary health 
care  
Some primary 
health care 
Welfare services Support for non-
governmental 
agencies 
Full  No 
Social Security Full  Agency role No 
Housing Subsidies to 
province & 
municipalities 
Concurrent 
with national 
and local 
Concurrent & 
as delegated 
by national & 
province 
Water & 
Sanitation 
Infrastructure 
grants to 
municipalities 
No Provision and 
service 
delivery 
Transport & 
Roads 
Funding of 
transport 
parastatal, 
network & 
national roads  
Concurrent 
with national 
& local, for 
provincial 
roads 
Urban roads & 
transport  
Electricity Generation 
through parastatal 
(Escom) 
No Local 
distribution 
Safety & Security Full No Metro Police 
Emergencies Concurrent Concurrent Concurrent 
Contingency 
Reserve 
Sole No  No 
1. Progressively 
provide basic 
services within 
available 
resources in 
terms of Bill of 
Rights; 
 
2. Provincial & 
municipal fiscal 
capacity;  
 
3. Provincial & 
municipal 
efficiency; 
 
4. Economic 
disparities; 
 
5. Stability of 
allocations; 
 
6. Predictability of 
allocations; 
 
7. Need for 
flexibility. 
(Source: Adapted from Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, Mabugu, Kallis: 2007) 
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Table 4.2: Revenues Allowed for National, Provincial and Local Governments  
Categories National Provincial Local Govt. 
Taxes Personal Income; 
Value Added Tax 
(VAT); Corporate tax; 
Tariffs 
Some surcharges on 
existing taxes; 
Tourism levies; Fuel 
levies; Gambling. 
Property rates; Motor 
vehicle license; other 
User Charges Electricity generation; 
Airport & harbour 
fees; Rail transport; 
National toll roads; 
other. 
Hospital fees; School 
fees; Provincial toll 
roads; other. 
Water & sanitation; 
electricity distribution; 
other. 
Borrowing Treasury bond issue; 
national & 
international financial 
markets and 
institutions. 
As per legislation & 
approval of national 
minister of finance. 
Municipal bond issue; 
national financial 
markets; Development 
Bank of Southern 
Africa  
(DBSA); other. 
(Source: Adapted from Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, Mabugu, Kallis: 2007 
Table 4.3: View of Revenue Shares for National, Provincial and Local Governments  
Types of 
Allocation 
National Share Provincial 
Share 
Local Govt. 
Shares 
Total Expenditures 
Discretionary NEA  PEA  LEA  ES  
Conditional 
Grants 
!PCG ! LCG  PCG  LCG  CG = PCG + LCG  
Total (NEA ! PCG ! LCG)  (PEA + PCG)  (LEA + LCG)  TNCR  
(Source: Adapted from Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, Mabugu, Kallis: 2007) 
 
TNCR = (NEA ! PCG ! LCG) + PEA + PCG + LEA + LCG
TNCR = NEA + PEA + LEA
Where
TNCR = Total  nationally collected revenue
NEA =  National government equitable allocation
PEA = Provincial government equitable alloaction
LEA = Local government equitable allocation
PCG = Provincial conditional grants
LCG = Local government conditional grants  
ES    =  Equitable Shares  
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The Methods for Developing a Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
Model 
The preceding sections of this chapter discussed the overall approach used in the 
thesis in general and, for assessing the intergovernmental fiscal relations 
institutional and governance policy instruments in particular. This section 
discusses the instruments and tools used in measuring and estimating the key 
variables used for constructing a municipal infrastructure grant model from the 
Petchey et al (2004) provincial capital expenditure grant model. The steps are 
represented in components C, D and E in Figure 1.1. In the study it was assumed 
that the budgeted pool of funds available for infrastructure grant allocations (see 
component B in Figure 1.1) were a pre-determined national government policy 
decision informed by macroeconomic considerations such as economic growth 
(GDP), nationally collected revenue from all taxes, debt repayments and deficit 
reduction.  
 
Based on the foundational principles (Young, 1994) discussed in Chapter 2 the 
development of the infrastructure grant model followed four steps. The first step 
was the assessment and construction of a reasonable estimate of the desired per 
capita level of public capital stock necessary to reach the national capital stock 
standard required to attain policy objectives (Levtchenkova and Petchey, 2000). 
The calculations were done in the Excel Simulation Model using the perpetual 
inventory method (see the Tab labeled Capital Stock PIM in the Simulation Model 
with Scenarios Municipal Infrastructure Grants, MJJPhD 2010 in the attached 
compact disc). The second step was the construction of the composite disparity 
indices that differentiate the five local municipalities from each other (see the Tab 
labeled Disparity Index in the Simulation Model with Scenarios Municipal 
Infrastructure Grants, MJJPhD 2010). The third step used the results of step one 
and two for constructing a model for allocating infrastructure grants to 
municipalities (see Chapter 6). The fourth step constructed an Excel Simulation 
Model from the theoretical model in Chapter 6 (Simulation Model with Scenarios 
Municipal Infrastructure Grants, MJJPhD 2010 in the attached compact disc); ran 
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model simulations using data and information from the Cape Winelands District 
Municipalities and, produced the results and findings presented in Chapter 7. The 
methods, assumptions and data for each of the four steps are discussed in the sub-
sections that follow.   
 
The relationship between capital stock estimates and public infrastructure 
provision. 
The first step in the construction of the municipal infrastructure grant model 
(component D Figure 1.1) is the estimation of a capital stock data set for the 
municipalities. The reason for estimating municipal level capital stock data is 
because there are no time series capital stock data for municipalities in South Africa. 
Estimating the municipal level public capital stock data using the perpetual inventory 
method (PIM) provides a data series that will help illustrate the role of the capital 
stock variable in a municipal infrastructure grant model. The role of the capital stock 
is best explained diagrammatically and is illustrated in Figure 4.2.   
 
As illustrated in the diagramme the actual per person capital stock of a 
representative poor municipality for a particular service is plotted (point b) against 
the standard capital stock for the service across all municipalities in the district and 
in which the standard capital stock is growing over time.  
 
Figure 4.2:  The Role of Capital Stock in the Model 
 
10
Diagram Illustrating Actual Capital Stock Relative to 
the Policy Norm and Standard
Time
Real Value
Of Capital 
Per Person 
Desired Standard
Actual
Previous
Years
Current
Year
Future
Years
a
b
c
d
e
f
 
                        (Source: MacDonald, Petchey & Josie, 2005) 
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For example, at a given period in time, a minimum policy standard for the 
provision of water reticulation in a poor municipality characterised by economic 
disparities may be a tap within 200 meters of a household. If, in a preceding period 
the municipality may have actually had a tap within one kilometre of a household 
this would amount to a capital backlog measured against the minimum policy 
standard. The desired service standard or policy target over a planned period of 
time may be to progressively provide a tap inside every household in the district 
municipality.   
 
In the diagramme above, for a relatively poor municipality, the actual capital stock 
is depicted below the standard. In a preceding period the municipality has a capital 
backlog defined as the difference between the standard and actual capital stock at a 
point in time and, equal to the distance in ab in the diagramme. In a current year or 
period, this would have grown to equal the distance cd. The reason for this growth 
is because we assume that the rate of net grant allocations and spending is 
insufficient to reduce the backlog of the preceding year or period. In addition 
because of continued low levels of net allocations and spending, by a given future 
year or period, the backlog has increased further to equal the distance ef. 
Therefore, municipalities that lie above the standard norm (i.e.; they have more 
than the nationally determined standard norm for the particular service), will have 
a capital stock surplus or negative backlog (no backlog). 
 
Given the above scenario the key question is, with a limited amount of 
infrastructure grant funds, how to raise the level of net allocations and spending for 
the poor municipality so that its actual capital stock for the service equals the 
standard norm at some future period. Achieving this goal can only take place over 
a period of time through the progressive elimination of infrastructure backlogs and 
the consequent creation of new capital stock. A formula based on such an 
infrastructure financing grant model could provide an objective mechanism to 
equitably allocate additional resources from a limited grant pool to municipalities 
for a chosen period of time to enable them to transform their capital stocks from 
the actual starting point toward the desired standard. The particular path taken is 
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the “transition path”. The line de is one possible transition path that sees the 
backlog eliminated in equal increments over the period.  
 
Estimating municipal capital stocks using the Perpetual Inventory Method 
(PIM)  
An adapted version of the perpetual inventory method23 (PIM) developed by 
Levtchnkova and Petchey, 2000, (see Chapter 2 for discussion) is used to estimate 
municipal capital stocks for the municipalities in the Cape Winelands District.  
 
This version of the PIM technique begins with a given estimated capital stock at 
some point in time. Thereafter it creates subsequent stock estimates using data on 
capital expenditure and depreciation. Instead of using the term “year” I will apply 
the term “period” in keeping with the notion of the three year medium term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) used in the allocation of municipal infrastructure 
grants. The adapted version of the PIM technique is explained as follows. 
 
The real capital stock for service s  in municipality i  for the current period 
)( ,
s
tiKt is defined as: 
 
s
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where: 
 
• stiK ,  is the capital stock for service s in period t  for municipality i .    
 
• s ntiK !,  is the capital stock estimate for service s in municipality i  during 
the initial or current period nt ! . 
 
                                                
23 The Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) is a technique for estimating capital stocks. The technique entails 
adding gross fixed capital to an initial estimate of the capital stock and then by applying a rate of 
depreciation, calculates the net capital stock. (UN SNA93).  
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• si !" ,  is the rate of depreciation for service s in municipality i  during period 
". 
 
• n    is the number of periods preceding the current period t .  
• !
"
"=
nt
nt#
s
i !" ,1( # ) + !
"
"=
2
,
t
nt
s
ik
#
# !
"
+=
1
1'
t
##
s
i ',1( !"# ) + 
s
tik 1, !  represents a stream of 
depreciated additions to the initial capital stock between period nt !  and 
t . 
 
• sik ! is the capital expenditure on service s in municipality i  during period 
". 
 
Equation (4.1) represents the last estimated time period (the current time period). 
However, the same expression applies to any intermediate time period for a given 
sample. 
 
The expression shows that the value of capital stock for service s in municipality i  
at the beginning of the current year or period, stiK , , is equal to an appropriately 
depreciated value of some initial capital stock estimate, s ntiK !,  and a stream of 
accumulated and depreciated additions to this initial capital stock. Additions to the 
capital stock, or capital expenditure, are not depreciated for the first period. 
 
Equation (4.1) is a version of the technique where the depreciation rate ! is 
assumed to vary across periods, sub-regions and services given a set of 
observations that span a relatively long period of time. The authors also present an 
alternate version of the technique where the depreciation rate is invariant across 
time, sub-regions and service.  
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In this version the equation is reduced to: 
 
s
tiK , = 
s
ntiK !,
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"
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1
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!!! "" #
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ik                                             (4.2) 
 
For the purpose of estimating capital stock data in a municipality in the Cape 
Winelands District the second formula would be more practical for several reasons. 
The municipal boundaries are about ten years old. This means that the data for the 
rate of depreciation across sub-regions is probably unavailable or is not likely to 
vary across local municipalities. Therefore, in estimating capital stock for the Cape 
Winelands district municipality the study for the thesis assumes a constant 
depreciation rate invariant across time, sub-region and service and applies equation 
(4.2).  
 
To estimate the initial capital stock for service s in municipality i  during period !  
it is necessary to define a weight factor. Thus, the equation can be represented as  
 
•= SRR
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s
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                                                                               (4.3) 
where 
 
• siw !,  is the weight for estimating the initial capital stock. 
• sik !,   is the capital expenditure of municipality i  during period ! on service 
s (can be obtained from National Treasury or relevant provincial departments).  
• SRRWCk
&
,!  is the total capital expenditure in the Western Cape by the Province and 
Local Government during period ! (from relevant government departments). 
• !,WCP  is the population of the Western Cape Province during period ! . 
• !,SAP   is the population of South Africa during period ! . 
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The weight obtained in (4.3), which is specific to each period, is then averaged 
over the entire sample of municipalities from t-n (the initial period) to t (the current 
period) to obtain the following average, 
 
,
t
s
i
s i t n
i
w
w
n
!
= "=
#
      (4.4) 
where n is the number of periods from the initial period to the current period. 
 
This average weight is then applied to an estimate of the aggregate capital stock for 
the province (using provincial capital stock estimates calculated by the FFC, 2007) 
and municipal sub-sector to obtain our estimate of the initial capital stock for 
service s, in municipality i, 
 
LWC
ntSA
s
i
s
nti KwK
&
,, . !! =                           (4.5) 
where 
• ,
s
i t nK !  is the estimate of the capital stock for service s in municipality i in 
the period t-n, the initial period. 
 
• LWC ntSAK
&
, !  is the total aggregate capital stock (aggregated over all services for 
South Africa, provinces and local municipalities) for the Western Cape 
Province and local municipalities in the year t n! = " .  
 
From (4.3) one can see that ,
s
ik ! , the actual capital spending by a municipality i on 
service s in each period !  (as well as its distribution across the entire sample from 
period t-n to t), will have a major influence on the size of the municipality’s 
weight, and hence its initial capital stock estimate in (4.4).  In general, the larger is 
a municipality’s actual capital expenditure over the whole period (for a particular 
service), relative to expenditure by other municipalities on that service, the larger 
is its weight, and hence the estimate of its initial capital stock.  Notice, also, that it 
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is average expenditure over the entire period that determines the magnitude of the 
weight, rather than expenditure in just one period.  
 
The weighting procedure assumes that a municipality with a high spending record 
on a particular service during the period (t-n to t) also has a relatively larger capital 
stock inherited from the period before the initial period.  While there is likely to be 
a strong correlation between municipalities with relatively large (small) capital 
stocks and those that have relatively high (low) capital expenditures during the 
period, there may be extreme cases where this is not so. Another implication is that 
as time progresses, any error associated with the initial stock estimate diminishes 
as depreciation reduces the value of the initial period capital stock, and the capital 
stock series increasingly reflects new capital spending after the initial period.  For 
this reason, it is always best to start the perpetual inventory procedure as far back 
as possible if one wishes to maximize the accuracy of the later estimates in the 
series.   
 
Constructing a composite infrastructure cost disparity indicator  
The second step in constructing an infrastructure grant model (component D in 
Figure 1.1) that complies with the requirements of the South African constitution 
(see Chapter 3) is to estimate a composite capital cost disparity indicator that 
captures the impact of both the geo-spatial and economic disparities on the other 
variables in the model. Such an indicator will more effectively take account of 
regional disparities and socio-economic inequalities (Constitution 1996, Chapter 
13, Section (2), 214) in a capital or infrastructure grant model. In fact several 
composite cost disparity indices for disadvantage and socio-economic inequality 
may be constructed for a specific and local municipality from sets of sub-
indicators.  The first such sub-indicator may be population dispersion.  
 
Consider, for example, a geographically large municipality with a dispersed 
population.  The cost of providing water and sanitation for residents, schools or 
hospitals in the remote regions of such a municipality is higher than the cost of 
providing the same services for residents, schools or hospitals in an urban 
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metropolitan municipality with a predominately city-based population.  This is so 
because, to provide such services in a remote location, it is also necessary to incur 
the cost of providing access roads, extending electricity and water systems and 
other infrastructure.  As a result of such ‘population dispersion disparity’ the per 
unit cost of the flow of capital services in such a municipality may be relatively 
high. 
 
An example of a composite disparity measure that may be relevant in South Africa 
is the impact of debilitating diseases. If a municipality has a relatively high 
incidence of debilitating diseases such as Aids or TB in its population, then the 
cost of each unit of health and related services may be high compared to a 
municipality with a relatively lower incidence of such diseases.  This is because 
Aids and TB require more public infrastructure services to manage health care.  
  
The cost of providing a given unit of public service output may be higher in 
municipalities with structural disadvantages resulting from the injustices of 
policies of the apartheid past. For example, the cost of achieving given educational 
and health outcomes for people from poor families may be higher than the cost of 
achieving the same educational or health outcomes for people from richer 
backgrounds.  Municipalities with more poor people (unemployed, lower incomes) 
and victims of past socio-economic discrimination might, therefore, be expected to 
incur higher costs in achieving given health and educational outcomes.  Thus, 
some aggregated measure of socio-economic inequality such as deprivation may be 
included in a composite capital cost disparity index. The information and data for 
identifying the disparity measures for the Cape Winelands District was collected 
and collated from official data sources and interviews with national, provincial and 
local government officials.  
 
In summary, the disparity and socio-economic inequality data used for constructing 
the indicators are regrouped into three broad categories: population dispersion; 
debilitating diseases (HIV and/or TB), and, socio-economic factors such as 
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deprivation, unemployment, household income inequality, housing, water and 
sanitation backlogs.     
 
Practically it will be cumbersome to use such a broad array of capital cost disparity 
indicators in a model for infrastructure grants to municipalities. One way of 
incorporating several indicators into a model is to aggregate all the indicators into a 
single composite capital cost disparity24 indicator. This method is used extensively 
in the literature (See Chapter 2). One such approach was used to construct the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission’s (FFC) Capital Grant Scheme Model with 
Provincial Disabilities (Petchey, MacDonald, Josie and Nthite, 2004). 
 
In the Petchey et al (2004) model the incorporation of multiple disparity indicators 
(called disabilities) began with the definition of a capital cost disparity index 
gamma (#).   
 
In adapting this provincial application procedure for local government, an 
infrastructure cost disparity for a given municipality can be defined in order to 
arrive at an infrastructure cost disparity function. This function is indexed by t, the 
subscript for time and by i the subscript for the municipality. There will be five (5) 
such values for i representing the five Cape Winelands District local 
municipalities. The subscript t represents any designated period of time for the 
allocated municipal infrastructure grant. Thus let the infrastructure cost disparity 
be  
   i ,ti,t e
!" =      (4.6) 
(read as gamma i, t equals e to the power phi i, t.) 
where  
  
J
i,t i,t , j i,t , j
i,t , j 1
D
=
! = "#      (4.7) 
                                                
24 Please note that the term disparity in this thesis refers to both geo-spatial cost disparity indicators and 
socio-economic inequality measures. 
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is an infrastructure cost disparity function for municipality i in period t with 
subscript j representing the value of the chosen disparity indicator. Each of the 
elements in equation (4.7) can be defined as follows: 
• i,t , jD  is the percentage deviation, for municipality  i, of the 
thj  disparity 
indicator from the mean or average value of the disparity indicator for all 
local municipalities (for period t). 
• i,t , j0 ! "  is a parameter that captures the impact of the percentage deviation 
of the thj  disparity from its average value on the value of the disparity 
function (in period t) for municipality i.    
• ( )t , j t , ji,t , j i,t , jD X X /X= ! , where i,t , jX  is the value of the jth disparity 
measure for Municipality i and t , jX  is the average value of the jth disparity 
measure for all local municipalities i = 1,....,5 in period t. 
The construction of equation (4.6) implies that the infrastructure cost disparity is a 
non-linear (exponential) function of i,t! (phi). This basically means that the capital 
cost disparity will increase over time according to some prescribed exponential 
growth factor in a non-linear fashion. This is a reasonable assumption as, at this 
stage, there is no advance information as to whether the infrastructure cost 
disparity is a linear or non-linear (i.e. whether it follows a straight or irregular 
path) function of i,t! .  
 
Policy decisions for prioritizing and ranking disparities  
In keeping with the equity principles of parity, proportionality, and priority 
(Young, 1994) policy makers have to decide on which disparity receives the 
highest priority. The weight i,t , j!  (beta) in the infrastructure cost disparity function 
is assumed to be a policy parameter for ranking the economic disparity according 
to its level of priority in achieving planned policy objectives and policy targets. 
This means policy decision makers may decide the beta value.  One can see from 
equation (4.7) that the choice of i,t , j!  will have a considerable impact on the 
relative importance of the different disparities incorporated into the disparity 
function, and on the overall magnitude of the aggregate value of the disparity 
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function itself.  It is for this reason it is argued in the literature (see Chapter 2) that 
the choice of i,t , j! has to be objectively informed by statistical analysis. In effect the 
weight associated with a disparity function determines the significance and 
importance of the disparity in the model.   
 
Under ideal conditions the weights could be determined from an econometric study 
that yields estimates of the importance of each disparity in determining the value of 
i,t!  from among a wide range of disparities (see Petchey et al, 2000). However, in 
the absence of reliable long-term official information and data for regions in South 
Africa I assume that these values are policy weights, which are disparity specific 
but not municipality specific25. However, in keeping with the hypotheses and the 
aims of my study I postulate that the policy-maker must choose beta (") values for 
disparities in compliance with the policy objectives and constraints derived from 
the constitution and summarized in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 above and, in 
accordance with the equity principles of parity, proportionality, and priority (see 
my discussion of Young, 1994 in Chapter 2). The policy objectives and constraints 
can be grouped into a list of criteria for prioritizing and ranking disparities. The 
policy-maker’s choice of beta (") values can then be informed by this list of 
criteria. Drawing from Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 I propose that the following criteria 
inform the prioritization of disparities and the choice of beta (") values to ensure 
parity, proportionality, and priority in the equitable allocation of infrastructure 
grants. In terms of the constitutional obligations and policy objectives the policy 
makers choice of beta (") values should prioritize: 
 
• Overcoming the apartheid legacy of historical infrastructure backlogs in the 
interests of promoting accessibility to municipal services and increasing 
regional capital stock for economic development in historically 
disadvantaged areas. 
                                                
25 In other words the state may determine the weights at a national or provincial level depending on the 
attainment of planned priority policy objectives at any given time.  
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• Improving the physical and intellectual capabilities of previously 
disadvantaged communities to ensure their human development and 
effective participation in the economy.  
• Targeting the unemployment and income distribution economic variables to 
ensure stable macroeconomic and regional economic balances between 
saving, investment and tax revenue. 
• Ensuring compliance with the Bill of Rights and Section 214 of the 
Constitution to avoid the costs of litigation brought by citizens. 
• Mitigating the potential for social and political conflict generated by 
growing socio-economic inequality, lack of social cohesion and, inadequate 
delivery of basic services within municipalities. 
• The prudent use of natural resources for sustainable long-term human 
development.   
 
In principle all disparities could be weighted equally or with zero values (" =0) 
being used for not including the disparity and non-zero values (" =x) for inclusion 
of the disparity. This means that the absolute value of weight influencing the 
aggregated magnitude of the disparity function becomes just as important as it 
results in a “reasonable” set of disparity weights – the higher the weight choice the 
greater the absolute value and variance of the disparity function. One possible 
option therefore is to include a wider range of disparities. A wide range of 
disparities that may be included as policy choices is presented in the summary 
table in Chapter 5, Table 5.10. These disparities capture the significance of most of 
the criteria presented above.   
 
For example, if I select five disparities (unemployment, household income, 
population density, HIV/TB incidence, deprivation) from Table 5.10 as proxy 
indicators for some of the criteria listed above and if a weight of 0.5 is given to the 
first three disparities and the fourth and fifth is given a weight of 1, this implies 
that the fourth (HIV/TB) and fifth (deprivation) disparities are more important in 
constructing the capital cost disparity index. A simple trial-and-error process for 
making such a selection from a wider selection of disparities would be as follows: 
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• Establish two selection index sets for the betas ( i,t , j! ) weights. Let x = 1 if 
the disparities are included in the construction of the index and, let x = 0 if 
they are not. This will show how the inclusion/exclusion of certain 
measures of disparity affected the index. 
• To use the betas as weights – setting them to any non-zero value would 
include them in the index. Thus for example if there were 5 disparities with 
the beta ( i,t , j! ) value 0; 1; 0.5; 0; 1; this would lead to the inclusion of the 
2nd, 3rd and 5th with the 2nd and 5th weighted 1 and the 3rd weighted 0.5. 
The signs for the infrastructure cost disparity are important in indicating the 
influence of the infrastructure cost disparity on the size of the municipality’s 
infrastructure grant share. The infrastructure cost disparity can have three different 
signs.  First, if i,t 0! =  then the weighted sum of the percentage deviations for 
municipality i is exactly equal to zero.  In this case, 0i,t e 1! = =  and the 
infrastructure cost disparity has no influence on the municipality’s grant.  Second, 
if i,t 0! "  then the weighted sum of the percentage deviations is negative implying 
that i,t0 1! " <  (a relatively low cost municipality).  If i,t0 1! " <  then the disparity 
will tend to reduce a municipality’s grant below what it would otherwise be.  
Finally, if i,t 0! "  then the weighted sum of the percentage deviations is positive, 
implying that the municipality has relatively high costs, and i,t 1! > .  Here, the 
effect of including disparities is to raise a municipality’s grant above what it would 
be without including an infrastructure cost disparity.  
 
A policy parameter for equitably sharing the available infrastructure  
grant pool 
Given the expenditure constraints and constitutional requirements listed in Table 
4.1 and the constraints determining the pool of nationally collected revenue listed 
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the policy-maker must also choose how much of the 
available infrastructure grant pool must go towards reducing disparities and how 
much should go towards the regular per capita economic efficiency allocation. 
Making this choice will indicate the transition path to be taken to achieve the 
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desired level of capital stock (see Figure 4.2) and the speed with which historical 
backlogs will be reduced.  If, for example, a portion of nationally collected revenue 
is designated for all infrastructure grants to municipalities then policy-makers are 
expected to equitably share (according to Section 214 (1) of the Constitution) these 
grants amongst municipalities taking into account the criteria above based on 
considerations listed in Section 214(2) of the Constitution.  
 
Assuming that the grant pool available for municipal infrastructure is designated 
by (CPt) the infrastructure grant-pool in period t, then the policy-maker has to 
make a decision as to how the grant pool can be shared between the two competing 
demands implied in the criteria presented above. That is how much goes to 
reducing backlogs and disparities and how much will go towards the regular per 
capita grant to ensure that municipalities are adequately funded to meet the 
economic efficiency demands. To do this the policy-maker can choose another 
policy parameter that can be used in the formula to apportion the grant pool 
equitably among municipalities to reduce backlogs and disparities. Call this policy 
parameter delta ($) with a value between 0 and 1. Therefore to determine this 
portion in a given period the model requires 1 1CP !" where t0 1! " ! = proportion of 
the capital grant pool allocated for reducing historical backlogs and disparities.  
 
To ensure that municipalities are adequately funded to meet the economic 
efficiency demand, the remaining portion of the pool, (1 - $), is allocated to all 
municipalities to help them overcome their overall shortage of capital relative to a 
generally accepted standard (see Figure 4.2) to achieve per capita economic 
efficiency. To attribute values to delta ($) policy-makers will have to consider: 
 
• The rate at which historical backlogs and disparities have to be reduced to 
move disadvantaged municipalities to a desired standard of capital stock 
and, 
• The rate at which to fund all municipalities to overcome their overall 
shortage of capital relative to a generally accepted standard and, to achieve 
per capita economic efficiency.  
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The greater is the value of delta (#) the greater is the allocation to reduce the 
historical domestic backlogs26 of a municipality.  Conversely, the lower is the value 
of delta ($), the smaller is the amount allocated for reducing the historical backlogs 
and the greater is the allocation of funds to addressing per capita economic 
efficiency. Policy makers therefore have the discretionary power to decide how 
quickly the historical backlog is eliminated.  Once all historical backlogs are 
eliminated and there is more equality of access to services, the parameter delta (#) 
can be set equal to zero, implying that all of the pool is allocated to the per capita 
economic efficiency-based grants to meet the requirement for municipal economic 
growth and development. 
 
Based on the system of equations in the Petchey et al (2004) model and using the 
estimated capital stock data and the estimated infrastructure cost disparity weights 
a complete municipal infrastructure grants model can be constructed. The 
incorporation of the capital stock and infrastructure cost disparity indices into an 
infrastructure grant model is the subject of Chapter 6. Standard statistical 
techniques employing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets are used for estimating the 
capital stock and capital backlogs data and, for estimating the infrastructure cost 
disparity indices for the five Cape Winelands District municipalities.  
 
The simulation model  
To assess the consequences of taking account of disparities in equitably allocating 
municipal infrastructure grants I run two simulations of the adapted Petchey et al 
(2004) model presented in Chapter 6. The first simulation excludes disparities from 
the calculations and the second simulation includes disparities. The Microsoft 
Excel computer simulation model programme in the research design (see 
components E and D in Figure 1.1) is illustrated in the flowchart in Figure 4.3.  
 
 
                                                
26 Historical domestic backlogs refer to the legacy of infrastructure backlogs inherited from the apartheid 
past and, backlogs resulting from the inadequate and inequitable financing of current basic municipal 
infrastructure needs.   
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Figure 4.3: Flowchart representation of the simulation model with data inputs 
and outputs 
1. LOAD INPUT DATASETS
3. SET POLICY PARAMETERS ( BETA’S _)
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The method for developing the computer simulation programme requires 
converting the equations into a statistical computer spreadsheet format in 
Microsoft Excel (Simon, 2005). The Excel Simulation model runs simulations 
using data inputs for the model variables to generate output results that establish 
the operational ability of the model. The computer simulation programme of the 
model with its data inputs and outputs is schematically represented in Figure 4.3. 
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Each box in the flowchart represents an Excel worksheet Tab for the data input 
requirements or the data output results.  
 
As mentioned above I compare the results of the simulations to evaluate the effects 
and impacts of excluding and including disparities attributing equal beta values to 
the set of disparity measures. To further compare the effects and impacts of 
excluding and including disparities when the beta values are varied I re-run the 
simulations to produce two alternative scenarios (see Simulation Model with 
Scenarios Municipal Infrastructure Grants, MJJPhD 2010 in the attached compact 
disc). 
 
To run simulations and generate results the programme requires five distinct 
processes. The first process is to load the data sets for estimating the capital stocks 
and the disparity indices. The second process is to apply the PIM methodology to 
calculate the capital stock. The third process is to set the policy parameters (betas) 
for each disparity index. The fourth process is to load the pool of funds available 
for municipal infrastructure grants. In the fifth process the programme calculates 
all the estimated outputs for capital stock, capital backlogs, municipal disparities 
and grant allocations. These processes are illustrated in the flowchart (Figure 4.3).   
 
The Excel simulation exercise demonstrates how the estimated capital cost 
disparity indicator weights are calculated following the processes in the flowchart. 
The simulations use the example of infrastructure grants for financing 
infrastructure backlogs under two assumptions given a budgeted medium term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) pool of funds. The first assumption is that the 
available pool of funds consists solely of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) 
allocations. The second assumption is that the available pool is a global pool of 
funds that includes the MIG and, all other infrastructure grants to municipalities. 
The results from both simulations are then compared in Chapter 7 to evaluate the 
impacts of disparities under the assumptions. The Excel Simulation Model also 
allows for the comparison and evaluation of results from scenarios with different 
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values of beta (") and delta (#). This comparison and evaluation is presented in 
Chapter 7. 
Reasons for choosing the five Cape Winelands Municipalities  
Five Cape Winelands District local municipalities in the Western Cape Province 
were chosen for the empirical study. A map locating the municipalities in the 
Western Cape Province is presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis. Although in 
aggregate terms these municipalities are not the poorest in the Western Cape 
nevertheless, the Cape Winelands District Municipality was chosen because it 
includes a set of homogenous local municipalities typical of the Western Cape 
Province.  
 
The District Municipality itself is administrative and is located in the Stellenbosch 
local municipality. It does not have any revenue raising powers. Thus, in the event 
of a restructuring of the intergovernmental transfer system it will be ideally placed 
to act as disbursement agency for infrastructure grants to local municipalities.  
 
While population density is concentrated in the towns and urban centers there are 
other pockets of population sparsely dispersed across each municipality. The local 
municipalities are characterized by spatial disparities and socio-economic 
inequalities within themselves and between each other. The wine industry and its 
labour market institutions are common to all five local municipalities. These 
institutions have evolved over time from slave labour during colonialism; tenant 
labour, the “tot system” and job reservation during apartheid; to the current use of 
migrant and casual labour (see Chapters 2 and 3). However, the wine industry 
processing, marketing, business and administrative hub is mostly located in the 
Stellenbosch local municipality in close proximity to the offices of the District 
Municipality and the Stellenbosch University. All these institutions, in one 
location, are important repositories for data and information about the local 
municipalities within the District.       
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Data and Information 
In this section I discuss the specific data requirements, sources and databases and 
methods used in the estimation of the model variables. The section also explains 
assumptions made when using the data and provides a brief explanation of the 
interview process used in gathering qualitative information from government 
officials and non-government sources. The section concludes with a discussion on 
the shortcomings and sources of error in the data. 
 
Databases and estimation methods 
It is obvious from the equations presented above that the proposed infrastructure 
grant model is data intensive. To run simulations the basic infrastructure grant 
model requires South African data on several economic and demographic 
indicators. The following data sets are used in the simulation model to estimate the 
basic per capita equitable grant shares to municipalities with and without 
infrastructure backlogs.  
• Capital stock data aggregated at the level of the national economy and 
disaggregated to the provincial and local government levels. 
• The estimated value of the actual capital stock for the particular service  for 
all municipalities in South Africa for a specified period in time. As this is 
not readily available it is derived from provincial capital stock data using 
the perpetual inventory method (PIM). 
• The estimated value of the actual capital stock  for the particular service for 
an identified municipality in the specified period of time. 
• Population data for South Africa and disaggregated to the provincial and 
local level. 
• The macro-economically determined pool of budget funds available for 
infrastructure grants. 
 
However, to estimate the impact of the disparity indicator (!) on the allocations as 
shown in equations 4.6 and 4.7 two further sets of information are needed to 
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construct the mean deviation27 as specified by   ( i,t! ) in equation 4.7. The first 
requirement is a set of politically determined beta (") policy weights.  Secondly, 
the actual disparity data values (Xi,t,j) for each of the three disparity categories for 
each of the local municipalities are required to calculate the percentage deviation 
(Di,t,j).  
 
Following equations 4.6 and 4.7 the capital cost disparity index (!i,t) is calculated 
based on an average of all the disparity sub-indicators weighted by the estimated 
betas ("i,t,j) for each index in the following manner: 
 
• The difference of the disparity indicators over the average of the disparity 
indicators is calculated [i.e., ( )t , j t , ji,t , j i,t , jD X X /X= ! ]. 
• The average  ( t , jX ) of the difference for each disparity indicator is 
calculated. 
• Apply the betas ("i,t,j) to each disparity difference.  
• Calculate phi ( i,t! ) by raising e in equation 4.6 above to the value 
calculated in point 3 above.  
 
These disparities are calculated for each local municipality. (See equations 4.6 and 
4.7 above). 
 
To estimate the categories of capital cost disparity indicators the following data 
sets (as represented in the boxes in the flowchart) were required:  
 
                                                
27  The Oxford Dictionary of Statistics, (2006) defines mean deviation as the difference between a value of a 
variable and the mean or average of its distribution and for a set of data 
x1 ,  x2 , ..., xn , with frequencies f1 , f2 , ..., fn ,  and with mean x , the mean deviation is 
f j x j ! x
j=1
n
"
f j
j=1
n
"
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• Population Count of each local municipality in 1996, 2001 and 2007 as per 
Census 1996 and 2001 and the Community Survey of 2007. 
• Mid Year Population Estimates for the Western Cape for 1997 to 2006 as 
per Statistics South Africa records. 
• Chosen static Population Density Indicator for each Local Municipality. 
• Unemployment Percentage Rate Indicator for each Local Municipality. 
• Indicator of the Percentage of Households with no Income for each Local 
Municipality. 
• Indicator for TB Prevalence per 100000 people for each Local 
Municipality. 
• Indicator for HIV Prevalence for each Local Municipality. 
• Indicator of percentage of illiterate people over 14 years for each Local 
Municipality. 
• Housing backlogs indicator for each Local Municipality. 
• Normalized Deprivation index for each Local Municipality. 
 
The data listed above are presented and discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
 
Notes on data sources 
Much of the secondary quantitative and qualitative data for the empirical study was 
drawn from official statutory institutions such as Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), 
the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC); the Medical Research Council 
(MRC); National Government departments (National Treasury, Provincial and 
Local Government, now called Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 
Housing, Water Affairs and Forestry, Police Services); the equivalent departments 
of the Western Cape Provincial Government; the Cape Winelands District 
Municipality and, the published reports of the five local municipalities.  
 
At this point a qualifying note about the data sources is in order. The value of the 
actual capital stock for all municipalities in the Western Cape Province is 
estimated using the perpetual inventory method (PIM) and is based on actual 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant and other infrastructure expenditure data for the 
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specified period. The data was sourced from the Western Cape Province 
Department of Local Government and Housing. However, because the municipal 
boundaries were demarcated in 2002 the expenditure data series is limited to the 
period after this date.  The weights for the capital stock were drawn from the FFC 
provincial capital-grant model average weights for the each of the nine provinces. 
The FFC weights are an average of National Treasury and South African Reserve 
Bank weights supplied to the FFC.  
 
Disparity and socio-economic inequality data was sourced from StatsSA 2001 and 
StatsSA 2007 Community Household Surveys. Provincial and municipal revenue, 
expenditure and financial data were sourced from the National and Western Cape 
Provincial Treasuries and, from National and the Western Cape Provincial 
Department of Local Government and Housing. The disparity index input data sets 
and flows are summarized below. 
 
Summary of data requirements for estimating capital cost disparity indices 
The following datasets (as represented in the boxes in the flowchart) are required 
to estimate capital cost disparity indices for the model: 
• Population Count of each local municipality in 1996, 2001 and 2007 as per 
Census 1996 and 2001 and the Community Survey of 2007. 
• Mid Year Population Estimates for the Western Cape for 1997 to 2006 as 
per StatsSA. 
• Population density indicator for each Local Municipality. 
• Unemployment percentage rate for each Local Municipality. 
• Percentage of Households with no income for each Local Municipality. 
• TB Prevalence per 100000 people for each Local Municipality. 
• HIV prevalence for each local municipality. 
• Percentage of illiterate people over 14 years for each local municipality. 
• Housing backlogs indicator for each local municipality. 
• Normalized Deprivation index for each local municipality. 
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In addition questionnaire based interviews were conducted with infrastructure 
grant specialists and finance officers. The interviewees included senior officials 
from National Treasury; one Deputy Director General from the Western Cape 
Province Department of Provincial and Local Government; two senior officials 
from the Cape Winelands District Municipality and, three senior officials from two 
of the five local municipalities. The names, positions and location of the officials 
interviewed are presented in the table below. In addition officials from two private 
consulting firms operating in the Western Cape Province were interviewed. 
Table 4.4: List of Officials Interviewed  
10 March 
2009 
Mr. M. C. 
Hoffman 
Chief Financial Officer Breede River Municipality, Ashton. 
Telephone: 023 615 8000 
16 March 
2009 
Mr. Hennie le 
Roux 
Manager Financial 
Administration 
Witzenberg Local Municipality, 
Ceres. Telephone: 023 3161854  
 
20 March 
2009 
Mr. Jaco Jooste Municipal Infrastructure 
Director 
Breede River/Valley Municipality, 
Main Rd. Bonnivale. Telephone: 023 
615 8000 
 
28 April 
2009 
Mr. Stoffel 
Arrangie 
Deputy Director Finance Cape Winelands District 
Municipality, 46 Alexander St., 
Stellenbosch. Telephone: Tel: 021 
888 5154 
4 October 
2009 
Dr. Hildegarde 
Fast 
Deputy Director 
General, Local 
Government & Disaster 
Management 
Provincial and Local Government, 
Western Cape Province 
9 November 
2009 
Mr. Feizal 
Toffey 
Director for 
Performance 
Management 
Cape Winelands District 
Municipality, 46 Alexander St., 
Stellenbosch. Telephone: Tel: 021 
888 5154 
18 October 
2009 
Ms. Malijeng 
Ngqualeni 
Chief Director, 
Provincial  & Local 
Government 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Improvement 
Programme 
National Treasury,  40 Church Sq., 
Pretoria, 0002. Telephone: 012 315 
5111 
18 October 
2009 
Mr. Jonathan 
Patrick 
Director, Provincial  & 
Local Government 
Intergovernmental 
Policy & Planning  
National Treasury, 40 Church Sq., 
Pretoria, 0002. Telephone: 012 315 
5111 
18 October 
2009 
Mr. Sello 
Mashaba 
Director, Provincial  & 
Local Government 
Intergovernmental 
National Treasury, 40 Church Sq., 
Pretoria, 0002. Telephone: 012 315 
5111 
Interview 
Date 
Names of 
Officials 
Position in 
Organization 
Organization & Contact 
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Policy & Planning 
18 October 
2009 
Mr. Mbali 
Mthuli 
Intern, Provincial  & 
Local Government 
Intergovernmental 
Policy & Planning  
National Treasury, 40 Church Sq., 
Pretoria, 0002. Telephone: 012 315 
5111 
18 October 
2009 
Ms. Zanele 
Mncwango 
Director, Provincial  & 
Local Government 
Intergovernmental 
Policy & Planning 
National Treasury, 40 Church Sq., 
Pretoria, 0002. Telephone: 012 315 
5111 
Data shortcomings, general assumptions, sources of error and  
missing data  
The model simulations in this thesis are for illustrative purposes and to 
demonstrate how the model can be used for allocating infrastructure grants. The 
reason for this qualification is that while the socio-economic disparity data for 
municipal regions are officially collected and published, capital stock data, 
unfortunately, are not collected at the municipal level. This is a significant 
shortcoming. The lack of municipal level capital stock data also means that there 
are no aggregated initial capital stock values that can be used to apply the perpetual 
inventory method (PIM) for municipal districts. To resolve this difficulty and to 
illustrate the workings of the model using the perpetual inventory method, I use the 
FFC provincial capital grant model capital stock estimates for the Western Cape 
Province as the initial capital stock value for estimating illustrative capital stock 
values for the five local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District.  
 
The key assumption for using public capital stock data estimates in the 
infrastructure grant model is that the successful elimination of disparities and 
inequality is a function of funding for the progressive eradication of infrastructure 
backlogs and on-going infrastructure needs. The study assumes that in the public 
sector infrastructure backlogs tend to grow at a faster rate because of inadequate 
funding for maintaining and recapitalizing public capital stock (see literature 
review for discussion of this assumption). For determining the pool of funds 
available for municipal infrastructure for a specified period I use data from the 
National Treasury macroeconomic projections and assume that all constitutional 
requirements have been taken into account. 
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The required population data for the five municipalities was sourced from Statistics 
South Africa (StatsSA), the statutory agency responsible for collecting and 
publishing statistics. However, a second data shortcoming is that a consistent set of 
population data per local municipality for the given period was not available. Local 
municipality data was missing for several years. Data for the missing years are 
required to make the data set consistent. Therefore assumptions were made and 
applied to produce a consistent dataset.  
 
To produce a consistent population data set I assumed28 that Statistics South Africa 
population forecasts include estimates for migration, and mortality due to 
pandemics such as HIV-AIDS and related diseases. Using the Western Cape 
Province midyear estimates for 1996 – 2007 and, local municipality population 
data for 1996, 2001 and 2007 a consistent set of population data was estimated as 
follows:  
• I calculated the share of Cape Winelands population from Western Cape 
Province population for 2001. 
• I used the calculated share for the Cape Winelands to produce a time series 
for 1996 to 2001 for the Cape Winelands by dividing the new provincial 
total by the calculated share. 
• I used the Cape Winelands Population figures for 1996 to 2001, calculate 
values for each local municipality by dividing the Cape Winelands 
Population by the 2001 share of population for each local municipality. 
• The period of 2002 to 2007 is calculated in a similar fashion using the 2007 
figures. 
• Projected figures for the future period of 2008 – 2015 are based on the 
average growth rate (from Statistics South Africa) experienced from 1996 
to 2007.  
• Using the average growth rate, the local municipality population estimate 
for 2008 is the local municipality estimate for 2007 multiplied by the 
average growth rate. 
                                                
28 The assumptions on data are based on explanations given by Statistics South Africa with respect to the 
demographic calculations and models used. Intergovernmental allocations made by National Treasury use 
the same population data.  
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A final shortcoming is that out of a possible five municipalities I was only able to 
interview officials from two. For the purposes of the study I assume that views 
expressed by the three senior officials from two of the five local municipalities are 
representative of the position of all five municipalities for the following reasons. It 
was only possible to interview three of the officials from two municipalities 
because senior officials from the other three municipalities were not available 
despite formal written requests to municipal managers (see copy of the letter and 
list of municipal managers in the Appendix) from the University of the Western 
Cape and persistent telephone calls to the offices of the municipal managers. 
Furthermore, from the interviews with the two officials from the Cape Winelands 
District Municipality and the officials from the two local municipalities it emerged 
that the scarcity of financial management and civil engineering skills in local 
municipalities meant that all five local municipalities shared personnel and 
coordinated infrastructure spatial and integrated development planning (IDP) at the 
level of the District. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, interviews with the District 
Municipality officials resulted in obtaining consolidated information and data 
reports for each of the municipalities.     
Data Limitations  
Several difficulties are associated with the weighting scheme used in the FFC-
type Capital Expenditure Grant Scheme model. A great degree of circumspection 
is required given the paucity of data and information in transitional economies 
like South Africa.  
 
As can be seen from the capital cost disparity weights generated in the model 
simulations the weighting scheme does not offer the possibility of reasonable 
bounds within which the weights may be specified. Nevertheless, the usefulness 
of the model is that it can serve as an indicative tool in decentralized economic 
systems. This is preferable to arbitrary decisions based on prevailing political 
interests as the model provides a more objective mechanism for equitably 
allocating a limited pool of available funds. Given these shortcomings it may be 
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prudent to explore other weighting schemes that go towards resolving these 
difficulties. Some of these procedures were discussed in the literature review.  
Summary 
In this chapter I restated the fundamental question and hypotheses and explained 
the methodologies for adapting the Petchey et al (2004) model for equitably 
allocating municipal infrastructure grants. Through explaining the methodologies,  
I discussed the approaches and definitions and, the variables to be used in 
constructing a municipal infrastructure grant model. I explained the eclectic set of 
methods for estimating the variables and policy parameters of the model. I also 
discuss the data sources and explain how the information and data were collected. 
Finally, I briefly discuss the data limitations and possible sources of error.      
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Chapter 5 
Disparity29 Data Profile Of The Cape Winelands District 
Municipality (CWDM) 
 
To understand the role of public infrastructure provision in the context of 
inequality and poverty in the Cape Winelands District (sometimes referred to as 
the District or abbreviated as CWDM in this Chapter) I use published data and 
information that profiles the disparity in access to services and the inadequate 
provision of public infrastructure. The lack of access to services contributes 
significantly to increasing inequality, deprivation and poverty. The use of poverty 
and inequality indictors to profile countries, regions and sub-regions is well 
established in the literature and discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. A typical 
indicator used in many country profiles is the level of poverty (Boateng et al, 
1992). 
 
The use of poverty as an indicator poses many difficulties because it is a 
normative concept and dependent on the subjective value judgments of those 
using it. The standard measure for poverty is a line below which a human being 
cannot afford to provide for the requirements to meet minimal human physical 
needs. This can be an absolute standard around the costs of goods and services or, 
a relative standard based on one individual’s resources in relation to others. A 
poverty line is normally established through income and expenditure household 
surveys. However, as noted by Boateng et al (Ibid: 34), poverty lines are 
invariably arbitrary. Given these conceptual difficulties attempting to establish a 
relationship of causality between poverty and infrastructure provision and access 
to services may prove to be a difficult task. Sen’s (1999) “capabilities approach” 
is an attempt to go beyond the banal measurements and causal relationships 
between poverty and development. For Sen, individual freedom is inextricably 
                                                
29 Please note that when used alone in this thesis the term “disparity” or “disparities” refers to the general 
notion of economic disparity meaning “a great difference” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006) and assumes 
that this is the meaning used in Section 214 (2) g of the Constitution. Any other usage will be qualified with 
the appropriate adjective.   
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linked to the endowment of abilities and capabilities necessary for every human 
being in the quest for true humanity. The capability approach as developed by 
Dubois and Rousseau (2008) (in Comim, Qizilbash and Alkire: 2008) is reviewed 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The authors demonstrate that a person’s vulnerability is 
determined by a set of capabilities. Vulnerability increases in the face of higher 
risk and decreases with enhanced capability. The authors imply that by combining 
assets and access to services individuals and households can protect themselves 
from a pattern of various social risks and associated shocks. This conclusion is 
germane to my premise that public investment in municipal public infrastructure 
services provides accessibility to socio-economic opportunities enhancing an 
individual’s capability and reducing vulnerability to risk.  
 
Following Dubois and Rousseau (2008), my assumption in selecting the disparity 
indicators discussed in this chapter is that increasing socio-economic disparity 
within and among local municipalities increases the risk of vulnerability for 
individuals living in these areas. The inverse argument is that increased municipal 
infrastructure grants will constitute an additional injection of investment for 
municipal services thus increasing the level of capability and access socio-
economic opportunities. However, to measure the risk of vulnerability one needs 
an appropriate set of socio-economic indicators that capture the level of 
vulnerability in communities. In this chapter I present a wide range of such 
indicators from which I will select a few to construct composite disparity 
indicators that can be used as weights in a municipal infrastructure grant scheme. 
My aim is not to apply the capability approach it is merely to show, by way of 
arguments in the literature, that public capital investment in infrastructure services 
can be a key variable in reducing the risk of vulnerability and enhancing the 
individual’s capability.  
 
For the Cape Winelands District municipalities the capability approach presents 
the possibility of using capital stock variables with measurable indicator weights 
that may capture the relative impact of infrastructure provision on inter and intra-
regional disparity more comprehensively. These indicators are discussed below as 
a way of constructing a disparity profile for each of the five local municipalities. 
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The disparity indicators are aggregated into composite disparity indices in the 
municipal infrastructure grant model. The use of the disparity index weights in the 
model demonstrates how disparities and developmental considerations may, as 
required by the Constitution [Constitution, Section 214 (2), 1996], be taken into 
account for equitably allocating municipal infrastructure grants.  
 
For a comprehensive disparity profile of the Cape Winelands District I present 
and discuss the main socio-economic inequalities, spatial disparities and 
infrastructure backlogs that differentiate the five Cape Winelands District local 
municipalities from each other. The chapter proceeds by first summarizing from 
the literature review (Chapter 2) the place of key concepts of socio-economic 
inequality, spatial disparity and infrastructure and capital backlogs in profiling the 
overall disparities that have to be taken into account when allocating 
infrastructure grants to municipalities. Thereafter the chapter draws on data and 
information from secondary sources and, from findings from interviews with 
government officials to present and discuss overall disparity profiles of the five 
local municipalities. The quantitative data presented in this chapter serve as inputs 
in illustrative model simulations discussed in Chapter 7. The qualitative 
information and findings garnered from the various interviews and secondary 
sources serve as inputs in formulating the assumptions on which the model is 
constructed in Chapter 6. The aim of this chapter is to present the data inputs and 
information context for understanding the output results of the simulation exercise 
and, the overall conclusions and recommendations of the thesis.     
 
The Conceptual Foundations Of Disparity And Socio-Economic 
Inequality In The Cape Winelands District   
In the introduction to this thesis I argued that the municipal service delivery 
protests that spread across South Africa over the past four to five years were 
symptomatic of the disparities and socio-economic inequalities that characterize 
poor and disadvantaged communities in local municipalities. In this section I 
discuss the conceptual foundations for constructing a set of disparity indicators for 
a comprehensive disparity profile of the District. Following the literature I argued, 
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in the introduction, that inadequate and inappropriate publicly financed municipal 
infrastructure investment would impact negatively on the a capabilities and 
functionings30 of individuals trapped within communities characterized by a long 
history of inequalities and spatial disparities. Inevitably, inadequate and poorly 
maintained service delivery infrastructure would exacerbate historical disparities 
and lead to community dissatisfaction and protests. I also pointed out that the 
local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District were not immune from the 
service delivery protests in which people claim their entitlement to municipal 
services under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (1996).  
 
To avoid making themselves vulnerable, the poor, according to Yaquib (in 
Comim et al, 2008) will only invest in activities with low risk thus perpetuating 
the cycle of poverty and low levels of capabilities and functionings.  Yaquib’s 
arguments are supported by the study carried out by Cunha and Heckman (2009) 
and other authors discussed in Chapter 2. Extrapolating from Yaquib’s notion of  
capabilities evolving from the effects of the lifecourse of individuals and, 
aggregating these effects for generations of victims of colonialism and apartheid 
over centuries, I suggest that diminished capabilities and functionings of the 
people and households in the Cape Winelands District can also be viewed as the 
effect of several lifecycles under institutionalized oppression such as expressed in 
the policies of  colonialism and apartheid. In the following section of this chapter 
I support this contention with a discussion on the historical context and disparity 
indicators that characterize the local municipalities in the District.  
An historical perspective of disparity in the Cape Winelands District 
The first wine and fruit farms of the Cape Colony (located in what is now called 
the Cape Winelands District Municipality and formerly called the Boland District) 
depended on slave and indentured labour for their growth and sustainability. 
Following the colonial subjugation and settlement of the Cape in the seventeenth 
century slavery and forced indenture labour was introduced and became the basis 
for labour, property, economic and social relations between European settlers, the 
                                                
30 Following Sen (1999), capabilities and functionings refers to the possible range of alternative things that 
human beings can do or be in their quest for true humanity and freedom. 
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slaves and the indigenous population in the Western Cape in general. Historically, 
the agricultural economy of the Western Cape depended on slave labour for its 
growth and development. Terreblanche, (2002), provides an in-depth analysis of 
the transition from slavery and indentured labour to legal and institutional 
inequality in South Africa under apartheid. The analysis argues that because of the 
history of slavery and apartheid the different forms of inequality have become 
systemically entrenched and will not be eradicated in the short-term. This analysis 
by Terreblanche echoes the arguments advanced by Yaquib (2008) and Cunha and 
Heckman (2009). The analysis by Terreblanche is discussed in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis. The legacy of some of these institutional patterns suggested by 
Terreblanche (2002) persist to this day in the economic, labour, property and 
social relations of the political economy of the Cape Winelands District.  
 
One of the most enduring legacies of apartheid history in the Cape Winelands was 
the payment of slaves and indentured labourers with tots of wine during the 
course of the day. This form of payment became known as the so-called “tot or 
Dop system”. Many studies on the devastating long-term effects of this system 
have been done in the Western Cape. The Dop System in South Africa 1793-2008 
- A Bibliography compiled for the University of Cape Town by Allegra Louw 
(http://www.lib.uct.ac.za/asl/info/Dop System.pdf) provides a comprehensive list 
of articles, monographs and theses undertaken on the Dop system. The University 
of Stellenbosch in the Cape Winelands District has also sponsored and promoted 
research on the impact of the Dop system on the incidence and prevalence of 
feotal alcohol syndrome (FAS) in the Cape Winelands District (See Nutrition 
Information Center - NICUS, University of Stellenbosch, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome 
Fact Sheet; http://www.sun.ac.za/nicus; and London, L. (1999) 
http://www.sahealthinfo.org/admodule/dopsystem.htm). To summarize the NICUS 
fact sheet and London, L (1999), the foetal alcohol syndrome can be described as 
the total long-term damage done to children before birth as a result of the mother 
drinking alcohol during pregnancy. This usually leads to brain damage, impaired 
growth and head and face deformities. It is one of the leading causes of mental 
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retardation and is reported to be an irreversible lifelong condition affecting the life 
of affected children and the lives of their families.  
 
At least one academic sociological study (Falletisch, 2008) concluded that former 
slaves, although free, continue working as labourers on wine estates and remain in 
a powerless and dependent paternalistic relationship with farm owners. The 
dependency is driven by a debt burden towards the farmer; economic deprivation; 
social and political marginalization and, the need for shelter. Furthermore, despite 
the new post-apartheid dispensation the former slaves are unable to break free of 
the legacy of slavery. The study also found that the tot system continued well into 
the twentieth century perpetuating a cycle of habitual drinking, domestic violence, 
foetal alcohol syndrome and poverty in communities in the Winelands District. 
Many of the former slaves constitute the majority of the so-called coloured 
population in the District – the largest population group in all five local 
municipalities.   
 
In a study on chronic poverty in the Ceres region of the Witzenberg Municipality 
in the Cape Winelands District, du Toit (2004) examines how the historical 
patterns of institutional and structural inequality may have contributed to the 
vicious cycle of chronic poverty in this area. Following interviews and a 
household survey of four areas around Ceres du Toit (2004: 14) concludes: 
… a look at the profile of  Ceres at the beginning of the 21st century seems to 
indicate that the coming to power of a black majority government in South 
Africa has not signaled the end of white hegemony in the Ceres district or 
elsewhere in the rural Western Cape… the machinery of local government 
has not fundamentally changed. The white elite that has run the valleys of 
the Witzenberg since the 18th century has not been displaced…Paternalism 
and networks of patronage continue to shape the life chances and livelihood 
options of the poor.   
For du Toit the current levels of chronic poverty in the rural areas of the Western 
Cape may be associated with the continuities of the legacy ‘of spatial apartheid, 
including the highly radicalized land tenure patterns on the farms and the 
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persistent radicalization of public space, which lives on in the segmentation of 
Ceres into ‘white’, ‘coloured’ and ‘black’ (African) areas.’ (du Toit, 2004: 25). 
The only difference with the paternalistic patterns of past slavery and systems of 
indenture is that today the victims of structural inequality have been marginalized 
through a process of casualization31 of their labour in the District as a whole. The 
existence of this new pattern of labour relations was confirmed through interviews 
with officials from the District municipality.  
Disparities and Factors that Differentiate Local Municipalities in 
the Cape Winelands District   
This section discusses a selection of disparity and that differentiate local 
municipalities in the Cape Winlands District (formerly known as the Boland 
District). The section also provides an estimate of the level of capital stock in the 
District calculated using the perpetual inventory method discussed in Chapter 4. 
The main sources of qualitative information for this Chapter were from the semi-
structured interviews with the senior officials from the District and local 
municipalities. This information was supplemented by recent published data 
contained in the Cape Winelands District Municipality Annual Report for 
2007/2008. 
 
The Cape Winelands District is a category B municipality. It is made up of six 
local municipalities that include the Breede River, the Breede Valley, 
Drakenstein, Stellenbosch, Witzenberg and the Breede River District Management 
Administrative area. The latter area is a national park and administered by the 
District Council and not by a local administration. For the purposes of this paper 
this area will be ignored. Maps 1 and 2  respectively give the location of the 
Winelands District in the Western Cape Province and the boundaries of each local 
municipality within the District. Map 2 refers to the Boland District, as this was 
the old name for the Cape Winelands District.  
 
                                                
31 This is a process whereby former farm workers and labour tenants, after having been evicted, are re-
employed as casual and seasonal labourers thus losing security of tenure and, whatever other benefits (such 
as housing and shelter) they may have enjoyed as formal workers on the farm or estate. 
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As a category B municipality the Cape Winelands District Municipality powers, 
functions and legal obligations are extensive and include the following: 
• Integrated development planning for the District as a whole and planning 
frameworks all local municipalities within the district; 
• Municipal roads, road transport systems and municipal airports; 
• Firefighting for the district; 
• Monitoring solid waste sites; 
• Health care services for the district; 
• Promotion of local tourism; 
• Municipal public works for the district and, 
• Imposition and collection of taxes, levies and duties for above listed 
functions or as assigned by national legislation. 
 
The District also performs an agency role, on behalf of the Western Cape 
Province, for the construction, repair and maintenance of roads in the district. This 
role is governed by a service level agreement.    
 
Map 1: Western Cape Province 
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 Map 2: Local Municipality Boundaries in the Cape Winelands District 
 
(Source: Boland District Municipality, Western Cape Province Government, 2006 ) 
As a precursor to discussing the disparity indicators for the Cape Winelands local 
municipalities, some general comments about the socio-economic disparity 
indicators are necessary. The analyses by Glyn and Miliband (1994), drawn from 
several countries and reviewed in Chapter 2, discuss indicators that do not fall 
obviously within the conventional set of indicators for welfare and absolute levels 
of consumption. The authors also show how welfare and levels of consumption 
can be dependent on psychosocial and relative material circumstances. Using 
evidence from different countries the authors point to cases where relative 
material deprivation can engender a sense of inferiority and social exclusion that 
results in mental and physical illness and anti-social behaviour. These indicators 
have to be taken into account in allocating grants as they reflect disparities that 
impose higher costs for health care, crime prevention and related infrastructure 
programmes in local municipal budgets. For example the crime statistics for the 
District presented in Table 5.18 on the next page provides an indication of the 
extent of anti-social behaviour in each of the local municipalities.   
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Following the arguments presented by Yaquib (2008) and Glyn and Milliband 
(1994) such disparity indicators have significant outcomes for the equality of 
capabilities. Hereafter, I discuss the extent to which a set of indicators may help 
us understand the economic profiles, spatial inequalities and disparities that 
differentiate the local municipalities from each other. A selection of eight of these 
indicators were selected and turned into composite indices for taking account of 
disparities in the municipal infrastructure grant allocation. The data selected are 
drawn from secondary sources produced by the Western Cape Provincial 
Treasury, Statistics South Africa and studies carried out by the Medical Research 
Council, The Health Economics Unit of the University of Cape Town and the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC).  
The Disparity indicators for the local municipalities in the District 
Firstly, consider the general economic situation of the District. The Cape 
Winelands District Municipal (CWDM) annual report for 2007/2008 indicated 
that on average economic growth for the district as a whole measured as the gross 
geographic product (GGP) was 3.4%. The GGP for each of the local 
municipalities and District Management Area (DMA) are presented in the table 
5.1 below. Gross geographic product is the total value of the final goods and 
services produced in a specific geographic region.  
 
Table 5.1: CWDM Local Municipalities Average (%) Economic Growth by GGP 
2002/03 to 2006/07 
Period Breede 
River 
Breede 
Valley 
Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenburg District 
Management 
Area  
2002/03 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.5 -1.0 -1.4 
2003/04 5.4 5.0 5.7 5.6 3.3 3.6 
2004/05 6.4 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.3 6.1 
2005/06 3.7 3.7 4.7 6.4 3.1 -1.5 
2006/07 5.0 4.8 4.8 7.5 3.3 1.7 
(Source: CWDM Annual Report 2007/2008)  
 
The Annual Report notes that over the period, the financial and business sector 
produced the largest growth at 23.9% of GGP; manufacturing at 19.6% and, retail 
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and wholesale trade at 15.2%. The financial and business sector grew by 7%; 
transport and communication by 6% and, retail and wholesale trade by 6%. The 
Stellenbosch local municipality made the biggest contribution to the financial and 
business sector while the Breede River and Breede Valley municipalities made 
significant contributions to the retail trade and wholesale sector. All the 
municipalities noted an increase in the construction sector. Although the District 
is known for its viticulture and wine production, in 2007 the agricultural sector 
fared badly when compared to the financial and business; manufacturing and 
retail, and the wholesale trade sectors. For the period Breede River registered 
about a 17% level of agricultural sector growth; Breede Valley, 16% and 
Stellenbosch about 5%. From the Report and interviews with municipal officials it 
is apparent that viticulture and the wine industry is losing its importance to other 
sectors. This is a significant development because agriculture and viticulture and, 
the wine industry in particular were traditionally the biggest employers in the 
District. As a counterpoint to this decline the municipal officials indicate that the 
community services sector contribution to GGP has seen a steady increase across 
all municipalities. This sector includes the provision of municipal services, 
welfare services and capital and current income and expenditures for community 
services generated in the municipality. The District Annual Report notes the 
community services sector contribution to GGP in 2007 was about 10% for 
Breede River; 19% for Breede Valley; 14% for Drakenstein; 11% for 
Stellenbosch and, about 12% for Witzenberg. These estimates suggest that the 
community services sector is playing a significant role in generating economic 
growth in the District. In this context targeted public sector investment in 
municipal infrastructure will contribute to increased capital stock formation and 
will play an important role in economic growth in the District. Also important is 
that government investment in municipal infrastructure projects is likely to 
generate direct employment creation opportunities.  Such multiplier effects of 
public investment are not the objective of my thesis. Nevertheless this is an 
important economic objective that government needs to consider when allocating 
infrastructure grants to municipalities. In the following sections of this chapter I 
will present and discuss the various data requirements for developing and 
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illustrating an infrastructure grant model that specifically targets infrastructure 
grants for municipal services.    
Data Requirements For Financing Municipal Services Using An 
Infrastructure Grant Model    
To run illustrative simulations for services using the adapted municipal 
infrastructure grant model I require two specific types of data that characterize 
disparity among the municipalities of the Cape Winelands District. The first type 
is the existing level of public capital stock and infrastructure backlogs for services 
for each local municipality. These data are presented and discussed under the sub-
heading The Capital Stock and Infrastructure Backlog data. The second type of 
data is a selection of economic disparity indicators that differentiate 
municipalities from each other. A key variable requirement for using the model is 
the population trends in the Cape Winelands District. As I explained in the 
methodology chapter population trends are used in estimating capital stock and 
for calculating the per capita allocations for each local municipality. The 
economic disparity indicators are presented and discussed under the sub-heading 
Socio-economic disparity indicators.  
Population Trends in the Cape Winelands District  
The 2007 Winelands Municipal District Annual Report (2007/2008) noted that the 
District makes up 14% of the population in the Western Cape Province as a 
whole. This is second only to the Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality. Between 
2001 and 2005 the population in the District grew rapidly by 0.6% per annum 
and, slowed to 0.37% from 2006 to 2007. The Report predicted, according to the 
South African Acturial Society, a slower growth of 0.2% between 2007 and 2012. 
In 2007 the population in the District was 652,154 and is expected to grow to 
658,000 by 2012. The Annual Report and interviews with municipal officials 
suggest that the slower growth rate may be due to the exodus of seasonal, low-
waged and low skilled farm workers to urban locations and, that this movement 
may be compounded by the casualization and seasonality of job opportunities 
especially in the agricultural and viticulture sectors of the District. These 
population trends were used as the basis for projecting local municipal population 
growth estimates required for demonstrating how the model may be used for 
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calculating sanitation grant allocations over the medium term. In the methodology 
chapter I presented the procedure for making such projections. The table below 
presents the population for the Western Cape and the five Cape Winelands 
municipalities from the 2001 census. This was the last census undertaken in South 
Africa. This population data was used as the basis for estimating population 
density and future projections used in the model simulations for the thesis. 
 
Table 5.2: Population: Western Cape Province and CWDM Local Municipalities 
from 1996 to 2007/08 
 1996 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Western 
Cape 3,956,875 4,011,000 4,086,900 4,149,242 4,223,920 4,299,962 4,736,400 4,645,600 4,530,916 4,639,221 4,744,494 4,839,766 
CWDM             
Breede 
River 63,556 75,704 77,164 78,359 79,795 81,258 78,221 76,749 74,900 76,734 78,516 80,125 
Breede 
Valley 128,820 135,995 138,618 140,765 143,345 145,973 131,076 128,610 125,512 128,585 131,571 134,267 
Drakenstein 177,092 181,084 184,576 187,436 190,871 194,370 211,930 207,944 202,934 207,903 212,731 217,090 
Stellenbosch 112,440 109,627 111,742 113,473 115,553 117,671 195,753 192,071 187,443 192,034 196,492 200,519 
Witzenberg 73,077 77,825 79,326 80,555 82,031 83,535 73,360 71,980 70,246 71,966 73,637 75,146 
Total  554,985 580,234 591,426 600,587 611,595 622,807 690,339 677,353 661,035 677,223 692,947 707,147 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 2001 Census. 
     
The Capital Stock and Backlog data 
As I noted in Chapter 4 (Methodology), capital stock data is not currently 
collected at the municipal level in South Africa. To overcome this problem and, 
for the purpose of illustrating how the model works, I estimated a capital stock 
data series using the perpetual inventory method (PIM) based on municipal 
infrastructure grant expenditures in the municipalities from 1997 to 2006. This 
exercise was undertaken for illustrative purposes because, as explained in Chapter 
4 (Methodology), the perpetual inventory method requires time series capital 
expenditure data over at least a twenty-five to thirty year period to produce 
reasonable robust estimates. This is not possible at present because the current 
municipal boundaries were demarcated in 2002 and, at this stage, consolidated 
data records from Government for municipal infrastructure grant expenditures are 
only available from 1997.  
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To illustrate the level of infrastructure backlogs I present the extent of sanitation 
backlogs for municipal services in the District using a 2008 profile of the 
sanitation situation of the municipalities in the District and a 2007 provincial 
government-calculated estimate of infrastructure backlogs. These data are 
presented in tables 5.3 to 5.7 below. The data for the sanitation profile of the Cape 
Winelands District was provided by the District Municipality and, the backlog 
estimates were extracted from a Sanitation Backlog Study for the Western Cape 
Province (2007) coordinated by the Department of Local Government and 
Housing of the Western Cape Province. The study was based on submissions from 
the chief-executive officer of each of the District municipalities in the Western 
Cape Province. 
Table 5.3: CWDM 2008 Sanitation Profile by Number of Households and Toilet 
Type   
Breede River 24 224 184 658 66 1 061 26 194 
Breede Valley 37 963 193 647 123 1 507 40 433 
Drakenstein 48 134 174 367 405 1 711 50 790 
Stellenbosch 35 341 162 433 285 1 164 37 385 
Witzenberg 22 341 173 493 138 710 23 855 
Source: CWDM, 2008. 
 
Table 5.4: Sanitation backlog in the CWDM 
                                Number of Households  
 
 
Local 
Municipality 
Informal housing 
with no access to 
basic sanitation 
excluding back 
yard dwellers 
( BD) 
Informal 
housing with 
access to 
shared service 
(excluding 
BD) 
Backyard 
dwellers 
(BD) with 
access to 
shared 
service 
Total 
existing 
backlog 
Estimated 
future % 
backlog due to 
growth 
 
Growth 
as % of 
existing 
backlog 
Breede River 0 628 4 635 5 263 4 510 3.1 
Breede Valley 470 2 041 5 180 7 691 6 320 3.0 
Drakenstein 1 189 2 112 10 200 13 501 7 845 2.3 
Stellenbosch 10 300 7 560 7 870 7 718 3.5 
Witzenberg 0 2 227 1 600 3 827 2 280 2.4 
Farmland 370 0 0 370 0 0 
Source: Department of Local Government and Housing, Western Cape Province, (2007) 
 
Local 
Municipality 
 
Flush 
Toilet 
 
Ventilation 
Improved Pit 
(VIP) Toilet 
Pit Toilet Bucket 
System 
No 
Toilet 
Total 
 
 
 
 
  174 
Table 5.5: Summary of Present and Future Water Demand in the CWDM 
Annual Average Daily Demand (AADD) in kl/d  
 
Local Municipality 
 
 
Actual Present 
Future 
developments - 
other 
Future 
developments 
- backlog 
 
 
Total 
future 
Breede River  17 158 6 976 5 
863 
29 997 
Breede Valley 32 305 13 858 7 
146 
53 309 
Drakenstein 42 607 40 604 9 
280 
92 491 
Stellenbosch 28 952 14 776 9 
353 
53 081 
Witzenberg 15 034 5 933 3 
682 
24 649 
Farmland     
Total   136 056 82 147 35 323 253 527 
 Source: Department of Local Government and Housing, Western Cape Province, (2007) 
 
 
Table 5.6: Summary of Present and future Sewer Flow in the CWDM 
Peak day Dry Weather Flows (PDDWF) in kl/d  
 
Local Municipality 
 
 
Actual Present 
Future 
developments - 
other 
Future 
developments - 
backlog 
 
 
Total future 
Breede River 6 856 7 647 4 044 18 546 
Breede Valley 22 794 8 840 6 002 37 636 
Drakenstein 32 256 22 632 6 398 61 286 
Stellenbosch 18 072 10 757 7 537 36 366 
Witzenberg 8 598 4 919 3 093 16 610 
Farmland     
Total  88 576 54 794 27 074 170 444 
 Source: Department of Local Government and Housing, Western Cape Province, (2007) 
 
 
In making its submission to the overall provincial study the Cape Winelands 
District Municipality (CWDM) calculated backlogs for a total of 38 522 
households assuming the standard provision of one full-waterborne sewerage 
connection per household in all urban areas and one ventilation improved pit 
(VIP) toilet per household in the rural areas. The submission assumed an 
installation cost of R29 000 per household for both urban and rural areas. The 
District submission also assumed that the rate of growth of the backlog would be 
influenced by the normal population growth rate and, the estimated population 
influx from the Eastern Cape Province.  
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Table 5.7: Summary of cost estimates to eradicate the Sanitation Infrastructure 
Backlog in the CWDM  
 
 
Total Costs (Rand) for 
 
 
Local Municipality 
Bulk water   Bulk sewer   Internal water & 
sewer 
Eradicating 
sanitation backlog 
Breede River 76 195 000 94 301 000 36 864 000 207 360 000 
Breede Valley 67 989 000 60 978 000 53 120 000 182 087 000 
Drakenstein 135 372 000 125 995 250 108 008 000 369 375 250 
Stellenbosch 65 678 000 106 040 000 62 960 000 234 678 000 
Witzenberg 60 975 520 31 998 520 30 856 000 123 830 040 
Farmland    1 480 000 
Total 406 209 520 419 312 770 291 808 000 1 118 810 290 
 Source: Department of Local Government and Housing, Western Cape Province, (2007) 
 
My estimation of capital stocks used the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as 
opposed to the engineering costs estimates of the District study. The complete 
PIM estimates calculated for capital stock and spending estimates for electricity, 
water, roads and transport and sanitation are presented in Chapter 6. For 
illustrating the level of capital stock and capital spending for sanitation alone in 
the five municipalities I present in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 respectively the 
calculated capital stock and capital spending estimates. Water and sanitation 
expenditures make up the largest part of the municipal infrastructure grants from 
national government. These estimates give an indication of the level of public 
capital spending for sanitation provision in the local municipalities. The estimates 
demonstrate that the level of capital stock and capital spending for sanitation are 
very low and vary significantly across the local municipalities. The estimates 
present a rough indication of the level of sanitation capital stock.  
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Table 5.8: PIM Estimates for Sanitation Capital Stock  based on MIG and CMIP 
Data: 1997-2006 
Year Breede River Breede Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
1997 R 39,296.12 R 57,976.94 R 148,854.74 R 22,566.66 R 21,890.39 
1998 R 37,331.31 R 55,078.09 R 141,412.00 R 21,438.33 R 20,795.87 
1999 R 33,691.51 R 414,265.98 R 591,709.33 R 1,341,311.09 R 899,768.27 
2000 R 407,234.26 R 2,210,479.71 R 3,054,847.54 R 2,423,908.45 R 1,709,249.82 
2001 R 1,531,125.45 R 4,071,182.04 R 6,272,242.63 R 3,596,495.34 R 3,170,253.11 
2002 R 4,033,414.54 R 5,307,398.93 R 8,839,521.48 R 4,323,995.95 R 4,208,036.95 
2003 R 6,658,602.24 R 6,979,630.99 R 10,550,592.27 R 4,892,575.96 R 5,148,501.59 
2004 R 8,159,492.60 R 8,547,562.46 R 14,062,007.21 R 5,045,007.79 R 5,734,722.04 
2005 R 10,212,817.20 R 11,575,864.27 R 19,160,128.95 R 4,893,883.78 R 7,425,708.49 
2006 R 13,356,925.97 R 14,559,990.85 R 25,596,463.98 R 4,915,943.78 R 10,200,816.97 
Source: Raw data from Western Cape Province:  CMIP & MIG STATUS REPORT AS ON 27 OCTOBER 
2006. 
 
Table 5.9: Capital Spending Estimates for MIG and CMIP Sanitation Projects  
  
Year Breede River Breede Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
1997 R 0.00 R 0.00 R 0.00 R 22,566.66 R 0.00 
1998 R 0.00 R 364,558.00 R 464,085.00 R 21,438.33 R 881,000.00 
1999 R 378,348.00 R 1,508,968.32 R 2,106,650.00 R 1,341,311.09 R 100,861.00 
2000 R 840,000.00 R 508,199.00 R 1,363,896.00 R 2,423,908.45 R 887,138.00 
2001 R 1,709,199.79 R 0.00 R 391,332.00 R 3,596,495.34 R 65,800.00 
2002 R 987,446.00 R 1,028,869.00 R 265,861.00 R 4,323,995.95 R 388,000.00 
2003 R 554.00 R 749,131.00 R 2,844,040.00 R 4,892,575.96 R 186,884.00 
2004 R 1,465,577.89 R 2,415,482.16 R 3,471,677.69 R 5,045,007.79 R 1,588,811.92 
2005 R 2,360,643.02 R 1,654,334.37 R 4,181,253.26 R 4,893,883.78 R 2,080,650.70 
2006 R 2,800,304.13 R 800,000.00 R 3,128,679.46 R 4,915,943.78 R 0.00 
 Source: Raw data from Western Cape Province:  CMIP & MIG STATUS REPORT AS ON 27 OCTOBER 
2006. 
 
The capital stock value estimates are a key variable in the proposed infrastructure 
grant model. An appropriate benchmark for the desired level of capital stock 
required for the provision of services to all municipalities is established based on 
the most desired municipal standard within the District. Thereafter disparity 
indicators are used to weight the allocation esimates determined by population 
size so as to achieve a more equitable spread of public infrastructure investment 
taking into account municipal economic disparities.   
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The socio-economic disparity indicators in the CWDM local 
municipalities 
The Western Cape Provincial Economic Review and Outlook (PERO), [Western 
Cape Provincial Treasury, March 2005], assess provincial inequality in terms of 
incomes, assets, opportunities and spatial factors. Income inequality is measured 
by the difference between highest income earning groups and lowest income 
earning groups. Asset inequality is defined as the difference in peoples’ 
capabilities and opportunities for individual development through access to 
various assets, goods and services. Spatial inequality is presented as the 
manifestation of patterns of individual inequalities and disparities aggregated to a 
community level with special emphasis on their dislocation effects on living, 
working and recreational spaces of the most disadvantaged communities.  
The Western Cape Provincial Treasury extends the methodology used at the 
provincial level to local municipalities in specialized profile reports for each 
district municipality. These reports were published as the “Socio-economic 
Profile of the Cape Winelands District - 2006” (SEP: CWD, 2006, Provincial 
Government, Western Cape Provincial Treasury) and I used the Cape Winelands 
District Report as the main source of secondary data for constructing the disparity 
profiles of the five local municipalities in the District. This source is 
supplemented with data and information from the Cape Winelands District 
Municipality (CWDM) Annual Reports and information gathered during the 
interview process with municipal officials. The SEP (2006) for the District 
includes consolidated data sets from surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa 
and submissions from the District municipality. The SEP (2006) report presents 
socio-economic data and indicators for the District as a whole and for each local 
municipality separately. There is no explicit comparative analysis. To provide the 
basis for a comparative analysis of levels of disadvantage that differentiate local 
municipalities from each other I constructed a general framework in Table 5.10 
that presents, in summary form, a selection of disparity indicators from various 
sources. Thereafter I discuss some indicators that require further clarification and 
explanation.  
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Table 5.10: Summary – Indicators of Disparity for five Winelands District Local 
Municipalities  
Indicators Breede River 
Breede 
Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
Population      
Total (2006) 92 627 152 921 194 231 116 606 87 728 
Population Density / 
Dispersion (p/km!) 
27.783 51.059 126.288 140.32 30.771 
% Population in rural areas 36.46 31.81 18.26 28.3 41.6 
% Population in urban areas 63.54 68.19 81.72 71.7 58.5 
Socio-Economic (2001)      
% Unemployment rate 12.2 19.7 22.8 17.1 14.6 
No. unemployed  3 637 12 208 19 318 8 959 5 600 
% households with no 
income 
10.59 8.96 10.47 19.95 8.21 
No. of households with no 
income 
2 240 3 138 4 836 6 938 1 673 
Supply/use of Public 
Infrastructure 
     
Health Trends 2006      
No. of medical facilities 25 12 23 16 16 
Nurse patient ratio 39 29 30 34 34 
% births under 2.5 kg 20 22 17 10 21 
TB prevalence per 100 000 1 188 1 621 1 196 890 358 
% TB cure rate 71 60 69 69 29 
% HIV/AIDS prevalence 
(2005) 
3.2 3.7 5.4 4.0 4.2 
% HIV/AIDS prevalence 
(2010) 
4.0 4.6 5.4 4.9 5.1 
No. HIV/AIDS Deaths 
(2005) 
120 234 327 193 158 
No. HIV/AIDS Deaths 
(2010) 
209 379 516 294 259 
Education Trends 2006      
No. of schools (primary & 
high) 
55 55 67 37 46 
Educator learner ratio  36 38 38 38 37 
% people over 14 illiterate 
(less than grade 7) 
38 14 23 20 35 
Crime Trends 2001/06      
No. of police stations 
(2004/05) 
5 5 6 4 5 
No. of murders (2001/06) 290 532 583 350 305 
Drug related (2001/06) 3 824 4 294 6 501 2 914 4 724 
No. of rapes (2001/06) 752 1 691 1 693 848 815 
Roads 2007      
Total lengths (2007) (k)m 229 346.8 544.5 282.9 220.9 
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Unsurfaced (km) 50.7 35.9 54.1 18.1 28.2 
Surfaced (k)m 178.6 310.9 490.4 264.8 192.7 
Surfaced (km) poor and very 
poor (beyond repair) 
25.00 46.64 19.62 18.54 9.64 
Household Census 2001       
Changes in access to basic 
services (No. of households 
affected) 
     
Energy -459 451 -872 -56 -232 
Refuse removal 1 721 2 573 2 531 -177 965 
Sanitation 658 1 605 1 334 58 591 
Telephone services -258 -1 206 -1 750 -1 380 -720 
Water 
 
-295 -139 -711 -607 -326 
Housing 2001/04      
Households (2004) 24 203 38 601 50 157 35 466 22 322 
Formal (2001) 18 651 35 095 46 268 34 845 20 458 
Housing backlogs units 
(2004) 
4 300 11 876 11 000  10 500 3 000 
Informal / inadequate 
housing units 
1 450 4 276 7 948 (13% of all 
housing) 
2 154 
Development indicators      
Human Development Index 
(2005, HDI) (Health, 
Income, Education) 
0.65 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.72 
City Development Index 
(2005, CDI) (HDI + 
infrastructure and waste) 
0.71 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.69 
Deprivation Index  2003 
(normalized)  
1.882 1.937 1.954 1.908 1.906 
Sources:  
Socio economic profile (SEP): Cape Winelands District 2006, Western Cape Provincial Treasury. 
Deprivation in South Africa and its Potential Relevance to Resource Allocation issues:  An analysis of 2001 Census Data, 
Di McIntyre and Okore Okarafor, Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town, October 2003. 
Information Management – South Africa Policy Service, Crime in the RSA for April to March 2001/02-2006/07. 
Cape Winelands District Municipality – unpublished Assessment of Roads in Local Municipalities, 2007 
IDP/Review 2005/2006, Cape Winelands District Municipality 
Cape Winelands District Municipality, Unpublished Census and Household Data Base, 2009   
 
Spatial disparity, population density and road infrastructure  
Spatial disparity among the municipalities is indicated by population density; that 
is, the number of people living in a square kilometer of land surface within the 
municipality boundary. In the table below the population per square kilometer 
area is given for the period 2001 to 2010. For a comparative perspective of the 
differences in population density between the municipalities see the Summary 
Table (5.10) above. In this summary table it is easy to see that all five local 
municipalities have a preponderance of urban populations ranging from 58.5% for 
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Witzenberg to 81.72% for Drakenstein. Population dispersion per square 
kilometer varies widely across all five municipalities. Both these factors have 
significant implications for the provision of public infrastructure and the delivery 
of basic services. Highly agglomerated locations may present problems of 
overcrowding and related socio-economic consequences. High levels of 
population dispersion mean higher levels of public investment in physical 
infrastructure for transport, roads, rail, water reticulation and electricity 
distribution. Poor road and transport networks exacerbate interpersonal and spatial 
dimensions of inequalities.  
The relationship between interpersonal and spatial disparities is explained in the 
multi-country study conducted by Kanbur and Venables (2005) and discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The study concluded that spatially 
targeted public infrastructure finance contributes to addressing disparities between 
and within regions. From the history of Cape Winelands District it is clear that in 
this region socio-economic inequalities coincide with the colonial and apartheid 
institutional legacies of discrimination. 
 In South Africa the Havemann and Kearney (2006) study investigating the 
relationship of spatial inequality to labour market outcomes found that location of 
population groups as a result of the apartheid political legacy of irrational racial 
spatial planning is a key determinant. (See Chapter 2 for a review of this article). 
Significantly, the study concluded that smaller municipalities, such as those 
located in the Cape Winelands, would benefit from location near to national 
highways or rail linkages to metropolitan areas. The authors suggest that the 
investment potential of such smaller municipalities with natural and human 
resources to influence labour market outcomes is indeed significant. For this 
reason the authors recommend increased public investment in public transport 
infrastructure as a means for reducing the structural spatial inequalities that 
separate the rural poor from the urban rich. Furthermore such investment creates 
opportunities for more positive labour market outcomes and higher household 
incomes.  
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In addition to the positive labour market outcomes of a good transport 
infrastructure network a good road network is important for communities to 
access services that would enhance their basic capabilities. Data supplied by the 
District indicate that the road system for all local municipalities requires 
significant upgrading and maintenance. Some areas such as Breede River and 
Breede Valley with larger rural populations have many kilometers of road that are 
un-surfaced. Kilometers that are surfaced are in poor to very poor condition and 
are characterized as being beyond repair. Table 5.11 below provides an indication 
of the differences in population density among the five municipalities.  
 
Table 5.11: Population and Population Density CWDM 
 Population  Population Density 
Local Municipality 2001 2006 2010 Area (sq km) 2001 2006 2010 
Breede River 79439 92627 100151 3334 23.827 27.783 30.039 
Breede Valley 143520 152921 155603 2995 47.920 51.059 51.954 
Drakenstein 195628 194231 192336 1538 127.196 126.288 125.056 
Stellenbosch 121843 116606 113043 831 146.62 140.32 136.03 
Witzenberg 82831 87728 89888 2851 29.053 30.771 31.529 
Breede River (DMA) 6659 6116 5881 12384 0.538 0.494 0.475 
Source: Economic Profiles, Cape Winelands District Municipality Data Base, 2007 , 
 
Local municipalities in the District are responsible for maintenance and 
construction of roads within their jurisdictions. The District municipality itself is 
responsible for construction of main divisional and minor provincial roads within 
overall boundaries of the District. The District municipality performs this function 
as an agent of the Western Cape provincial department of Roads and Transport. In 
this capacity the District’s responsibilities include maintenance and re-surfacing 
of permanent surface roads; re-gravelling of non-permanent surface roads; road 
construction and improvement projects; fencing and maintenance; placement and 
maintenance of kilometer markers; minor road maintenance and, placement and 
maintenance of road signs.  
In 2007 the District’s department of Engineering and Transport conducted a study 
to assess the state and maintenance costs of the roads in all the local 
municipalities in the District (Cape Winelands District Municipality, 2007). The 
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study concluded that poor and unacceptable maintenance of the roads in the 
District had resulted in a R116 million backlog and the required funding to 
address the maintenance of municipal roads is estimated at R191 million over a 2 
to 5 year period from the date of the study.  Table 5.10 presents a summary of the 
2007 study of the state of the roads and the related maintenance costs.  
Table 5.12: CWDM - State and Maintenance Costs of the Roads-2007 
Status Breede River Breede Valley  Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
     
178.6 310.9 490.4 264.8 192.7 
 50.7  35.9  54.1  18.1   28.2 
Roads length  
-surfaced 
(km); 
-unsurfaced, 
Total (Km) 229.3  346.8 544.5 282.9 220.9 
Replacement 
value surfaced 
(Rmillion) R188 900 R370 000 R582 500 R308 000 R200 100 
     
25.00 46.64 19.62 18.54 9.64 
Surfaced 
beyond repair: 
Km 
-poor/very 
poor 
-value 
(Rmillion)  R14 557 961 R29 763 349 R43 196 170 R12 763 709  R15 335 554 
Surfaced  
maintenance 
needs 
(Rmillion):       
R8 554 298 R15 737 449 R26 035 427 R8 386 957 R8 119 472 -Resurface 
-Rehabilitate R14 557 961 R29 763 349 R43 196 171 R12 763 709 R15 335 555 
Unsurfaced 
maintenance 
needs 
(Rmillion)  R2 285 483 R2 193 699 R1 499 400 R222 073.00 R1 451 993 
 Maintenance 
expenditure: 
(Rmillion)      
-Actual R1 371 000 R1 300 000 R6 978 180 R1 780 000 R1 317 698 
-Require reseal R2 211 615  R4 396 660  R7 153 020 R4 782 227 R2 523 623 
-Require rehab R14 557 961 R29 763 349 R43 196 171  R12 763 709 R15 335 555 
-Total R16 769 576 R34 160 009 R50 349 191 R17 545 936 R17 859 177 
-Deficit R15 398 576 R32 860 009 R43 371 011  R15 765 936 R16 765 936 
Source: Adapted from unpublished Report CWDM, 2007 
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Unemployment32, Income And Poverty 
Unemployment 
Unemployment in the Cape Winelands District has grown from 9.1% in 1996 to 
14% in 2008. Of all the municipal districts this has been one of the fastest rates of 
unemployment growth given the size of the population (see Table 5.13).    
 
Table: 5.13 Unemployment (%) by Municipal District in the Western Cape:  
1996-2008 
Year Municipal District 
 West Coast Cape Winelands Overberg Eden Central Karoo 
1996 6.7 9.1 5.9 13.1 16.2 
1997 6.4 9.1 5.6 12.6 15.4 
1998 8.2 11.7 6.9 15.5 18.9 
1999 7.7 11.3 6.3 14.0 16.8 
2000 8.9 12.9 7.3 15.4 18.1 
2001 10.0 14.3 8.3 16.8 19.3 
2002 10.6 15.4 8.9 17.5 21.5 
2003 10.8 15.4 9.4 16.6 21.3 
2004 10.1 14.4 9.2 14.5 19.6 
2005 9.9 14.5 9.1 13.8 19.3 
2006 10.2 14.8 9.6 13.0 19.5 
2007 10.1 14.6 9.7 12.0 19.5 
2008 9.6 14.0 9.4 11.0 18.6 
Source: Adapted from CWDM Data Base (2008) 
 
A significant aspect of the unemployment trends in the District from 1996 to 2008 
is the racial profile of the distribution of unemployment. Table 5.14 shows that by 
far the African population has been hardest hit by unemployment with the 
coloured population coming in a close second and, the white community the least 
affected.    
 
                                                
32 Unemployment statistical data is officially defined by Statistics South Africa as the number of people 
actively seeking work.  
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Table: 5.14 CWDM Unemployment Rate (%) by Race, 1996-2008  
 
Year Black (African) White Coloured Asian Total 
1996 15.2 2.2 9.6 7.1 9.1 
1997 16.9 2.3 8.9 7.4 9.1 
1998 20.5 3.0 11.4 10.3 11.7 
1999 18.8 3.0 11.0 11.4 11.3 
2000 19.2 3.9 12.8 10.9 12.9 
2001 20.7 4.3 14.2 11.2 14.3 
2002 22.2 4.2 15.4 11.3 15.4 
2003 21.8 4.0 15.6 10.6 15.4 
2004 20.3 3.5 14.7 9.7 14.4 
2005 20.4 3.4 14.7 7.7 14.5 
2006 20.2 3.1 15.3 7.1 14.8 
2007 19.4 3.0 15.3 5.9 14.6 
2008 19.0 2.7 14.7 5.5 14.0 
 Source: Adapted from CWDM Data Base (2008) 
  
In Table 5.10 under unemployment it is clear that the Drakenstein Municipality, 
with the largest population for 2006, also has the highest rate of unemployment. 
The Cape Winelands Annual Report 2007/08 notes that unemployment is most 
severe in the De Doorns and Touws River areas and, generally in informal 
settlements around urban centers in the District.  
 
Income distribution and poverty 
The Municipal District’s Annual Report states that poverty in the District has 
deepened between 1996 and 2001 and that according to the Statistics South Africa 
2001 census 11% of households were without incomes. The proportion of 
households in each local municipality earning less than R19 200 per annum 
ranged between, 41.4% in the Drakenstein Municipality to 56.7% in the Breede 
River Municipality.  Table 5.15 provides a detailed local municipality profile of 
income distribution by income category. The SEP (2006) Report noted that in 
2001 Stellenbosch had 19.95% of households with no income. Between 1996 and 
2001 the Cape Winelands District Annual Report revealed a racial income 
distribution profile of 3 out of every 4 African and, 1 out of every 2 coloured 
households earning less than R19 200 per annum. The Report also revealed that 
single-women and child-headed households were the most vulnerable and, 
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because households depended on wage income, the low levels of employment and 
the high seasonal nature of some employment meant that households were 
constantly caught in a poverty trap.    
  
 Table 5.15: CWDM: Number of Households by Income Category for 2008   
Annual 
Income 
Category 
(Rand)  
Breede 
River Breede Valley  Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
0-2400 70 79 105 183 41 
2400-6000 227 266 308 367 183 
6000-12000 2238 2553 2613 2860 1593 
12000-18000 2558 3068 3077 2968 2062 
18000-30000 2493 3530 3700 3042 2445 
30000-42000 2935 4149 4218 3239 2718 
42000-54000 2617 3770 3920 2978 2318 
54000-72000 2904 4378 4884 3548 2619 
72000-96000 2399 3847 4841 3332 2249 
96000-132000 2188 3693 5249 3423 2116 
132000-192000 1966 3595 5486 3365 1946 
192000-360000 2159 4217 6774 4285 2068 
360000-600000 942 1999 3288 2237 3288 
600000-1200000 426 1032 1809 1210 479 
1200000-
2400000 96 270 502 340 126 
2400000+ 14 48 96 66 24 
Total 26234 40496 50870 37443 23892 
Source: Adapted from Household Income and Expenditure, CWDM Data Base, 2008.    
 
The SEP Report (2006) noted that social grant transfers supplement incomes for a 
large percentage of poor households in the District. For example the proportion of 
total number of recipients of child support grants for all municipalities range 
between 40.2% for Stellenbosch and 50.6% for Breede Valley. In the medium to 
long-term social security transfers are not a satisfactory means for attaining basic 
capability equality amongst local communities.  
 
Health, Mortality, Education, Transport, Safety, Crime, Housing And 
Access To Services   
The supply and use of public infrastructure for the provision of health, education, 
safety and transport services present a very disparate picture for all five 
municipalities.  
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Health Trends and Debilitating Diseases 
The Cape Winelands District 2007/08 Annual Report reveals that by 2007 there 
was a 27% vacancy rate for medical officers while the incidence of HIV had 
doubled over the period covered by the Report. Furthermore, the report noted that 
the HIV/Aids infections are projected to increase from 3.6% in 2005 to 4.7% by 
2010. It was also observed in the Report that in certain communities in the District 
women were disproportionately affected and, that many patients in some 
communities present with dual tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/Aids infection. The 
Annual Report also noted that teenage pregnancy rates were above the national 
average and increasing annually. In addition low birth-weight figures in the 
District were unacceptably high. The SEP Report (2006) indicated that in 2006 
there was 1 nurse for 32 patients (see Table 5.10) aggravating an already 
precarious situation with respect to the scarcity of health professionals in the 
District. Table 5.16 below for the Western Cape Province and, the accompanying 
graph, provides an indication of the increasing rate of HIV/Aids infections in the 
Cape Winelands District compared to other municipal districts in the province. 
Table 5.17 provides an indication of the prevalence of tuberculosis (TB) incidence 
in each local municipality. 
 
Table 5.16: HIV and AIDS Estimates by Municipal District in the Western Cape: 
1996-2008 
Municipal District 
West Coast 
Cape 
Winelands Overberg Eden Central Karoo  
Year HIV AIDS HIV AIDS HIV AIDS HIV AIDS HIV AIDS 
1996 1477 16 4981 54 1372 15 3331 36 370 4 
1997 2624 32 8091 100 2311 28 5404 68 613 8 
1998 4469 57 12684 173 3745 51 8499 119 979 14 
1999 6499 98 17539 282 5365 87 11875 197 1355 22 
2000 8693 166 22476 449 7116 143 15393 315 1733 35 
2001 10702 257 26793 664 8788 220 18623 473 2042 52 
2002 12118 364 29415 911 9964 311 20750 656 2217 70 
2003 13205 495 31492 1201 10998 421 22516 874 2327 91 
2004 14516 639 33826 1512 12088 543 24417 1113 2488 114 
2005 15144 783 34582 1813 12621 664 25208 1348 2542 136 
2006 15700 932 35269 2120 13106 790 25939 1590 2584 158 
2007 15983 1072 35427 2397 13369 907 26278 1813 2585 178 
2008 15753 1172 34661 2585 13292 992 25960 1972 2494 191 
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Source: Adapted from Household Income and Expenditure Survey CWDM Data Base, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Household Income and Expenditure Survey CWDM Data Base, 2008. 
 
For an overall picture of the HIV/Aids and TB situation for each municipality in 
the District consider Table 5.10 above. This table shows that in 2005 Drakenstein 
had the highest percentage of HIV/AIDS prevalence at 5.4% while Breede Valley 
has the highest prevalence of TB per 100 000 inhabitants. The SEP Report (2006) 
suggests that the HIV/Aids prevalence is projected to remain the same by 2010. 
 
 
Table 5.17: Incidences of TB Per 100000 
 
Local Municipality Incidence/100 000 
Witzenberg 1324 
Breede River  1021 
Breede Valley 1536 
Stellenbosch 982 
Drakenstein 1010 
Source: IDP/REVIEW 2005/2006, CWDM 
 
The supply and use of public infrastructure for the provision of health, education, 
safety and transport services present a very disparate picture for all five 
municipalities. Using Table 5.10 it is evident that in Drakenstein, with the highest 
population and relatively high population dispersion there were only 23 public 
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medical facilities. Breede River with a lower population and lower population 
dispersion had 25 facilities. Associated with HIV/Aids and other debilitating 
diseases is the issue of parental mortality for children in the 0-4 age group. Table 
5.16 seems to imply that children without parents or living in single parent 
households have very little chance of acquiring any basic capabilities.  
 
Table 5.18: CWDM Parental Mortality, for Children in Age group 0-4 
 
Mother Alive Mother Not Alive  Municipality 
  Father Alive Father Not Alive Father Alive Father Not Alive 
Breede River 8233 209 58 19 
Breede Valley 14060 441 73 43 
Drakenstein 16851 465 93 71 
Stellenbosch 9159 249 42 12 
Witzenberg 8095 224 40 15 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Census 2001 (Mortality) 
 
Education and literacy trends 
Indicators for education in Table 5.10 from the SEP Report (2006) show that 
Breede River and Witzenberg had the highest percentage of people over 14 years 
old who are functionally illiterate at 38% and 35% respectively. Functional 
illiteracy is defined as having less than a grade seven education. The Cape 
Winelands District Municipal 2007/08 Annual Report revealed that the District 
achieved lower outcomes in both numeracy and literacy among grade 3 learners 
between 2002 and 2007 compared to other municipal districts in the Western 
Cape. The Report also revealed that between 2005 and 2006 the total number of 
individuals without schooling in the District increased by 7% and, by 2006 only 
2.3% had any post-graduate qualifications. Table 5.19 presents a picture in 2008 
of the levels of racial disparity in educational achievement among the different 
communities in the District.  
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Table 5.19: CWDM – Highest Level of Education in 2008 by Race for Age 15 Years 
and Older 
No Schooling 7098 432 13374 38 20942 
0 – 2 2289 127 5941 104 8461 
3 – 6 16512 1062 45868 221 63663 
7 – 9 34137 7303 97171 292 138903 
10 – 11 24133 10880 57305 187 92504 
Less than grade 12 390 1389 967 85 2831 
Grade 12 only 16683 35738 58453 380 111255 
Source: Adapted from Cape Winelands District Municipality Data Base (2008) 
Safety and crime trends 
The picture for safety and crime is extremely bleak and seems to attest to the 
analysis presented in Glyn and Miliband (1994). High numbers of murder, drug 
related crimes and rape all seem to present a picture of dysfunctional 
communities. Table 5.20 presents a comprehensive summary of crime statistics 
for all five municipalities for the period 2001 to 2006. 
 
Table 5.20: Summary of Key Crime Statistic Indicators for 2001 to 2006, for the 
CWDM 
 Breede River Breede Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
All theft not mentioned 
elsewhere 4845 21183 26837 21340 5569 
Common assault 5365 15151 14269 5229 5402 
Assault with the intent to 
inflict grievous bodily 
harm 4355 11258 11400 5171 5497 
Burglary at residential 
premises 3674 8890 11689 8004 3463 
Malicious damage to 
property 2238 7699 8216 5762 2233 
Theft out of or from motor 
vehicle 1254 5500 7505 10063 1195 
Drug-related crime 3824 4294 6501 2914 4724 
Crimean injuria 1034 3024 5097 1510 1022 
Burglary at business 
premises 1267 2820 3152 2052 1301 
Shoplifting 1050 2366 3609 1578 1163 
Common robbery 252 1895 3529 1092 341 
Rape 752 1691 1693 848 815 
Driving under the 430 1309 1197 730 396 
Grades Black (African) White Coloured Asian Total 
 
 
 
 
  190 
influence of alcohol or 
drugs 
Commercial crime 253 924 1534 940 320 
Theft of motor vehicle and 
motorcycle 158 614 1190 1364 144 
Robbery with aggravating 
circumstances 96 779 1358 980 82 
General aggravated 
robbery 
(subcategory of aggravated 
robbery) 93 764 1321 894 81 
Indecent assault 292 757 793 384 296 
Murder 290 532 583 350 305 
Stock-theft 388 277 201 375 380 
Attempted murder 67 285 488 307 171 
Culpable homicide 130 368 313 284 132 
Neglect and ill-treatment 
of children 74 279 540 117 87 
Illegal possession of 
firearms and ammunition 75 191 347 224 84 
Arson 64 184 206 97 72 
Abduction 10 72 121 47 16 
Public violence 28 57 94 41 14 
Kidnapping 17 68 58 27 15 
Carjacking (subcategory of 
aggravated robbery) 1 10 21 27 0 
Robbery at business 
premises 
(subcategory of aggravated 
robbery) 1 1 3 39 0 
Robbery at residential 
premises 
(subcategory of aggravated 
robbery) 1 2 7 11 1 
Robbery of cash in transit 
(subcategory of aggravated 
robbery) 0 0 3 4 0 
Bank robbery (subcategory 
of aggravated robbery) 0 0 2 3 0 
Truck hijacking 
(subcategory of aggravated 
robbery) 0 2 1 2 0 
Source:  Information Management - South African Police Service, Crime in the RSA for April to March 2001/2002 to 
2006/2007  
 
The Cape Winelands District Municipality 2007/08 Annual Report notes that 
there were 23 police stations in the District. The Report also noted that there was a 
decrease in certain crimes between 2004/05 and 2006/07. Murder dropped by 
22.3%; rape by 10.9% (although this could also be due to under-reporting of 
rape); neglect and ill treatment of children by 49.6% and, drug related crimes 
remained high, increasing by 20.8% in 2005/06.  
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Housing and access to basic services 
Following the Guarcello et al (2004) study (see Chapter 2) one may examine the 
access to basic services such as energy (gas, paraffin, candles and other) and 
water. This is difficult to assess as the SEP Report (2006) for the District only 
presents data (see Table 5.10) between 1996 and 2001 that reflects changes in 
access to these services. What the changes in access to these services does show, 
however, is that four out the five municipalities have shown very limited 
improvement in household access to energy sources for cooking and lighting. For 
water the situation is negative improvement for all five municipalities.  
The Cape Winelands District Municipality 2007/08 Annual Report observes that 
housing and access to basic services in the District is characterized by significant 
and, growing backlogs and sub-optimal accommodation. The Report notes that in 
2005 the District had a 10% housing backlog of the Province’s estimated total 
backlog of 296 000 units. However, the Report notes and, my interviews with 
local municipal officials reveal that the municipalities estimate the housing 
backlog to be in the region of 48 000 units. In addition the Annual Report 
suggests that the backlog situation is being exacerbated by evictions of farm-
workers and their families. Between January and September 2005 352 farm-
workers and their families faced eviction because the worker was retrenched or 
died. Other reasons included the sale or liquidation of the farm; wage disputes; 
drought and, the unemployment impact of the implementation of new legislation 
that seeks to provide security of tenure for farm-workers and their families (see 
also Falletisch 2008).   
 Aggregate housing provision is an important indicator for assessing inter-
municipality spatial inequality and disparities. From Table 5.10 it is clear that in 
2004 municipalities with the largest population had the highest housing backlogs 
and, the highest number of informal and inadequate housing units.  
Inequality, deprivation and human development 
The final set of indicators in Table 5.10 represents the level of aggregate 
development in each of the local municipalities. The human development index or 
HDI is a composite indicator between values of zero and one representing the 
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level of health, education and income attainment in an area and where a value 
closer to one indicates higher human development. The Gini Coefficient measures 
the level of income inequality with one representing absolute inequality and zero 
absolute inequality. The city development index is the HDI plus the level of 
infrastructure and waste removal provision. Column two in Table 5.21 presents 
the HDI and Gini coefficients for the Cape Winelands District between 1996 and 
2008. From Table 5.21 it is clear that income inequality is increasing in all 
municipal districts in the Western Cape Province with only marginal 
improvements in human development.  
  
Table 5.21: HDI and GINI Coefficient by Municipal District in the Western Cape: 
1996-2008  
1996 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.53  0.54 0.60 0.57 0.61 .54 0.61 0.55 0.53 0.54 
1997 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.49 0.56 
1998 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.56 
1999 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.54 0.56 
2000 0.61 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.57 
2001 0.62 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.59 
2002 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.56 0.59 
2003 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.65 0.60 0.57 0.60 
2004 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.65 0.60 0.57 0.60 
2005 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.66 0.59 0.57 0.60 
2006 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.66 0.59 0.58 0.60 
2007 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.66 0.60 0.57 0.60 
2008 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.66 0.60 0.57 0.61 
Source: Adapted from Household Income and Expenditure Survey CWDM Data Base, 2008. 
 
For a more localized view of developmental disparity among the municipalities I 
consider the deprivation index. The deprivation index represents a state of social 
and material disadvantage experienced by an individual, household, group or 
community relative to the general norm in society as a whole. In this sense 
McIntyre et al (2000) assert that deprivation is closely related to Sen’s human 
capabilities in that deprivation may be seen as the inability to achieve an adequate 
level of basic capability relative to the societal norm. McIntyre and Okorafor, 
(2003) developed a series of multiple deprivation indices at the level of the local 
Municipal District 
West Coast CWDM Overberg Eden Central Karoo 
              
Year 
HDI GINI HDI GINI HDI GINI HDI GINI HDI GINI 
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municipality (see Chapter 2). Table 5.22 and Table 5.23 represent the McIntyre-
Okorafor deprivation indices (Di McIntyre and Okore Okorafor, 2003) for the five 
local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District.  
Table 5.22: Deprivation Index 
 
Drakenstein WC023 -1.36425 
Breede Valley WC025 -1.37312 
District Management Area WCDMA02 -1.39115 
Witzenberg WC022 -1.40588 
Stellenbosch WC024 -1.41633 
Breede River/Winelands WC026 -1.42491 
Source: Di McIntyre and Okore Okorafor, October 2003, Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town 
Table5.23: Normalized Deprivation Index for the five local municipalities 
 
Breede River  WC026 1.882 
Breede Valley  WC025 1.937 
Drakenstein  WC023 1.954 
Stellenbosch  WC024 1.908 
Witzenberg  WC022 1.906 
Source: Di McIntyre and Okore Okorafor; October 2003; Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town 
 
The Human Development Indices (2005), Deprivation Indices (2003) and the City 
Development Indices (2005) for the five local municipalities are presented in 
Table 5.10.  It is clear from this table that, for all three indices, the CWDM local 
municipalities perform very poorly indeed. 
Summary 
This disparity profile of the Cape Winelands District as whole shows wide 
variations and levels of disparity among the five local municipalities in the Cape 
Winelands District. The premise of the thesis is that public infrastructure 
provision can play an important role in mitigating the effects of structural and 
spatial disparities within and among local municipalities in the District. This 
chapter presents a variety of data sets and information to give an overall picture of 
disparity in the Cape Winelands District Municipality. However, to run 
Local Municipality Municipality Code Deprivation Index 
Local Municipality Municipal Code Normalized Deprivation Index 
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illustrative model simulations that take account of capital stock weighted by 
population and economic disparity indices I selected the following eight disparity 
indicators from the data sets discussed in this chapter.  
 
• Population density/dispersion per square kilometer, 
• Unemployment rate, 
• Household with no income, 
• Tuberculosis (TB) per 100 000 inhabitants, 
• Percentage of HIV/Aids prevalence, 
• Percentage of persons over 14 years illiterate (with less than grade 7), 
• Housing backlog units and, 
• The normalized deprivation index  
 
I used the data listed above to construct disparity indices as input weights in the 
municipal infrastructure grant model. I investigated whether such a financing 
formula could provide an objective mechanism to equitably allocate infrastructure 
grants to municipalities over a given period of time to enable them to address 
economic disparities and infrastructure backlogs. The full model, including the 
construction of the disparity indices is presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
The Municipal Infrastructure Grant Model 
 
In Chapter 3 I argued that government’s current method for allocating municipal 
infrastructure grants to address historical backlogs was not equitable because it 
did not adequately take account of disparities as required by Section 214 (2) of the 
Constitution. Citing government reports I also suggested that inadequate financing 
of infrastructure made it more difficult for municipalities to provide basic 
services. Together, inequitable allocations and inadequate financing may be 
implicated in the social exclusion and marginalization of disadvantaged 
communities giving rise to anti-social behaviour and the violent service delivery 
protests discussed in earlier chapters.  
 
Following my earlier arguments for an infrastructure grant model that takes 
account of municipal disparities, in this chapter, I develop and present a municipal 
infrastructure grant model that takes account of economic disparities. The model 
is based on the Petchey, Josie, MacDonald and Nthite (2004)33 provincial capital 
grant model developed for the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC, 2005). My 
model is an adapted version of the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC, 2005) 
provincial capital expenditure grant model. Whereas the latter was for allocating 
capital grants to provinces the municipal infrastructure grant model is an adapted 
version for equitable allocation of infrastructure grants to municipalities taking 
account of economic disparities as prescribed in Section 214 (2) (g) of the 
Constitution.  
 
Accounting for Economic Disparities in a Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant Model  
This section of the chapter presents the formal structure of the grant model for 
allocating grants to municipalities taking into account economic disparities. The 
development of the municipal model follows the same processes used to develop 
the FFC provincial capital grant model. Following from equations 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 
                                                
33See footnote 8 in Chapter 1: Introduction. 
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in Chapter 4, the variables and parameters for the grant model for the five (Breede 
River, Breede Valley, Drakenstein, Stellenbosch Witzenberg) Cape Winelands 
local municipalities represented by “i” are defined as follows: 
 
• tK =  Value of the actual capital stock (in constant prices) for the Cape 
Winelands District as a whole in period t.  
• i,tK =Value of the actual capital stock (in constant prices) for 
Municipality i in the Cape Winelands District in period t. 
• i,tP =  Population of Municipality i in period t. 
• tP = Population of the Cape Winelands District in period t. 
• Bi,t = historical backlog for municipal i for period t  
• tCP =  Capital (Infrastructure) grant-pool in period t (given as a policy 
parameter in government’s medium term budget statement for municipal 
infrastructure grants)34.  
• t0 1! " ! = Proportion of the capital grant pool allocated to capital backlog 
( 1! is called delta and is a policy parameter). 
• i,t0 ! "  is the capital cost disparity for Municipality i in period t.  
• i,t! =  the disparity function for Municipality i in period t. 
• $i,t (tau) is the ratio, which defines a share of the grant pool for 
municipality i in  period t = 1, 2 or 3 as a proportion of the municipal’s 
share of the Cape Winelands District population.  
The model is constructed over three consecutive periods of the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) cycle. Each MTEF is equivalent to three years. 
This is convenient as capital infrastructure budgets are normally spent over a 
longer period than annual operational expenditures. The formulae for each period 
are developed consecutively.  
 
                                                
34 In the Petchey et al (2004) version the capital grant pool can also be derived from macroeconomic 
forecasts. 
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Period One 
The grant is used to raise the overall level of public capital formation for the 
delivery of important public services and equal access to these services over time 
and, for long-term economic growth and development.  For this reason, the model 
is divided into two components: a per capita component to address long-term 
economic growth and development and a municipality’s backlogs component 
designed to address inequality of access to services created by the historical 
backlogs and socio-economic disparities.  The formulae for each component (for 
period one) are developed below, starting with the historical backlog part. 
The historical domestic backlog grant  
In the first period, a portion of 1CP , the grant pool, is allocated to the 
municipalities according to their historical domestic backlogs. This portion of the 
grant is for financing municipal infrastructure to ensure equality of access to basic 
services especially for those previously disadvantaged by the historical legacies of 
colonial and apartheid policies of spatial and socio-economic disparity. The 
amount allocated to this component of the model is 1 1CP !"  where $ is a policy 
parameter (i.e. it is a value between 0 and 1 and may be determined by the policy 
maker.). To determine this allocation in period one, the model requires a value for 
the amount of capital needed by each municipality to provide basic services. A 
simple way to do this would be to use per capita values for minimum standards 
developed for each of the services and then estimate the amount of capital that a 
municipality would require to meet such standards.  Comparison of these standard 
values against a municipality’s actual capital stock would yield a measure of the 
historical backlog for each municipality.  Unfortunately, there are no commonly 
established and consistent minimum standard values for all the relevant services 
in South Africa. If and when such countrywide standards are established this 
approach may be used. 
 
In the Josie, MacDonald and Petchey (2008) article a simple per capita average 
value is used as the standard to establish whether each province has a historical 
backlog, that is; a shortage of capital compared to other provinces because of the 
historical legacy of apartheid.  Analogously, a Cape Winelands Municipal district 
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standard can be set to compare local municipalities with each other in a district 
municipality. In adopting this approach for municipalities, the first step in 
constructing this municipal district standard is to let the (per capita) stock of 
capital for period one be: 
 
1
1
K
P
    (Municipal District Standard Capital Stock) (6.1) 
 
In the following analysis this municipal district standard is applied to each 
municipality to derive the amount of capital that a particular local municipality 
needs in order to meet the per capita average.  Let us call this value of capital 
stock the municipal district standard.    
   
As discussed in the Josie et al (2008) article there are problems associated with 
the use of a per capita average in this way. Chief among these is that a per capita 
average may conceal service specific backlogs within a region. For example, a 
municipality may have large deficiencies in infrastructure for one service but 
more than adequate infrastructure for all of its other services. An aggregate 
measure of the municipality’s capital stock, together with the use of an average 
for the standard, may falsely show an overall excess of capital for the 
municipality, “concealing” the fact that there is a deficiency for one particular 
service35.   
 
It is important to note at this stage that the capital stock estimates used in the case 
study was the amount of capital per person in the Cape Winelands District as a 
whole. As noted in Chapter 5 the municipal PIM capital stock estimates were 
derived from national and provincial capital stock data. This is not an ideal 
solution because as noted by Josie et al (2008: 1183) and confirmed in my 
discussion in Chapter 5, municipal capital stock time series data are not available 
in South Africa. 
 
                                                
35 It is not possible to convert ‘excess’ infrastructure used for example, for providing roads, into 
infrastructure for providing water and sanitation. 
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In practice the problem of ‘concealment’, can be overcome. The model is 
developed so that all municipalities also receive a per capita grant from the grant 
pool in addition to the backlogs component of the grant allocation.  To an extent, 
this allocation will overcome the “concealment effect” resulting from the use of a 
simple average for calculating a municipal district level standard. To ensure 
equity, while an affluent municipality may not have an historical backlog when 
estimated using an average, it will still receive an equal per capita allocation for 
capital spending from the grant pool. In this case a policy decision can be made 
within such a municipality to use this equal per capita allocation to also address 
any residual historical backlogs. 
  
There are two advantages in using an average to set the district-level standard.  
Firstly, it is perceived as being fair and compliant with the equity principles of 
parity, proportionality and priority (Young, 1994) and, it is feasible.  Secondly, 
being derived from a mathematical formula there is very little possibility for 
political interference.  
  
The formal steps in the development of the model are presented in the following 
paragraphs. The aggregate amount of capital that municipality i requires in period 
one to achieve the municipal district level standard is the per capita standard from 
equation (6.1) multiplied by the population of municipality i taking account of its 
cost disparity (#i,t) which may be less or greater than one. If more than one, 
municipality i would need more than the standard amount of capital in order to 
provide the standard amount of services from that capital stock.  If less than one it 
would require less than the standard in order to provide the standard amount of 
services. Thus the measure of capital needed in municipality i to achieve the 
standard in period one, taking account of cost disparities, is:  
 
 
K1
P1
! Pi,1
"
#
$
%
&
' ! ( i,1  (Desired Capital Stock) (6.2) 
 
In period one this is what municipality i needs to achieve the Cape Winelands 
District standard taking into account its capital cost disparity.  The municipality’s 
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historical domestic backlog depends on how its actual capital stock deviates from 
the disparity-adjusted standard capital stock for that municipality.  This can be 
calculated for municipality i, and period one, as follows: 
 
       1i,1 i,1 i,1 i,1
1
KB P K
P
! "
= # # $ %& '
( )
 (Historical Backlog)   (6.3) 
 
Municipalities with i,1B 0>  (a positive capital backlog) have a deficiency in their 
capital stock in the sense that it is inadequate to achieve the municipal district 
standard, as determined from (6.2). Local municipalities with i,1B 0<  have a 
negative backlog compared to the municipal district standard.  Their capital stock 
exceeds what is required to achieve the standard.  Finally, i,1B 0=  implies that a 
municipality has no historical backlog.  The capital stock in such a municipality is 
equal to what it needs to achieve the municipal district average, adjusted for cost 
disparities.  
  
The available pool of funds is allocated among those municipalities with a 
positive historical backlog according to the following equation that automatically 
ensures that the sum of all the historical backlog grants is equal to the available 
infrastructure grant pool: 
 
 
i ,1
i,1
1 1 i,1
D i,1
i,1 i:B 0
i,1
B
( CP ) B 0
BG
0 B 0
>
! "
# $ % >& && &
= ' (
& &
% )& &* +
,   (Historical backlog grant)   (6.4) 
 
where Di,1G  is the historical backlog grant to local municipality i in period one. D 
here denotes a municipality’s historical domestic backlog. Only those 
municipalities with a positive historical backlog (i.e., i,1B 0> ) receive this grant. 
Municipalities with a negative backlog (i.e., i,1B 0! ) receive no allocations from 
this part of the grant pool in period one. 
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The per capita economic efficiency grant 
To ensure that municipalities are adequately funded to meet the economic 
efficiency standard, the remaining portion of the pool, 1(1 )!" , is allocated on a 
per capita basis to all municipalities to help them overcome their overall shortage 
of capital relative to a generally accepted standard to achieve per capita economic 
efficiency. This can be a general internationally, nationally or regionally accepted 
standard. The aggregate amount remaining in the pool for this grant is: 
 
 1 1CP (1 )!" . (Pool available for per capita grant)  (6.5) 
 
As I noted in Chapter 4 the policy maker chooses the value of the parameter ( 1! ).  
The greater is the value of 1!  (delta), the smaller is the allocation to the per capita 
economic efficiency-based grants, and the greater is the allocation to the historical 
domestic backlogs.  Conversely, the lower is the value of 1! , the smaller is the 
amount allocated to equality of access component (the historical domestic 
backlogs) and the greater is the allocation of funds to addressing per capita 
economic efficiency. Policy makers therefore have the discretionary power to 
decide how quickly the historical domestic backlog is eliminated.  Once all 
historical domestic backlogs are eliminated and there is more equality of access to 
services, the parameter  ( 1! ) can be set equal to zero, implying that all of the pool 
is allocated to the per capita economic efficiency-based grants to meet the 
requirement for municipal economic growth.   
 
A municipality’s unadjusted total per capita economic efficiency-based grant for 
economic growth from this component of the pool in period one is:  
 
 i,t1 1 i,1
1 t
PCP (1 )
P P
! "# $
% % &' (
) *
                             (6.6) 
 
It is clear that equation (6.6) does not have a component to ensure that the sum of 
the grants so calculated is equal to the share of the pool designated to this part of 
the model.  To ensure that such a “balanced budget” condition is satisfied as 
discussed in Chapter 4 (see tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4), we use (6.6) to construct 
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shares that are then applied to the grant pool. The share tau ($i,t), defined by 
equation 6.7, for municipality i is just its aggregate grant from (6.6) divided by the 
sum of the aggregate grants for all municipalities, also from (6.6).  Simplified, this 
ratio, which defines the per capita economic efficiency share of the grant pool for 
municipality i, is: 
 i,1 i,1i,1 i,1
i,1 i,1
i
P
0 1
P
! "
# = $ # $
! "%
  (Share of the Grant Pool)  (6.7) 
  
The share of municipality i in the revenue pool is a function of its population 
relative to total district population (the higher its population the larger is its grant), 
and its capital cost disparity relative to the sum of all disparities (the higher is its 
disparity relative to the sum of the disparities in the Municipal District, the greater 
is its grant).  Thus, one can consider this part of the scheme an equitable per capita 
economic efficiency grant, adjusted for capital cost disparities.  If a municipality 
has a disparity of one then it will receive a share of the grant pool based purely on 
its population share. 
 
Therefore, the aggregate grant for municipality i for this component of the scheme 
is: 
 
 Ei,1 i,1 1 1G CP (1 )= ! " # $  (Per capita efficiency grant)          (6.8)  
 
where E denotes per capita economic efficiency. 
The aggregate grant 
The aggregate infrastructure grant to municipality i is the sum of the per capita 
economic efficiency grant and any historical domestic backlog grant that may be 
received such that:  
 
 E Di,1 i,1 i,1G G G= +       (Aggregate Infrastructure Grant)       (6.9) 
 
Municipalities with no historical backlog in period one will receive only a per 
capita economic efficiency grant. For these municipalities, Ei,1 i,1G G= . 
Municipalities with a positive historical backlog will receive their per capita 
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economic efficiency grant and a share of the pool allocated to historical backlogs.  
Their share of the backlog pool will depend upon the size of their backlog relative 
to the backlogs of other municipalities.  Once the historical backlogs have been 
eliminated all municipalities will receive only the per capita economic efficiency 
grant (as noted above, once this point is reached, t!  will be set equal to zero). 
Therefore, policy makers may wish to set 1!  at a relatively high level in the early 
stages of the scheme since this implies that most of the pool will go towards 
eliminating the historical domestic backlogs and economic disparities. The 
National Government will then meet demands to address economic disparities and 
correct the historical backlogs as quickly as possible and improve equality of 
access to services. As the scheme progresses, increasingly more emphasis should 
be placed on the per capita grant by reducing 1!  as economic disparities and the 
historical domestic backlogs diminish.   
Period Two 
At the start of period two the historical capital domestic backlog estimated in 
period one is adjusted to take account of the positive impacts of the historical 
domestic backlog grant made in period one.  Thus, the estimate of the historical 
backlog for the start of period two is  
 
 Di,2 i,1 i,1B B G= ! . (Historical Domestic Backlog) (6.10) 
 
The backlog grant for period two is now based on the estimate of each 
municipality’s domestic backlog at the start of period two, namely; 
 
i ,2
i,2
2 2 i,2
D i,2
i,2 i:B 0
i,2
B
( CP ) B 0
BG
0 B 0
>
! "
# $ % >& && &
= ' (
& &
% )& &* +
, . (Historical backlog grant)  (6.11) 
As before, the per capita economic efficiency grant is  
 
 Ei,2 i,2 2 2G CP (1 )= ! " # $  (Per capita efficiency grant)        (6.12) 
 
where 
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 i,2 i,1i,2 i,2
i,2 i,1
i
P
(0 1)
P
! "
# = $ # $
! "%
  (Share of the infrastructure grant 
pool) 
 
and the total grant to Municipality i in period two is 
 
E D
i,2 i,2 i,2G G G= + .  (Aggregate Grant)             (6.13) 
 
In calculating the share i,2!  (tau) we use the cost disparity from period one.  As 
will be seen below, this disparity is used again for the period-three estimates.  
This seems to be reasonable since it is unlikely that a disparity would change 
significantly between periods because disparity indicator data is normally 
collected in five-year intervals.  This should not, however, preclude the use of 
revised estimates in subsequent periods. 
Period Three 
For period three the scheme proceeds as before thus the following analysis 
presents only the formulae without discussion.  The backlog at the beginning of 
period three is  
  
 D Di,3 i,1 i,1 i,2B B (G G )= ! + .     (6.14) 
 
The historical domestic backlog grant for period three is  
 
i ,3
i,3
3 3 i,3
D i,3
i,3 i:B 0
i,3
B
( CP ) B 0
BG
0 B 0
>
! "
# $ % >& && &
= ' (
& &
% )& &* +
, .   (6.15) 
 
The per capita economic efficiency grant is  
 
 Ei,3 i,3 3 3G CP (1 )= ! " # $       (6.16) 
 
where, 
 i,3 i,1i,3 i,3
i,3 i,1
i
P
(0 1)
P
! "
# = $ # $
! "%
 
and the total grant to municipality i in period three is 
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E D
i,3 i,3 i,3G G G= + .              (6.17) 
 
At the end of the three periods (this could, for example, be nine years if each 
period is equal to three years corresponding with the MTEF cycle) the historical 
domestic capital backlog for municipality i is the backlog estimated in period one 
less the total of the backlog grants made during the period of the simulation of the 
grant scheme cycle, that is: 
 
T
D
i,3 i,1 i,t
t 1
B B G (T 3)
=
= ! =" .          (6.18) 
  
If at the end of the cycle of three MTEF periods (T=3) the municipalities still have 
domestic backlogs, as measured by (6.17), then the backlog part of the grant 
scheme would require a second phase.  This would be the same as the first three-
period phase, but would use, as its initial backlog estimates, the results derived 
from (6.17).  All municipalities would continue to receive the per capita grant on 
the assumption that there is still a need to raise the general level of public capital 
stock formation in the municipalities. 
 
In the analysis for the FFC provincial capital grant scheme, the cost disparities are 
allowed to affect both components of the grant scheme, namely, the per capita 
economic efficiency part and the historical domestic backlogs part.  However, in 
the simulation model in Petchey et al (2004) the authors also allowed for the 
possibility that the policy maker may wish to allow the cost disparities to affect 
only one part of the grant allocation (e.g. the per capita economic part) or have no 
influence at all (by setting all the betas equal to zero in the program). This 
technique offers maximum flexibility and can also be adopted for the municipal 
infrastructure grant model. 
 
To use the model for making equitable municipal infrastructure grant allocations 
several data inputs are required. These data inputs are identified in Chapter 4, and 
illustrated in Figure 4.4 showing a schematic representation of the simulation 
model. The actual data is presented in Chapters 5. 
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To estimate the Municipal District Standard Capital Stock as represented by 
( 1
1
K
P
) in equation (6.1) for each of the five local municipalities the model requires 
municipal level capital stock and population data inputs. As the municipal level 
capital stock data are not available they are estimated using the perpetual 
inventory method formula stiK , = 
s
ntiK !,
n)1( !" + !
"
"=
1t
nt#
1
, )1(
!!! "" #
ts
ik  presented in 
equation (4.2) in Chapter 4 and based on the following data: 
 
• Capital expenditure per local municipal service between 1997 to 2007, 
• Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) initial capital stock estimates for 
the Western Cape Province for 1997, 
• A 1997 depreciation rate for the Western Cape Province that is invariant 
across time, region and service, 
• Population data (in Chapter 5, Table 5.2) for each of the local 
municipalities between 1997 and 2007  
• Municipal capital expenditures directed at addressing the specific 
infrastructure needs (see Tables 5.8 and 5.9 in Chapter 5) 
 
In addition to population and capital stock inputs, to estimate each municipality’s 
Desired Capital Stock represented by 1 i,1 i,1
1
K P
P
! "
# # $% &
' (
in equation (6.2) the model 
also requires the composite capital cost disparity indicator values represented by 
(!i,t) for each of the municipalities. The composite capital cost disparity indicators 
are estimated from the following data sets presented in Table 5.10 in Chapter 5. 
• Population density/dispersion per square kilometer, 
• Unemployment rate, 
• Household with no income, 
• Tuberculosis (TB) per 100 000 inhabitants, 
• Percentage of HIV/Aids prevalence, 
• Percentage of persons over 14 years illiterate (with less than grade 7), 
• Housing backlog units and, 
• The normalized deprivation index  
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However, as I noted earlier capital stock data is not available at the level of the 
municipality. For this reason I use a version of the perpetual inventory method 
(PIM) (discussed in Chapter 4) to estimate the capital stock for each of the five 
local municipalities. The capital stock estimation procedures, limitations and 
results are discussed and presented in the next section of this chapter. 
  
Application of the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) in the 
CWDM  
In this section I demonstrate how the PIM was used for estimating capital stocks 
for the five CWDM local municipalities by service from 1997 to 2005 using 
actual municipal infrastructure expenditures.       
 
In Chapter 2 I presented a fuller discussion of different methods used for 
estimating capital stock from the literature. In the following sub-sections I explain 
how I applied a modified version of the perpetual inventory method developed by 
Levtchnkova and Petchey (2000) and show how municipal level public capital 
stocks were estimated for the CWDM. 
The Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) 
The PIM is the most popular technique for estimating capital stocks in developed 
and developing economies. The technique entails adding gross fixed capital 
formation to an initial estimate of the capital stock and then deducting the value of 
capital assets that have reached the end of their service lives. The SNA93 
elaborates: 
 
The perpetual inventory method requires an estimate to be made of the stock 
of fixed assets in existence and in the hands of producers. This is done by 
estimating how many of the fixed assets installed as a result of gross fixed 
capital formation undertaken in previous years have survived to the current 
period. [Para.6.189].  
 
The standard procedure is to estimate the gross capital stock by applying a 
depreciation rate to calculate the consumption of fixed capital. Thereafter, by 
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subtracting the accumulated capital consumption from gross capital stock the net 
capital stocks are obtained. An alternative procedure uses a more integrated 
approach that combines the relationship between the service output efficiency, the 
age and the declining price value of the asset. The age-efficiency profiles are 
estimated for each service life for each asset type against a discount rate in order 
to generate the net capital stock. It is assumed in this approach that the market 
price of the asset is equivalent to the rentals the asset is expected to earn under 
market conditions.  
 
Financial resource allocation mechanisms to address infrastructure investment 
needs require a reasonable estimate of infrastructure backlogs. Capital stock data 
is a critical input for measuring and forecasting infrastructure investment and, for 
estimating infrastructure deficiencies or backlogs as a function of a desired level 
of capital stock necessary for economic growth. The difference between the 
estimated level of capital stock and desired level of capital stock gives an 
indication of the level of capital backlog in the economy. For public sector 
infrastructure spending general capital stock estimates provide an important 
indicator for determining what amount of government’s contribution is required to 
enhance the desired level of capital stock in the economy. Generally accepted 
international or nationally determined best practice estimates can be used as the 
standard benchmark for the desired level of capital stock. 
 
The PIM estimation procedure requires several different categories of 
information. This includes a value of an initial or benchmark capital stock 
estimate; gross fixed capital formation for each year after the starting year; 
depreciation and average service life of the asset; information on how assets are 
written off and, rates of variations in the prices of assets. 
 
Recall from Chapter 2 that the Levtchnkova and Petchey (200) version of the 
perpetual inventory method was developed for estimating capital stock data for 
National, State and Local components of the General Government in Australia for 
the period 1962 to 1999 for a service or function provided. The version of the 
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PIM technique used in this thesis is presented in Chapter 4 and begins with an 
initial estimated capital stock at some point in time. Thereafter the formula creates 
subsequent stock estimates using data on capital expenditure and depreciation.  
Some Capital Stock Data Issues   
For estimating capital stock inputs in the simulation exercise provincial capital 
stock and infrastructure backlogs data for education, health, housing, water, 
sanitation and access roads were sourced from official reports published by the 
South African Reserve Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, StatSA, 
National Treasury and the Western Cape Provincial Treasury and the Department 
of Local Government and Housing. For calculating the capital stocks for the 
Western Cape Municipal districts capital expenditure data for the municipal 
infrastructure grants was sourced from the Western Cape Department of Local 
Government and Housing.   
 
Other official national and provincial sources of data disaggregated to various 
sub-regional levels include the Trends in Intergovernmental Finances published 
annually by National Treasury. Aggregated national capital stock data are 
regularly published in the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Quarterly 
Reports. Public expenditure and infrastructure backlogs data are found in Annual 
Budget Reviews and other reports from National and Provincial Treasuries and 
government service departments.            
 
To estimate municipal capital stocks within a province an initial provincially 
aggregated capital stock estimate for a given year is required. In South Africa, 
unfortunately, the South African Reserve Bank only publishes aggregated national 
capital stock data. This data is not disaggregated to provincial or local government 
level. For this reason the first step in estimating local government capital stock is 
to estimate the provincial capital stock for a particular service. Fortunately, such 
an exercise was carried out for a Financial and Fiscal Commission modeling 
project in 2007 by Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, Mabugu and Kallis (Unpublished 
research report available). I use the FFC initial capital stock estimate for the 
Western Cape to demonstrate how capital stock estimates may be calculated for 
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municipalities in the Cape Winelands District. The estimation procedure follows a 
step-by-step iterative process.   
 
Based on the Western Cape Province initial capital stock estimated by the FFC 
and, using the PIM equations presented in Chapter 4 in an Excel Simulation 
Model spreadsheet format, I estimated the capital stocks for the municipal 
districts in the Western Cape.   
The First Iteration: calculating the capital stock data for the Western 
Cape Province 
The Reserve Bank’s capital stock values for 2004 were used in the FFC exercise. 
These values were then aggregated into provincial capital stocks and given in 
2000 nominal prices. The capital stocks were then split into province and service 
specific components. 
 
To split the provincial capital stocks into individual provinces actual capital 
payments data from Table A7 of Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review 
(Natianal Treasury 2001/02 – 2007/08) was used. This data arranges payments 
according to Province and Service. The spending flow data was used to construct 
individual provincial weights and then they were disaggregated into capital 
stocks. The provincial capital stock series derived from this exercise are presented 
in the following Table 6.1. The actual calculations are presented in an Excel 
spreadsheet format in the Appendix section of this thesis.   
 
Table 6.1: Estimated Provincial Capital Stocks, Rand (Millions, 2000)  
 2002 2003 2004 
SOUTH AFRICA 108621 108476 110037 
Eastern Cape  10721.31929 17621.9007 16619.8259 
Free State  6142.170336 5899.94394 5403.45399 
Gauteng  22738.70125 20489.7552 19973.6938 
Kwa Zulu Natal  27852.65059 26127.8788 25554.0193 
Limpopo  8709.796385 9720.38516 13048.383 
Mpumalanga  9070.382147 8083.11935 8165.79339 
Northern Cape  3447.420995 2525.67224 2312.42118 
North West  8010.575586 7171.28342 7323.02696 
Western Cape  11927.98342 10836.0613 11636.3825 
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To disaggregate the data in Table 6.1 further by service, data from the Provincial 
Budgets and Expenditure Review (National Treasury, 2001/02 – 2007/08, Table 
A7) were used to sort payment flows by service and province. Based on these data 
service and province specific weights were constructed to arrive at service 
specific provincial capital stocks in 2000 prices. The provincial service specific 
capital stock series derived from this exercise are presented in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Estimated Provincial Capital Stocks by Service, Rand (Millions, 2000)  
Province Service 2002 2003 2004 
Education 1501.52 1388.071 2821.388 
Health 1251.222 4994.373 4498.621 
Housing 49.16621 76.40853 55.51919 
Roads and Transport 6716.003 8873.32 7836.073 
Eastern Cape 
  
  
  
  Other 1203.408 2289.727 1408.226 
Education 1748.595 1707.16 1247.264 
Health 632.3505 1344.937 1650.397 
Housing 0 33.01618 26.42633 
Roads and Transport 3214.599 2041.426 1660.33 
Free State 
  
  
  
  Other 546.6253 773.4048 819.0364 
Education 4323.549 5871.504 7161.637 
Health 7088.884 5746.21 4325.126 
Housing 91.49975 56.90868 46.63329 
Roads and Transport 8860.98 7313.514 7344.52 
Gauteng 
  
  
  
  Other 2373.789 1501.619 1095.778 
Education 5619.664 6176.21 5574.063 
Health 7641.529 5922.982 6267.042 
Housing 68.30814 44.4549 56.98932 
Roads and Transport 11466.76 11782.41 11727.76 
Kwa Zulu 
Natal 
  
  
  
  Other 3056.386 2201.823 1928.165 
Education 2675.146 3522.37 4596.879 
Health 4059.482 3697.874 4212.667 
Housing 482.0651 585.2922 622.0286 
Roads and Transport 216.4252 246.8467 230.7204 
Limpopo 
  
  
  
  Other 1276.679 1668.003 3386.087 
Education 1606.517 2459.147 1769.59 
Health 1619.642 1519.765 1815.713 
Housing 128.42 297.4365 424.4008 
Roads and Transport 4365.559 2966.208 3487.217 
Mpumalanga 
  
  
  
  Other 1350.243 840.5621 668.8725 
Education 223.4554 454.1565 253.7131 Northern 
Cape Health 529.1825 484.1067 723.924 
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Housing 343.5078 93.15999 14.36752 
Roads and Transport 2135.528 1277.54 1130.223 
  
  
  
  Other 215.7472 216.7095 190.1935 
Education 1714.123 1646.253 1996.983 
Health 2626.792 1719.693 1770.945 
Housing 611.4277 226.5751 193.551 
Roads and Transport 2264.403 2715.328 2298.593 
North West 
  
  
  
  Other 793.8308 863.4336 1062.954 
Western Cape Education 1481.912 1538.247 1882.791 
Health 2010.431 2286.489 3334.313 
Housing 24.46203 18.29483 27.86427 
Roads and Transport 6239.91 5668.525 5304.376 
  
  
  
  Other 2171.267 1324.505 1087.038 
South Africa ALL SERVICES 108621 108476 110037 
 
The second iteration: capital stocks for the WCDM by service: 1997-2007 
In this illustrative exercise capital stocks for Western Cape district municipalities 
are calculated according to services provided in separate excel spreadsheets in the 
Simulation Model. The spreadsheets contain the formulae from Chapter 4 and use 
municipal infrastructure grant (MIG) expenditure data provided by the Western 
Cape Department of Local Government and Housing. The MIG expenditures are 
not the total capital expenditures made by the local municipalities. MIG represents 
only a proportion of all the capital expenditures.  
Capital stock and infrastructure expenditures 
The Excel Simulation Model estimates the value of capital stock within each local 
Western Cape Province district municipality per infrastructure related service.  In 
order to do this the formula behind the model requires an identification of all 
funding directed to the district municipality that addresses the specific 
infrastructure need. However in the South African context, simply identifying the 
sources of funding is a problem on its own. Infrastructure funding is directed in 
many forms. In some cases it is difficult to identify the purpose of the related 
funding.  In South Africa all municipal governments receive conditional and 
unconditional funding from national and provincial government sources.  
 
The conditional funding is directed via the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) 
and before 2002, via the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme 
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(CMIP) and the Provincial Infrastructure Grant (PIG).  The PIG allocates funds 
directed via the provincial departments for funding local government projects 
within the district municipality. 
 
The unconditional funding is sourced via the Provincial Equitable Share (PES) 
and the Local Government Equitable Share. With unconditional funding, the 
relevant sphere of government may apply its discretion in distributing these funds 
to infrastructure related projects if it is deemed necessary. Including this funding 
stream into the model would require a complete analysis of every programme 
within each provincial and municipal department identifying the specific funds 
aimed at Capital Expenditure. At the provincial level such information is hard to 
get because of poor reporting and expenditure monitoring systems that do not 
clearly identify whether each sub-programme is a capital or current (or 
operational) expenditure item.  
 
For illustrative purposes in this model, only the MIG, CMIP and other clearly 
identified infrastructure projects in the Western Cape Province were included in 
the model. The Excel Simulation Model spreadsheet used for this model has left 
placeholders (cells) that would support future incorporation of other sources of 
funding (e.g. the local government equitable share, etc). In the Simulation Model I 
separate the infrastructure expenditure data into two distinct sets. The first is the 
MIG/CMIP set and the second is called Global Capital Expenditure and includes 
the MIG/CMIP expenditures as well. The reason for this separation is to compare 
the results between the two sets of capital expenditure data. 
Population: Western Cape Metropolitan and District Municipalities  
The weighting formula requires population input data for the WC district 
municipalities. The most reliable population data available can be retrieved from 
the South African Census 2001 (Statistics South Africa, 2001). The Census 2001 
data for the WC District Municipalities is captured in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3: Population: Cape Metropolitan & District Municipalities 
Metropolitan & Municipal Districts Population 
City of Cape Town 5456328 
Cape Winelands 1192559 
Central Karoo 116569 
Overberg 362113 
Eden 835649 
West Coast 517202 
Western Cape 8480803 
Source: Statistics South Africa; Census, 2001 
 
The initial provincial capital stock data for the Western Cape is sourced from the 
first iteration of this exercise and is listed and highlighted in Table 6.4 below.  
Table 6.4: Initial Capital Stock Value for the Western Cape 
 R’ (000) 2002 2003 2004 
SOUTH AFRICA 108,621.00 108,476.00 110,037.00 
Eastern Cape 10,721.32 17,621.90 16,619.83 
Free State 6,142.17 5,899.94 5,403.45 
Gauteng 22,738.70 20,489.76 19,973.69 
Kwa Zulu Natal 27,852.65 26,127.88 25,554.02 
Limpopo 8,709.80 9,720.39 13,048.38 
Mpumalanga 9,070.38 8,083.12 8,165.79 
Northern Cape 3,447.42 2,525.67 2,312.42 
North West 8,010.58 7,171.28 7,323.03 
Western Cape 11,927.98 10,836.06 11,636.38 
Source: Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, Mabugu & Kallis, 2007, Financial & Fiscal Commission (FFC). 
 
The chosen value of R11 636 million is based on the FFC 2007 estimation of WC 
Capital Stock.  
The depreciation rate 
The chosen time, region and service invariant depreciation rate is 0.05. This is an 
average rate that is very often used in municipal accounting in South Africa.   
 
Selection and Classification of Actual Infrastructure Project Expenditure  
As depicted in the tables in the Appendix the CMIP/MIG Projects within the 
Western Cape have been classified against the identified key infrastructure service 
areas. Various assumptions had to be made based on the name and intention of the 
particular project.  
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In Roads and Transport, access roads and storm water systems were included; in 
Sanitation, bucket system eradication, sewers and oxidation ponds were 
aggregated together; in Water, reservoirs, dams and pipelines were grouped 
together; and in electricity street lighting and distributors were grouped.  
 
However there are various projects that are infrastructure related but do not fall 
within the above classification system. These projects have been assigned to 
either the “Other” or “Unknown” category.  For the purposes of this exercise, this 
funding has not been incorporated. 
 
To estimate the capital stock value for the Cape Winelands District I started with 
the Western Cape Province’s capital stock estimate of R11, 636, 380 for 1997 (see 
Table 6.4 above) as the initial capital stock for all the municipal districts in the 
Province. Based on the name, project objectives and location of the CMIP and 
MIG projects I was able to classify the project spending across all district 
municipalities in the Western Cape Province according to local municipality and 
infrastructure service. I thereafter used the district municipality project spending 
data to build a PIM model for each district per service.  
 
Using equation (4.4) 
,
t
s
i
s i t n
i
w
w
n
!
= "=
#
 I calculated the average weighting per district 
municipality and per service where n is the number of periods (years) from the 
initial period, 1997 to 2007. These calculations are in the Excel Simulation Model 
spreadsheets for PIM. The services utilized in the exercise were grouped into the 
following categories: electricity, water, sanitation roads and transport and other. 
Based on this calculation the Cape Winelands initial stock value is reflected in 
Table 6.5 on the next page. 
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Table 6.5: CWDM Initial Capital Stock Estimate Value per Service for 1997 
Service Capital Stock Value (R million) 
Electricity 468,709.38 
Water   481,403.80 
Sanitation   211,636.73 
Roads and Transport  174,913.25 
Cape Winelands Total Capital Stock 1,336,663.16 
(Source: Estimated using Initial Western Cape Capital Stock in Table 6.4) 
Data Requirements for Simulating Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant Allocations  
Recall that the Cape Winelands District Municipality includes the Breede River, 
Breede Valley, Drakenstein, Stellenbosch and Witzenberg local municipalities. 
From Chapter 5, Tables 5.3 to 5.7 we have an official indication of the level of 
sanitation backlogs and the funding required to eradicate the backlogs in the five 
municipalities. Recall also that using the PIM methodology described above, in 
Tables 5.8 and 5.9  (Chapter 5), I presented the estimated sanitation capital stock 
values and capital spending estimates for MIG and CMIP sanitation projects for 
the municipalities. These estimates were based on MIG and CMIP data from 1997 
to 2006. Tables 5.3 to 5.7 present a disaggregated picture of the current levels of 
backlogs and disparity in the provision of sanitation services within and among 
the local municipalities. On the other hand Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present an 
aggregated estimate of sanitation capital stock values and capital spending using 
the PIM methodology. These estimates will help calculate the future aggregated 
equitable infrastructure grant allocations for each municipality using the proposed 
municipal infrastructure grant model.       
Data requirements  
To conduct simulations for the five local municipalities using the infrastructure 
grant model in an Excel Simulation Model programme the capital stock and 
disparity data sets from Chapter 5 are used as inputs. These data sets are listed 
below.  
Capital stock data inputs 
• Complete expenditure history of funds dedicated to all infrastructure 
projects and activities for each local municipality. 
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• Sum of funding on CMIP and MIG projects in entire district 
municipality of the Cape Winelands. 
• Population count of each local in 1996, 2001 and 2007 as per Census 
1996 and 2001 and the Community Survey of 2007. 
• Mid Year Population Estimates for the Western Cape Province for 
1997 to 2006 from Statistics South Africa. 
• An initial capital stock estimate for the Cape Winelands.  
Disparity indicator data inputs 
• A population density indicator for each local municipality. 
• An unemployment percentage rate indicator for each local 
municipality. 
• An indicator of the percentage of households with no income for each 
local municipality. 
• An indicator for TB Prevalence per 100000 people for each local 
municipality. 
• An indicator for HIV prevalance for each local municipality. 
• An indicator for the percentage of illiterate people over 14 years for 
each local municipality. 
• A housing backlogs indicator for each local municipality. 
• A normalized Deprivation Index for each local municipality. 
Activating the Excel Simulation Model 
In this section, I will explain how the infrastructure grant model can simulate 
estimates for equitable grant allocations for sanitation services for the five Cape 
Winelands local municipalities. In this example the following outputs are 
calculated and generated by the Excel simulation model: 
• The capital stock estimate for the municipal service/s for each local 
municipality from 1997 to 2015 using the PIM. 
• The desired capital stock estimate for the municipal service/s for each 
local municipality from 1997 to 2015 using the PIM. 
• The calculated capital stock backlogs for municipal service/s for each 
local municipality from 1997 to 2015. 
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• The desired capital stock per capita for the five combined Cape 
Winelands local municipalities from 1997 to 2015. 
• The calculated composite capital cost disparity index for each local 
municipality. 
• The estimated domestic grant allocation for each local municipality for 
2007 to 2015. 
• The estimated per capita economic grant allocation for each local 
municipality for 2007 to 2015. 
• The total infrastructures grant allocation for each local municipality for 
2007 to 2015. 
 
Step 1: Producing the required population data series input 
As noted earlier (see Chapter 4 and 5) a consistent set of population data per local 
municipality is not available for the required period. I therefore make some 
assumptions in order to produce a consistent population dataset.  
 
The data that is available includes Western Cape midyear estimates for 1996 – 
2007 and local municipality population for the five municipalities for 1996, 2001 
and 2007. This means therefore that data per local municipality for the missing 
years are required. I calculate this as follows. 
 
First, I derive the share of Cape Winelands population data from the Western 
Cape provincial population data for 2001. Secondly, I use the Cape Winelands 
share of the population data to produce a time series population data set from 
1996 to 2001 for the Cape Winelands by dividing the Western Cape province data 
set total by the share calculated for the Cape Winelands District. Thirdly, using 
the Cape Winelands population data for 1996 to 2001 I can then calculate the 
missing-year population data values for each local municipality by dividing the 
Cape Winelands population by the 2001 ratio for each local municipality. 
Similarly, using the 2007 totals from Statistics South Africa, I am able to calculate 
the population data for 2002 to 2007.  
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In my example the simulation model is expected to generate allocations for three 
medium term expenditure programme budgets (three years per budget) from 2008 
to 2015. I therefore also require a projected population data set for the future 
period of 2008 to 2015.  This projection is based on the average growth rate 
experienced from 1996 to 2007. Using the average growth rate, the local 
municipality population data for 2008 is the local municipality population data for 
2007 multiplied by the average growth rate. 
Step 2: Estimating the disparity index for each local municipality 
The Excel simulation model estimates the composite disparity indicator from an 
average of all the eight disparity measures multiplied by the beta weight for each 
indicator as follows. Firstly, the model calculates the difference of the disparity 
measure over the average value of the disparity and then calculates the average 
differences for each disparity. Secondly, the betas ("i,t,j) are applied to the 
difference of the disparity value. Thirdly, the spreadsheet model calculates the 
disparity index  (!i) from equation 4.6 in Chapter 4. Finally, the simulation model 
calculates the disparity indicator for each local municipality according to the 
Excel formula derived from equation 4.7 in Chapter 4.  
 
Using the estimated values it is now possible to attach the disparity weights to the 
capital backlogs per service for periods 1, 2 and 3. By adjusting the beta (") 
values and the input depreciation I can adjust the outcome of how to reduce the 
backlogs progressively over time according to the importance of the disparity. In 
order to prioritize the progressive reduction of capital backlogs it will probably be 
best to determine and rank the set of disparities that relate to a set of infrastructure 
services.  
 
In this illustrative example I run simulations using the Excel model for basic 
services and the funding of related infrastructure. In Chapter 5 I identified eight 
disparities and all of them are used in the illustrative simulations. The disparity 
indicator input data are presented in Table 6.5 below.  
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Table 6.6: Disparity Indicator Input Data for Excel Simulation Model  
Disparity 
Indicators 
Breede 
River 
Breede 
Valley 
Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
1. Population 
Density 
(Dispersion 
p/km!) 
27.783 51.059 126.288 140.32 30.771 
2. Percentage 
Unemploymen
t Rate 
12.2 19.7 22.8 17.1 14.6 
3. Income 
Inequality as a 
Percentage of 
households 
with no income 
10.59 8.96 10.47 19.95 8.21 
4. TB 
prevalence per 
100 000 
1188 1621 1196 890 358 
5. Percentage 
of HIV/AIDS 
prevalence 
(2005) in 
Population 
3.2 3.7 5.4 4 4.2 
6.Iliteracy: 
Percentage of 
poulation over 
14 illiterate 
(less than 
grade 7) 
38 14 23 20 35 
7. Housing 
backlogs units 
(2004) 
4300 11876 11000 10500 3000 
8. Deprivation 
Index 
(normalized)  
1.882 1.937 1.954 1.908 1.906 
 
 
As in the FFC Capital Grant Scheme Model, developed by Petchey, et al (2004), 
all or some of the disparities can be switched off by the user by setting the 
associated beta value equal to zero.  Setting a zero value for a beta will exclude its 
influence completely, whilst a low value (between 0 and 1) would reduce its 
overall influence. If all the betas are set equal to zero then the effect of the 
disparities are taken out of the simulations. The Excel simulation model also 
creates the possibility of including more disparities within the separate 
spreadsheet sub-programme without affecting the main programme that includes 
the formulae. However, the strength of the influence of the betas can only be 
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determined over time with extended testing and revisions and, the exclusion of old 
and, inclusion of new disparities.  
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 7) of this thesis, in addition to presenting the findings 
of the research, I will also show how the Excel simulation model uses the 
population data to generate for each disparity indicator (X) its percentage mean 
deviation from the mean value (D) and the resultant composite disparity index (!i) 
for each municipality and its shares ($i,t) of the grant pool for each period. 
Step 3: Generating PIM estimates for capital stock for each local 
municipality 
The PIM Excel spreadsheet simulation model uses equation (4.2) in Chapter 4 to 
calculate stock values for each local municipality for each year from 1997 to 
2007. 
 
The Excel Simulation Model spreadsheet formula is derived from the two separate 
terms of equation (4.2) where, stiK , , the capital stock, is equal to term one 
s
ntiK !,
n)1( !"  plus term two !
"
"=
1t
nt#
1
, )1(
!!! "" #
ts
ik . Term one is the previous stock 
value reduced by the invariant depreciation rate to the power of the nth period. 
Term two is the sum of all infrastructure expenditure in the year reduced by the 
depreciation rate to the power of the number of years. 
 
In the Excel Simulation Model spreadsheet the initial capital stock value is based 
on a different formula derived respectively from equations (4.3); (4.4) and (4.6) in 
Chapter 4. This initial capital stock value is estimated as the average weight, 
multiplied by the initial capital stock value of the Western Cape Province (derived 
from the Financial and Fiscal Commission estimates mentioned in Chapter 5) and 
not of the Cape Winelands District as a whole as this data are not available. The 
average weight is calculated as the average of the sum of weights which are 
individually estimated from the expenditure of a local municipality divided by the 
expenditure of the Cape Winelands District for a particular period and, multiplied 
by the ratio of the population of the local municipality, divided by the population 
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of the Cape Winelands as a whole for 2001 only. This was a major shortcoming 
of the PIM application in the model as consistency between the population and the 
expenditure for the period could not be established with certainty.  
Step 4: Determining the Capital Stock Value for Period One 
Period one is the 3-year medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) of the 
three years following 2006. 2006 was the last year of expenditure data that was 
available from the CMIP/MIG dataset. Therefore period one includes 2007, 2008 
and 2009. 
 
Estimating the capital stock value for period one required population data for the 
same period as well the assumed spending for the period, i.e. the budgeted values 
that was collected from the infrastructure pool of funds available for each year for 
the particular period. The pool of funds used was the MTEF infrastructure budget 
(See Chapters 4  for an explanation of the determination of the pool of funds). 
 
The population for 2007 is based on the 2007 community survey data whilst the 
population for 2008 and 2009 is a projection estimated according to the 
methodology discussed above. Feeding these values (population and pool of funds 
data) into the Excel Simulation Model PIM spreadsheet, I was able to estimate a 
capital stock value for Period One. 
Step 5: Determining Capital Stock Values for Period Two 
Period two is the 3-year MTEF following period one. Therefore period two 
includes 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
Calculating the capital stock value for period two again required population for 
the same years as well the assumed infrastructure spending for the period. As this 
period is well in the future, the MTEF budgeted values would not be available. Of 
course the functionality of the model would be improved if the infrastructure 
budget values for period two and period three were released by national 
government. As this population and expenditure data is not available, it must 
therefore be estimated. The population for 2010, 2011 and 2012 was a projected 
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estimate calculated in Step 1. Feeding these values (population and pool of funds) 
into the PIM model, I estimated a projected capital stock value for period two. 
Step 6: Determining Capital Stock Values for Period Three 
Period three is the 3-year MTEF following period two. Therefore period three 
includes 2013, 2014 and 2015.  
 
Estimating the capital stock value for period three again required population data 
as well the estimated spending for the period. The population for 2013, 2014 and 
2015 was the same projected estimate calculated in Step 1. Feeding these values 
(population and pool of funds) into the PIM Excel model, I estimated a projected 
capital stock value for period three. 
 
Step 7: Estimating the Standard Desired Capital Stock Levels 
The purpose of estimating the standard desired capital stock is discussed in 
Chapter 4 and illustrated in Figure 4.2. The figure shows that for a comparatively 
poor municipality, the actual capital stock is depicted below the standard. In the 
preceding period the municipality has a capital backlog defined as the difference 
between the standard and actual capital stock at a point in time. Therefore, 
municipalities that lie above the standard norm (i.e.; they have more than the 
nationally determined standard norm for the particular service), will have a capital 
stock surplus or no backlog. 
 
In my illustrative simulation exercise the key question is, with a limited amount of 
infrastructure funds, how does government raise the level of net allocations and 
spending for the poor municipality so that its actual capital stock equals the 
standard desired capital stock at some future period. Achieving this goal can only 
take place over several medium term budget expenditure programmes through the 
progressive elimination of municipal service infrastructure backlogs and the 
consequent creation of new capital stock. Thus the  Excel Simulation Model 
provides an objective mechanism to equitably allocate additional resources from a 
limited grant pool to municipalities for a chosen period of time to enable them to 
transform their capital stocks from the actual starting point toward the desired 
 
 
 
 
  224 
standard. As I noted in Chapter 4 the particular path taken is called the “transition 
path”. 
 
In the Excel Simulation Model the desired sanitation service capital stock levels 
were calculated for the period taking account of the data inputs available for 
infrastructure expenditure, population, the PIM estimated capital stock and, the 
given medium term budget pool of funds data. 
 
The standard desired capital stock per capita was calculated in the simulation 
model as the total capital stock generated by the PIM for each local municipality 
divided by the total population of the Cape Winelands for each year. In turn the 
desired capital stock for each local municipality was calculated as the capital 
stock value for the local municipality multiplied by the per capita desired stock 
and, further multiplied by the calculated composite disparity index for each local 
municipality. 
 
It should be noted that the composite disparity index is not dynamic – i.e. the 
formula used a static view of the disparity measure based on indicators at a 
specific point in time. However, as the disparity indicator data are collected 
periodically (every five to ten year intervals respectively) during national census 
or during household surveys it is reasonable to assume that the disparity indicator 
values will remain valid over the chosen period.   
 
Step 9: Estimating the Capital Backlog Levels 
Backlogs were calculated in the simulation model as the difference between the 
actual capital stock value (calculated by the PIM formulae) and the standard 
desired capital stock values. When backlogs were estimated and produced 
negative values – i.e. the model believes no backlog exist, I substituted the 
backlog value with a value of (0.1) to enable the division by zero errors. The zero 
errors occur because of inconsistencies in the datasets and the assumptions used in 
calculating the capital stock values. 
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Description and Location of the calculations in the Excel Simulation Model  
The Excel Simulation Model is located in a separate Excel file folder called 
Simulation Model with Scenarios Municipal Infrastructure Grants MJJPhD 2010 
in a compact disc attached to a copy of the thesis. The Simulation Model folder is 
divided into six separate Excel files. The first Excel file runs a model simulation 
in which the capital cost disparity indices are excluded because the beta (") values 
are all set to zero. The file is labeled Scenario 0 - Simulation - MunCAPEX 
(REVIEW 20100817).xls. The second, third and fourth files run simulation 
scenarios 1, 2, and 3 and, are discussed in Chapter 7. The files are labeled 
Scenario 1 - Simulation - MunCAPEX (REVIEW 20100817).xls; Scenario 2 - 
Simulation - MunCAPEX (REVIEW 20100817).xls and, Scenario 3 - Simulation - 
MunCAPEX (REVIEW 20100817).xls respectively. The fifth Excel file is labeled 
Scenario Comparisons Simulations 20100817.xls, and captures the results of all 
the scenarios in tables that facilitates comparisons on which my findings for the 
evaluation of the model are based. The sixth spreadsheet is labeled Scenario 
Comparisons with total allocations in Tab 7.15. 20110126.xls and, calculates the 
total allocations (historical backlog grant and per capita economic grant) for each 
municipality over the period. Each of the Excel files contains spreadsheet Tabs for 
estimating the capital stock data inputs. The Tabs are labeled Capital Stock PIM; 
PIM Calculation for each local municipality and, Capital Expenditure Flows.   
 
Estimates for Capital Spending and Capital Stock in the Cape Winelands 
District  
Following the process described above the simulation model firstly generated the 
capital stock estimates for electricity, water, roads and transport, and sanitation 
services in millions of Rand for the Cape Winelands District as a whole for the 
period 1997 to 2007. These estimates are presented in Table 6.7. The estimates 
calculated for the other four Districts (Central Karoo, Overberg, Eden and West 
Coast) are presented in the Appendix. Calculating the estimates for the Cape 
Town Metropolitan local municipality was not undertaken because I assumed that 
metropolitan municipalities raise much of their capital expenditures from own 
revenues or borrowing whereas the majority of the local municipalities depend 
largely on transfers from National and Provincial governments.  
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Secondly, the model generated the capital stock estimates for the five local 
municipalities (Breede River, Breede Valley, Drakenstein, Stellenbosch and 
Witzenberg) in the Winelands District. As I noted in Chapter 5 the illustrative 
capital stock estimates are based on CMIP, MIG and other infrastructure project 
spending data kindly provided by the Western Cape Province, Department of 
Provincial, Local Government and Housing during the process of interviews 
conducted in 2009. The calculated capital stock estimates for the five 
municipalities are presented in Tables 6.8 to 6.12. Based on these estimates the 
simulation model was able to calculate the capital backlogs and the desired level 
of capital stock for the five local municipalities.  
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Table 6.7: Cape Winelands Total Estimated Capital Spending and Capital Stock for Electricity, Water, Roads and Transport and Sanitation from 1997 to 
2006 using CMIP and MIG Project Expenditures from Western Cape Department of Provincial, Local Government & Housing.   
  Electricity Water 
Year Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 468,709.38 R 0.00 R 481,403.80 R 1,421,793.00 
1998 R 445,273.91 R 2,642,573.00 R 1,879,126.61 R 2,840,237.00 
1999 R 3,044,432.71 R 3,355,948.00 R 5,886,852.12 R 12,873,262.34 
2000 R 8,476,612.84 R 618,200.00 R 21,901,895.51 R 7,781,207.45 
2001 R 13,095,526.87 R 2,647,165.00 R 41,632,361.12 R 3,494,859.44 
2002 R 18,661,943.15 R 18,661,943.15 R 58,312,660.68 R 1,606,504.00 
2003 R 23,610,901.47 R 1,316,949.00 R 69,265,084.58 R 5,452,962.00 
2004 R 27,203,347.56 R 2,544,674.21 R 78,903,278.45 R 7,766,539.41 
2005 R 30,771,156.53 R 4,029,262.57 R 89,118,828.67 R 9,340,128.37 
2006 R 35,510,470.77 R 1,776,643.03 R 100,441,360.10 R 3,852,296.99 
2007 R 38,349,192.76   R 106,050,806.90   
 Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 174,913.25 R 0.00 R 211,636.73 R 0.00 
1998 R 166,167.59 R 3,671,543.00 R 201,054.89 R 3,031,606.00 
1999 R 3,821,509.25 R 7,071,371.00 R 3,213,058.04 R 4,260,593.32 
2000 R 13,835,803.34 R 2,699,943.00 R 9,895,414.66 R 4,205,504.00 
2001 R 24,000,661.30 R 1,317,643.76 R 19,048,969.15 R 2,166,331.79 
2002 R 31,983,645.32 R 4,432,651.00 R 27,345,698.46 R 2,920,176.00 
2003 R 40,685,340.87 R 5,791,484.00 R 34,997,447.98 R 3,780,609.00 
2004 R 50,519,276.37 R 1,475,319.29 R 42,371,686.64 R 8,941,549.66 
2005 R 55,992,665.57 R 4,408,705.04 R 54,086,872.57 R 10,638,881.35 
2006 R 61,051,337.64 R 800,000.00 R 69,404,899.30 R 7,687,045.46 
2007 R 61,827,584.59   R 82,793,168.24   
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Table 6.8: Breede River - Total Estimated Capital Spending and Capital Stock for Electricity, Water, Roads and Transport and Sanitation from 1997 to 2006 
  Electricity Water Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 419.02 R 0.00 R 34,220.07 R 0.00 R 2,712.26 R 0.00 R 39,296.12 R 0.00 
1998 R 398.07 R 60,000.00 R 32,509.07 R 100,118.00 R 2,576.64 R 161,133.00 R 37,331.31 R 0.00 
1999 R 60,359.26 R 0.00 R 129,457.43 R 4,437,609.16 R 163,458.42 R 138,867.00 R 33,691.51 R 378,348.00 
2000 R 108,750.52 R 0.00 R 4,643,714.83 R 1,675,154.00 R 432,088.51 R 0.00 R 407,234.26 R 840,000.00 
2001 R 142,727.98 R 0.00 R 9,763,573.95 R 70,875.00 R 629,284.98 R 0.00 R 1,531,125.45 R 1,709,199.79 
2002 R 161,882.69 R 0.00 R 13,307,919.64 R 250,000.00 R 750,407.59 R 385,000.00 R 4,033,414.54 R 987,446.00 
2003 R 167,869.03 R 0.00 R 15,497,943.43 R 2,287,080.00 R 1,186,923.47 R 0.00 R 6,658,602.24 R 554.00 
2004 R 163,656.06 R 0.00 R 18,539,501.56 R 1,431,920.00 R 1,432,412.61 R 0.00 R 8,159,492.60 R 1,465,577.89 
2005 R 152,678.29 R 0.00 R 21,062,278.28 R 1,189,999.95 R 1,523,654.49 R 0.00 R 10,212,817.20 R 2,360,643.02 
2006 R 138,125.64 R 0.00 R 22,789,142.86 R 1,422,839.37 R 1,504,976.91 R 0.00 R 13,356,925.97 R 2,800,304.13 
Source: Infrastructure Expenditure Data: Western Cape Department of Provincial, Local Government & Housing CMIP & MIG Status Report, 27 October 2006 
 
Table 6.9: Breede Valley - Total Estimated Capital Spending and Capital Stock for Electricity, Water, Roads and Transport and Sanitation from 1997 to 
2006 
 Electricity Water Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 76,721.96 R 0.00 R 104,816.26 R 0.00 R 99,967.92 R 0.00 R 57,976.94 R 0.00 
1998 R 72,885.86 R 1,885,521.00 R 99,575.45 R 1,651,912.00 R 94,969.52 R 1,741,775.00 R 55,078.09 R 364,558.00 
1999 R 1,951,300.49 R 1,583,000.00 R 1,741,778.84 R 1,850,748.00 R 1,827,485.00 R 1,992,949.00 R 414,265.98 R 1,508,968.32 
2000 R 5,047,241.21 R 500,000.00 R 4,913,422.03 R 1,352,976.45 R 5,214,475.20 R 930,483.00 R 2,210,479.71 R 508,199.00 
2001 R 7,816,542.21 R 555,000.00 R 8,604,050.58 R 1,600,000.00 R 8,642,959.13 R 497,992.56 R 4,071,182.04 R 0.00 
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2002 R 10,123,547.43 R 0.00 R 12,629,586.08 R 598,656.00 R 11,361,699.24 R 592,173.00 R 5,307,398.93 R 1,028,869.00 
2003 R 11,313,230.88 R 0.00 R 15,555,901.27 R 875,410.00 R 13,384,311.09 R 1,737,827.00 R 6,979,630.99 R 749,131.00 
2004 R 11,578,369.67 R 0.00 R 17,697,071.24 R 4,495,938.95 R 15,865,387.82 R 0.00 R 8,547,562.46 R 2,415,482.16 
2005 R 11,175,349.67 R 0.00 R 22,728,652.54 R 4,540,385.09 R 16,718,115.43 R 0.00 R 11,575,864.27 R 1,654,334.37 
2006 R 10,362,579.07 R 0.00 R 29,303,756.14 R 386,791.47 R 16,419,640.73 R 800,000.00 R 14,559,990.85 R 800,000.00 
 Source: Infrastructure Expenditure Data: Western Cape Department of Provincial, Local Government & Housing CMIP & MIG Status Report, 27 October 2006 
Table 6.10: Drakenstein - Total Estimated Capital Spending and Capital Stock for Electricity, Water, Roads and Transport and Sanitation from 1997 to 2006 
 Electricity Water Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 110,983.85 R 0.00 R 140,268.75 R 1,421,793.00 R 119,131.44 R 0.00 R 148,854.74 R 0.00 
1998 R 105,434.66 R 0.00 R 1,555,048.31 R 558,207.00 R 113,174.87 R 0.00 R 141,412.00 R 464,085.00 
1999 R 95,154.78 R 0.00 R 3,312,341.45 R 1,701,075.00 R 102,140.32 R 3,840,000.00 R 591,709.33 R 2,106,650.00 
2000 R 81,583.33 R 0.00 R 6,354,458.58 R 2,604,307.00 R 3,927,572.56 R 0.00 R 3,054,847.54 R 1,363,896.00 
2001 R 66,450.13 R 816,691.00 R 11,118,866.07 R 456,176.00 R 6,847,032.40 R 573,800.00 R 6,272,242.63 R 391,332.00 
2002 R 868,108.84 R 1,511,909.00 R 14,705,706.46 R 282,025.00 R 9,337,503.15 R 1,286,860.00 R 8,839,521.48 R 265,861.00 
2003 R 2,925,905.22 R 443,837.00 R 16,889,103.42 R 685,153.00 R 11,988,212.84 R 1,021,972.00 R 10,550,592.27 R 2,844,040.00 
2004 R 4,660,482.92 R 336,163.00 R 18,254,548.78 R 1,258,754.76 R 14,261,863.64 R 610,259.25 R 14,062,007.21 R 3,471,677.69 
2005 R 5,914,376.06 R 1,198,337.00 R 19,506,440.45 R 2,787,743.33 R 15,667,416.10 R 3,157,264.70 R 19,160,128.95 R 4,181,253.26 
2006 R 7,607,259.66 R 809,176.89 R 22,107,865.74 R 1,715,866.15 R 18,927,158.61 R 0.00 R 25,596,463.98 R 3,128,679.46 
Source: Infrastructure Expenditure Data: Western Cape Department of Provincial, Local Government & Housing CMIP & MIG Status Report, 27 October 2006 
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Table 6.11: Stellenbosch - Total Estimated Capital Spending and Capital Stock for Electricity, Water, Roads and Transport and Sanitation from 1997 to 
2006 
 Electricity Water Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate 
Capital 
Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 99,314.08 R 0.00 R 16,434.43 R 0.00 R 50,753.11 R 0.00 R 22,566.66 R 0.00 
1998 R 94,348.37 R 397,052.00 R 15,612.71 R 0.00 R 48,215.46 R 1,310,985.00 R 21,438.33 R 1,321,963.00 
1999 R 482,201.41 R 1,252,948.00 R 14,090.47 R 883,830.18 R 1,354,499.45 R 194,015.00 R 1,341,311.09 R 18,037.00 
2000 R 2,043,574.83 R 0.00 R 895,911.00 R 1,012,770.00 R 2,600,764.72 R 351,000.00 R 2,423,908.45 R 412,000.00 
2001 R 3,213,144.50 R 1,108,474.00 R 2,582,133.78 R 701,750.00 R 3,836,817.33 R 219,027.00 R 3,596,495.34 R 0.00 
2002 R 5,065,951.99 R 278,319.00 R 4,459,544.13 R 0.00 R 4,820,437.41 R 1,613,584.00 R 4,323,995.95 R 250,000.00 
2003 R 6,452,957.16 R 873,112.00 R 5,616,636.05 R 211,400.00 R 6,916,050.69 R 2,715,889.00 R 4,892,575.96 R 0.00 
2004 R 7,972,018.73 R 2,027,321.34 R 6,355,244.69 R 200,000.00 R 10,749,582.06 R 0.00 R 5,045,007.79 R 0.00 
2005 R 10,608,515.62 R 1,342,115.54 R 6,727,490.52 R 822,000.00 R 12,755,346.00 R 1,120,000.00 R 4,893,883.78 R 362,000.00 
2006 R 13,081,855.99 R 967,466.14 R 7,447,723.71 R 76,800.00 R 14,501,710.23 R 0.00 R 4,915,943.78 R 958,061.87 
2007 R 14,876,109.57  R 7,583,367.74  R 14,822,237.50  R 5,641,416.60  
Source: Infrastructure Expenditure Data: Western Cape Department of Provincial, Local Government & Housing CMIP & MIG Status Report, 27 October 2006 
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Table 6.12: Witzenberg - Total Estimated Capital Spending and Capital Stock for Electricity, Water, Roads and Transport and Sanitation from 1997 to 2006 
 Electricity Water Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 17,436.46 R 0.00 R 27,984.23 R 0.00 R 30,871.17 R 0.00 R 21,890.39 R 0.00 
1998 R 16,564.63 R 300,000.00 R 26,585.01 R 530,000.00 R 29,327.61 R 457,650.00 R 20,795.87 R 881,000.00 
1999 R 314,949.58 R 520,000.00 R 553,992.98 R 4,000,000.00 R 484,118.17 R 905,540.00 R 899,768.27 R 100,861.00 
2000 R 1,075,029.90 R 102,200.00 R 4,978,479.73 R 1,136,000.00 R 1,755,378.32 R 1,353,460.00 R 1,709,249.82 R 887,138.00 
2001 R 1,742,568.57 R 167,000.00 R 9,469,327.85 R 666,058.44 R 4,056,518.74 R 26,824.20 R 3,170,253.11 R 65,800.00 
2002 R 2,338,968.84 R 0.00 R 13,136,852.57 R 475,823.00 R 5,661,095.59 R 555,034.00 R 4,208,036.95 R 388,000.00 
2003 R 2,660,429.40 R 0.00 R 15,651,800.63 R 1,393,919.00 R 7,112,586.24 R 315,796.00 R 5,148,501.59 R 186,884.00 
2004 R 2,751,895.83 R 181,189.87 R 18,019,411.62 R 379,925.70 R 8,086,382.99 R 865,060.04 R 5,734,722.04 R 1,588,811.92 
2005 R 2,856,171.61 R 1,188,810.03 R 19,069,088.24 R 0.00 R 9,193,160.54 R 131,440.34 R 7,425,708.49 R 2,080,650.70 
2006 R 3,967,892.80 R 0.00 R 18,777,191.90 R 0.00 R 9,562,488.75 R 0.00 R 10,200,816.97 R 0.00 
2007 R 4,435,126.71  R 17,663,563.19  R 9,305,494.75  R 11,352,336.08  
Source: Infrastructure Expenditure Data: Western Cape Department of Provincial, Local Government & Housing CMIP & MIG Status Report, 27 October 2006 
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Summary 
In this chapter I present the complete technical formulation of a municipal 
infrastructure grant model and its Excel simulation model counterpart. I also 
describe and locate the Excel Simulation Model. The model is an adaptation of 
the provincial capital grant model first developed by Petchey et al (2004) for the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC, 2005) and later published as a journal 
article in 2008 (Josie et al, 2008). Following a discussion of the required 
population, capital stock and disparity data I also present a step-by-step discussion 
of how the model can be used to simulate capital stock outputs that can then be 
used as inputs to generate equitable infrastructure grant allocations from a given 
and limited pool of funds. In the next chapter I will use the output data and 
present results and findings to illustrate how the model can produce composite 
disparity indices and equitable allocations given different values of the betas.     
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Chapter 7 
Model Simulations, Results And Findings 
The purpose of the research for this thesis was to study the implications of taking 
account of capital cost disparities and capital backlogs in intergovernmental 
infrastructure grant transfers to municipalities with historically disadvantaged 
communities. The ultimate aim was to explore and test the possibility of 
accounting for capital cost disparities in a grant model intended to equitably 
allocate infrastructure finance to municipalities within the constraints of a limited 
available pool of funds. My preliminary research from interviews with municipal, 
provincial and National Government officials (see Appendix for a summary of the 
responses to my interview questions) and, from government reports and the 
literature found that there is a disjuncture in the way the current municipal 
infrastructure grant allocations are made. Informed by this initial finding I posed a 
fundamental question and two sub-questions that guided my case study on which 
this thesis is based. The questions were informed by the two propositions derived 
from my preliminary research and presented in Chapter 1. 
Recall that the study sought to answer the fundamental question that asked: How 
can municipal infrastructure grants take account of historical backlogs and 
disparities that differentiate municipalities from each other? From the main 
question the empirical research was guided by two sub-questions suggested by the 
two propositions respectively. The first asks: What is the likely impact on grant 
shares of including capital cost disparities in an infrastructure grant model? The 
second asks: Can equitability, stability, predictability and flexibility of municipal 
budgets be enhanced by the inclusion of capital cost disparities and efficiency in a 
municipal infrastructure grant model?  
To address the main question and the two sub-questions I set myself three 
fundamental objectives. The first was to analytically review the way in which 
municipal infrastructure grants are currently allocated for redressing socio-
economic disparities and infrastructure backlogs. The second was to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) Provincial Capital 
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Expenditure Grant Scheme (Petchey et al, 2004) for allocating targeted municipal 
infrastructure grants. The third was to assess the trade-off between the equitability 
of allocations that take account of capital cost disparities within and between 
municipalities and, economic efficiency considerations.  
I argued in chapters 1, 3 and 4 that government’s current approach and formula 
used for equitably allocating infrastructure grants to local municipalities is not 
equitable, stable, predictable and flexible enough to enable municipalities to 
provide basic services as required in the Bill of Rights. My main argument is that 
equitability is compromised by government not adequately taking into account 
capital cost disparities and economic efficiencies that differentiate local 
municipalities from each other.  Furthermore, I also argued that the unit-cost 
driven project based approach currently used for allocating municipal 
infrastructure grants undermined the budgeting principles of stability, 
predictability and flexibility in the Constitution. In the absence of capital budget 
stability, predictability and flexibility local municipalities will not be able to 
ensure the progressive eradication of historical backlogs and the provision of 
basic services as required by the Bill of Rights. My analysis was based on a 
review of the relevant international and national public finance and related socio-
economic literature and, the relevant government and media reports. These 
analyses were presented in the preceding chapters of this thesis.  
My arguments were also supported by statistical analyses based on officially 
published secondary data for the Western Cape Province and the five Cape 
Winelands District local municipalities. In this chapter I will present the findings 
and results of my analyses. All calculations are undertaken and, results generated, 
in the Excel Simulation Model. By first excluding and then including disparities 
in the simulations I was able to undertake the following comparisons: the positive 
or negative effects of disparities on infrastructure backlogs; the impact of 
disparities on the municipalities’ share of the available infrastructure grant pool; 
the impact of disparities on the speed with which municipal backlogs are reduced 
and, how disparities affect the economic per capita portion of an infrastructure 
grant. 
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The Excel Simulation Model is located in a separate Excel file folder called 
Simulation Model with Scenarios Municipal Infrastructure Grants MJJPhD 2010. 
The Simulation Model folder is divided into six separate Excel files. The first 
Excel file runs a model simulation in which the capital cost disparity indices are 
excluded because the beta (!) values are all set to zero. The file is labeled 
Scenario 0 - Simulation - MunCAPEX (REVIEW 20100817).xls. The second, third 
and fourth files run simulation scenarios 1, 2, and 3 as discussed in the first 
section of this chapter. The files are labeled Scenario 1 - Simulation - MunCAPEX 
(REVIEW 20100817).xls; Scenario 2 - Simulation - MunCAPEX (REVIEW 
20100817).xls and, Scenario 3 - Simulation - MunCAPEX (REVIEW 
20100817).xls respectively. The fifth Excel file is labeled Scenario Comparisons 
Simulations 20100817.xls, and captures the results of all the scenarios in tables 
that facilitates comparisons on which my findings for the evaluation of the model 
are based. The sixth spreadsheet is labeled Scenario Comparisons with total 
allocations in Tab 7.15. 20110126.xls and, calculates the total allocations 
(historical backlog grant and per capita economic grant) for each municipality 
over the period. Chapter 7 is presented in two sections aimed at addressing the 
two sub-questions. 
Section One: The impacts on grant shares of including capital cost 
disparities in a grant model for equitably allocating infrastructure 
funds to municipalities. 
 
The first step in analyzing and discussing the impact of capital cost disparities is 
to aggregate all eight disparity indicators presented in Chapter 5 into one 
composite disparity index. The next step is to assess the impact of the composite 
disparity index on the share of infrastructure grants to the five municipalities. A 
municipality’s percentage share of the grant is from the designated national pool 
of funds available for infrastructure for the five local municipalities in the Cape 
Winelands Municipal District. 
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Estimating a Composite Capital Cost Disparity Index in an Infrastructure 
Grant Model 
Based on a selection of the eight socio-economic indicators discussed in Chapter 
5 I will define a set of disparity measures that differentiates five local 
municipalities from each other. My argument here is that if these disparities are 
taken into account within an infrastructure grant model the allocations to 
municipalities will come close to reflecting the real cost of infrastructure based 
services while at the same time meeting the requirements set out in Section 214(1) 
(a) to (c) and Section 214(2) (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of the Constitution. From 
these disparity measures I will be able to construct composite capital cost 
disparity indices that may be assigned as weights for each of the municipalities in 
my infrastructure grant model. By taking the composite capital cost disparity 
indices into account in the model I will be able to show how disparities can 
impact on the way infrastructure grants are shared amongst municipalities.   
To test the impact of disparities on the infrastructure grant shares my case study 
used the defined disparity indicators (see Chapter 5) from the following five local 
municipalities falling within the jurisdiction of the Cape Winelands District 
Municipality of the Western Cape Province, viz; Breede River, Breede Valley, 
Drakenstein, Stellenbosch and Witzenberg36. By running simulations that includes 
disparities in the model calculation I assess the impact of disparities on a 
municipality’s share of the infrastructure grant pool allocated through the 
National Government intergovernmental transfer. In Chapter 4 I presented in 
Table 4.1, a set of criteria against which my main propositions may be discussed 
and, based on Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 I proposed criteria for the prioritization and 
ranking of disparity indicators and the choice of beta (!) values to be taken into 
account when allocating infrastructure grants. Recall that the beta (!) values rank 
the importance of a given disparity indicator. The criteria included overcoming 
the legacy of apartheid; improving the capabilities of previously disadvantaged 
communities; targeting unemployment and income distribution variables for 
macroeconomic stability; ensuring compliance with the Bill of Rights; mitigating 
                                                
36 The profiles of the five municipalities are presented in detail in Chapter 5. 
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the potential for conflict generated by inequality and inadequacy in the delivery of 
municipal services and, ensuring sustainable use of natural resources.  
I assume the role of policy-maker and informed by the criteria I prioritize my set 
of disparity indicators and, assign three different beta (!) values for all the 
disparities measures in order to derive three sets of composite capital cost 
disparity indices. Using the Excel Simulation Model I construct the three sets of 
disparity indices. The results from these simulations constitute three scenarios in 
which the beta (!) values are varied. The idea behind this exercise is to compare 
results of the impact of the composite disparity index under three different 
assumptions for the beta (!) policy parameter given that the beta (!) value defines 
the degree of importance of a disparity. 
At this point it is important to note that by setting all the !’s equal to zero the 
simulation can be run without disparities affecting the outcome. The use of this 
procedure implies that the policy-maker has the option of allocating grants to 
municipalities with or without taking account of disparities. Depending on the 
importance of a disparity or disparities in the pursuit of policy objectives the 
policy-maker can vary the value of the !’s for each disparity in the set of 
disparities. In the simulation model the policy-maker has the choice of adding 
more disparities, refining the existing set of disparities or reducing the number of 
disparities.     
Summary of data inputs 
Several data inputs are used in the simulation to generate a composite capital cost 
disparity index. The details are listed and explained in the data input and the 
disparity index calculation spreadsheet file in the linked Excel Simulation Model 
in a compact disc appended to this thesis. In summary the data inputs include the 
following: 
• Total population for the Western Cape Province, the district and local 
municipalities. Figures for the district and local municipalities were 
estimated from Statistics South Africa 2001 (StatsSA) census estimates.  
• The population of each of the five local municipalities as a proportion of 
the total Cape Winelands District population.  
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• Eight disparity measures for the five Cape Winelands local municipalities 
selected from Table 5.10 in Chapter 5. The selected disparity measures 
included are: Population density per square kilometer, Unemployment 
rate, Households with no income, Tuberculosis prevalence per 100000 
persons, HIV/AIDS prevalence, Percentage persons over 14 years 
illiterate (i.e. less than grade seven education level) and, housing backlog 
units.  This data was sourced from the Cape Winelands District, Socio 
Economic Profile, the Western Cape Provincial Government, 2006. In 
addition I included the Deprivation Index developed by McIntyre and 
Karafor (2003). 
• National Government infrastructure grant transfers to the municipalities to 
define the available grant pool. The data was sourced from National 
Government’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework published estimates 
for the periods under consideration.        
 
I constructed the set of composite capital cost disparities using equations 4.6 and 
4.7 (see Chapter 4) and, the key data from the data input spreadsheet in the Excel 
simulation model. The results in the tables below are drawn from the model 
output spreadsheet. I present the results of this exercise in the tables below for 
each of the eight disparities selected from the data presented in Chapter 5. The 
disparity indicators in these tables are not expected to change over life of the 
allocation cycle of the budget because national census and household survey data 
are collected every 5 to 10 years. Thus it is important to note that in this 
application there is no time dimension to the disparities as denoted by the 
subscript t in the generic formula. 
 
From the original Petchey et al (2004) model equation 4.6 and equation 4.7, i,t , jD  
is the percentage deviation, for municipality i, of the thj  disparity indicator from 
the average value of the disparity indicator for all local municipalities (for period 
t); i,t , j0 ! "  is a parameter that captures the impact of the percentage deviation of 
the thj  disparity from its average value on the disparity function represented by 
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equation 4.7 in period37 t and, ( )t , j t , ji,t , j i,t , jD X X /X= ! , when i,t , jX , is the jth 
disparity measure for municipality i and t , jX  is the average of the jth disparity 
measure for all local municipalities  given that i = 1,....,5 in period t.  
 
With the above formula and using the values of the disparity measures (X) for all 
five local municipalities I am able to calculate the average disparity measure 
( t , jX ) for all municipalities. The results for ( t , jX ) are reported in Table 7.1.   This 
average allows me to calculate the percentage mean deviation of X from the 
average value D and the average per municipality for all disparity measures in 
Table 7.2. The mean deviation and its average by municipality shows whether the 
percentage of the disparity measure for a municipality falls above or below the 
average. Depending on the particular disparity measure this value should indicate 
whether a municipality is at an advantage or disadvantage.  
 
From the socio-economic indicators presented in Chapter 5 I selected eight 
disparity measures to construct one aggregated composite disparity index38 that 
can be taken into account in an infrastructure grant model to meet government’s 
constitutional obligations. I applied the disparity measure data to the formula 
( )t , j t , ji,t , j i,t , jD X X /X= ! for the five local municipalities to demonstrate how the 
use of disparity measures in an infrastructure model presents a more 
comprehensive picture of the characteristics of inequality and poverty that 
differentiate municipalities from each other.  In other words i,t , jD  will show the 
percentage deviation of the disparity from its average value for all five local 
municipalities. In Table 7.1 the eight disparity measures (X) are listed in column 1 
                                                
37  Note that the period (t) has no effect as I assume that the disparity indicators apply for the full three periods (nine years) 
of the simulation because census data is collected every ten years and are not likely to change in between. 
38  In the Petchey et al (2004) model the disability index (") for the FFC provincial capital grant model is constructed for 
each indicator separately as if it were the only disability and thereafter all are aggregated into a single index. I chose to 
calculate a single composite disparity indicator from the eight single disparities although the simulation model has the 
option of calculating each disparity separately. See the Excel Simulation Model for an explanation of how this can be done 
using the spreadsheet Disparity Index Calculation.    
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with their values for each municipality in the rows. The values of the 
corresponding average disparity measure ( t , jX ) are reported in column 7.  
 
To understand Table 7.1 consider the disparity measure 2 – the Unemployment 
Rate for each of the five local municipalities. The argument here is that because 
high unemployment creates the condition for socio-economic disparities such as 
poverty and inequality it is a good proxy indicator and, therefore, should be taken 
into account when allocating grants. This data is sourced from Statistics South 
Africa and reflects the rate of unemployment for each of the local municipalities 
in the Cape Winelands District (See Chapter 5). In Table 7.1 the Drakenstein local 
municipality has the highest unemployment rate at 22.80% and Breede River has 
the lowest rate at 12.20%. The average unemployment rate for the five local 
municipalities is 17.28%. As Drakenstein with 22.80 % and Breede Valley with 
19.70% have above the average rates these municipalities are considered to have a 
positive unemployment rate disparity. If this were the only disparity taken into 
account in the grant scheme then these municipalities should receive a 
proportionately higher share of the grant allocation. The other three municipalities 
(Breede River, Stellenbosch and Witzenberg) are below the average and therefore 
have a negative unemployment rate disparity. These municipalities will therefore 
receive a proportionately smaller share of that part of the per capita allocation 
earmarked for municipalities with unemployment rate disparities.   
 
 
 
 
  241 
 
Table 7.1: Average Disparity Measure ( t , jX ) 
Disparity 
(X) 
Breede  
River 
Breede 
Valley 
Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
Average 
Measure 
( t , jX ) 
Population  
Density  
(P/km2) 
 
27.78 
 
51.06 
 
126.29 
 
140.32 
 
30.77 
 
75.2442 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
 
12.20 
 
19.70 
 
22.80 
 
17.10 
 
14.60 
 
17.28 
(%) 
Households  
with no income 
 
10.59 
 
8.96 
 
10.47 
 
19.95 
 
8.21 
 
11.636 
TB Prevalence 
Per 100 000 
 
1188.00 
 
1621.00 
 
1196.00 
 
890.00 
 
358.00 
 
1050.6 
(%) HIV/AIDS 
(2000)  
 
3.2 
 
3.7 
 
5.4 
 
4.0 
 
4.2 
 
4.1 
(%) Illiteracy 38 14 23 20 35 26 
Housing Back- 
log (units, 
2004)  
 
4300 
 
11876 
 
11000 
 
10500 
 
3000 
 
8135.2 
Deprivation  
Index 
(Normalized) 
 
1.882 
 
1.937 
 
1.954 
 
1.908 
 
1.906 
 
1.9174 
 
Similarly, each of the other disparity measures can be taken into account in the 
model. However, it is up to the policy maker to make a decision about the 
importance of a disparity measure in the model. For example, in Table 7.1 
disparity measure 1, Population Density (the number of people per square 
kilometer) may be considered by a policy maker to be an important factor. This 
may be so because it is often argued that it costs more to provide certain 
municipal infrastructure (for example water and sanitation) to sparsely populated 
communities than to communities that are more densely populated. On the other 
hand a policy maker may believe that municipalities with densely populated 
townships and informal settlements may be a higher priority than a sparsely 
populated rural municipality because of overcrowding and slum development. In 
the latter case a ratio of rural to urban populations in a region may be a more 
appropriate measure. This means having to calculate the total number of 
households in urban and non-urban regions. The Petchey et al (2004) paper uses 
the number of households per province classified as non-urban as a proxy to 
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capture spatial disparity. In the Petchey et al paper (2004)39, the rural to urban 
ratio is chosen to avoid the possibility of introducing an upward bias of the 
disparity measure resulting from large uninhabited regions in some provinces.  
In my simulation exercise I retain the use of population density as a disparity to 
show spatial impacts in the provision of infrastructure services because all five 
local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District have rural and semi-rural 
communities. However, to avoid the possibility of an upwards bias of the 
disparity indicator I give this disparity a very low beta weight compared to the 
other seven disparities. In Chapter 5, Table 5.10, I also present data showing the 
total number of urban and non-urban households in each of the municipalities. A 
rural to urban ratio disparity measure can be constructed from this data set as an 
alternative if necessary. From Table 7.1 it is clear that Stellenbosch and 
Drakenstein have higher than average population densities and Breede River, 
Breede Valley and Witzenberg have lower than average population densities. 
These three municipalities will have a positive disparity with respect to population 
dispersion per square kilometer whilst Stellenbosch and Drakenstein will have a 
negative disparity.   
To capture a disparity measure for income inequality and poverty I use the 
percentage number of households with no incomes from data provided by the 
Western Cape Province government. This is disparity 3 in Table 7.1. My 
argument is that municipalities with large numbers of households with no incomes 
imply that these municipalities have a higher number of people living in absolute 
poverty. Therefore these municipalities will have a positive income inequality and 
poverty disparity compared to other municipalities and should receive a 
proportionately higher share of the grant. In the Petchey et al (2004) paper the 
simulation model uses data on household incomes below R4 800 to construct an 
income poverty disparity measure for provinces.  
                                                
39 In the Petchey et al (2004)  model the ratio of rural to urban incomes is used as the disparity measure 
because it focuses on the notion that the cost of infrastructure provision is higher in provinces with a greater 
non-urban population. 
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In Table 7.1 on average 11.63 percent of households in the District have no 
incomes. Stellenbosch with 19.95 percent has the largest number of households 
with no incomes. It is the only municipality above the average and will therefore 
have a positive disparity for income inequality and poverty and, should therefore 
receive a proportionately higher share of the grant. All the other municipalities 
have disparity measures below the average.    
In the preceding paragraphs of this chapter I discussed the role of disparity 
measures for population density, no income households and the unemployment 
rate. The discussion in Chapter 5 and the literature review in Chapter 2 address 
some of the reasons why disparities should be taken into account when allocating 
infrastructure grants. For income inequality and the unemployment rate it is 
obvious that municipalities with a larger proportion of households living in 
poverty will have a positive disparity. Both of these indicators are associated with 
socio-economic disparities and inequality. From table 7.1 and 7.2 it is clear that 
Drakenstein and Stellenbosch are the most affected by these disparities.  
Taking these disparities into account when allocating grants for municipal 
infrastructure services will have significant impacts for the local economy. It is 
well known that the construction, operation and maintenance functions of 
municipal infrastructure is labour intensive over the life span of infrastructure 
services and, therefore, will have positive local employment creation and income 
generation effects.   
In the literature the infection rates of debilitating diseases such as HIV/AIDS and 
the incidence of tuberculosis in disadvantaged communities are also associated 
with poor sanitation and other associated municipal services (David A. M. et al, 
2007; Lienhardt C., 2001). My argument is that municipalities play a key role in 
providing primary health care services for disadvantaged communities. Higher 
rates of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis infections will lead to higher costs for the 
provision of primary health care services. By the same token, improved sanitation 
services will contribute to the improved health and the prevention of infectious 
diseases such as TB. The provision of sanitation infrastructure not only ensures 
that the right to basic health care is supported; it also ensures a healthy population. 
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In Tables 7.1 it is evident that Breede Valley had the highest prevalence of 
tuberculosis with 1621 per 100 000 inhabitants, Drakenstein next in line with 
1196 and, Witzenberg with the lowest at 358 per 100 000. Breede Valley and 
Drakenstein clearly are above the average disparity measure of 1050.60 per 100 
000. The picture for HIV/AIDS infection rates in Table 7.1 reveals that 
Drakenstein and Witzenberg had the higher than average rates of HIV/AIDS 
infection with 5.4% and 4.2% respectively in 2000. The results for debilitating 
diseases suggest that these disparity measures will have a significant influence on 
the composite disparity index for the Drakenstein municipality as on both counts 
the disparity measure is above the average.  
In Table 7.1 the results for illiteracy, defined as persons with an education level 
below grade seven, reveal that Breede River and Witzenberg had higher than 
average (26%) rates with 38% and 35% respectively. Illiteracy is an important 
indicator of disadvantage in South Africa as the unequal and inadequate provision 
of basic education was one the pillars of apartheid policy. With respect to the 
disparity measure for housing backlog units Table 7.1 show that in 2004 Breede 
Valley (11876), Drakenstein (11000) and Stellenbosch (10500) had higher than 
average (8135.2) backlogs. Housing backlogs are a significant indicator for 
municipal decision-making on the provision of related municipal infrastructure. It 
is the role of municipalities to construct low-cost houses and provide 
infrastructure services for the houses built. The significance of each of these 
disparity measures in the capital cost composite disparity index (" i) will depend 
on the beta weights assigned to each of them.             
In the next step I calculate the deviation and the average deviation for each 
municipality from Table 7.1 using the formula ( )t , j t , ji,t , j i,t , jD X X /X= ! . The 
calculations are processed in spreadsheet Disparity Index Calculation in the Excel 
Simulation model and presented in Table 7.2 below. Using the calculated 
deviation i,t , jD  and the average deviation I then assign three different beta (!) 
policy parameters for constructing composite capital cost disparity indices for 
each municipality.  
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Table 7.2: Deviation ( i,t , jD ) & Average Deviation by Municipality  
Population  
Density  
(P/km2) 
 
- 6.3 
 
- 0.32 
 
0.68 
 
0.86 
 
- 0.59 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
 
-0.29 
 
0.14 
 
0.32 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.16 
(%) Household  
no income 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.10 
 
0.71 
 
-0.29 
TB Prevalence 
Per 100 000 
 
0.13 
 
0.54 
 
0.14 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.66 
(%) HIV/AIDS 
(2000)  
 
-0.22 
 
-0.10 
 
0.32 
 
-0.02 
 
0.02 
(%) Illiteracy 0.46 -0.46 -0.12 -0.23 0.35 
Housing Back- 
log (units, 
2004)  
 
-0.47 
 
0.46 
 
0.35 
 
0.29 
 
-0.63 
Deprivation  
Index 
(normalized) 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 
Average by 
Municipality 
 
-0.14 
 
0.01 
 
0.20 
 
0.18 
 
-0.25 
 
Constructing the Composite Disparity Index using the Simulation Model 
The disparity measures are grouped into a single composite capital cost disparity 
index for each municipality by assigning the selected ! weights to the average 
deviation following equations 4.6 and 4.7. This process is demonstrated in the 
spreadsheet Disparity Index Calculation in the Excel Simulation Model. The 
aggregate or composite disparity index is constructed using the input data 
calculated for each of the disparities for each municipality. The “Average by 
Municipality” column shows the average by municipality of the deviation (D) 
over all the disparities given that D measures the municipal deviation from the 
average for each disparity. 
Thus, to calculate the aggregated capital cost composite disparity index gamma   
(" i) for each scenario for a municipality from equations 4.6 and 4.7, I assume the 
role of policy-maker and assign a beta (!) value to the mean deviation average for 
all disparities from a scale ranging between 0 and 1 (See spreadsheet Disparity 
Index Calculation in the Excel Simulation Model). The weighting determines the 
Disparity Breede  
River 
Breede 
Valley 
Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg  
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composite disparity index and has the effect of prioritizing the disparity indicators 
according to their importance in meeting policy objectives in the delivery of 
municipal infrastructure services in disadvantaged communities. The function of 
the beta values ranks the relative importance of disparity weights in determining 
the shares of the grant in the simulation.  
As noted previously if the policy-maker uses a beta (!) value of zero for any of 
the disparities that particular disparity will be excluded from the simulation. This 
is demonstrated in Table 7.3 below. By assigning a beta (!) value of zero to all 
the disparity measures in the Disparity Index Calculation spreadsheet in the 
simulation model I exclude the impact of the disparity index for each 
municipality. By virtue of the fact that each municipality’s disparity index is 
approximately equal to one it will not change the value of the population and 
capital stock variables in the grant model40. The Disparity Index Calculation 
spreadsheet in the simulation model is set up so that disparity measures can be 
added or removed. The beta values can also be varied according to the policy 
maker’s decisions. 
Table 7.3: Control Scenario 0 - Disparity Index (" i) when (betas) !1 = !2 =  !3  = !4 =  
!5  =  !6  = !7= !8  = 0, for all Eight Disparity Measures. 
Breede River 0.03 -0.57 0.99 
Breede Valley 0.04 0.02 1.01 
Drakenstein 0.04 0.80 1.01 
Stellenbosch              - 0.01 0.72 1.00 
Witzenberg              - 0.10 - 0.98 1.00 
 
To generate composite capital cost disparity indices for each municipality I 
simulate three different scenarios with three different permutations for the beta 
(!) values. In the first scenario of my simulation exercise I set the betas (!) values 
equal to 0.5 such that !1 = !2 =  !3 = !4 = !5 = !6 = !7= !8 = 0.5, for all eight 
disparity measures. This means that all eight disparities in the composite disparity 
                                                
40 Mathematically, any value multiplied by one will remain unchanged. 
Municipality Average by 
Municipality 
" i Control Disparity 
Index (# i) 
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index are treated equally. I call this first simulation Scenario one (S1) and the 
results are presented in Table 7.4.  
However, to demonstrate that disparities maybe used with different beta (!) 
permutations depending on the decisions of the policy-maker to prioritize or not 
to prioritize particular disparity measures, I also simulate for two other scenarios 
where the permutations for the beta (!) values are varied. Table 7.5 presents 
results for Scenario Two (S2) when the betas (!) for each disparity measure are 
varied such that !1 = 0.2 and !8 = 0 and !2 = !3 = !4 = !5 = !6 = !7= 0.5. 
Table 7.6 presents results for Scenario Three (S3) when the betas (!) for each 
disparity measure are varied such that !1 = 0.2 and !2 = !3 = !8 = 0.5 
respectively and, !4 = !5 = !6 = !7= 0. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2 the beta values and composite disparity indicators 
may be also determined using econometric and linear programming techniques 
such as data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
Table 7.4: Scenario One - Disparity Index S1 (" i) when (betas) !1 = !2 =  !3  = !4 =  
!5  =  !6  = !7= !8  = 0.5, for all Eight Disparity Measures. 
Breede River -0.14 -0.57 0.57 
Breede Valley 0.01 0.02 1.02 
Drakenstein 0.20 0.80 2.24 
Stellenbosch 0.18 0.72 2.06 
Witzenberg -0.25 - 0.98 0.37 
 
From the model presented in Chapter 4 we know that the exponential 
transformation of the disparity function in equations 4.6 and 4.7 means that the 
disparity index is normalized around one41. This implies that municipalities with 
                                                
41  
   i ,ti,t e
!" =      (4.6) 
[read as gamma i, t equals e to the power # (phi)  i, t.] 
where  
  
J
i,t i,t , j i,t , j
i,t , j 1
D
=
! = "#      (4.7) 
Municipality Average by 
Municipality 
" i Disparity Index S1 
(# i) 
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positive disparities take gamma (#i) values in excess of one and municipalities 
with negative disparities take values below one.  It is clear from Scenario One in 
Table 7.3 that if all the disparity measures are weighted equally with a beta (!) 
value of 0.5 then Drakenstein with a gamma (#i) value of 2.24 will have the 
highest positive disparity index followed by Stellenbosch with a value of 2.06. At 
0.37 (the lowest) and 0.57 (the second lowest) respectively Witzenberg and 
Breede River have negative disparities with values below one. This means that the 
composite capital cost disparity gamma ("i) for each municipality is important for 
calculating the desired capital stock and, through this result, the historical 
domestic backlog. A municipality with a positive composite capital cost disparity 
gamma ("i) greater than 1 will have a greater historical domestic backlog and, 
consequently, need a higher level of desired capital stock. By allocating a greater 
share of the infrastructure grant for infrastructure services to such municipalities, 
government will not only ensure the delivery of services to municipalities that 
were previously disadvantaged it will also contribute towards building up the 
higher level of desired capital stock in these municipalities through an increase in 
public infrastructure thus promoting per capita economic efficiency.  
In Scenario Two in Table 7.5 I assign a beta (!) value of 0.2 for disparity measure 
1 (population density) and 0 for disparity measure 8 (the deprivation index) and, 
0.5 for the six other measures. For disparity measure 1 my reasoning is that 
population density and spatial inequality is not highly significant in the local 
municipalities of the Cape Winelands District Municipality. This observation was 
verified through interviews with municipal officials and visits to the 
municipalities themselves (See summary report of interviews with municipal 
officials in Appendix...). By way of comparison the Cape Winelands District 
reports (from data supplied by the Global Insight Southern Africa Explorer 451) 
reveal that in 2008 it had an overall population density of 30.03 persons per 
square kilometer while the other four Western Cape Province district 
municipalities – the West Coast (10.57), Overberg (22.19), Eden (22.73) and 
Central Karoo (1.58) had much lower population densities. Furthermore, the latter 
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group of district municipalities is located in very mountainous areas and faces the 
challenge of higher unit costs for the provision of municipal services to 
communities living in such locations. 
Table 7.5: Scenario Two - Disparity Index S2 (" i) when disparity measures 1 and 8 have 
(betas) !1 = 0.2 and !8  =  0 respectively, and !2 = !3  =  !4 = !5  =  !6  =  !7=  0.5. 
Municipality Average by 
Municipality 
" i Disparity Index S2 
(# i) 
Breede River -0.14 -0.37 0.69 
Breede Valley 0.01 0.11 1.12 
Drakenstein 0.20 0.59 1.81 
Stellenbosch 0.18 0.47 1.59 
Witzenberg -0.25 -0.80 0.45 
 
My reasoning for assigning a beta value of 0 for disparity measure 8 (deprivation 
index) and 0.5 for each of the other six was that the deprivation index measure 
calculated by McIntyre42 and Okarafor (2003) already incorporates measures for 
poor health, education and housing. My assumption here is that I can either have 
0.5 values for the six other disparities and 0 for the deprivation index or, 0.5 for 
the deprivation index and 0 each for illiteracy, TB, HIV and housing backlogs, as 
is the case for Scenario Three. In Scenario Three I also retain beta values of 0.2 
for population density and, 0.5 for households with no incomes and the rate of 
unemployment.    
Table 7.6: Scenario Three - Disparity Index S3 (" i) when disparity measures 1, 2, 3 and 
8 have (betas) !1 = 0.2 and !2 = !3  = !8  = 0.5 respectively and, !4 = !5  =  !6  = !7=  
0. 
Breede River - 0.14 - 0.33 0.72 
Breede Valley 0.01 - 0. 10 0.90 
Drakenstein 0.20 0.25 1.29 
Stellenbosch 0.18 0.52 1.69 
Witzenberg -0.25 - 0.35 0.71 
 
                                                
42 The paper by McIntyre and Okarafor  (2003) presents a detailed review and analysis of the development of 
deprivation indices and the construction of the Deprivation Index for South Africa. See Chapter 2 for a 
review of this paper.    
Municipality Average by 
Municipality 
" i Disparity Index S3 
(# i) 
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Findings for the Impact of Composite Capital Cost Disparity Indices on 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant Shares 
The composite capital cost disparity index gamma ("i) in the model is the main 
determinant of the per capita allocation intergovernmental share of the municipal 
infrastructure grant pool from National Government to municipalities. Using 
equation 6.7 the model calculates the share tau ($), adjusted for disparities ("i), of 
the grant pool (designated by CP in the model in Chapter 6) for each municipality 
with data inputs for both the municipal population and the total district 
population. To calculate the per capita allocation I first have to determine the 
share ($) of the grant pool (CP) for municipality i in period t. To do this I require 
the local municipality population as a proportion of the total District population. 
The model calculates the share ($) of the grant pool (CP) adjusted for disparities 
for each municipality by using the inputs defined by equation 6.7 in Chapter 6. 
The calculations are carried out in the Excel Simulation Model. 
A municipality’s share in the grant is a function of its population relative to total 
district population. The allocations are based on the projected population shares 
for each of the three periods in the nine-year cycle (2007 to 2015) used in the 
simulation. Table 7.7 presents the projected municipality population shares from 
2007 to 2015 from the spreadsheet Population in the Excel Simulation Model.  
Table 7.7: Local Municipality Population Shares as a Proportion of District 
Population  
Breed River 0.1133 0.1126 0.1119 0.1111 0.1103 0.1094 0.1085 0.1074 0.1064 
BreedeValley 0.1899 0.1854 0.1809 0.1765 0.1721 0.1677 0.1632 0.1589 0.1544 
Draknstein 0.3069 0.3041 0.3011 0.2980 0.2946 0.2912 0.2876 0.2839 0.2800 
Stellenbosch 0.2836 0.2940 0.3048 0.3158 0.3270 0.3382 0.3497 0.3614 0.3732 
Witzenberg 0.1062 0.1036 0.1011 0.0985 0.0960 0.0934 0.0908 0.0883 0.0858 
(Totals may not add up to 1 because of rounding. See spreadsheet Population/ Share of 
Population in the Excel Simulation Model) 
 
To demonstrate the workings of the simulation model, I first consider the impact 
of the disparity index on the grant shares for 2007. Column 4 in tables 7.8 to 7.10 
Municipality 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
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below shows each local municipality’s population as a proportion of the Cape 
Winelands District population as a whole for 2007. A municipality’s share ($i) in 
the per capita grant will depend on whether its composite capital cost disparity    
(" i) is above or below the average. The third column of the tables 7.8 to 7.10 
shows each municipality’s population as a proportion of the total district 
population. Those above the average will receive a share greater than their 
population share and those below the average will receive less than their 
population share. The average by municipality (column 2) shows whether the 
percentage of the disparity measure for a municipality falls above or below the 
average. Depending on the particular disparity measure this indicates whether a 
municipality is at an advantage or disadvantage. If a municipality happened to 
have a zero disparity (i.e. its X value just equaled the average) then the measured 
disparity (") would equal 1 (since e to the power of 0 =1 in equation 6.7) and the 
calculated ($) would simply equal the population in the municipality as a 
proportion of the total District population. Therefore a comparison of columns 3 
and 4 of the tables 7.8 to 7.10 shows the impact of the disparities. If a 
municipality had a positive disparity its share in the pool is raised from its share 
value (or percentage value) in column 3 (municipal population as a proportion of 
total district population) to its share in column 5 ($ for the period). If a 
municipality had a negative disparity its share would fall in the opposite direction. 
The calculated percentage share ($i) for 2007 population shares for each 
municipality in the per capita grant is presented in column 5 in the tables below. 
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Table 7.8: Scenario 1: Average Growth of Municipal Share ($ i) of per capita Grant 
based on projected 2007 Municipal Population Shares. 
Breede River -0.14 0.57 0.1133 0.03 
Breede Valley 0.01 1.02 0.1898 0.02 
Drakenstein 0.20 2.24 0.3069 0.31 
Stellenbosch 0.18 2.06 0.2835 0.63 
Witzenberg -0.25 0.37 0.1062 0.00 
 
The results for Scenario 1 presented in Table 7.8 report that all the disparities 
aggregated into one composite capital cost disparity will mean that Stellenbosch 
will receive the largest share (63%) of the infrastructure grant for infrastructure 
services. Drakenstein will be next with a share of 31% of the grant followed by 
Breede River (3%), Breede Valley (2%) and Witzenberg (0%).   
 
Table 7.9: Scenario 2: Average Growth of Municipal Share ($ i) of per capita Grant 
based on projected 2007 Municipal Population Shares. 
Breede River - 0.14 0.69 0.1133 0.05 
Breede Valley 0.01 1.12 0.1898 0.03 
Drakenstein 0.20 1.81 0.3069 0.31 
Stellenbosch 0.18 1.59 0.2835 0.63 
Witzenberg -0.25 0.45 0.1062 0.00 
 
For Scenario 2 in Table 7.9, with a slightly varied beta value, Stellenbosch and 
Drakenstein will still receive the largest share of the grant. 
Municipality Average by Municipality 
Disparity 
Index S1 
! i  
 
Municipal 
population 
proportion of 
District 
population for 
2007 
Municipal 
Share  
($i) 
Municipality Average by Municipality 
Disparity 
Index S2 
! i  
 
Municipal 
population 
proportion of 
District 
population for 
2007 
Municipal 
Share 
($i) 
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Table 7.10: Scenario 3: Average Growth of Municipal Share ($ i) of per capita Grant 
based on projected 2007 Municipal Population Shares. 
Breede River - 0.14 0.72 0.1133 0.05 
Breede Valley 0.01 0.90 0.1898 0.02 
Drakenstein 0.20 1.29 0.3069 0.24 
Stellenbosch 0.18 1.69 0.2835 0.68 
Witzenberg -0.25 0.71 0.1062 0.01 
 
A further variation of the beta values for Scenario 3 in Table 7.10 shows a very 
small drop in the share for Drakenstein and an increase in the share for 
Stellenbosch with very little change in the shares for the other municipalities. It is 
important to note that the calculations in Tables 7.8 to 7.10 are based on 
municipal population shares for 2007 only. The infrastructure grant allocations, 
however, are made over several three-year medium term expenditure framework 
(MTEF) cycles with each cycle representing one period.  
To calculate the shares over the three periods I chose three MTEF cycles from 
2007 to 2015 representing three distinct periods as defined in the Tables 7.11 to 
7.13 below. The municipal population shares (Table 7.7) are calculated from the 
spreadsheet called Population (under heading Share of Population) in the Excel 
Simulation Model. Tables 7.11 to 7.13 present the results for the average growth 
of municipal shares based on the projected growth of population shares over the 
three periods for the three scenarios.    
Municipality Average by 
Municipality 
Disparity 
Index S3 
! i  
 
Municipal 
population 
proportion of 
District 
population for 
2007 
Municipal 
Share  
($i) 
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Table 7.11: Scenario 1: Average Growth of Municipal Share ($ i) of per capita Grant 
based on projected Municipal Population Shares for 3 MTEF Periods from 2007 to 
2015. 
Breede River             0.57 
   
0.11263 
  
0.11031 
  
0.10745 
       
0.0405     0.0389 
    
0.0373 
Breede Valley               1.02 
   
0.18534 
  
0.17202 
  
0.15877 
     
0.1200     0.1094 
    
0.0992 
Drakenstein            2.24 
   
0.30403 
  
0.29454 
  
0.28378 
    
0.4307     0.4098 
    
0.3879 
 Stellenbosch            2.06 
  
0.29437 
  
0.32721 
  
0.36172 
    
0.3841     0.4193 
    
0.4553 
Witzenberg            0.37 
  
0.10363 
  
0.09591 
  
0.08827 
     
0.0245 
      
0.2234 
    
0.0201 
 
Based on projected population shares (Table 7.7) for each MTEF cycle period, 
Scenario 1 in Table 7.11 reveals a more nuanced sharing of the infrastructure 
grant than the shares for 2007 alone. Although Drakenstein and Stellenbosch still 
receive the larger part of the grant for the three periods it is more evenly 
distributed between these two municipalities when compared to the calculations 
based on the 2007 single-year population shares. Over the three periods the shares 
for Drakenstein will show a gradual decrease from about 43% in the first period, 
41% in the second period and, 39% in the final period. Stellenbosch on the other 
hand will show a gradual increase in shares from 38% in the first period, 41% in 
the second period and, 46% in the last period.  One of the main reasons for these 
inverse trends observed in Drakenstein and Stellenbosch is that the projected 
population shares (see Table 7.6 and, Population Shares in the spreadsheet 
Population in the Excel simulation model) for Drakenstein decreases over the 
three periods while the projected population shares for Stellenbosch increases. 
The implication of this observation is that the population share variable in the 
model is a key driver in determining the grant share while the inclusion of the 
disparity index serves to increase the share in favour of the most disadvantaged 
or, decrease the share for the more advantaged municipality.  
Municipality 
Disparity 
Index S1 
# i 
Average share of Population 
per Period 
Average Share ($ i) of per 
capita grant per Period  
  Period 1 2007/09 
Period 2 
2010/12 
Period 3 
2013/15 
Period 1 
2007/09 
Period 2 
22010/12 
Period 3 
2013/15 
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Table 7.12: Scenario 2: Average Growth of Municipal Share ($ i) of per capita Grant 
based on projected Municipal Population Shares for 3 MTEF Periods from 2007 to 
2015. 
Breede River              0.69 
    
0.11263                
            
0.11031  
            
0.10745  
     
0.0577 
    
0.0559 
    
0.0539 
Breede 
Valley 
            
1.12 
        
0.18534                  
            
0.17202  
            
0.15877  
      
0.1537 
     
0.1410 
    
0.1287 
Drakenstein           1.81       0.30403                   
            
0.29454  
            
0.28378  
    
0.4068 
    
0.3897 
    
0.3713 
Stellenbosch            1.59 
   
0.29437                   
            
0.32721  
            
0.36172  
    
0.3472 
    
0.3817 
    
0.4172 
Witzenberg           0.45    0.10363                   
            
0.09591  
            
0.08827  
    
0.0344 
    
0.0314 
    
0.0286 
 
Scenario 2 in Table 7.12 presents a similar result as for Scenario 1 although here 
both Drakenstein and Stellenbosch receive smaller shares over the three periods. 
The reason for the smaller shares is clearly the impact of the variation in beta 
values.   
Table 7.13: Scenario 3: Average Growth of Municipal Share ($ i) of per capita Grant 
based on projected Municipal Population Shares for 3 MTEF Periods from 2007 to 
2015. 
Breede River 0.72 0.11263 0.11031 0.10745 0.0671 0.0644 0.0615 
Breede 
Valley 0.90 0.18534 0.17202 0.15877 0.1381 0.1256 0.1137 
Drakenstein 1.29 0.30403 0.29454 0.28378 0.3242 0.3080 0.2909 
Stellenbosch 1.69 0.29437 0.32721 0.36172 0.4098 0.4467 0.4841 
Witzenberg 0.71 0.10363 0.09591 0.08827 0.0606 0.0550 0.0496 
 
A similar pattern is observed in Scenario 3 in Table 7.13 where beta values have 
been changed to show disparity measures where betas !1 = 0.2 and !2 = !3 = !8 
= 0.5 respectively and, !4 = !5 = !6 = !7= 0. In this scenario it is clear that beta 
values that favour disparity measures of households with no income; 
Municipality Disparity 
Index S2 
# i 
Average share of Population 
per Period 
Average Share ($ i) of per 
capita grant per Period 
  Period 1 
2007/09 
Period 2 
2010/12 
Period 3 
2013/15 
Period 1 
2007/09 
Period 2 
22010/12 
Period 3 
2013/15 
Municipality Disparity 
Index S3 
# i 
Average share of Population 
per Period 
Average Share ($ i) of per 
capita grant per Period 
  Period 1 
2007/09 
Period 2 
2010/12 
Period 3 
2013/15 
Period 1 
2007/09 
Period 2 
22010/12 
Period 3 
2013/15 
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unemployment; the normalized deprivation index and, to a lesser degree, 
population density, will have a significant impact on the distribution of shares. In 
this scenario Drakenstein’s share over the 3 periods drops sharply while the share 
for Stellenbosch increases substantially over the period. In relative terms the 
shares for the other municipalities remain relatively small but show consistently 
similar trends when the beta values change over the three periods. A general 
observation of the results from this exercise is that the capital cost disparity index 
has a gradual and nuanced incremental impact on the infrastructure grant shares 
over a longer period of time. The implication here is that the model gives the 
policy-maker an important tool to determine the size of the grant pool and, within 
available resources, equitably allocates funds for the progressive provision of 
basic infrastructure services as prescribed in the Bill of Rights of the South 
African Constitution (1996). In this context, while the population data is the 
primary variable in determining grant amounts, it is the composite capital cost 
disparity index weight that is ultimately used to take account of disparities when 
allocating infrastructure grants to municipalities.  
In the next section of this chapter I will use the composite capital cost disparity 
indices in the model to determine actual infrastructure grant allocations for the 
five local municipalities. To do this I used re-constructed capital expenditure data 
to build a capital stock data series using the perpetual inventory method (PIM). 
The purpose of this simulation is to illustrate the likely effects on backlogs and 
economic efficiency when capital cost disparity measures are taken into account 
in infrastructure grant schemes in contrast to the instability, lack of predictability 
and flexibility of the current project based approach.  
 
Section Two: Taking Account of Disparities in Capital Grants: 
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.  
In this section of the chapter I address the second sub-question and present my 
analyses and findings for the effects on capital backlogs of including (or 
excluding) disparities in a municipal infrastructure grant model. In particular I 
consider the effects for equitability of transfers and, the stability, predictability 
 
 
 
 
  257 
and flexibility of municipal budgets. The data assumptions for this section are the 
same as for section one.  
Disparity effects on backlogs and economic efficiency using reconstructed 
capital stock data  
To address the second sub-question I collected data from and, conducted semi-
structured interviews with officials from the Cape Winelands District 
Municipality and the five local municipalities. I also collected data from and, 
interviewed officials from related provincial and national government 
departments. The aim of the interviews was to establish the extent to which the 
current project based approach undermined municipal infrastructure budget 
processes and compromised the constitutional principle of equitability, stability, 
predictability and flexibility of local government revenues and budgets. This 
constitutional principal requires that National Government ensure that its transfers 
are not only equitable but that they also take account of the need for stability and 
predictability of sub-national budgeting processes. (See Appendix 1 for a 
summary and discussion of the responses from government officials). 
Given that the current project based approach to allocating municipal 
infrastructure grants undermines municipal budget processes and compromises 
constitutional requirements my analysis asses whether the inclusion of capital cost 
disparities and an economic efficiency component in a grant model may enhance 
equitability, stability and predictability of municipal budgets. I carry out my 
assessment by evaluating the effects for capital backlogs by excluding and 
including disparities in my municipal infrastructure grant model through 
attributing different beta (!) weights to the disparity index ("i). I evaluate the 
effects by using reconstructed municipal capital stock data based on municipal 
capital expenditures to illustrate how a grant scheme that includes disparities can 
have medium-term positive effects for reducing infrastructure backlogs and 
enhancing per capita economic efficiency. These positive effects will in turn 
enhance equitability, stability and predictability of municipal budgets because the 
grant model can be used over several medium-term expenditure cycles to 
determine equitable, stable and predictable grant shares for targeted municipalities 
with historical backlogs. The allocations targeting historical backlogs can be 
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reduced and eventually stopped once all backlogs have been eliminated. In 
addition, the per capita economic efficiency component of the model will ensure 
that over the medium-term expenditure cycle all municipalities will receive an 
equitable, stable and predictable share of the grant. Once all backlogs have been 
eliminated then municipalities will only receive the equitable, stable and 
predictable per capita economic efficiency grant.  
I will illustrate the effects of capital cost disparities in the grant model by running 
the scenario simulations from section one above using two different reconstructed 
capital expenditure data sets covering the period 1996 to 2007. The first capital 
expenditure data set constitutes global capital expenditures allocated to the 
municipalities. The second data set constitutes only project-based expenditures 
allocated from the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) and 
the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) programme for municipal services. By 
comparing the global expenditure generated results with the project-based 
expenditure results I will be able to assess the effects of including capital cost 
disparities in the model.  
Simulation Model Procedures in Taking Account of the Composite 
Disparity Index (") for Allocations  
In the model presented in Chapter 6 the total infrastructure grant pool available 
for reducing historical backlogs and enhancing per capita economic efficiency in 
period one is represented by CP. Given the pool of funds available, the simulation 
model first calculates the share of the grant dedicated for reducing historical 
infrastructure backlogs before calculating the grant share for enhancing the per 
capita economic efficiency of the five municipalities.  The formal theoretical 
model in Chapter 6 is converted into the Excel Simulation Model using data from 
the five local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District. The Excel Simulation 
Model is presented in a separate computer file attached to this thesis in compact 
disc format. The first set of data in the User Input spreadsheet of the Excel 
Simulation Model is the available pool of funds (CP) for municipal infrastructure 
for the Cape Winelands District municipalities over the three medium term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) periods from 2007 to 2015. The Rand amounts 
for the three periods from the spreadsheet are summarized in Table 7.14 below. 
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Table 7.14: Available Pool of Funds for Infrastructure: Cape Winelands District 
Municipalities 
 
 992,155,469.06   3,348,524,708.07   11,301,270,889.73  
 
To calculate the per capita economic efficiency grant the model uses inputs 
defined in the simulation model and calculates the desired capital stock for period 
one adjusted to take account of the composite capital cost disparity index ("i). The 
model uses equation 6.2 (in Chapter 6) 1 i,1 i,1
1
K P
P
! "
# # $% &
' (
with the variables for 
capital stock and population. The subscript 1 indicates Period One. 
In the next step the simulation model calculates the historical backlogs 
(represented by $i,1 that differentiate municipalities from each other using 
equation (6.3) 1i,1 i,1 i,1 i,1
1
KB P K
P
! "
= # # $ %& '
( )
with the input variables adjusted to take 
account of the disparity index. Recall that a municipality with a positive disparity 
will have a value for ("i) more than 1. Thus the positive disparity will increase the 
size of any backlog and raise the level of the desired capital stock and the 
commensurate funding requirement from the grant pool in period one. As noted in 
Chapter 6 those municipalities with a disparity index value greater than 1 will 
have i,1B 0>  and therefore a positive capital backlog because their capital stock is 
inadequate to achieve the municipal district average standard, as determined from 
equation (6.2). By the same token municipalities with i,1B 0<  have a negative 
backlog compared to the municipal district average. This means that their capital 
stock exceeds what is required to achieve the district average and, in cases where 
i,1B 0=  it means that municipalities have no historical backlog.  In such cases the 
capital stock (adjusted for cost disparities) is equal to what municipalities need to 
achieve the district average. This is how the disparity variable impacts on the 
historical infrastructure backlog of municipalities. 
Period 2007 to 2010 (Rand) Period 2010 to 2012 (Rand) Period 2013 to 2015 (Rand) 
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The speed with which backlogs are eliminated is determined in equation (6.6), 
adjusted to take account of the disparity index.  This is achieved by assigning a 
value to delta (%). Delta (%) is the policy parameter that determines how much of 
the grant pool will go towards reducing municipal historical backlogs and how 
much will be used for enhancing the per capita economic efficiency part of the 
grant.  
From equations (6.4), and (6.5) [ 1 1CP (1 )!" ] we know that the greater the value of 
1!  (delta), the greater is the allocation for the reduction of the historical 
infrastructure backlogs and the smaller is the allocation for increasing the per 
capita economic efficiency grant. Note also that CP1 represents the total 
infrastructure grant pool available for period one. In equation (6.4) Di,1G  is the 
historical backlog grant to local municipality (i) in period one. D here denotes a 
municipality’s historical domestic backlog. Only those municipalities with a 
positive historical backlog (i.e., i,1B 0> ) receive this grant. Municipalities with a 
negative backlog (i.e., i,1B 0! ) receive nothing from this part of the grant pool in 
period one. However, to ensure that municipalities are adequately funded to 
achieve economic efficiency objectives, the remaining portion of the pool, 
CP1 1(1 )!" , defined by equation 6.5, is allocated on a per capita basis to all 
municipalities to help them overcome their overall shortage of capital relative to a 
generally accepted district average necessary to achieve economic efficiency. If 
D
i,1G  represents the aggregate historical backlogs part of the grant for municipality 
(i) then Ei,1 i,1 1 1G CP (1 )= ! " # $ , from equation (6.8), is the aggregate per capita 
economic efficiency grant for municipality i with GE denoting the aggregate per 
capita economic efficiency component of the grant. Recall from my explanation in 
the first section of this chapter that the simulation model calculates each 
municipality’s share ($) of the grant pool (CP) for period one using the inputs 
defined in equation (6.7), adjusted to take account of the disparity index.  
In the simulation model the policy-maker can choose the value of the policy 
parameter delta ( 1! ). Policy makers therefore have the discretionary power to 
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decide how quickly the historical domestic backlog is eliminated.  Once all 
historical domestic backlogs are eliminated and there is more equality of access to 
services, the parameter  ( 1! ) can be set equal to zero, implying that all of the pool 
is allocated to the per capita economic efficiency-based grants to meet the 
requirement for municipal economic growth and development. The simulation 
model User Input spreadsheet includes a Delta Policy Parameter Choice Key that 
can be set by the simple choice of a policy parameter to accelerate or reduce the 
rate at which a municipality’s domestic historical backlogs are eliminated.  
Once the Simulation Model determines the historical backlogs and per capita 
economic efficiency shares of the grant the aggregate infrastructure grant for 
period one to municipality i is calculated. The aggregate historical domestic 
backlog grant and per capita economic efficiency grant received by each 
municipality is denoted by Gi,1 in equation (6.9) such that E Di,1 i,1 i,1G G G= + . 
Municipalities with no historical backlog in period one will receive only a per 
capita economic efficiency grant. For municipalities with no historical backlog the 
Simulation Model calculates Ei,1 i,1G G= .  
Municipalities with a positive historical backlog will receive their per capita 
economic efficiency grant and a share of the pool allocated to historical backlogs.  
Their share of the backlog pool will depend upon the size of their backlog relative 
to the backlogs of other municipalities.  Once the historical backlogs have been 
eliminated all municipalities will receive only the per capita economic efficiency 
grant (as noted above, once this point is reached, t!  will be set equal to zero). In 
such cases policy makers may wish to set 1!  at a relatively high level in the early 
stages of the scheme since this implies that most of the pool will go towards 
eliminating the historical domestic backlogs. This policy stance suggests that 
National Government is responsive to demands to correct the historical backlogs 
as quickly as possible and improve equality of access to services. As the scheme 
progresses, increasingly more emphasis should be placed on the per capita 
economic efficiency grant by reducing 1!  as the historical domestic backlogs 
diminish.   
 
 
 
 
  262 
For the start of Period Two the Simulation Model uses equation (6.10) to calculate 
the historical backlog part of the grant for Period Two. This is the basically the 
value of the historical backlog from Period One less the value of the historical 
backlog part of the grant. Thus in Period Two the Simulation Model calculates the 
historical capital domestic backlog estimated in Period One adjusted to take 
account of the positive impacts of the historical domestic backlog grant made in 
period one. The backlog grant calculated for period two is now based on the 
estimate of each municipality’s domestic backlog at the start of period two. The 
new per capita economic efficiency grant for Period Two is now calculated using 
equation (6.11) and, the total grant to Municipality i in Period Two is defined in 
equation (6.12).  
The Simulation Model uses the capital cost disparity indices defined by i,2! (tau) 
for Period One to calculate municipal grant shares for Period Two and Period 
Three. This seems a reasonable assumption since it is unlikely that a disparity 
measures would change significantly between periods because disparity indicator 
data is normally collected in five to ten year intervals.  This should not, however, 
preclude the use of revised estimates in subsequent periods.  
For Period Three the Simulation Model uses the same process used to calculate 
the grant shares for   Period Two where the historical backlog at the beginning of 
period three is defined by equation (6.13) and the historical backlog grant is 
specified in equation (6.14) in Chapter 6. The per capita economic efficiency part 
of the grant for Period Three is calculated using equation (6.15). 
In my illustrative exercise I run the simulations for nine years from 2007 to 2015 
dived into three periods of three years each corresponding with National 
Government’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) cycle. At the end 
of the three periods the historical backlog grant calculated for municipality i is the 
backlog estimated in period one less the total of the backlog grants made during 
the period of the simulation of the grant scheme cycle. In the grant model in 
Chapter 6 this is defined by equation (6.17), where T represents the MTEF 
periods. If, at the end of the 9-year cycle municipalities still have domestic 
backlogs then the backlog part of the grant scheme would require a second phase.  
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The second phase would use, as its initial historical backlog estimates, the results 
derived from (6.17) and, all municipalities would continue to receive the per 
capita economic efficiency grant on the assumption that there is still a need to 
raise the general level of public capital stock in the municipalities. 
Illustrative Simulations using Data from the Cape Winelands District 
Local Municipalities  
The simulations and results presented in this section are based on several broad 
assumptions with respect to the data sets used in the Simulation Model. The 
assumptions were necessary because of the limited availability of long-term time 
series capital stock and capital expenditure data from government. The 
simulations and results are therefore purely illustrative and only presented as an 
example to show the effects of disparities on municipal infrastructure grant 
allocations. I briefly discuss the assumptions below.  
Assumptions used in Estimating Municipal Capital Stock 
In order to estimate the initial capital stock data applying the perpetual inventory 
method (PIM) I used the Western Cape provincial level capital stock data from 
the provincial estimates calculated by the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
(2007). I then disaggregated this stock data to the district and local municipal 
level. The model allocates to each local municipality a share of the total capital 
stock of the District in order to calculate the capital backlogs resulting from the 
difference between the desired capital stock and measured capital stock. To 
estimate the municipal capital stock for the five local municipalities applying the 
perpetual inventory method (PIM) I reconstructed two capital expenditure data 
sets from 1996 to 2007. I reconstructed a first set of municipal capital 
expenditures from the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) 
and Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) project expenditures for the period. I 
then reconstructed a second set of capital expenditures using all capital 
expenditure figures for two years and applying the average incremental 
expenditure growth rate to generate a global capital expenditure data set for the 
rest of the period. The data was sourced from the Western Cape Province and 
Cape Winelands District Municipality budget expenditure reports. The capital 
stock and capital expenditure data assumptions are used uniquely to illustrate how 
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disparities can be taken into account for the equitable allocation of municipal 
infrastructure grants. 
Population data are used in the model for two reasons. Firstly, the population data 
are used to calculate the amount of capital stock per person in the local 
municipality. Secondly, the simulation model requires projected future population 
data estimates in order to calculate and allocate the per capita part of the pool of 
funds over the full cycle of the future three MTEF periods. I assume that the 
population forecasts include the effects of HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis and 
therefore the backlog calculations include the effects of population change. 
The total infrastructure grant pool is determined exogenously by National 
Government’s budgeted amount of funds set aside for municipal infrastructure 
grants. Therefore, in this example I also used the same two projected expenditure 
data sets to represent the infrastructure grant pool available for the project-based 
and the global capital expenditure grants.  
The proportions of the infrastructure grant pool represented by delta (%) and (1&%) 
allocated to the historical domestic backlogs and the per capita economic 
efficiency components respectively, are set over the three periods. Assuming the 
role of policy-maker I set delta (%) at 0.3; 0.2; and 0.1 for periods 1, 2 and 3 with 
the understanding that the higher the value of this policy parameter the faster the 
eradication of historical domestic backlogs in a municipality and, the lower the 
values, the greater the allocation for the per capita economic efficiency 
component.  
To evaluate the effects of the constructed capital cost disparity indices I run the 
illustrative simulations using the same three beta (!) scenarios used in the first 
section of this chapter. 
I assume a depreciation rate 0.002 because the lifespan of municipal infrastructure 
in South Africa has been somewhere between 20 to 30 years.   
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Findings Based on Illustrative Simulation Results 
The simulation user inputs and results can be observed in the Excel Simulation 
Model spreadsheets entitled User Inputs and Model Outputs respectively.  To 
observe the results under conditions of the two different capital expenditure data 
sets the user can switch between the two data sets by setting the Capital 
Expenditure Data Set Choice Key in the User Inputs spreadsheet to 1 for the 
global capital expenditure data set and 0 for the CMIP/MIG project-based data 
set.  
The first set of results presented is the simulation findings for infrastructure grant 
allocations based on the CMIP and MIG Capital Expenditure data set. The idea 
here is to assess the effectiveness of the project based approach to allocating 
conditional grants against allocating capital expenditures from a more global pool 
of funds. The second set of results presented is the simulation findings using the 
global capital expenditure data set.  
Results using the CMIP and MIG Capital Expenditure (Capex) Data Set 
To get a picture of the results when only the CMIP and MIG expenditures are 
applied the user need only change the 1 to 0 in the Capital Expenditure Data Set 
Key Choice cell in the User Input Spreadsheet. Illustrative results for this 
possibility are presented in Tables 7.15 and 7.16. 
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Table 7.15:  S0 CMIP/MIG Capex: Capital Backlogs and Desired Capital Stock 
Budget 2006/07 to 2015  
 
2006/07 15291768.49 25624709.89 41431388.72 38268831.52 14341531.79 
2007/08 20315534.12 34043130.36 55042737.01 50841192.97 19053118.59 
2008 25045544.81 41222804.11 67611694.37 65379298.04 23049534.28 
2009 29539371.89 47754478.67 79453339.01 80432822.51 26676372.56 
2010 33778051.73 53635613.53 90524274.58 95937618.04 29933256.01 
2011 37745085.85 58868758.69 100788373 111824518 32822648.89 
2012 41426561.15 63461327 110216968.3 128019988.5 35349716.84 
2013 44811233.82 67425313.09 118788948.9 144446853 37522157.61 
2014 47890576.08 70776965.01 126490747.5 161025081 39350006.53 
2015 50658785.91 73536415.45 133316233.5 177672627.5 40845420.44 
Backlog      
2006/07 0.01 0.01 0.01 24418941.21 0.01 
2007/08 0.01 0.01 0.01 33972651.12 0.01 
2008 0.01 0.01 0.01 45591591.94 0.01 
2009 0.01 0.01 0.01 57834821.97 0.01 
2010 0.01 0.01 0.01 70646716.3 0.01 
2011 0.01 0.01 0.01 83965725.71 0.01 
2012 0.01 0.01 0.01 97724990.67 0.01 
2013 0.01 0.01 0.01 111853039.7 0.01 
2014 0.01 0.01 0.01 126274561.5 0.01 
2015 0.01 0.01 0.01 140911238.2 0.01 
 
According to these results only Stellenbosch will receive an allocation for 
historical backlogs. These results must be considered with extreme caution for 
several reasons. Firstly, because the CMIP/MIG grant is allocated on the basis of 
project proposals submitted by municipalities it is possible that Sellenbosch, with 
a highly developed financial and human resource capacity, was able to submit 
better project proposals and therefore able to access most of the funds earmarked 
for historical backlogs despite other municipalities having higher levels of 
backlogs. Secondly, the model calculates the backlogs on the basis of past 
expenditures. In reality the past CMIP/MIG grant allocations do not present trends 
of capital expenditure data for all municipalities that are consistent and 
comparable.  Many municipalities forego CMIP/MIG grants because of the 
Year Breede River Breede Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
Desired 
Stock      
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onerous bureaucratic and administrative processes involved in accessing the grant. 
Municipal managers revealed this difficulty during interviews. Municipalities 
rather choose to use global capital expenditure budgets and loans to finance 
municipal infrastructure. 
Table 7.16: S0 CMIP/MIG Capex: Grant Allocations Per Period 2007-09 to 2012 -15 
(R million) 
 
Allocation per 
Period 
Period 1 
2007/08-09 
Period 2 
2010-12 
Period 3 
2013-15 
Total 
Historical 
Backlog Grant 
    
Breede River  0.01   0.01   0.02   0.04  
Breed Valley  0.01   0.01   0.02   0.04  
Drakenstein  0.01   0.01   0.02   0.04  
Stellenbosch  27,385,099.46   92,424,710.73   311,933,398.75   431,743,208.93  
Witzenberg  0.01   0.01   0.02   0.04  
Economic 
Efficiency 
Grant  
    
Breede River  3,079,768.57   10,176,138.47   33,438,116.87   46,694,023.92  
Breed Valley  5,045,988.84   15,799,281.37   49,195,186.39   70,040,456.60  
Drakenstein  8,306,176.94   27,147,293.96   88,236,010.13   123,689,481.03  
Stellenbosch  8,132,388.29   30,495,070.64   113,719,317.32   152,346,776.25  
Witzenberg  2,820,776.84   8,806,926.33   27,344,768.13   38,972,471.30  
Total 
Infrastructure 
Grant 
    
Breede River  3,079,768.58   10,176,138.48   33,438,116.90   46,694,023.96  
Breed Valley  5,045,988.84   15,799,281.38   49,195,186.42   70,040,456.64  
Drakenstein  8,306,176.95   27,147,293.97   88,236,010.15   123,689,481.07  
Stellenbosch  35,517,487.76   122,919,781.37   425,652,716.06   584,089,985.19  
Witzenberg  2,820,776.84   8,806,926.34   27,344,768.16   38,972,471.34  
 
 
Results using the Global Capital Expenditure (Global Capex.) Data Set 
Using the Global Capital Expenditure Data set for Scenario 0 (S0) I run the 
simulation with the beta values equal to zero to generate a set of results when 
disparities are excluded from the model calculation of the infrastructure grant 
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allocations. The default delta (%) policy parameter is set at 0.3, 02 and 0.1 for 
Period 1, 2 and 3 respectively in the User Input spreadsheet. The first results I 
consider are the determination of the desired capital stocks and the historical 
backlogs for the budget years 2007/08 to 2014/15 for the five municipalities. 
These results are presented in Table 7.17 below. 
 
Table 7.17: S0 Global Capex: Capital Backlogs and Desired Capital Stock Budget 
2006/07 to 2015 
 
2006/07 656879009.3 1100744761 1779742454 1643890447 616060281.2 
2007/08 796833201.8 1335268686 2158933164 1994136621 747317663.4 
2008 926827636.7 1525478260 2502017320 2419405956 852963892.3 
2009 1049676997 1696947991 2823362076 2858167870 947940760.4 
2010 1164877331 1849689580 3121840069 3308525823 1032284859 
2011 1271996939 1983857744 3396534915 3768449361 1106112438 
2012 1370679368 2099742995 3646745477 4235793463 1169615005 
2013 1460645343 2197762953 3871987227 4708319881 1223054134 
2014 1541693647 2278452385 4071990729 5183720153 1266755592 
2015 1613700943 2342452169 4246697346 5659639909 1301102904 
2006/07 0.01 0.01 329 911 508 410 827 433 0.01 
2007/08 0.01 0.01 397 077 529 501 686 533 0.01 
2008 0.01 0.01 438 457 016 676 203 485 0.01 
2009 0.01 0.01 469 386 013 837 651 720 0.01 
2010 0.01 0.01 489 671 062 1 092 864 441 0.01 
2011 0.01 0.01 499 019 848 1 332 462 669 0.01 
2012 0.01 0.01 497 581 679 1 590 871 453 0.01 
2013 0.01 0.01 485 406 113 1 866 338 970 0.01 
2014 0.01 0.01 462 709 778 2 156 058 169 0.01 
2015 0.01 0.01 429 817 465 2 460 690 605 0.01 
 
The scenario in Table 7.17 reveals that while all municipalities have a desired 
capital stock, only Drakenstein and Stellenbosch have significant backlogs. Based 
on this scenario the infrastructure grant allocation for each municipality is 
presented in Table 7.18. It is clear from these results that all the funds earmarked 
Year Breede River Breede Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
Desired 
Stock 
 
 
    
Backlog      
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for the historical backlogs will be shared between Drakenstein and Stellenbosch 
while all the municipalities will receive a share of the funds earmarked for 
economic efficiency.  
 
Table 7.18 S0 Global Capex: Grant Allocations Per 3 Periods 2007-09 to 2012 -15 (R 
million) 
(Where the delta (%) policy parameter is set at 0.3, 02 and 0.1 for Period 1, 2 and 3 
respectively) 
 
Allocation per 
Period 
Period 1 
2007/08-2009 
Period 2 2010-
2012 
Period 3 2013-
2015 
Total  
Historical 
Backlog 
Grant 
    
Breede River 0.00 0.00  0.00   0.01  
Breed Valley 0.00 0.00  0.00   0.01  
Drakenstein  113,932,968.41   176,826,167.08   191,745,792.20   482,504,927.70  
Stellenbosch  183,713,672.30   492,878,774.52   938,381,296.76  
 
1,614,973,743.57  
Witzenberg 0.00 0.00  0.00   0.01  
Economic 
Efficiency 
Grant  
    
Breede River  78,105,484.49   258,075,308.86   848,018,367.92   1,184,199,161.27  
Breed Valley  127,970,460.62   400,682,874.92  
 
1,247,630,715.36  
 
1,776,284,050.89  
Drakenstein  210,651,534.07   688,477,882.97  
 
2,237,738,374.46  
 
3,136,867,791.50  
Stellenbosch  206,244,109.80   773,380,275.33  
 
2,884,016,173.35  
 
3,863,640,558.49  
Witzenberg  71,537,239.36   223,350,953.57   693,485,991.72   988,374,184.65  
Total 
Infrastructure 
Grant 
    
Breede River  78,105,484.49   258,075,308.86   848,018,367.92   1,184,199,161.28  
Breed Valley  127,970,460.62   400,682,874.92  
 
1,247,630,715.37  
 
1,776,284,050.90  
Drakenstein  324,584,502.48   865,304,050.05  
 
2,429,484,166.66  
 
3,619,372,719.20  
Stellenbosch  389,957,782.10  
 
1,266,259,049.85  
 
3,822,397,470.11  
 
5,478,614,302.06  
Witzenberg  71,537,239.36   223,350,953.58   693,485,991.72   988,374,184.66  
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Table 7.18 presents the illustrative grant allocations for Scenario 0 given the 
global capital expenditure data set and delta (%) set at 0.3, 02, and 0.1 for each of 
the consecutive three periods. The results confirm that Drakenstein and 
Stellenbosch receive all the funds earmarked for the historical backlogs grant 
while the other three municipalities receive no funds from this part of the grant. 
The shares for Drakenstein and Stellenbosch increase progressively over the three 
periods with Stellenbosch receiving the largest share. However, all the 
municipalities receive a share of the grant earmarked for the per capita economic 
efficiency grant.   
Finally, as noted earlier, the results for both the CMIP/MIG and Global Capital 
Expenditure sets of data are significantly influenced by the chosen disparity 
weights in the model. It is clear that compared to the CMIP/MIG the results 
generated by the Global Capital Expenditure data set present a very different 
picture. For example, if greater emphasis is placed on spatial disparities it is 
possible that the rural municipalities with dispersed populations and/or living in 
mountainous areas may be able to access larger shares of an infrastructure grant 
with fewer administrative obligations and conditions.  
Given the problems associated with using the CMIP/MIG data set the findings 
presented in the rest of this chapter are based solely on the Global Capital 
Expenditure data set that also includes the CMIP/MIG expenditures. Based on the 
findings from interviews with municipal officials my argument is that equitably 
allocating infrastructure funds from a combined and specific purpose capital 
expenditure grant pool offers municipalities the possibility to target disparities 
and promote economic growth and development based on their own integrated 
development plans (IDP) and budgets without deferring to narrow conditions and 
bureaucratic project proposal application processes as is the case with the existing 
MIG allocations.   
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The Rate of Reducing the Level of Historical Backlogs – Applying the 
Delta (%) Policy Parameter 
To illustrate how the choice of the delta (%) policy parameter influences the rate at 
which historical backlogs are reduced, consider a situation where the policy maker 
chooses to accelerate the speed at which historical backlogs are eliminated at the 
expense of promoting per capita economic efficiency. Recall that the delta (%) 
policy parameter key in the simulation model can be set anywhere between 0 and 
1 for the three periods. The closer to 1 the faster are backlogs eliminated and the 
lower the amount of funds available for the per capita economic efficiency 
allocation. For example to generate the simulation results presented in Table 7.18 
the delta (%) policy parameter key was set at 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 for periods 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. If the policy maker wishes to increase the rate at which backlogs are 
eliminated by a hundred percent then the value of the delta (%) policy parameters 
must be increased to 0.6, 0.4 and 0.2 respectively for each of the three periods. 
Table 7.19 presents simulation results when delta (%) is doubled for each of the 
consecutive three periods. When comparing over the three periods the findings 
show that the total historical backlog grant for Drakenstein increases twofold to 
about R965 million in Table 7. 19 from about R483 million in Table 7.18. On the 
other hand the total economic efficiency grant has decreased proportionately to 
about R1,8 million in Table 7.19 from about R3,1 million in Table 7.18. Similar 
findings can be observed for the other municipalities. Assuming all other policy 
requirements and conditions are met elsewhere (certeris paribus), one can 
conclude that the Drakenstein municipality will have more financial resources to 
accelerate the reduction of historical backlogs over the three periods. However, 
this reduction will be at the expense of achieving per capita economic efficiency. 
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Table 7.19: S0 Global Capex: Grant Allocations Per 3 Periods 2007-09 to 2012 -15 
(R million) 
(Where the delta (%) policy parameter is set at 0.6, 0.4 and 0.2 for Period 1, 2 and 3 
respectively) 
 
The Effects of Including the Disparity Weights   
This section presents the effects of including the impact of disparity weights in the 
calculation of the infrastructure grant allocations. To do this I run the simulations 
with and without the impact of disparities and compare the results for the three 
scenarios over the three periods. The disparity indices or weights calculated in 
tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 are summarized in Table 7.20 and used in the simulations 
to assess the impact of disparities. The results and findings are presented and 
discussed below with the aid of the graphs and tables.  
Allocation per 
Period 
Period 1 2007/08-
09 
Period 2  
2010-12 
Period 3  
2013-15 
Total  
Historical 
Backlog Grant 
    
Breede River  0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02  
Breed Valley  0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02  
Drakenstein  227,865,936.82   353,652,334.17   383,491,584.41   965,009,855.40  
Stellenbosch  367,427,344.60   985,757,549.04   1,876,762,593.51   3,229,947,487.15  
Witzenberg  0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02  
Economic 
Efficiency 
Grant  
    
Breede River  44,631,705.42   147,471,605.06   484,581,924.52   676,685,235.01  
Breed Valley  73,125,977.50   228,961,642.81   712,931,837.35   1,015,019,457.65  
Drakenstein  120,372,305.18   393,415,933.12   1,278,707,642.55   1,792,495,880.86  
Stellenbosch  117,853,777.03   441,931,585.91   1,648,009,241.92   2,207,794,604.85  
Witzenberg  40,878,422.49   127,629,116.33   396,277,709.55   564,785,248.37  
Total 
Infrastructure 
Grant 
    
Breede River  44,631,705.43   147,471,605.07   484,581,924.53   676,685,235.03  
Breed Valley  73,125,977.50   228,961,642.82   712,931,837.36   1,015,019,457.67  
Drakenstein  348,238,242.01   747,068,267.29   1,662,199,226.96   2,757,505,736.25  
Stellenbosch  485,281,121.62   1,427,689,134.94   3,524,771,835.43   5,437,742,092.00  
Witzenberg  40,878,422.50   127,629,116.33   396,277,709.56   564,785,248.39  
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Table: 7.20: Summary Municipal Disparity Indices (# i) for Three Scenarios 
 
Breede River 0.57 0.69 0.72 
Breede Valley 1.02 1.12 0.90 
Drakenstein 2.24 1.81 1.29 
 Stellenbosch 2.06 1.59 1.69 
Witzenberg 0.37 0.45 0.71 
 
Tables 7.21(a), presents the simulation results for including and excluding the 
disparity impact on historical capital stock backlogs for Period 1. The effect is 
captured in the row indicating “Effect on Backlog”. Analogous to the FFC 
Provincial Capital Grant Scheme model  (Petchey et al, 2004), a positive “Effect 
on Backlog” means the municipality’s historical capital stock backlog has grown. 
Conversely, if the “Effect” is negative or zero the historical backlog will decrease.  
In considering the results of the simulation that excludes disparities Breede 
River’s capital stock will drop to an optimal level of about R1,049 million from 
more than R1,588 million; Breede Valley will drop to R1,697 million from 
R1,937 million; Drakenstein will increase to R2,823 million from about R2,354 
million; Stellenbosch will increase to R2,858 million from about R1,985 million 
and, Witzenberg will drop to about R948 thousand from R1,512 million. With the 
inclusion of varying disparity weights for the three different scenarios the 
consequent effect on backlogs changes the optimal capital stock value of the 
municipalities. In Scenario 1 where all the disparities are given an equal beta 
weight of 0.5 the optimal capital stock increases to about R1,458 million for 
Breede River; R2,078 million for Breede Valley; drops to R2,620 million for 
Drakenstein ; drops to about R2,288 million for Stellenbosch and, decreases to 
about R750 thousand for Witzenberg.  
For Scenario 2 where the disparity weight for population density is given a beta 
weight of 0.2, the deprivation index is excluded (beta = 0) and all the other 
disparities are given an equal weight of 0.5 the effect on backlogs again changes 
the optimal capital stock value for all municipalities. While Breede River sees a 
slight increase from the original capital stock, it sees a decrease from Scenario 1. 
Municipality Scenario 1 (# i) Scenario 2 (# i) Scenario 3 (# i) 
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Breede Valley has a slight increase from Scenario 1 and, from its original capital 
stock. Drakenstein experiences a significant increase from Scenario 1 and its 
original stock value. Stellenbosch sees an increase from its original stock value 
and a slight drop from Scenario 1. Witzenberg has significant decrease in its 
capital stock value. Except for Stellenbosch and Witzenberg all the other 
municipalities will increase their optimal capital stock values if disparities are 
included under Scenario 2.  
Table 7.21 (a): Disparity Impact on Desired Capital Stocks and Domestic Backlogs: 
Period 1. 
Total Cape Winelands District Population (Million) 1,1487,36.21 
Capital 
Stocks & 
Disparity 
Impact 
Breede River Breed Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
Capital Stock 1,588,935,916.61 1,937,096,558.60 2,353,976,061.61 1,984,516,149.77 1,511,571,008.01 
Population 
(2009) 83,815.69 135,499.65 225,442.71 228,221.92 75,692.15 
Optimal capital 
stock without 
disparities 
1,049,676,997.47 1,696,947,991.24 2,823,362,075.59 2,858,167,869.90 947,940,760.39 
Backlog 
without 
disparities 
0.01 0.01 469,386,013.99 873,651,720.12 0.01 
Optimal capital 
stock with 
disparities (S1) 
1,457,824,428.26 2,077,952,605.74 2,620,758,129.19 2,288,163,474.62 750,075,306.67 
Optimal capital 
stock with 
disparities (S2) 
1,176,590,543.89 2,098,844,537.74 3,122,827,154.18 2,791,385,579.15 632,974,649.66 
Optimal capital 
stock with 
disparities (S3) 
996,357,484.23 1,614,299,239.59 2,811,951,774.80 3,556,877,441.46 847,000,605.69 
Backlog with 
disparities (S1) 0.01 140,856,047.14 266,782,067.59 303,647,324.85 0.01 
Backlog with 
disparities (S2) 0.01 161,747,979.15 768,851,092.57 806,869,429.38 0.01 
Backlog with 
disparities (S3) 0.01 0.01 457,975,713.19 1,572,361,291.69 0.01 
Effect on 
Backlogs (S1) 0.00 140,856,047.13 -202,603,946.40 -570,004,395.27 0.00 
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Effect on 
Backlogs (S2) 0.00 161,747,979.14 299,465,078.59 -66,782,290.74 0.00 
Effect on 
Backlogs (S3) 0.00 0.00 -11,410,300.79 698,709,571.56 0.00 
Legend: S=Scenario 
 
In Scenario 3 where population density is given a weight of 0.2; unemployment 
rate, households with no income and the deprivation index given weights of 0.5 
and, the other disparities excluded (!=0) the effect on backlogs again changes the 
level of optimal capital stock compared to the situation when disparities are 
excluded and, compared to the optimal capital stock results in Scenario 1 and 2. 
Scenario 3 shows that optimal capital stocks for Breede River decrease 
significantly compared to when disparities are excluded and, compared to 
Scenario 1 and 2. Breede Valley sees a slight drop compared to when disparities 
are excluded and, a significant drop compared to Scenario 1 and 2. Drakenstein 
has a slight decrease compared to when disparities are excluded, a slight increase 
compared to Scenario 1 and, significant decease compared to Scenario 2. 
Stellenbosch on the other hand will experience a significant increase in optimal 
capital stock levels compared to when disparities are excluded and, compared to 
Scenario 1 and 2.    
 
It is clear from the simulation results that the inclusion of disparities will have a 
significant effect on capital backlogs and consequent impacts on the level of 
capital stock for each municipality. For example, it seems that in Scenario 1 
where disparities have equal weights Breede Valley and Drakenstein are favoured; 
in Scenario 2, where the deprivation index is excluded Drakenstein and, to lesser 
degree, Breede Valley will benefit and, in Scenario 3, by including disparities for 
the unemployment rate, households with no income and the deprivation index with 
weights of 0.5 and excluding the other disparities Stellenbosch is most favoured. 
In the three scenarios the disparity weights have a noticeable backlog effect and, 
therefore, impact on the relative size of the optimal capital stock.  In general, 
assuming a given disparity weight, municipalities that face larger disparities in the 
provision of capital goods will require a greater stock of physical capital. 
However, as noted earlier, the pool of funds available for a municipal district’s 
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capital expenditure is limited and may be inadequate to cover the costs of 
eliminating all historical backlogs in one period or, in one medium term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) cycle.  
 
Based on the results presented in Table 7.21(a) the simulation model will generate 
respective grant allocation shares for Period 1 from the infrastructure grant pool 
for the Cape Winelands District for each of the five municipalities. Period 1 grant 
allocation shares for each municipality are presented in Table 21(b) and 
represented in the histogramme in Figure 7.1.   
 
Table 7.21 (b): Historical Backlog Allocations: Period 1 
Scenarios Breede River 
Breede 
Valley 
Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg Total 
1  0.00   74,874,030.46   120,881,272.73   101, 891, 337.5   0.00   297, 646, 640.7  
2 0.001923921 34, 423, 437.5 136, 877, 546.9 126, 345, 656.3 0.001923921  297, 646, 640.7  
3 0.001703519 0.001703519 73,207, 782.96 224. 438, 857.8 0.001703519  297, 646, 640.7  
0 0.004317074 0.004317074 189, 888, 280.7 306, 189, 453.8 0.004317074  496, 077, 734.5 
 
Figure 7.1: Historical Backlog Allocations: Period 1 
 
 
 
Table 7.22(a) presents the results for Period 2. Recall that for the start of Period 
Two the Simulation Model uses equation (6.10) to calculate the historical backlog 
part of the grant that is, the historical backlog from Period One less the value of 
the historical backlog part of the grant. In Period Two the historical capital 
domestic backlog estimated in Period One is adjusted to take account of the 
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positive impacts of the historical domestic backlog grant made in period one. The 
new per capita economic efficiency grant for Period Two is estimated using 
equation (6.11) and, the total grant to the five municipalities in Period Two is 
calculated using equation (6.12). The results for Period 2 in Table 7.22 (a) 
indicate a similar variable trend for the three scenarios during Period 1 with 
Drakenstein and Stellenbosch showing increasing optimal capital stock values 
with the inclusion of disparities. The increase in optimal capital stock for the three 
scenarios translates into correspondingly higher grant allocation shares for 
Stellenbosch and Drakenstein in Table 7.22(b) and Figure 7.2.  
Table 7.22 (a) Disparity Impact on Desired Capital Stocks and Domestic Backlogs: 
Period 2. 
Total Cape Winelands District Population (Million) 1,1487,36.21 
Capital Stocks 
& Disparity 
Impact 
Breede 
River 
Breed 
Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
Capital Stock 2,125,701,605.23 2,585,727,196.12 3,149,163,797.97 2,644,922,009.25 2,017,061,699.76 
Population (2009) 89,672.90 137,369.87 238,578.22 277,115.05 76,518.82 
Optimal capital stock 
without disparities 
1,370,679,368.04 2,099,742,995.18 3,646,745,477.18 4,235,793,462.76 1,169,615,005.17 
Backlog without 
disparities 
0.01 0.01 497,581,679.22 1,590,871,453.51 0.01 
Optimal capital stock 
with disparities (S1) 
1,903,642,616.59 2,571,184,532.89 3,385,055,688.41 3,391,049,206.60 925,479,070.36 
Optimal capital stock 
with disparities (S2) 
1,536,404,424.43 2,597,035,465.33 4,033,544,226.93 4,136,822,372.39 780,994,634.97 
Optimal capital stock 
with disparities (S3) 
1,301,054,181.54 1,997,476,374.02 3,632,007,564.83 5,271,278,280.42 1,045,070,176.53 
Backlog with 
disparities (S1) 0.01 0.01 235,891,890.45 746,127,197.35 0.01 
Backlog with 
disparities (S2) 
0.01 11,308,269.21 884,380,428.96 1,491,900,363.14 0.01 
Backlog with 
disparities (S3) 
0.01 0.01 482,843,766.86 2,626,356,271.17 0.01 
Effect on Backlogs (S1) 
0.00 0.00 -261,689,788.77 -844,744,256.16 0.00 
Effect on Backlogs (S2) 
0.00 11,308,269.20 386,798,749.74 -98,971,090.38 0.00 
Effect on Backlogs (S3) 
0.00 0.00 -14,737,912.36 1,035,484,817.65 0.00 
Legend: S=Scenario 
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Table 7.22 (b): Historical Backlog Allocations: Period 2 
 
Scenarios Breede River 
Breede 
Valley 
Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg Total 
1  0.01  29,450,169.71  184,042,277.57  456,212,494.32   0.01   669,704,941.61  
2 0.003019508 17510837.51 260022870.2 392171233.9 0.003019508  669,704,941.61  
3 0.002385148 0.002385148 115008176.5 554696765.1 0.002385148  669,704,941.61  
0 0.008911587 0.008911587 442065417.7 1232196936 0.008911587 1,674,262,354.03  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Historical Backlog Allocations: Period 2 
 
 
For Period Three the same process is used to estimate the grant shares. In this 
case the historical backlog at the beginning of period three is defined by equation 
(6.13) and the historical backlog grant is calculated using the formula specified in 
equation (6.14). The per capita economic efficiency part of the grant for Period 
Three is calculated using the formula from equation (6.15). In Period 3 [Table 
7.23(a) and 7.23(b)] Stellenbosch gets the largest share of the historical backlog 
grant under the three scenarios indicating that this municipality, despite having 
received the largest portion of the grant in the preceding two periods, is still more 
severely affected by disparities and has a greater historical backlog to eliminate 
compared to the other municipalities. Drakenstein will receive a considerably 
lower share of the grant for Period 3 indicating a proportionately larger reduction 
of the backlog. In the next part of this section of the chapter I will undertake a 
comparative analysis of the degree of the reduction in historical backlogs with and 
without disparities. 
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Table 7.23 (a) Disparity Impact on Desired Capital Stocks and Domestic Backlogs: 
Period 3. 
Total Cape Winelands District Population (Million) 1,1487,36.21 
Capital Stocks 
& Disparity 
Impact 
Breede River Breed Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
Capital Stock 2,576,422,370.96 3,130,085,076.87 3,816,879,880.83 3,198,949,303.06 2,441,256,639.51 
Population (2009) 95,939.42 139,265.90 252,479.06 336,482.79 77,354.52 
Optimal capital 
stock without 
disparities 
1,613,700,942.75 2,342,452,169.19 4,246,697,346.31 5,659,639,908.63 1,301,102,904.37 
Backlog without 
disparities 0.01 0.01 429,817,465.47 2,460,690,605.57 0.01 
Optimal capital 
stock with 
disparities (S1) 
1,613,700,942.75 2,342,452,169.19 4,246,697,346.31 5,659,639,908.63 1,301,102,904.37 
Optimal capital 
stock with 
disparities (S2) 
1,613,700,942.75 2,342,452,169.19 4,246,697,346.31 5,659,639,908.63 1,301,102,904.37 
Optimal capital 
stock with 
disparities (S3) 
1,531,731,204.44 2,228,364,555.08 4,229,534,795.84 7,043,199,152.09 1,162,556,769.48 
Backlog with 
disparities (S1) 0.01 0.01 125,075,240.30 1,331,988,664.00 0.01 
Backlog with 
disparities (S2) 0.01 0.01 880,251,210.90 2,328,450,746.00 0.01 
Backlog with 
disparities (S3) 0.01 0.01 412,654,915.00 3,844,249,849.00 0.01 
Effect on Backlogs 
(S1) 0.00 0.00 -304,742,225.22 -1,128,701,941.39 0.00 
Effect on Backlogs 
(S2) 0.00 0.00 450,433,745.48 -132,239,859.62 0.00 
Effect on Backlogs 
(S3) 0.00 0.00 -17,162,550.47 1,383,559,243.46 0.00 
Legend: S=Scenario 
 
 
Table 7.23 (b): Historical Backlog Allocations: Period 3 
 
Scenarios Breede River 
Breede 
Valley 
Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg Total 
1  0.01   0.01   136,500,249.17   993,626,839.78   0.01   1,130,127,088.97  
2 0.003783186 0.003783186 336,185,675.80 793,941,413.10 0.003783186  1,130,127,088.97  
3 0.002861907 0.002861907 125,092,111.80 1,005,034,977.00 0.002861907  1,130,127,088.97  
0 0.021130018 0.021130018 958,728,961.00 4,691,906,484.00 0.021130018  5,650,635,444.86  
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Figure 7.3: Historical Backlog Allocations: Period 3 
 
 
Comparative Analysis of Backlog Reduction Without and With 
Disparities 
In this sub-section I present a comparative analysis of the impact of disparities on 
the speed with which the historical backlogs are reduced and the concomitant 
effect on the per capita economic efficiency portion of the grant pool. The 
cumulative level of the reduction in historical backlogs with and without 
disparities is illustrated in Table 7.24 for the three periods and for each of the 
three scenarios. The table presents the backlog at the beginning of each period. 
The results are generated in the Simulation Model in the Spreadsheet called 
Scenario Comparisons Simulations 20100817 using equation (6.6) of the model.   
In Table 7.24 the row for Period 2 presents the backlog at the beginning of Period 
2 after the allocation of the backlog grant for Period 1. As delta is set at 0.3, 0.2 
and 0.1 for Periods 1, 2 and 3 respectively the pool of funds for these periods will 
decline proportionately as the backlogs are reduced. Cumulatively there is a 
progressive reduction of backlogs from Period 2 to Period 3 in the region of R1, 
347 million without disparities and, if a fourth Period is included in the cycle the 
backlog reduction goes up to about R2, 149 million. With disparities it is in 
Scenario 3 that we can observe a significant progressive reduction of backlogs 
over the same periods to about R1, 973 million and, to R3, 121 if a fourth period 
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is added. Of course the assumption here is that the pool of funds is used strictly 
for the reduction of backlogs and, that inflation is taken into account in the value 
of the grant. The inclusion of disparities raises the total level of the historical 
backlogs by increasing the optimal capital stock in municipalities with backlogs 
and, draws other municipalities into the historical backlog part of the grant 
scheme. Given a limited pool of funds the raising of the total historical backlog 
will invariably slow down the rate of backlog elimination if more funds are spent 
on the per capita economic efficiency part of the grant. 
Table 7.24: Backlog Reduction Without and With Disparities Per Period 
Without Disparities       
Period 1 740,738,941.62     
Period 2 1,343,037,734.14 -602,298,792.53   
Period 3 2,088,453,132.76 -745,415,398.62 -1,347,714,191.14 
Period 4 2,890,508,071.07 -802,054,938.31 -2,149,769,129.45 
With Disparities       
Period 1(S1) 433,802,280.69     
Period 2(S1) 711,285,439.60 -277,483,158.92   
Period 3(S1) 982,019,087.83 -270,733,648.22 -548,216,807.14 
Period 4(S1) 1,457,063,904.46 -475,044,816.63 -1,023,261,623.77 
        
Period 1(S2) 1,053,270,582.62     
Period 2(S2) 1,737,468,501.12 -684,197,918.50   
Period 3(S2) 2,387,589,061.33 -650,120,560.21 -1,334,318,478.71 
Period 4(S2) 3,208,701,956.93 -821,112,895.60 -2,155,431,374.31 
        
Period 1(S3) 1,135,412,837.39     
Period 2(S3) 2,030,337,004.91 -894,924,167.52   
Period 3(S3) 3,109,200,038.06 -1,078,863,033.15 -1,973,787,200.67 
Period 4(S3) 4,256,904,764.06 -1,147,704,726.00 -3,121,491,926.67 
 
In Table 7.25 we can observe how the inclusion of disparities has affected the 
municipal percentage shares of the per capita economic efficiency part of the 
grant pool among over the three periods for the three scenarios. Recall that 
Disparity Impact 
Total Backlog at 
beginning of period 
in 2007 (constant 
prices, R million) 
Backlog Reduction 
per period 
Cumulative Backlog 
Reduction 
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equation (6.8) is the aggregate per capita economic efficiency grant for 
municipality i with GE denoting the aggregate per capita economic efficiency 
component of the grant and, that the simulation model calculates each 
municipality’s share ($) of the grant pool (CP) for period one using the inputs 
defined in equation (6.7) adjusted to take account of the disparity index. The 
results in Table 7.25 show that with the inclusion of disparities, there is very little 
change in the percentage share of the per capita economic efficiency part of the 
grant over the three periods. 
 
Table 7.25: Municipal Percentage Shares in Per Capita Economic Efficiency Grant   
Without 
Disparities 
          
Period 1 11.246 18.426 30.331 29.696 10.300 
Period 2 8.918 13.845 23.790 26.724 26.724 
Period 3 10.720 15.771 28.287 36.456 8.766 
With 
Disparities 
          
Period 1(S1) 15.895 22.962 28.653 24.195 8.295 
Period 2(S1) 11.010 17.094 29.372 32.994 9.529 
Period 3(S1) 10.720 15.771 28.287 36.456 8.766 
Period 1(S2) 12.026 21.741 32.004 27.668 6.561 
Period 2(S2) 11.010 17.094 29.372 32.994 9.529 
Period 3(S2) 10.720 15.771 28.287 36.456 8.766 
Period 1(S3) 10.208 16.762 28.888 35.340 8.801 
Period 2(S3) 11.010 17.094 29.372 32.994 9.529 
Period 3(S3) 10.720 15.771 28.287 36.456 8.766 
 
The possible implication of such a result is that municipalities now have a degree 
of predictability, certainty and stability in determining their policy objectives and 
policy targets for addressing socio-economic disparities and economic efficiency 
in integrated development plans (IDP).  
 
Disparity 
Impact 
Breede River Breede Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg 
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Table 7.26: Municipal Shares in Per Capita Economic Efficiency Grant (R Million) 
Without 
Disparities 
          
 
Period 1 55,789,631.78 91,407,471.87 150,465,381.48 147,317,221.29 51,098,028.11 496,077,734.53 
Period 2 184,339,506.33 286,202,053.51 491,769,916.40 552,414,482.38 552,414,482.38 2,067,140,441.01 
Period 3 605,727,405.65 891,164,796.69 1,598,384,553.19 2,060,011,552.40 495,347,136.94 5,650,635,444.86 
With 
Disparities 
          
 
Period 1(S1) 108,475,353.42 156,702,829.71 195,535,218.50 165,112,848.64 56,605,137.15 682,431,387.41 
Period 2(S1) 184,339,506.33 286,202,053.51 491,769,916.40 552,414,482.38 159,536,395.41 1,674,262,354.03 
Period 3(S1) 605,727,405.65 891,164,796.69 1,598,384,553.19 2,060,011,552.40 495,347,136.94 5,650,635,444.86 
Period 1(S2) 87,549,002.88 158,278,334.78 232,994,675.52 201,425,129.69 47,768,026.14 728,015,169.01 
Period 2(S2) 184,339,506.33 286,202,053.51 491,769,916.40 552,414,482.38 159,536,395.41 1,674,262,354.03 
Period 3(S2) 605,727,405.65 891,164,796.69 1,598,384,553.19 2,060,011,552.40 495,347,136.94 5,650,635,444.86 
Period 1(S3) 74,138,029.34 121,737,742.31 209,800,209.55 256,662,678.67 63,919,695.83 726,258,355.69 
Period 2(S3) 184,339,506.33 286,202,053.51 491,769,916.40 552,414,482.38 159,536,395.41 1,674,262,354.03 
Period 3(S3) 605,727,405.65 891,164,796.69 1,598,384,553.19 2,060,011,552.40 495,347,136.94 5,650,635,444.86 
           
Table 7.26 presents the monetary value of the grants when disparities are 
included. It is safe to assume from Table 7.27 that the slight variations in the grant 
shares ($) may be due to changes in the shares of the population forecasts for the 
three periods. 
 
Table 7.27: Municipal Population Forecasts and Estimated Grant Shares ($) With 
Disparities 
 
Scenario (S) Forecasts 
Period 1 
Forecasts 
Period 2 
Forecasts 
Period 3 
Shares ($) 
Period 1 
Shares ($) 
Period 2 
Shares ($) 
Period 3 
Breede River (S1)    113,833.37 
     
121,788.28 
       
130,299.10          0.1591 
          
0.1571          0.1544 
Breede Valley (S1)     165,167.22 
      
167,446.92 
       
169,758.09          0.2309 
          
0.2161          0.2013 
Drakenstein (S1)     205,376.13 
     
217,342.44 
       
230,005.98          0.2871 
          
0.2804          0.2726 
 Stellenbosch (S1)    171,499.02 
      
208,240.11 
       
252,852.43          0.2395 
          
0.2685          0.2994 
Witzenberg (S1)         59,676.58 
       
60,328.34 
         
60,987.21          0.0834 
          
0.0779          0.0723 
Breede River (S2)      91,873.39 
       
98,293.69 
        
105,162.65          0.1204 
          
0.1182 
           
0.1155 
Breede Valley (S2)  166,827.82      169,130.45 
       
171,464.85 
           
0.2187 
          
0.2035          0.1884 
Drakenstein (S2)  244,720.85      258,979.60   274,069.13 0.3208 0.3116 0.3010 
 Stellenbosch (S2)   209,215.77     254,037.11 
    
308,460.75 0.2740 0.3054 0.3385 
Disparity 
Impact 
Breede 
River 
Breede 
Valley Drakenstein Stellenbosch Witzenberg Total 
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Witzenberg (S2)     50,359.96       50,909.97     51,465.98 0.0660 0.0613 0.0565 
Breede River (S3)     77,800.00       83,236.82     89,053.58 0.1023 0.0993 0.0958 
Breede Valley (S3)   128,313.47      130,084.51 
   
131,879.98 0.1688 0.1553 0.1420 
Drakenstein (S3)   220,359.05     233,198.35   246,785.73 0.2899 0.2783 0.2656 
 Stellenbosch (S3)   266,589.78     323,702.64   393,051.07 0.3503 0.3859 0.4225 
Witzenberg (S3)    67,388.03       68,124.01     68,868.03 0.0887 0.0813 0.0741 
 
 Summary 
In addressing the fundamental question and sub-questions of the thesis and, in 
fulfillment of the three objectives of the research discussed above, this chapter 
presented the results and findings of applying an adapted version of the Financial 
and Fiscal Commission (FFC) capital expenditure model (2004) to equitably 
allocate infrastructure grants to five municipalities in the Cape Winelands District 
Municipality. The exercise was undertaken using official government data and 
information in a computer version of the model to firstly test and evaluate the 
impacts on grant shares of including capital cost disparities in the grant model. A 
composite capital cost disparity index was constructed and used as a weight in the 
model to assess the effects of disparities on grant shares. The findings for the 
impact of the composite capital cost disparity indices on grant shares under three 
different scenarios showed that disparities had a significant effect on the 
municipal infrastructure grant percentage shares drawn from a limited pool of 
available funds.   
 
Secondly, I ran illustrative simulations using the constructed disparity indices to 
study the effects of taking account of disparities in capital grants. I studied the 
effects with particular reference to the impact on the trade-off between equitably 
addressing historical infrastructure backlogs against considerations of achieving 
economic efficiency. The simulation results were used to compare the effects of 
disparities under two different capital expenditure data assumptions. The 
illustrative simulation results showed that when compared to the current approach 
used to allocate the conditional Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG), allocations 
made from a more global infrastructure grant pool that takes account of disparities 
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provided municipalities with the possibility of equitable, stable, predictable and 
flexible budgets. A grant scheme based on such an approach was more likely to 
respect the intergovernmental autonomy of municipalities and, fulfill all the 
requirements of the Constitution for the progressive provision of basic municipal 
services targeted at disadvantaged communities.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion, Possibilities, Limitations and 
Recommendations 
 
In this chapter I draw conclusions, highlight the possibilities and limitations of the 
study and, propose policy recommendations that may make the current municipal 
infrastructure grant allocation system more equitable and effective in achieving its 
stated policy objectives.  
Conclusions 
The introduction to this thesis stated that the purpose of the research was to study 
the implications of taking account of capital cost disparities and capital backlogs 
in infrastructure grant transfers to municipalities with communities historically 
disadvantaged by apartheid. The study asked: How can municipal infrastructure 
grants take account of historical backlogs and disparities that differentiate 
municipalities from each other? The question was posed as a way to evaluate 
two fundamental propositions about the nature of the current intergovernmental 
system of infrastructure grants to municipalities.  
The first proposition argued that the structure of the existing infrastructure grant 
formulae does not adequately take account of disparities that differentiate 
municipalities from each other and thus compromises the constitutional rights of 
citizens to basic services and violates the constitutional requirement for 
allocations to be equitable. To address this proposition I analyzed the likely 
impact on grant shares of including disparities in an intergovernmental 
infrastructure grant model intended to equitably allocate funding to 
municipalities.   
The second proposition argued that government’s existing approach to financing 
municipal infrastructure based on the unit costs of inputs is inadequate and 
compromises the intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) principle of municipal 
autonomy and the constitutional requirement for stability, predictability and 
flexibility of municipal budgets. To address this proposition I evaluated whether 
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equitability, stability, predictability and flexibility of municipal budgets may be 
enhanced by the inclusion of disparities and economic efficiency considerations in 
an intergovernmental municipal infrastructure grant model.  
The ultimate objective of the study was to explore the possibility of taking 
account of capital cost disparities in an intergovernmental infrastructure grant 
model intended to equitably allocate finance to municipalities within the 
constraints of a limited available pool of funds. To achieve the main purpose of 
the research I set three goals for the study. The first was to analytically review the 
way in which municipal infrastructure grants are currently allocated to 
municipalities for redressing socio-economic disparities, infrastructure backlogs 
and inequalities in historically disadvantaged communities. The second goal was 
to evaluate whether the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) Provincial 
Capital Expenditure Grant model could also be used for allocating municipal 
infrastructure grants and assess whether this approach may be appropriate for 
addressing disparities and inequalities within and between municipalities. The 
third goal was to assess the trade-off between economic efficiency considerations 
and the equitability of allocations that take account of disparities within and 
between municipalities in achieving their targets as required by the Constitution. 
As local municipalities in South Africa receive a large part of their infrastructure 
investment finance from national government through the use of the municipal 
infrastructure grants I examined the extent to which there is equitability and 
efficiency in the way this finance is allocated.  Municipalities are faced with 
varying degrees of historical disadvantage, socio-economic inequalities and geo-
spatial disparities. They also have to deal with past and present institutional 
arrangements and transaction costs and, macroeconomic constraints that impede 
their ability to finance their infrastructure investments. 
The goals of the thesis were addressed by using data and other information from 
five local municipalities (Breede River, Breede Valley, Drakenstein, Stellenbosch, 
Witzenberg) in the Cape Winelands Municipal District. The data and information 
was used to examine whether National Government’s municipal infrastructure 
grants are equitably allocated and redress socio-economic disparities, 
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infrastructure backlogs and inequalities in historically disadvantaged 
communities. The study used an adapted version of the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission (FFC) Provincial Capital Expenditure Grant model (Petchey et al, 
2004) to examine the notion of equitability in South Africa’s intergovernmental 
fiscal relations system against government’s constitutional obligations to provide 
certain basic municipal services to all citizens (Bill of Rights, Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution). The adapted grant model was used to process and analyze the data 
by running simulations in an Excel Computer Model. I argued that if disparities 
are taken into account within an infrastructure grant model the intergovernmental 
allocations to municipalities will come close to reflecting the real cost of 
infrastructure based services while at the same time meeting the requirements set 
out in Section 214(1) (a) to (c) and Section 214(2) (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of the 
Constitution. 
In order to analyze and discuss the impact of disparities in the model I constructed 
a set of composite capital cost disparity indices for the five municipalities. Each 
composite disparity index was constructed by aggregating the values of eight 
disparity indicators into one disparity index. Three scenarios with varying weights 
between 0 and 1 were applied to the indicators to determine their importance. 
Using the set of composite disparity indices I assessed the impact of the capital 
cost disparity on the share of infrastructure grants to the five municipalities given 
that a municipality’s share of the grant is from a designated national pool of funds 
available for infrastructure. By taking the composite capital cost disparity indices 
into account in the model I was able to show how disparities can impact on the 
way infrastructure grants are shared amongst municipalities. 
In the next step of my analysis I compared the effects and impacts of including 
disparities in the model simulations in order to study the appropriateness of the 
model for allocating infrastructure grants to municipalities while taking account 
of disparities.  Firstly, I examined the positive or negative effects of disparities on 
infrastructure backlogs. Secondly, I assessed the impact of disparities on a 
municipality’s share of the limited grant pool available for infrastructure grants. 
Thirdly, I assessed the impact of disparities on the speed with which municipal 
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backlogs can be reduced. Fourthly, I assessed how including disparities may 
affect the structure of the regional economy through impacts on the per capita 
economic efficiency portion of the infrastructure grant pool. The aim of this 
assessment was to evaluate the trade-off between economic efficiency 
considerations and the equitability of allocations that take account of capital cost 
disparities within and between municipalities. The latter assessment was 
undertaken to evaluate whether municipalities can achieve their targets with 
specific reference to the requirements listed in clauses (e), (f) and (g) in Section 
214(2) of the Constitution (1996). 
The findings of my research show that the use of the proposed municipal 
infrastructure grant model to allocate capital grants satisfy the various statutory, 
economic and institutional considerations that go towards informing government 
infrastructure investment decisions. The various statutory, economic and 
institutional considerations were presented in Chapter 4, tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
The findings support my structural approach argument that municipal 
infrastructure investment plays an important role in determining the capital stock 
variable in the macroeconomic balance and the eventual growth and stability of 
the economy as a whole. The reason for this is that the way municipal 
infrastructure grant allocations are made (see Box 4 in Figure 4.1 above) will 
become a key element in determining macroeconomic policy objectives for 
investment and employment.  
Through the model simulations I found that the use of a grant system based on the 
adapted version of the Petchey et al (2004) model offered policy makers the 
choice of increasing or reducing the rate at which historical backlogs can be 
eradicated against the rate at which per capita economic efficiency can be 
enhanced. This option is possible because the grant shares are drawn from an 
exogenous macro-economically determined pool of funds over which 
municipalities have no control. In other words while offering municipalities 
greater fiscal autonomy and, the possibility of equitable, stable, predictable and 
flexible infrastructure budgets, the use of the model also imposes a degree of 
fiscal discipline on municipalities. Using the model for allocating infrastructure 
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grants from a designated pool of funds for capital expenditure obliges 
municipalities to make a choice that will simultaneously balance the need to 
address disparities and infrastructure backlogs and, enhance the local economic 
prospects of the area over a nine-year budget cycle.  
The final set of simulations explored the effects of including the disparity weights 
in the calculation of the infrastructure grant allocations. To do this I ran the 
simulations with and without the impact of disparities and compared the results 
for the three scenarios over the three periods. Without disparities the results from 
the simulation calculations show that the pool of funds to finance municipal 
infrastructure will decline proportionately over the three medium term budget 
periods as the backlogs are reduced with a cumulative progressive reduction from 
the second to third period. However, with the inclusion of disparities the results 
show a more significant progressive reduction of backlogs for all municipalities 
over the same period because on aggregate the optimal capital stock is increased 
drawing other disadvantaged municipalities into the historical backlogs part of the 
grant.  
The calculations also reveal that with a limited grant pool an increase of the total 
historical backlog will invariably slow down the rate of backlog elimination if 
more funds are spent on the per capita economic efficiency part of the grant. On 
the other hand while the inclusion of disparities shows a significant effect on the 
reduction of historical backlogs there is very little change in the percentage share 
of the per capita economic efficiency part of the grant over the three periods. This 
means that municipalities within a district will have medium to long-term 
certainty and predictability in integrated planning for the eradication of disparities 
and promoting efficient economic growth and development in the region as a 
whole.  
 Over several budget cycles the use of infrastructure grants to increase the level of 
capital stock in a more balanced and equitable way will promote the economic 
prospects of the disadvantaged local municipalities making them more reliant on 
own revenues and less dependent on infrastructure grants to address disparities. In 
this way local municipalities will not only promote economic growth and 
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development in the municipal district as a whole they will also contribute towards 
the stability and balance of the structure of the regional economy.  
It is obvious that the exercise of greater fiscal autonomy and fiscal discipline by 
disadvantaged municipalities will have positive benefits for the structure of the 
national economy as well. Greater municipal fiscal autonomy and fiscal discipline 
will mean prudent and more realistic infrastructure budgets and a greater degree 
of public finance accountability. The concomitant increase in municipal own 
revenues from local economic growth over time will mean less dependence on 
grant transfers from the national fiscus. Over the long term, with growth and 
development, municipalities will be able to finance public infrastructure through 
borrowing on the financial markets with fewer guarantees from National 
Government.   
In general it is in this way, (as alluded to in Chapter 4 and illustrated in Box 4, 
Figure 4.1) that the use of the proposed municipal infrastructure grant model 
provides a small but key link in the macroeconomic structure as whole. The 
CMBS macroeconomic model (Petchey et al, 2007) prepared for the FFC 
demonstrated how this might be achieved for provinces. Analogously, a similar 
application for municipalities will most likely generate positive results.     
The questions and objectives that informed the study for this thesis presupposed 
an analytical understanding of the political economy structure in which 
infrastructure grants are determined and allocated to municipalities in South 
Africa’s intergovernmental fiscal relations context. In this sense 
intergovernmental fiscal relations decisions that affect municipalities are 
determined by both macroeconomic and microeconomic structural constraints. 
This is particularly so with respect to the roles, decision-making behaviour and 
linkages of economic agents and institutions within municipal boundaries with 
large communities which have been disadvantaged by apartheid. Thus, my 
approach can be defined as structural because it seeks to model the way policy-
makers should behave and impact upon intergovernmental fiscal relations agents 
and institutions in allocating infrastructure grants to municipalities.  
 
 
 
 
  292 
In this study for the thesis I have demonstrated the relevance of the structural 
approach in analyzing infrastructure investment decisions by local municipalities 
with specific reference to the influence of state intervention and institutional 
arrangements in the allocation of financial resources. In particular I showed how 
this intervention might impact on income distribution and class relationships 
among households, the macroeconomic impacts of debt and, consequentially 
interest rates, prices and inflation. In the long term one can argue that through a 
multiplier effect, the microeconomic nature of infrastructure investment decisions 
by municipalities will have significant macroeconomic impacts for employment, 
income distribution, demand for goods and services and, domestic saving and 
investment opportunities for disadvantaged communities.  
Through the process of interviewing government officials and analyzing official 
data from the five local municipalities in the Western Cape Winelands District, 
the thesis evaluated the approaches that maybe adopted for the equitable and 
efficient allocation of existing municipal infrastructure grants such that they take 
into account the cost of structural socio-economic disparities that differentiate 
local municipalities from each other. Appraising the equitable sharing models 
proposed by Josie, MacDonald and Petchey (2008); Petchey, MacDonald, Josie, 
Mabugu, Kallis (2007) the thesis evaluated the provincial capital grant scheme 
model (Petchey et al, 2004) of the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) for 
application to municipalities with disparities that differentiate them from each 
other. 
 The findings and results from my research for this thesis show, indeed, that the 
current approach to intergovernmental financing of municipal infrastructure does 
not sufficiently account for capital cost disparities that differentiate municipalities 
from each other. By not comprehensively accounting for socio-economic 
disparities in infrastructure grants government undermines the constitutional 
requirement for equitability, adequacy and efficiency of intergovernmental grant 
allocations to municipalities. Consequently, the right of citizens to basic 
municipal services as enshrined in the Bill of Rights is compromised. Furthermore 
the research shows that under the present conditional infrastructure grant system 
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the macroeconomic structure and institutional arrangements are weakened and, 
the intergovernmental principle of local government autonomy is undermined 
because historically disadvantaged communities cannot meet the legal 
requirement for stability, predictability, flexibility and economic efficiency of 
municipal capital budgets.  
Possibilities and Limitations 
There are several possibilities and limitations associated with using the 
infrastructure grant model proposed in this thesis. The thesis problem statement 
highlighted the disjuncture between the possibility of high municipal 
infrastructure budgets informed by the project-based unit-cost approach and, the 
limited infrastructure funds available from national government through the MIG 
conditional grants. While municipalities with substantial own revenue sources 
may be able to close this budget expectation gap through deficit financing and 
borrowing, poorer disadvantaged municipalities with higher levels of socio-
economic disparities and need will not be able to close the gap because of low 
own revenues and limited access to financial markets. These municipalities are 
almost totally dependent on infrastructure grant transfers from national 
government. The pool of funds available for infrastructure grant transfers is 
macro-economically determined using a model that may include and, may be 
constrained by, a variable for the level of capital stock in the country. The 
infrastructure grant model proposed in this thesis offers the possibility of 
incorporating capital stock data at the municipal level and, therefore, a more 
realistic long-term (at least three medium-term expenditure cycles) municipal 
infrastructure budget estimate that takes account of macroeconomic constraints, 
socio-economic disparities and per capita economic efficiency considerations.  
For disadvantaged municipalities prior knowledge of available infrastructure 
grants will strengthen their integrated development planning (IDP) processes and 
their ability to progressively provide constitutionally mandated basic services 
(CMBS). Of course, as noted elsewhere in this thesis, the lack of municipal level 
capital stock data is the single most important limitation to applying the model in 
South Africa. Alternatively, as shown in this thesis, it is possible to generate 
 
 
 
 
  294 
municipal level capital stock estimates using the perpetual inventory method 
(PIM) on long-term capital expenditure time series data. However, even this 
possibility is limited because long-term (25-30 years) municipal capital stock time 
series data does not exist in South Africa as the current municipal boundaries 
were only demarcated in 2002.  
Taking account of disparities in the allocation of infrastructure grant transfers to 
municipalities offers local government the distinctive possibility of reducing 
historical backlogs and addressing inequality and poverty thus complying with the 
requirements set out in the Constitution. The findings from the simulation model 
indicate that the definition, benchmarking and ranking of the disparity indicators 
play a role in determining the share of the grant allocated to municipalities. Good 
long-term municipal-level household disparity indicator data in South Africa is 
collected regularly and is available and reliable. The disparity weights are policy 
parameters and, therefore subject to political decision-making. This is not an ideal 
situation if policy-makers wish to make grant allocations based on objectively 
determined criteria. The choice of a disparity weight in the model should ideally 
be based on a set of generally agreed standards and criteria and, its importance 
should be ranked and benchmarked according to accepted statistical procedures 
and techniques. International practice shows that achieving this goal is not easy. 
The Australian Grants Commission and the European Commission have 
undertaken several research projects to address this difficulty. In this regard the 
econometric studies in Australia by Koshy et al (2000) and Chan et al (2007) and, 
in the European Commission, the research by Cherchye et al (2008) and Nardo, 
M. et al (2005) using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques are 
significant (see literature review). The difficulty of objectively benchmarking and 
ranking disparities in South Africa is a limitation because it leaves open the 
possibility of the manipulation of politically determined disparity weights in 
deciding grant shares.  
Recommendations: Issues to consider 
The findings of the thesis raise several issues that may be considered by 
policymakers. Fundamentally, policymakers may wish to consider whether the 
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requirements of Section 214 (1) and (2) of the Constitution are in fact 
comprehensively taken into account in a municipal infrastructure grant formula? 
In this regard policy makers need pay careful attention to the role of infrastructure 
grant transfers to disadvantaged local governments with respect to the equitability, 
adequacy, predictability and stability of municipal budgets. Some of the broader 
institutional, macroeconomic and microeconomic principles that need to be 
considered are addressed in the Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis.  
The requirements of the Bill of Rights and Chapter 13, Section 214 (1) and (2) of 
the Constitution (1996) are explicit that factors for equitability, disparity, 
efficiency, predictability, stability and flexibility should be considered in 
intergovernmental grant transfers for municipal infrastructure. Acknowledging 
these constitutional requirements and taking cognizance of the findings and 
results of my study I recommend that national government give serious 
consideration to adopting the municipal infrastructure grant model proposed in 
Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. In considering the adoption of the municipal 
infrastructure grant model national government must also take steps to address 
some of the limitations highlighted above.          
With respect to the limitations discussed in this chapter policymakers need to 
address the need for reliable time series capital stock data at the local municipality 
level. Currently, the capital stock data are aggregated at the national level. In the 
absence of capital stock data at local municipality level it will be extremely 
difficult to use the municipal infrastructure grant model to establish the level of 
municipal capital stock backlogs and future infrastructure requirements. A key 
benefit of local capital stock data is that it provides useful information for 
assessing capital formation at local municipality level in the interests of planning 
economic policy objectives and specific infrastructure investment targets. 
Nationally aggregated capital stock data is used in the construction of the national 
accounts and in particular used to determine the level of annual gross domestic 
fixed investment or gross capital formation in the national accounts. Annual gross 
domestic fixed investment in the national accounts is a key variable in structural 
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macroeconomic planning models used to determine the projected pool of funds 
available for infrastructure grant allocations.  
The collection and aggregation of capital stock data at local municipality or 
district municipality level should not be difficult because currently in South 
Africa capital stock data is aggregated at the national level but collected from 
public sector institutions and enterprises by nine economic sectors or economic 
activity and for three types of organizations (public, authorities, public enterprises 
and private enterprises). Identifying the geographic location of the data sources 
will provide the necessary information for disaggregating capital stock data to the 
provincial and local government level. The geographic disaggregating of capital 
stock data will enhance integrated development planning at local government 
level and provide vital information for efficient determination of 
intergovernmental infrastructure grant transfers because capital stock data is a 
more effective indicator for identifying the aggregate level of regional capital 
stock backlogs and infrastructure investment needs. Furthermore, disaggregating 
capital stock data to municipal level will provide useful information for further 
research into the microeconomic and macroeconomic implications of 
infrastructure investment in local municipalities.       
Another key limitation identified in this chapter is the risk of the arbitrary and 
subjective choice of disparity indicators that could be taken into account in an 
infrastructure grant allocation model. Such arbitrariness begs the question as to 
what socio-economic disparity indicators should policy-makers select for 
inclusion in an infrastructure grant scheme that takes account of disparities? This 
difficulty is addressed, but not resolved in Chapters 4 (discussion of methodology 
and variables) and 5 (discussion of disparity data). One way of addressing this 
challenge is to undertake an extensive econometric or statistical study that will 
help to identify the socio-economic indicators that correlate most closely with the 
provision of municipal infrastructure. Koshy et al (2000) and Chan et al (2007) 
conducted such econometric studies for the Australian Grants Commission.  
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Related to the issue of identifying the most appropriate socio-economic disparity 
indicator is the criteria that policy-makers should use to arrive at decisions about 
prioritizing and ranking infrastructure disparities to be targeted for funding? The 
objective choice and role of the beta (!) policy parameter (discussed in chapters 4, 
6 and 7) in ranking and prioritizing disparity indicators in the model is important 
in arriving at an unbiased policy decision. The literature indicates on-going 
international work in developing methodologies for the determining appropriate 
weights for ranking variables in models. The studies carried out in the European 
Union using linear programming and data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
techniques (Cherchye et al, 2008) reveal some examples of best practice in 
determining appropriate weights for ranking variables in models. It should not be 
inconceivable for similar research to be undertaken in South Africa. Policy 
makers and researchers should seriously consider using the experience and 
example of international best practice for identifying parameter weights for 
ranking and prioritizing socio-economic disparities in South Africa.   
In the introduction to the thesis I also discussed the issue of the possible link 
between the legacy of apartheid disparities, socio-economic inequality and the 
rising tide of service delivery protests and demonstrations in local municipalities. 
In May 2011 South African local government elections will be held and the 
specter of more violent service delivery and related protests is a very strong 
possibility. Although the studies cited in the introduction allude to the possible 
link between protests and municipal service delivery there are no empirical 
studies providing concrete evidence of such a linkage. As a way to assess if there 
is a correlation between protests and the delivery of municipal infrastructure 
services a community survey research project should be considered for 
municipalities with disadvantaged communities. The results of such research will 
provide the necessary qualitative information to assess the risk of inadequate 
investment in local municipal infrastructure in particular and fixed capital 
investment in general.  
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Summary 
The premise on which this thesis was based suggested that Government in South 
Africa is presented with the challenge of equitably financing the provision of 
municipal infrastructure services while ensuring economic efficiency in the quest 
for growth and development. Local government is constitutionally entitled to an 
equitable share of nationally raised revenues for the provision of services to 
communities. Municipalities, at the coalface of service delivery and development 
are faced with many problems, not the least of which is the poverty and 
deprivation consequent on structural inequalities inherited from the apartheid past. 
These inequalities inhibit the ability of municipalities to deliver the concomitant 
services as mandated by the Constitution. Among the risks facing municipalities 
are disparities in the quality, availability and adequacy of public infrastructure 
across local municipalities. For its part National Government is required to 
allocate adequate and equitable levels of capital grants to local governments to 
eliminate the socio-economic inequalities and disparities that limit their 
infrastructural capacity to promote growth and development in the quest to 
eradicate inequality and poverty. Using secondary data and information from five 
local municipalities in the Cape Winelands District Municipality, the study for my 
thesis found that government’s existing municipal infrastructure grants are not 
allocated equitably and, they do not adequately take into account the cost of socio-
economic inequalities and disparities that differentiate local municipalities from 
each other. 
In the final analysis growing inequality and disparities inherited from colonialism 
and the apartheid past pose a serious threat to democracy and social justice in 
South Africa. The post-apartheid Constitution and the democratic institutional 
foundations of the new South Africa provide an opportunity to develop new 
models that can be used as policy instruments to mitigate the potential risks of 
socio-economic instability and threats to democracy. Hopefully, the research and 
up-dated model presented in this thesis will make a small contribution to the body 
of knowledge related to policy instruments aimed at the equitable financing of 
municipal infrastructure taking into account backlogs and socio-economic 
disparities.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1  
 
Summary of Interview Responses from Government Officials 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with 3 officials from 2 out of 5 
Cape Winelands District local municipalities; 2 officials from the Cape Winelands 
District Municipality which is responsible for the five local municipalities; the 
Deputy Director-General, Local Government & Disaster Management, Western 
Cape Provincial, Local Government and Housing and, 5 officials from National 
Treasury variously responsible for provincial and local government infrastructure 
policy, planning and development. The respondent names, positions, contact 
details and dates of the interviews are listed in Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 of the 
thesis. The interviews were based on two semi-structured questionnaires. The first 
questionnaire was intended for the officials from the local and district 
municipalities and, the second questionnaire was intended for officials from the 
Western Cape Province Department of Provincial, Local Government and 
Housing and, National Treasury. The questionnaires are reproduced in 
Appendices 2 and 3. 
 
The questionnaire for the officials from the local and district municipalities 
included questions and points for discussion on the state and financing of local 
municipal infrastructure targeting socio-economic disparities, poverty and 
economic development. The questionnaire for the Western Cape Province and 
National Treasury officials included questions on capital expenditures and 
financing infrastructure in local governments in general and the Cape Winelands 
District municipalities in particular. The responses from the government officials 
are summarized according to the two sets of questions. Thus, the first section of 
the summary captures the responses and discussions with the local and district 
municipalities and, the second section presents a summary of the responses and 
discussions from the Western Cape Province and the National Treasury officials.  
 
Although I made every effort to interview officials from all the five local 
municipalities in the study it was not possible to do so because officials from the 
Breede Valley, Drakenstein and Stellenbosch municipalities were unavailable for 
interviews. Fortunately, however, the officials interviewed from the Cape 
Winelands District Municipality were able to provide the relevant information and 
data that I needed from these three municipalities. Soliciting data and information 
was one of the main aims of the interviews. I am pleased to report that the District 
Municipality officials kindly provided financial, demographic and disparity 
indicator data for all the five municipalities from the District Municipality 
database. In this summary I will discuss the responses pertaining to questions 
related to the substantive issues of the intergovernmental arrangements rather than 
those related to data. In the body of the thesis I make adequate and detailed 
references to the data sources. One caveat to this, however, is that all the local 
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officials interviewed bemoaned the lack of in-house capacity to capture and store 
data for integrated development planning purposes.  
Responses from the Municipal Officials 
In response to the question about municipal infrastructure services required to 
target economic disparities the officials reported that water and sanitation, street 
lighting electricity, roads and transport and sewage services were provided 
according to the number of houses built. The houses for indigent communities 
were built under the national Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP).  
 
Under the RDP indigent households are entitled to a subsidized basic four-roomed 
structure connected with electricity and water and sanitation. However, as the 
provision of housing is a concurrent function with provincial and national 
departments of housing the officials expressed frustration at the interminable 
number of bottlenecks in the implementation of the housing programme. The 
most important of these is the fact that national government is responsible for 
disbursing the RDP housing grants to the provinces and the latter is responsible 
for constructing the houses. Sometimes the province will delegate this 
responsibility to a municipality that has been accredited to build houses.  
 
The disjuncture between the municipalities and the province resides in the fact 
that municipalities have legal authority over the land on which houses have to be 
built. Furthermore, municipalities are legally bound to provide bulk infrastructure 
services to the new households. Officials argued that very often the decisions to 
build houses is not adequately planned and coordinated within their own 
integrated development plans. Consequently, allocating funds to construct bulk 
infrastructure and provide municipal services has to be financed outside the plans 
and budgets of the municipalities. The increased budgetary pressure is further 
exacerbated by the influx of new indigent migrants into the area and the 
subsequent growth of informal shack settlements. The informal settlements very 
soon degenerate into overcrowded slums that also have to be serviced in terms of 
the Constitution and according to certain norms and standards. For example 
informal shack dwellers are entitled to piped water within 200 meters of their 
dwelling place.  
 
The local municipalities in the Cape Winelands claim that almost all residents are 
connected to electricity and, within most towns the same standard of tarred roads 
are built. However, the officials expressed concerns that road construction and 
maintenance suffers from inadequate funding and the fact that some roads in the 
district fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial administration while others are 
under the municipality. While municipalities provide the physical infrastructure, 
the provincial administration is responsible for the provision of social 
infrastructure such as housing, health care and education. The officials were 
apprehensive that the construction, maintenance and supply of municipal services 
to new social infrastructure facilities will place added pressure on their budgets. 
National government is responsible for security, crime prevention and national 
roads.   
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Questions 2 and 3 were used to gather data and information from the local 
municipalities and the District Municipality. While the local municipalities were 
able to provide much of their financial records and annual reports the District 
Municipality was able to supply data trends covering current infrastructure need 
and historical backlogs. From the discussions around question 3 I was able to 
establish that capital stock data is collected according to magisterial district 
jurisdiction by economic sector but not according to local municipality.  
 
Questions 4, 5, 6 and 7 were intended to establish the main sources of municipal 
finance for building and maintaining infrastructure and, to establish the most 
important challenges associated with financing the infrastructure budget. In 
general water and sanitation, street lighting, roads and transport and sewage 
infrastructure are all partially financed through conditional grants from the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) allocations as per project application. Water 
and sanitation is sometimes co-funded through conditional grants from the 
Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF). The officials indicated that DWAF 
conditional grant allocations were not predictable and, were mostly allocated from 
DWAF funds that were carried over from the previous unspent budget 
expenditures. Officials perceived this allocation as a form of  ‘fiscal dumping’ as 
it did not form part of the annual division of revenue allocation.  
 
Many of the poorer municipalities financed their operational costs from the 
discretionary local government equitable shares transferred from the national 
division of revenue allocations. On average District Municipal officials indicated 
that five percent of the discretionary equitable share allocation was spent on 
administration. This allocation however, constituted between ten and twelve 
percent of the municipal budgets. Electricity, sewage, water and sanitation 
services are mostly financed through own revenues from user fees. From 2002 to 
2007 property rates in the District on average, ranged between eight and ten 
percent across the local municipalities. Housing for indigent households was 
financed through Reconstruction and Development national housing subsidies. 
Electricity was financed through the Integrated National Electricity Programme. 
Shortfalls in funds in some instances (e.g. Breede River) are financed from 
surplus funds kept in a reserve trust. Almost all the local municipalities finance 
their deficit through private bank loans. Municipal officials implied that they 
preferred to finance some infrastructure projects through loans from the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) rather than apply for MIG 
funding because of the onerous conditions and unpredictability and uncertainty 
associated with approval for MIG allocations.    
 
A problem often associated with the project applications for the MIG grants was 
that municipalities were required to finance the costs of environmental impact 
assessments and that these assessments had to be part of the documentation. 
Without these assessments MIG allocations were not approved. Officials 
complained that the added costs of environmental impact assessments were too 
excessive for poorer municipalities to bear. Other problems associated with MIG 
funding were the requirement to include detailed business plans with project 
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applications although there was no guarantee that the amount requested would be 
allocated. As MIG funds were intended for basic municipal services this 
uncertainty created instability in municipal budgeting and planning processes. 
Furthermore there was no cross compensation for the costs incurred for 
environment impact assessments, business plan development and, project cost 
benefit analyses.  
 
Officials indicated that since 1994 many municipalities had to secure private bank 
loans to finance services in some poorer communities. One of the reasons for this 
was that housing subsidies were insufficient. Another problem associated with the 
housing subsidy was that the amount did not cover the costs of electricity 
connections and municipalities are unable to recover these costs from user fees. 
This is especially so in areas where the bulk of the connections are for indigent 
households that also receive a portion of electricity supply as a national free basic 
service allocation. In addition the conditions attached to MIG does not allow for 
this grant to be used for electricity connections. On the other side of the equation 
the National Integrated Electricity Programme (INEP) does not finance electricity 
reticulation to households. The National Department of Minerals and Energy 
(DME), also responsible for the national electricity programme, expects 
municipalities to recover the costs of electricity reticulation from users.  
 
Officials indicated that municipalities have had to sometimes fund bulk services 
through loan-financed public-private partnerships. Servicing such loans adds 
another level of obligation to users and the municipalities. In 2007/08 financial-
year for instance the Breede River Municipality had to secure a R30 million loan 
to finance bulk infrastructure to meet growing housing demand. According to the 
Breede River and Witzenberg officials servicing of loans becomes a problem with 
higher liabilities for the provision of basic services as poorer households and 
commercial users are unable to pay the increased costs for services. For example 
the loan-financed construction of the Koekemoer Dam in the District meant that 
households and small and medium sized commercial farmers had difficulties 
paying increased costs for pumped water services from the dam.  
 
Given the current dispensation for the intergovernmental financing of municipal 
infrastructure the general consensus from municipal officials was that the 
targeting of economic disparities in fulfillment of the Bill of Rights was very 
difficult to achieve. With respect to questions 7, 9, 10 and 11 the municipal 
officials argued for the discretionary equitable allocation of all municipal 
infrastructure grants targeted at addressing economic disparities as opposed to the 
current conditional grant mechanism based on the submission of project 
proposals. Their argument was based on an assumption that municipalities have a 
legal obligation to provide constitutionally mandated basic services as was 
determined by the Constitutional Court in the ruling in favour of Mrs. Grootboom 
(see Chapter 5).  
 
The municipal officials took issue with the way in which indigent households are 
defined according to the poverty-line norm of between R2700 to R3000 per 
annum. They argued that many households have very little to no incomes at all. 
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As a result of the casualization and seasonal nature of farm labour in many 
instances indigent household incomes in the District are also seasonal. The 
officials suggested that income inequality and geo-spatial disparity indicators 
within and between municipalities would be a much better way of accounting for 
economic disparities and equitably allocating infrastructure grants. The officials 
felt that the lack of cohesion and coordination of the disparate infrastructure grant 
allocations from different national government departments compromised their 
ability to plan effectively. This in turn compromised planning, predictability and 
stability of municipal budgets leading to delays in the implementation of 
infrastructure projects and the subsequent perception of non-delivery of basic 
services.  
 
Question 11 asked about the extent to which taking account of economic 
disparities would impact on the cost of infrastructure provision. The question 
specifically focused on income inequality, poverty, unemployment, population 
density, access to services, debilitating diseases and other disadvantages. 
Respondents were asked to rate the impact according to no impact at all, weak, 
medium, strong or excessive impacts. For water and sanitation all the officials 
rated the impact as strong. This was so mainly because indigent residents have to 
be provided with free basic services that many poorly resourced municipalities 
cannot afford. There was no cost impact on the provision of electricity because 
this service is provided by ESKOM, the national state enterprise responsible for 
the supply of electricity.  
 
The cost impact for street lighting and roads and transport was rated medium. 
Although street lighting, roads and transport, security and crime prevention 
infrastructure are public services that were available to the populace at large, the 
provision of these services in informal settlements with large numbers of indigent 
households meant that municipalities incurred higher unplanned costs. The cost 
impact for sewage services was rated strong as municipalities found it very 
difficult to recover user fees from indigent households. In many informal 
settlements there was no provision for waste removal and sewage services were 
provided communally in outside toilets.  
 
The cost of housing provision was rated as having an excessive impact because of 
the influx of new migrants, the rapid growth of informal settlements and, the 
retrenchment and eviction of many farm workers formerly resident on farms. The 
lack of coordination and delegation of responsibility between national, provincial 
and national governments meant that municipalities were placed in an invidious 
predicament of having to provide housing although they did not have the 
necessary funds to build low cost houses. At least one municipality, Breede River, 
had to secure bank loans to cover the cost of providing low cost houses. In 2009 
Mr. Jaco Jooste, the municipal director for infrastructure, estimated that there was 
a total backlog of about 2000 houses for the five towns (Robertson, McGreggor, 
Bonnivale, Ashton and Montagu) that make up the Breede River Municipality. 
The increased housing demand meant increased supply and higher costs for the 
provision of other municipal services. These costs cannot be covered by property 
rates and taxes. The delivery of housing in the District was further complicated by 
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administrative delays by provincial government in conducting environmental 
impact assessments.      
 
Responses from Provincial and National Government Officials 
The ten questions for the provincial government official (Dr. Hildegarde Fast) and 
the officials from national government are listed in Appendix 3. Questions 2 and 8 
asked about the availability of municipal infrastructure disparity and expenditure 
trends data. Dr. H. Fast, the Deputy Director General from the Department of 
Provincial, Local Government and Housing, made available copies of raw data for 
the Western Cape Province on the completed municipal infrastructure projects 
from 1996 to 2006 funded under the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure 
Programme (CMIP) and the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) formula. The 
projects are listed in Appendix 4 and the their costs are captured in the PIM 
spreadsheet calculations in the Excel Simulation Model. The National Treasury 
made available actual financial expenditure statements and budget allocations for 
the period studied. These data covered the actual capital spending trends and the 
global amounts of municipal infrastructure grants for the period.  These data are 
used as inputs for the PIM calculation and for running simulations on the 
allocations under different scenarios in the Excel Simulation Model. 
 
Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 asked about the extent to which economic disparities were 
taken into account, how they were defined and determined and, how they were 
incorporated into the grant formula. It became clear from the national and 
provincial respondents that greater importance in the application of the MIG 
formula was attached to targeting infrastructure backlogs rather than economic 
disparities. The weight for poverty in the formula was seen to be an adequate 
proxy for all economic disparities.  
 
Question 5, about the problems associated with the project-based approach to 
allocating MIG and other infrastructure funds, elicited significant responses from 
national and provincial officials. The disjuncture between the MIG formula and 
the housing grant formula proved to be the most significant challenge in 
coordinating and planning integrated infrastructure development. While both 
depend on project applications from municipalities, the housing allocations have 
to be approved by several intermediate levels of bureaucracy from national and 
provincial departments before funds are released. If municipalities are not 
accredited to build houses then provinces take on the responsibility. However, to 
build the houses the provinces have to seek approval from municipalities in terms 
of municipal by-laws for planning and land use, property evaluations, property 
rates and the provision of bulk services and roads. The officials felt that this level 
of disjuncture presented the biggest challenge for the municipal service delivery 
across the country. 
 
Officials from national and the province provided similar responses to Question 6 
about the criteria and conditions for determining MIG allocations. There was 
general agreement that the conditions were onerous and the reporting 
requirements excessively time-consuming. Officials from National Treasury 
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argued that the conditions were necessary to ensure that funds were spent for 
infrastructure. The provincial official, however, felt that that MIG projects 
reflected in the municipal Integrated Development Plans, do not always show how 
they intend to contribute to the overall national and provincial policy objectives.  
 
On question 7 the officials agreed that there was no specific requirements for 
municipalities to undertake cost-benefit or cost effectiveness analyses before 
making project application proposals. In fact official felt that municipalities either 
did not have the in-house capacity to do such studies or they could not afford to 
pay for consultancy services. However, environmental impact assessment studies 
were a requirement for certain projects. Such studies proved to be politically and 
finically costly for municipalities faced with priorities of service delivery to 
disadvantaged and indigent communities.       
 
Question 9 highlighted the concerns raised in the 2008/09 Auditor General’s 
Report on Municipal finances. The question specifically asked about the Report’s 
concerns about the unconditional and conditional funding of municipal 
infrastructure, housing and social facilities with specific reference to the Cape 
Winelands District and the Western Cape Province. The officials responded by 
suggesting that the Auditor General’s concerns were symptomatic of underlying 
systemic problems in the way in which intergovernmental grants were allocated to 
municipalities in general.  
 
With specific reference to the Western Cape Province all the officials agreed that 
the municipal accreditation process for housing delivery was a major difficulty for 
grant allocations targeted at reducing infrastructure backlogs. The backlog weight 
in the housing grant formula is different from the weight in the MIG formula. 
Furthermore, while the MIG at least includes a weight for poverty the housing 
formula does not include any weight for economic disparities.  
 
Dr. Fast raised some pertinent points about how the MIG and housing grant 
allocations were perceived in the Western Cape. Projects were very often 
approved because of political preference or public pressure rather than on the 
basis of objective criteria and costing processes. The housing grant in the Western 
Cape was used to fund land purchase, construction and the provision of bulk 
services. This led to decisions being made on the basis of where it was cheaper to 
build rather than where there was the greatest need. In the short run this may have 
been cheaper, however, in the long run it places a greater financial burden on 
indigent households because of increased transport and infrastructure service 
costs. For most residents in disadvantaged communities such decisions seem to be 
perpetuating and entrenching apartheid-type spatial planning policies. 
 
In response to question 10 the officials agreed that there was a need for a re-
evaluation of the municipal infrastructure grant system and the related 
intergovernmental institutional arrangements. I was told (in late 2009) that the 
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Department of Provincial and Local Government43 had just completed a major 
review of local government issues and problems. 
 
                                                
43 The Department is now called Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA)]. The review 
was published in late 2009 by COGTA and isdiscussed and  reffered to as the COGTA Report in this thesis.     
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Appendix 2 
Questionnaire for Interviews with Cape Winelands Local and 
District Municipal Managers and Officials 
1. What basic infrastructure is required to target socio-economic disparities, 
poverty and economic development in your municipality with respect to: 
• Municipal services such as water, sanitation, street lighting, electricity, 
roads and transport, sewage, other? 
• Social infrastructure such as housing, primary health care facilities, social 
welfare facilities, educational facilities, recreational facilities, security and 
crime prevention facilities, other? 
2. Is there any data and information covering the past five (5) to twenty (20) 
years that show the level of current need and, the trends in historical backlogs 
with respect to the infrastructure identified in 1 above?  
3. Is there any recorded data and information showing long-term (more than ten 
years) trends in the value of public and/or private capital stock? Such data is a 
good regional and sub-regional indicator of economic development. 
4. Please comment on the main sources of funds for financing the building and 
maintenance of the respective infrastructure listed in 1 above? Are they 
financed from property rates; user charges; specific purpose and conditional 
grant transfers (e.g. Municipal Infrastructure Grant-MIG, roads, housing and 
other departmental grants); loans from private banks or development banks 
(e.g. Development Bank of Southern Africa-DBSA); donor funding; other? 
5. Can you provide actual infrastructure spending data on the items listed in 1 
above and financed from the main sources in 4 above? 
6. Please comment on the main problems encountered in accessing and using 
specific purpose and conditional grant transfers with respect to the 
infrastructure needs listed above in relation to:  the grant system; the transfer 
mechanism and time delays; the structure of the formulae; the associated 
conditions; your administrative capacity to manage and monitor the funds; 
your human resource capacity and, the geographical impediments to 
implement specific projects; other?   
7. Please comment on how the different infrastructure grant transfers are made 
from the different sources (National and provincial government departments) 
and comment on the fairness/equitability and efficacy [fairness, in this sense, 
means the equitable allocation of nationally collected revenue to all spheres of 
government as prescribed in Section 213 of the Constitution of South Africa 
and, efficacy refers to the ability of the grant mechanism or instrument to 
produce an intended result or achieve the desired policy objective and target 
taking into account Section 214(2) a-j of the Constitution]?   
8. What alternative infrastructure grant transfer mechanism would be more 
suited for targeting poverty, socio-economic disparity and economic 
development in your municipality?  
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9. Please comment on the methods (e.g.; cost benefit analysis; cost effectiveness 
analysis) and procedures used for selecting infrastructure projects for funding.   
10. Please comment on the criteria used for funding and budgeting for 
infrastructure projects taking into account development and other needs and, 
socio-economic disparities (such as poverty, unemployment, income 
inequality; geographical features such as population density and physical 
accessibility; debilitating diseases and historical disadvantage) as required in 
Section 214 (2) d, e, f, g, h, i and j of the Constitution. 
11. Please comment on the types of development and other needs prioritized in 
your municipality with specific reference to municipal infrastructure services 
and social infrastructure facilities. 
12. Please comment on the different types of socio-economic disparity targeted in 
your municipality with specific reference to municipal infrastructure services 
and social infrastructure facilities. 
13. Please indicate whether you have prepared capital and infrastructure budget 
estimates for the next two medium term expenditure cycles to finance the 
priorities and targets listed above. Can these estimates be made available for 
use in the research project? 
14. Please comment on the extent to which taking into account socio-economic 
disparity factors impacts on the cost of infrastructure provision. 
15. Please comment on what methods and steps are used for determining the real 
costs of socio-economic disparity factors when deciding on infrastructure 
project budget allocations.  
16. What socio-economic disparity and developmental need indicators (data and 
information) are available for use in determining the real cost of infrastructure 
provision in your municipality?   
17. Are there any other comments or suggestions you wish to make that may be 
relevant to the issues discussed above?  
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire for Interviews with Provincial and National 
Treasury Officials Responsible for Management and Financing of 
Local Government infrastructure 
1. Are economic disparities [as stipulated in Section 214 (2) (g) of the 
Constitution] taken into account when allocating capital and other 
infrastructure grants to local municipalities? 
2. If yes please list the economic disparities considered and what data sources are 
used and whether any analyses of the significance of disparity data trends 
have been undertaken for the Cape Winelands? 
3. If disparities are not considered please give reasons why not? 
4. If disparities are taken into account how are these incorporated into both the 
unconditional and conditional capital and infrastructure grant formulae 
(including housing and roads grants). Can the formulae for all these grants be 
provided? 
5. Can you please comment on the problems associated with the project-based 
approach to allocating the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) and other 
capital grants for housing and roads? 
6. Can you please comment on the criteria used for determining the MIG and 
other capital/infrastructure allocations to municipalities?  
7. Are cost-benefit analyses, feasibility studies and environment impact analyses 
undertaken and, their results, considered in allocating grants using the project-
based approach?  Please provide reasons for your response.  
8. Does your department have capital/infrastructure (CMIP/MIG) grant actual 
expenditure data and trends and reports for the Cape Winelands municipalities 
for the past ten years and, can these be made available? 
9. Does your department have any specific concerns with respect to the financing 
of unconditional and conditional capital grants for municipal infrastructure, 
housing and other social infrastructure in the Cape Winelands municipalities 
in particular and the Western Cape in general? Please discuss in relation to the 
latest Auditor General’s Report on municipal finance and the National 
Governments recent report on local government service delivery. 
10. Do you have any alternative proposals for allocating capital/infrastructure 
grants to municipalities taking into account disparities?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  320 
Appendix 4 
List of the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) and 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) Projects for the Western Cape Province 
Completed between 1996 and 2006 (Source: Department of Provincial, Local 
Government and Housing, Western Cape Province, 2007)  
The costs for each project are captured in the Excel Simulation Model spreadsheet 
labeled Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) calculations.  
 
Roads and transport 
Access Road Programme Bardale: New 
Stormwater System 
Bulk Stormwater Chris Hani Park: Roads 
& Stormwater 
Extension of Maroela 
Street Ph1A 
Extension of Roads External Stormwater Ext Maroela Street Ph1B 
Access Road Programme Bardale: New 
Stormwater System 
Bulk Stormwater Chris Hani Park: Roads 
& Stormwater 
Extension of Maroela 
Street Ph1A 
Extension of Roads External Stormwater Ext Maroela Street Ph1B 
Formalise Stormwater Hex River: Rehabilitate 
Stormwater Canal 
Industrial Park: New 
Roads 
Link Roads & 
Associated Stormwater 
Mooi Uitsig: Upgrade 
Stormwater 
Mooiwater: Upgrade 
Stormwater 
New Access Collector New Access 
Collector/Bus Route 
New Access Collectors New Access onto Dassie 
Road 
New Access Road New Access Roads 
New Access Roads & 
Stormwater 
New Bulk Roads New Bulk Stormwater New Bulk Stormwater 
Channel Ph1 
New Bulk Stormwater 
Channel Ph2 
New Bulk Stormwater 
Pipeline 
New Bulk Stormwater 
Pond 
New Bus Route 
New Bus Route Ph1 New Bus Routes New Link Road New Main Collector 
Roads 
New Main Roads New Main Roads Ph2 New Minibus 
Taxi/Trade Area Ph1 
New Pedestrian 
Walkway 
New Pedestrian 
Walkway (Labour Int) 
New Pedestrian 
Walkway (Labour Int) 
New Primary Road New Primary Roads 
New Primary Roads New Road & Associated 
Stormwater 
New Roads New Roads & 
Associated Stormwater 
New Roads & Bridges New Roads Ph2 New Roads & 
Stormwater 
New Sercor Drive 
New Stormwater New Stormwater Canal New Stormwater 
Channel 
New Stormwater 
Channel 
New Stormwater 
Channels 
New Stormwater 
Connector 
New Stormwater Culvert New Stormwater 
Detention Pond 
New Stormwater 
Drainage 
New Stormwater 
Network 
New Stormwater 
Pipeline 
New Stormwater 
Pipelines 
New Stormwater Pipes New Streets & 
Stormwater 
New Taxi Rank New Taxi Route 
New Taxi Terminus New Taxi/Trading Area New Traffic Calming 
Measures 
New Transport 
Interchange 
Noordend: New Roads 
& Stormwater 
Obiqua Crescent: 
Rehabilitate Roads 
Pedestrian Bridge Over 
River 
Pedestrian Bridge over 
Vanguard Drive 
Planning of Frans 
Conradie Drive 
Primary Roads Rehabilitate Access 
Road 
Rehabilitate Access 
Road from Bitterfontein 
Rehabilitate Access 
Roads 
Rehabilitate Access 
Streets 
Rehabilitate Bo-Dal 
Road 
Rehabilitate Concrete 
Road 
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Ashbury (680 erven): 
New Bulk Sewer 
Berg River Pollution: 
New Sewer Pumps & 
Connectors 
Bucket Eradication: New 
Sewer Pipe Network 
Bucket Eradication: New 
Sewer Reticulation 
Bucket Eradication: 
Sanitation 
Bucket Eradication: 
Upgrade Sanitation 
Bucket Eradication: 
Water Meters & 
Sanitation 
Buffer South Ph2: New 
Sewer Line 
Bulk Sanitation 
Studies/Design 
Bulk Sewer Connector Chris Hani Park: New 
Connector Sewer Line 
Cleaning of Sewer Lines 
Construction of 1200 
New VIP Toilets 
Eikevlei: New Sewer 
Main 
Extend Existing Waste 
Disposal Site 
External Water Supply 
Rehabilitate Concrete 
Roads 
Rehabilitate Concrete 
Roads Ph2 
Rehabilitate Etlinger 
Street 
Rehabilitate Gravel 
Roads 
Rehabilitate Gravel 
Roads (Labour ) 
Rehabilitate Internal 
Roads 
Rehabilitate Main 
Access Road 
Rehabilitate Main 
Access Road 
Rehabilitate Main Road Rehabilitate Parking 
Areas 
Rehabilitate Roads Rehabilitate Roads 
Rehabilitate Roads & 
Associated Stormwater 
Rehabilitate Roads & 
Associate Stormwater 
Ph3 
Rehabilitate Roads Ph1 Rehabilitate Roads Ph2 
Rehabilitate Roads Ph3 Rehabilitate Roads Ph4 Rehabilitate Roads & 
Stormwater 
Rehabilitate Roads & 
Stormwater Ph2 
Rehabilitate Roads & 
Stormwater Ph2 
Rehabilitate Roads & 
Stormwater Ph3 
Rehabilitate Stormwater Rehabilitate Stormwater 
Canal 
Rehabilitate Streets Rehabilitate Streets & 
Associated Stormwater 
Ph1 
Rehabilitate Streets & 
Associated Stormwater 
Ph2 
Rehabilitate Streets Ph2 
Rehabilitate Streets & 
Stormwater 
Rehabilitate Streets & 
Stormwater 
Rehabilitate Streets & 
Stormwater Ph3 
Rehabilitate Taxi Routes 
& Stormwater Ph2 
Rehabilitate Taxi Route 
& Stormwater 
Roads Roads & Stormwater South Western Area: 
Rehabilitate Roads 
Stock Road Bus & Taxi 
Facility 
Upgrade Access Road Upgrade Bulk 
Stormwater 
Upgrade Bulk 
Stormwater 
Upgrade Bulk 
Stormwater Drainage 
Upgrade Bus & Taxi 
Facility 
Upgrade Existing 
Stormwater 
Upgrade Main Access 
Road 
Upgrade Minibus/Taxi 
Route 
Upgrade Primary Road Upgrade Primary Roads Upgrade Primary Street 
Upgrade Road Upgrade Road Junction 
to Hydroponics 
Upgrade Roads & 
Stormwater 
Upgrade Sidewalks 
Upgrade Sidewalks 
along Diaz Road 
Upgrade Sidewalks 
(Labour Intensive) 
Upgrade Stormwater Upgrade Stormwater 
Upgrade Stormwater 
along Chris Hani Drive 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Berm & Retention Pond 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Buitenkant Street 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Canal 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Channel 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Channel (Labour Int) 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Channels (Labour 
Intensive) 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Channels Ph1 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Control to River 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Discharge 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Drainage 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Drainage Ph2 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Open Drain 
Upgrade Stormwater 
Pump Line 
Upgrade Stormwater 
System 
Upgrade Taxi Rank 
Upgrade Taxi/Trade 
Facility Ph2 
Widening of Hlathi 
Road 
  
Sanitation 
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Farming Village: New 
Bulk Sewer 
Informal Settlements: 
New Basic Sanitation 
Landfill Extension Cells 
1 & 2 
Leachate Treatment 
Line Oxidation Pond at 
Beukeskraal 
Main Outflow Sewers: 
Capacity Investigation 
Main Sewer Pipe Line New Bulk Outfall Sewer 
New Bulk Sanitation New Bulk Sewer New Bulk Sewer New Bulk Sewer Main 
New Bulk Sewer Mains New Bulk Sewer 
Pipeline 
New Bulk Sewer 
Pipeline Ph2 
New Bulk Sewer Pipe 
Lines 
New Internal Sewer 
Reticulation 
New Main Outfall Sewer New Main Sewer New Main Sewer Outfall 
East Pipeline 
New Outfall Sewer New Oxidation Ponds New Oxidation Ponds & 
Outflow Line 
New Oxidation Ponds 
Ph2 
New Refuse Site New Refuse Transfer 
Station 
New Regional Landfill 
Site 
New Sanitation 
New Sewage Pump 
Station 
New Sewage System New Sewage Works New Sewer 
New Sewerage & 
Connector Pipe 
New Sewerage Pump 
Station 
New Sewerage 
Reticulation 
New Sewerage Works 
New Sewer Connect New Sewer Connector New Sewer Connector 
Ph2 
New Sewer Connector 
Ph3 
New Sewer Interceptor 
Pipe Line 
New Sewer Line New Sewer Line & 
Works 
New Sewer Link 
New Sewer Main New Sewer Main New Sewer Main & 
Pump 
New Sewer Mains 
New Sewer Network New Sewer Outfall New Sewer Outflow New Sewer Pipeline 
New Sewer Pump 
Stations 
New Sewer Pump 
Stations & Main 
New Sewer Reticulation New Sewer Reticulation 
New Sewer Reticulation 
Ph2 
New Sewer Reticulation 
Ph3 
New Sewers New Sewer System 
New Sewer System Ph2 New Solid Waste 
Disposal 
New Solid Waste 
Recycling Centre 
New Solid Waste 
Transfer Station 
New Waste Disposal 
Site 
New Waste Water 
Treatment Facility 
New Waterborne Toilets Noordend: New Sewer 
Pipeline 
Planning Waste Disposal 
Site 
Regional Waste Disposal Rehabilitate Ablution 
Facilities at Sports 
Fields 
Rehabilitate Access 
Collector & Stormwater 
Rehabilitate Internal 
Sewer 
Rehabilitate Main Sewer Rehabilitate Oxidation 
Dams 
Rehabilitate Oxidation 
Ponds 
Rehabilitate Refuse Site 
at Overhills 
Rehabilitate Sanitation Rehabilitate Sewage 
Pipes 
Rehabilitate Sewage 
System 
Rehabilitate Sewage 
Treatment Works 
Rehabilitate Sewage 
Works 
Rehabilitate Sewerage 
Treatment Works 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Mains 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Outfall Relocation 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Pipeline 
Rehabilitate Sewer Pipe 
Network 
Rehabilitate Sewer Pipes 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Pumps 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Pumps Ph2 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Pump Station 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Reticulation 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Treatment 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Treatment Plant 
Rehabilitate Sewer 
Works 
Rehabilitate Solid Waste 
Disposal Site 
Rehabilitate Sports 
Stadium 
Rehabilitate Waste 
Water Treatment 
Rehabilitate Waste 
Water Treatment Works 
Rehabilitate Waste 
Water Works 
Rehabilitate Water 
Reticulation 
Rehab Sewer System: 
Pipes 
Replace Pitch Fibre 
Sewer Pipes 
Sewer Pump Station 
Sewer Works: Re-use of 
Treated Effluent 
Solid Waste Transfer 
Station 
SPCA: Upgrade Waste 
Water Pump Station 
Stormwater 
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Stormwater Retention 
Pond (Labour Int) 
Swartklip Refuse 
Transfer Stn 
Upgrade Bulk Sanitation Upgrade Bulk Sewer 
Upgrade Connector 
Sewer 
Upgrade Disposal Site Upgrade Existing 
Sewerage Purification 
Plant 
Upgrade Existing 
Sewerage Works 
Upgrade External Sewer Upgrade External Sewer 
System 
Upgrade Internal 
Sewerage 
Upgrade Landfill Site at 
Karwyderskraal 
Upgrade Main Sewer Upgrade Main Sewer 
Line 
Upgrade Main Sewer 
Pump Station 
Upgrade Outfall Sewer 
Line 
Upgrade Potsdam Sewer 
Treatment Works 
Upgrade Refuse Site Upgrade Sanitation Upgrade Sanitation 
Upgrade Sanitation: 
Oxidation Ponds 
Upgrade Sanitation Ph3 Upgrade Sanitation 
System 
Upgrade Sanitation 
System 
Upgrade Sanitation 
Works 
Upgrade Schulphoek 
Access 
Upgrade Sewage Upgrade Sewage Pump 
Upgrade Sewage 
System: Effluent 
Irrigation 
Upgrade Sewage 
Treatment 
Upgrade Sewage 
Treatment Works 
Upgrade Sewage Works 
Upgrade Sewer Upgrade Sewerage 
Network 
Upgrade Sewerage 
Pump Station 
Upgrade Sewerage 
Pump Stations 
Upgrade Sewerage 
Treatment Works 
Upgrade Sewerage Work Upgrade Sewerage 
Works 
Upgrade Sewer Dams 
Upgrade Sewer Line Upgrade Sewer Main Upgrade Sewer Main 
Ph1 
Upgrade Sewer Main 
Ph2 
Upgrade Sewer Outfall Upgrade Sewer Pipe Upgrade Sewer & Pump 
Station 
Upgrade Sewer Pump 
Station & Pump Line 
Upgrade Sewer Pump 
Station & Rising Main 
Upgrade Sewer System Upgrade Sewer System 
Ph2 
Upgrade Sewer 
Treatment 
Upgrade Sewer 
Treatment at Kleinkrantz 
Upgrade Sewer 
Treatment Works 
Upgrade Sewer 
Treatment Works 
(Oxidation Pond) 
Upgrade Sewer Works 
Upgrade Shelly Point 
Sewer Treatment Works 
Upgrade Solid Waste 
Disposal Site 
Upgrade Solid Waste 
Site 
Upgrade Treatment 
Works 
Upgrade Waste Disposal Upgrade Waste Disposal 
Site 
Upgrade Waste Water 
Treatment Works 
Upgrade Water Works 
Sludge Disposal 
Waste Disposal Site Waste Water Treatment 
Works 
  
 
 
Buffer South Ph2: New 
Local Distributor 
Community Lighting Community Lighting: 
Wind Generation 
Groendal Road: New 
Streetlights 
High Mast Lighting High Mast & Street 
Lighting 
Mooiwater & Langrug: 
New Street Lighting 
Morkels Cottage: New 
Street Lighting 
N2 Lights New Bulk Electricity 
Infrastructure 
New Community 
Lighting 
New Community 
Lighting 
New Community Lights New Community Lights New Flood Lights for 
Rustdene Stadium 
New High Mast Lighting 
New High Mast Lighting New High Mast Lighting 
for 2 Sports Fields 
New High Mast Lighting 
Ph2 
New Lighting 
New Local Distributor New Local Distributor 
(Saxdowns Road) 
New Night Lighting New Residential Street 
Lights 
Electricity 
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New Sports Field 
Lighting 
New Street & High Mast 
Lighting 
New Street Lighting New Street Lighting 
New Street Lighting 
along Eerste River Road 
New Street Lighting & 
Bulk 
New Street Lighting & 
Bulk Supply 
New Street Lighting in 
Beach Road 
New Street Lighting on 
Stock Road 
New Street Lighting Ph1 New Street Lighting Ph1 New Street Lighting Ph2 
New Street Lighting Ph2 New Street Lights New Street Lights New Street Lights along 
Pedestrian Walkway 
New Street Lights & 
Associated Bulk Supply 
New Streetlights & 
Electricity 
New Street Lights on 
Access Roads 
New Streetlights on 
Mossel Bay/Oudtshoorn 
Roads 
Pama & Spine Roads: 
New Street Lighting 
Rehabilitate Bulk 
Electricity 
Rehabilitate Electricity 
Reticulation Street Light 
Rehabilitate High Mast 
Lighting 
Rehabilitate Street 
Lighting 
Rehabilitate Street 
Lights 
Sheffield Rd: New Street 
Lighting 
Solar Driven Street 
Lights 
Street Lighting Street Lighting on 
Access Road 
Street Lights on Main 
Access Roads 
Upgrade Bulk Electricity 
Upgrade Bulk Electricity 
Supply 
Upgrade Community 
Lighting 
Upgrade Electrical 
Control Room & Fault 
Repor 
Upgrade Electricity 
Supply 
Upgrade Flood Lighting 
for Sports Field 
Upgrade High Mast 
Lighting 
Upgrade Lighting: 22kV 
Auto Reclosers 
Upgrade Lighting Ph2 
Upgrade Street Lighting Upgrade Street Lighting 
& Associated Bulk 
Supply 
Upgrade Street Lighting 
Ph2 
Upgrade Street Lights 
 
Ashbury (680 
erven): New Main 
Water Line 
Augmentation of 
Raw Water Supply 
Buffer South Ph2: 
New Water Pipe 
Buffer South Site 
B: New Water 
Connector 
Bulk Water Supply 
Bulk Water Supply 
Ph 2&3 
Bulk Water Supply 
Telemetry 
Chris Hani Park: 
New Water 
Connectors 
Eikevlei: New 
Water Main 
Extension to Waste 
Water Treatment 
Works 
Extension to Water 
Treatment Works 
Industrial Park: 
New Water 
Pipeline 
Informal 
Settlement: New 
Water 
Informal 
Settlements: New 
Basic Water 
Supply 
Investigate Water 
Network Losses 
Investigation of 
New Water Supply 
Ph1-3 
New 1Ml Raw 
Water Reservoir 
New 2Ml 
Reservoir 
New 500Kl 
Reservoir 
New 5Ml 
Reservoir 
New Booster Pump 
Station 
New Bulk & 
Connector Water 
New Bulk Water New Bulk Water New Bulk Water 
Main 
New Bulk Water 
Main 
New Bulk Water 
Mains 
New Bulk Water 
Ph2 
New Bulk Water 
Provision 
New Bulk Water 
Supply 
New Bulk Water 
Supply: Irrigation 
New External 
Water Supply 
New Gravity Sand 
Filters 
New Internal 
Water Reticulation 
New Koekedouw 
Dam 
New Main Water 
Supply 
New Pump Station New Reservoir New Reservoir & 
Main 
New Reservoir 
(Old CMIP 
4207.1) 
New Reservoir & 
Pipe 
New Reservoir & 
Pipeline 
New Reservoir & 
Pipe Line 
New Water New Water 
Connect 
New Water 
Connector 
New Water 
Connector Ph3 
New Water 
Connectors 
New Water Main New Water Main 
Water 
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New Water Mains New Water Pipe New Water 
Pipeline 
New Water Pipes New Water 
Reticulation 
New Water 
Reticulation 
New Water 
Reticulation Ph2 
New Water 
Reticulation Ph3 
New Water 
Stabilisation 
New Water 
Storage 
New Water Supply New Water Supply 
Network 
New Water Supply 
Pipeline Ph1 
New Water 
Treatment Works 
Raw Water Storage 
Reconstruct 
Wesselsgat Water 
Pipe Bridge 
Rehabilitate Bulk 
Water 
Rehabilitate Bulk 
Water Supply 
Rehabilitate 
Gamka Dam Pipe 
Rehabilitate 
Internal Water 
Rehabilitate 
Internal Water 
Network 
Rehabilitate 
Internal Water Ph2 
Rehabilitate 
Internal Water 
Reticulation 
Rehabilitate Low 
Level Reservoir 
Rehabilitate Low 
Water Bridge 
Rehabilitate Main 
Water Supply 
Rehabilitate Main 
Water Supply 
Rehabilitate Main 
Water Supply 
Pipeline 
Rehabilitate Main 
Water Supply 
Pipelines 
Rehabilitate Raw 
Water Channels 
Rehabilitate 
Reservoir 
Rehabilitate Water Rehabilitate Water 
Connection 
Rehabilitate Water 
Main 
Rehabilitate Water 
Mains 
Rehabilitate Water 
Main & Works 
Rehabilitate Water 
Network 
Rehabilitate Water 
Network 
Rehabilitate Water 
Network 
Rehabilitate Water 
Pipe 
Rehabilitate Water 
Pipe from Bok 
River Ph1 
Rehabilitate Water 
Pipe Network 
Rehabilitate Water 
Pipes & Meters 
Rehabilitate Water 
Resources 
Rehabilitate Water 
Reticulation 
Rehabilitate Water 
Reticulation 
Network 
Rehabilitate Water 
Reticulation Ph1 
Rehabilitate Water 
Supply 
Rehabilitate Water 
Supply from Bok 
River Ph2 
Rehabilitate Water 
Supply Network 
Rehabilitate Water 
Supply Ph3 
Rehabilitate Water 
Treatment at 
Stettynskloof Dam 
Rehabilitate Water 
Treatment Works 
Rehab Water 
Connector 
Replace Raw 
Water Pipeline 
Rural Water 
Scheme 
Upgrade Bulk 
Water 
Upgrade Bulk 
Water Ph2 
Upgrade Bulk 
Water Pipeline 
Upgrade Bulk 
Water Supply 
Upgrade Bulk 
Water Supply 
Pipeline Ph4 
Upgrade 
Chlorination of 
Potable Water 
Upgrade Existing 
Water 
Upgrade Existing 
Water Network 
Upgrade & Extend 
Water Supply 
Upgrade 
Keurbooms Water 
Supply 
Upgrade Lotus 
Canal 
Upgrade Lotus 
River Canal Ph2 
Upgrade Lotus 
River Canal Ph3 
Upgrade Lotus 
River Canal Ph4 
Upgrade Main 
Water Supply 
Upgrade Rising 
Water Main 
Upgrade 
Roodefontein Dam 
Upgrade Water Upgrade Water 
Main 
Upgrade Water 
Main Ph2 
Upgrade Water 
Main Supply 
Upgrade Water 
Network 
Upgrade Water 
Pump Station 
Upgrade Water 
Resources 
Upgrade Water 
Services 
Upgrade Water 
Source: Fencing 
Upgrade Water 
Storage 
Upgrade Water 
Supply 
Upgrade Water 
Supply Line 
Upgrade Water 
Supply: New 
Connector 
Upgrade Water 
Supply: New 
Reservoir 
Upgrade Water 
Supply: Pipeline 
Upgrade Water 
Supply Pipelines 
Upgrade Water 
Supply: Pipes 
Upgrade Water 
Supply: Reservoir 
Upgrade Water 
Supply & Storage 
Upgrade Water 
Supply to 
Göldnerville 
Reservoir 
Upgrade Water 
Treatment 
Upgrade Water 
Treatment at 
Reservoir 
Upgrade Water 
Treatment Plant 
Upgrade Water 
Treatment Works 
Water Supply Water Supply 
Scheme 
Water Treatment 
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Completion of C-Field Construct Cell Ph2B LED Mountain View: 
Rehabilitate Main 
Access 
New Construction of 
Cell 3 
New Main Supply Line New Rag/Sand Trap at 
Monwabisi 
PMU 
Rehabilitate Access 
Collector 
Upgrade Access 
Collectors 
Upgrade Main Supply Upgrade Pump Station 
Upgrade Pump Station 
& Rising Mains 
   
 
 
Art & Craft Village Capping & Remediation 
Ph2 
Cemetery Extension Embankment Protection 
Ph1 
Flood Damage Irrigation of Community 
Recreation Centres 
Irrigation of Sports 
Fields 
New Athletics Track at 
CBD 
New Cemetery New Cemetery Ph1 New Cemetery Ph2 New Colorado Park 
Community Centre 
New Community Centre New Community 
Facility: Fish Market 
New Community Hall New Community Hall at 
Bergsig 
New Community Sports 
Ground 
New Cricket Oval New Detention Ponds New Lentegeur Hall 
New Multi Purpose 
Sports Centre 
New Recreational 
Facilities 
New Recreational 
Facility 
New Rehabilitation 
Centre for HIV/AIDS 
New Sidewalks, 
Pedestrian Crossings, 
Kerbing 
New Sports Complex New Sports Complex New Sports Field 
New Sports Field 
Lighting 
New Sports Ground New Undercover 
Structure 
Pedestrian Safety 
Improvements 
Phumlani Square: New 
Library & Clinic Access 
Rehabilitate Community 
Recreation Centres 
Rehabilitate Fencing at 
Sports & Rec Facilities 
Rehabilitate Internal 
Services 
Rehabilitate Outfall 
Works 
Rehabilitate Roofs to 
Sport & Recreation 
Centres 
Rehabilitate Van 
Riebeeck Sport Stadium 
Sea Erosion 
Upgrade Blyth Street 
Cemetery 
Upgrade Clanwilliam 
Clinic 
Upgrade Community 
Facility 
Upgrade Debt Collection 
Office 
Upgrade Göldnerville 
Cemetery 
Upgrade Irrigation & 
Pump at Oxidation Pond 
Upgrade Public Open 
Space 
Upgrade Public Space at 
Flats 
Upgrade Rustdene 
Regional Sport Stadium 
Upgrade Sludge Drying 
Beds 
Upgrade Sport Facilities Upgrade Sports 
Facilities in Rustdene 
Upgrade Sports 
Facilities Ph1 
Upgrade Sports Facility Upgrade Sports Fields: 
High Mast Lighting 
Upgrade Sports Grounds 
Upgrade Supply Line Upgrade Telemetry 
System Ph2 
Upgrade Telemetry 
System Ph3 
 
 
Unknown 
Other 
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Appendix 5 
Estimated Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) Capital Stock Calculations for the 
four (Central Karoo, Overberg, Eden, West Coast), Western Cape Province 
District Municipalities excluding the Cape Winelands District Muncipality.  
 
Central Karoo 
  Electricity Water 
Year Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 17,354.39 R 62,030.00 R 11,166.65 R 0.00 
1998 R 78,516.67 R 234,970.00 R 10,608.32 R 300,298.00 
1999 R 364,759.79 R 220,000.00 R 309,872.01 R 1,354,080.81 
2000 R 811,939.50 R 1,785,000.00 R 1,905,040.42 R 1,210,489.00 
2001 R 2,920,573.19 R 0.00 R 4,319,552.05 R 1,947,870.63 
2002 R 4,406,165.09 R 4,406,165.09 R 7,919,748.14 R 2,435,364.00 
2003 R 7,860,095.39 R 2,398,733.00 R 12,605,599.69 R 2,345,934.00 
2004 R 12,277,831.97 R 4,188,108.31 R 17,593,558.60 R 819,361.11 
2005 R 18,782,865.39 R 785,399.22 R 20,842,355.64 R 2,538,371.73 
2006 R 22,728,914.81 R 8,651.81 R 24,386,162.00 R 1,864,123.64 
2007 R 23,963,766.43   R 27,152,785.31   
 Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 14,179.87 R 0.00 R 20,007.83 R 285,368.00 
1998 R 13,470.87 R 445,000.00 R 304,375.44 R 751,136.00 
1999 R 457,157.46 R 204,330.00 R 1,296,934.43 R 1,044,529.82 
2000 R 1,019,035.38 R 1,501,575.00 R 3,127,612.80 R 204,873.00 
2001 R 2,927,311.69 R 48,596.00 R 4,667,204.13 R 296,249.82 
2002 R 4,306,129.93 R 10,241,580.00 R 5,921,400.17 R 2,031,746.00 
2003 R 15,345,961.54 R 15,881,356.00 R 8,579,025.50 R 323,905.00 
2004 R 38,169,545.63 R 13,529,290.92 R 10,329,898.11 R 3,414,820.22 
2005 R 64,931,991.26 R 14,245,030.57 R 14,389,788.08 R 2,771,147.20 
2006 R 92,797,437.83 R 952,512.97 R 19,000,189.14 R 151,000.00 
2007 R 105,794,151.10   R 20,961,597.10   
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Overberg 
  Electricity Water 
Year Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate 
Capital 
Spending 
1997 R 44,049.11 R 0.00 R 48,125.56 R 0.00 
1998 R 41,846.66 R 880,969.00 R 45,719.28 R 8,836,822.00 
1999 R 918,735.61 R 953,488.00 R 8,878,083.65 R 3,792,890.07 
2000 R 2,578,109.49 R 825,363.00 R 19,799,717.94 R 4,848,613.79 
2001 R 4,626,137.42 R 0.00 R 32,554,085.22 R 859,982.00 
2002 R 5,979,555.51 R 5,979,555.51 R 41,655,449.23 R 1,297,085.00 
2003 R 7,652,893.41 R 755,421.00 R 47,560,100.65 R 1,197,978.00 
2004 R 9,194,223.99 R 479,679.00 R 50,503,511.92 R 2,424,126.59 
2005 R 10,236,742.00 R 3,124,821.26 R 52,355,182.09 R 3,180,846.62 
2006 R 13,506,772.52 R 284,800.00 R 54,085,283.64 R 0.00 
2007 R 15,074,121.95   R 52,416,895.16   
 Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year Capital Stock Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate 
Capital 
Spending 
1997 R 24,992.60 R 0.00 R 42,007.81 R 0.00 
1998 R 23,742.97 R 1,437,721.00 R 39,907.42 R 3,556,864.00 
1999 R 1,459,149.03 R 2,977,679.76 R 3,592,880.44 R 1,562,229.61 
2000 R 5,594,552.61 R 3,358,341.86 R 8,021,696.28 R 1,852,969.00 
2001 R 12,041,478.90 R 186,258.00 R 13,080,878.65 R 2,258,760.08 
2002 R 16,614,171.63 R 250,000.00 R 18,600,293.67 R 2,988,597.00 
2003 R 19,394,812.39 R 1,567,833.00 R 24,716,153.21 R 2,429,768.00 
2004 R 21,934,729.92 R 1,699,566.51 R 30,181,046.36 R 4,545,194.95 
2005 R 24,222,593.11 R 2,688,172.76 R 36,842,710.77 R 7,056,465.99 
2006 R 27,141,560.65 R 464,336.42 R 46,255,551.28 R 657,798.46 
2007 R 27,996,512.72   R 50,236,387.49   
 
 
 
 
  329 
Eden 
  Electricity Water 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 152,162.44 R 894,797.00 R 327,969.64 R 92,374.00 
1998 R 1,039,351.31 R 2,868,363.00 R 403,945.16 R 7,800,788.00 
1999 R 4,656,434.71 R 939,058.00 R 8,253,103.80 R 11,637,716.57 
2000 R 8,463,867.85 R 1,014,730.66 R 26,207,837.58 R 6,119,950.38 
2001 R 12,156,583.21 R 0.00 R 45,641,638.96 R 5,054,292.35 
2002 R 14,406,106.80 R 14,406,106.80 R 63,451,354.41 R 5,351,944.00 
2003 R 17,854,357.01 R 1,069,015.00 R 78,722,508.09 R 7,808,775.00 
2004 R 20,438,695.89 R 571,141.00 R 93,259,573.86 R 7,119,213.41 
2005 R 21,702,405.31 R 0.00 R 105,359,995.01 R 7,905,998.11 
2006 R 21,413,737.16 R 0.00 R 115,624,276.67 R 7,765,771.18 
2007 R 20,170,214.01   R 123,754,438.59   
 Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 61,860.81 R 0.00 R 217,786.92 R 0.00 
1998 R 58,767.77 R 3,210,085.00 R 206,897.57 R 4,256,563.00 
1999 R 3,263,122.91 R 832,814.90 R 4,443,288.06 R 13,040,744.66 
2000 R 6,680,115.66 R 320,000.00 R 20,894,043.61 R 4,569,480.00 
2001 R 9,449,271.82 R 175,876.03 R 37,818,064.64 R 9,212,309.06 
2002 R 11,295,404.51 R 877,723.00 R 58,234,955.33 R 2,558,250.00 
2003 R 12,965,434.46 R 2,700,683.00 R 72,889,748.34 R 4,183,529.00 
2004 R 16,184,089.93 R 5,836,815.12 R 83,662,778.45 R 3,973,829.15 
2005 R 23,347,022.36 R 5,051,994.92 R 90,600,516.96 R 17,297,279.13 
2006 R 31,746,100.09 R 2,818,865.03 R 107,740,275.84 R 5,724,262.41 
2007 R 38,006,498.21   R 118,339,731.23   
 
 
 
 
  330 
West Coast 
  Electricity Water 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 31,721.90 R 181,824.00 R 88,504.70 R 0.00 
1998 R 211,959.80 R 1,449,776.00 R 84,079.46 R 11,446,588.00 
1999 R 1,813,802.52 R 200,000.00 R 11,522,469.72 R 5,200,214.16 
2000 R 3,296,492.30 R 864,417.00 R 25,953,550.23 R 3,229,122.00 
2001 R 5,203,744.77 R 3,333.00 R 39,639,200.00 R 1,452,466.00 
2002 R 6,422,686.14 R 6,422,686.14 R 49,699,400.90 R 1,665,044.00 
2003 R 7,021,585.75 R 0.00 R 56,274,646.96 R 473,827.00 
2004 R 7,088,740.39 R 0.00 R 58,526,481.16 R 2,722,101.30 
2005 R 6,778,855.14 R 922,845.44 R 59,816,171.23 R 3,606,163.11 
2006 R 7,167,452.82 R 0.00 R 61,244,352.17 R 2,528,144.75 
2007 R 7,041,747.97   R 61,565,384.01   
 Roads and Transport Sanitation 
Year 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
Capital Stock 
Estimate Capital Spending 
1997 R 29,750.74 R 0.00 R 120,421.47 R 50,000.00 
1998 R 28,263.20 R 400,000.00 R 164,400.39 R 6,607,291.32 
1999 R 425,507.54 R 1,519,999.55 R 6,803,162.68 R 6,508,633.49 
2000 R 2,264,819.08 R 672,000.00 R 18,663,546.84 R 5,427,274.75 
2001 R 4,321,708.87 R 702,465.80 R 32,818,001.28 R 5,052,792.52 
2002 R 6,399,671.33 R 1,441,075.00 R 47,182,340.76 R 2,124,553.00 
2003 R 9,048,256.12 R 4,815,236.00 R 57,506,886.19 R 2,009,036.00 
2004 R 15,260,684.86 R 3,402,752.84 R 63,850,593.02 R 4,889,242.26 
2005 R 22,021,855.61 R 3,314,770.76 R 69,755,850.35 R 4,678,827.80 
2006 R 28,496,757.46 R 1,405,304.26 R 74,668,670.58 R 6,270,042.22 
2007 R 32,353,986.76   R 80,146,766.22   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
